

ANTI-PALESTINIAN RACISM

NAKBA DENIAL

Denying Palestinian history or rejecting the rights of Palestinian refugees

DEHUMANIZATION

erasing the human rights and equal dignity of Palestinians

FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE

Palestinians as an Indigenous people with a collective Palestinian identity, belonging, and rights

EXCLUDING

or pressuring others to exclude Palestinians or divisions of solidarity with Palestinians

VIOLENCE

or justification of violence against Palestinians

DENYING,

DISTORTING, OR SILENCING Palestinian narratives

The Construction and Deployment of “Anti-Palestinian Racism”

From Origin to Weaponisation

WHAT IS IT?

A form of racism that silences, excludes, erases, stereotypes, dehumanizes or defames Palestinians or Palestinian narratives. Anti-Palestinian racism is distinct from Islamophobia.

WHO IS AFFECTED?

Palestinians, those perceived to be Palestinian, and non-Palestinians who support Palestinian rights, of multiple religious, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. Since many people who experience anti-Palestinian racism (APR) are not Muslim, addressing APR under Islamophobia excludes a significant number of those impacted, noting that all forms of anti-racist efforts can co-exist.

WHERE DOES IT OCCUR?

Anti-Palestinian racism is rooted in the systemic oppression Palestinians experience as a colonized people under Israeli rule, but it occurs globally, especially in countries that support the Israeli government to advance their own imperial interests.

WHAT ARE ITS EFFECTS?

Anti-Palestinian racism can cause physical, mental, and emotional harm to both those who experience it and those who witness it. Ultimately, it functions to justify and uphold systems of oppression, whether their manifestations are implicit or overt.

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Executive Summary

While the term *anti-Palestinian racism* (APR) appeared in rare pre-2011 contexts as a critique of Israeli or Lebanese policy, its modern definition and function constitute a recent activist construct, developed within anti-Israel networks between 2011 and 2022. Its evolution shows a clear strategic purpose: to neutralise the IHRA definition of antisemitism.

Once institutionalised, APR operates not as a tool for combating discrimination, but as a framework for pathologising political disagreement and diluting antisemitism safeguards in public institutions.

1. Origins as a niche activist slogan (2011-2015)

First sustained uses appear among contributors to *Electronic Intifada* and connected circles. Initially aimed at Israel, the term shifts to target critics of anti-Israel activism.

2. Politicisation during the UK Labour antisemitism crisis (2016-2018)

As Labour adopted the IHRA definition, pro-Corbyn activists sought a counter-framework. By September 2018, an APR definition is posted in a private Facebook group. *Jewish Voice for Labour* (JVL) publishes an edited version the next day. This definition was a response to IHRA and treats denial of core political claims as “racism”.

3. Internationalisation (2018-2019)

Mondoweiss publishes an adapted version, turning it into a globalised activist template. The structure and clauses remain largely intact. APR becomes a standard BDS talking point.

4. Institutionalisation in Canada (2019-2022)

Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy invites NGOs to propose new racism frameworks. BDS-aligned groups push for recognition of APR. ACLA’s definition closely replicates earlier activist models.

5. Real-world weaponisation (2022-2025)

APR-style framing is now being deployed in real political and institutional settings, notably in the UK and the US, including a Vermont resolution by elected officials asserting a hate motive contrary to prosecutorial findings.

6. Key finding

APR is a politically engineered construct developed during the Labour antisemitism crisis to counter and dilute the IHRA definition of antisemitism.

In practice, it functions to reclassify contested political claims as racism and to deflect or neutralise allegations of antisemitism. Once institutionalised, it also imposes predetermined narratives onto real-world events irrespective of evidentiary findings.

In such settings, this has the further effect of diluting antisemitism education itself. It creates unresolved tension between opposing frameworks and reduces antisemitism to one competing claim among others, rather than a distinct and historically grounded form of hatred.

Introduction

Over the past decade, the term *anti-Palestinian racism* (APR) has been deliberately constructed, promoted, and institutionalised within activist and policy-adjacent spaces across Western democracies. What began as a polemical slogan within anti-Israel advocacy networks has evolved into a moralised framework designed not to identify discriminatory harm, but to recast political disagreement - particularly over Israel, Zionism, and Jewish self-determination - as a form of racism.

This transformation was neither organic nor accidental. On 4 May 2022, the *Arab Canadian Lawyers Association* (ACLA) formally codified and defined “anti-Palestinian racism,” converting a campaign slogan into a structured doctrine explicitly intended for use in policy, education, and institutional settings. While this codification did not originate the concept, it provided the first consolidated definition capable of being operationalised by public bodies and embedded in official training, complaints processes, and governance frameworks.

Presented as an anti-racist tool, the ACLA definition does not focus on demonstrable patterns of discrimination or exclusion. Instead, it classifies opposition to a set of contested political and historical claims - including rejection of the *Nakba* narrative and resistance to antizionist framing - as forms of racism. In doing so, it collapses ideological disagreement into moral transgression, placing specific political positions beyond debate and insulating them from scrutiny under the language of racial justice.

This report demonstrates that the ACLA definition did not emerge from established scholarship on racism, nor from empirical analysis of discriminatory harm. It is the product of a sustained activist project that developed within anti-Israel advocacy networks and evolved during the UK Labour Party antisemitism crisis as a direct counter to efforts to define and address antisemitism. It was subsequently institutionalised through favourable policy openings in Canada before circulating into a wider transnational ecosystem.

The timing and function of this institutionalisation are critical. The elevation of APR has occurred amid a marked rise in antisemitic hostility and violence across Western democracies, including shootings, terrorist attacks, synagogue arsons, and persistent harassment targeting Jewish communities. Rather than strengthening antisemitism education or clarifying safeguards, the APR framework deliberately introduces conceptual friction - antisemitism protections are recast as “political,” Jewish self-definition is treated as exclusionary, and hostility directed at Zionists is normalised or reframed as legitimate grievance.

By tracing APR’s evolution from activist rhetoric to institutional doctrine, this report shows how a politically engineered vocabulary can be used to redirect moral attention, reshape institutional responses, and reinterpret real-world events through an ideological lens. In practice, this process does not merely fail to address antisemitism at a moment of heightened vulnerability - it actively contributes to an environment in which antisemitic hostility is obscured, minimised, or rationalised under the banner of anti-racism.

Origins (2011-2015)


While the precise first use of the phrase *anti-Palestinian racism* cannot be definitively attributed to a single individual or publication, the term's modern activist usage can be traced with reasonable confidence to networks clustered around the online outlet *Electronic Intifada* in the early 2010s.

Although the phrase had appeared sporadically in earlier activist-adjacent contexts - most often in reference to Israeli government policy or to the treatment of Palestinians in Lebanon - these isolated uses bore little resemblance to the more expansive and politicised framing that began to emerge from 2011.^{1 2}

In April 2011, Hugh Sansom, a frequent letter contributor to *Electronic Intifada*, used the term “anti-Palestinian racism” in a post on Twitter.^{3 4}

The following month, Nancy Kricorian, affiliated with Code Pink, and also a contributor to *Electronic Intifada*, employed the phrase in a similar context.^{5 6}

In September 2011, Ali Abunimah, co-founder and editor of *Electronic Intifada*, used the term publicly himself:⁷



At this early stage, the expression was largely deployed in what might be described as its “classical” activist sense: as a descriptor for alleged discriminatory laws or policies attributed to the Israeli state, consistent with broader boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) narratives.^{8 9}

However, within a short period, a notable shift began to occur.

By early 2012, Abunimah’s usage had expanded beyond criticism of Israeli policy to include accusations directed at pro-Israel activists and commentators. The term began to function not

¹ Example of earlier academic use from 2009

<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/E1474947509000523>

² An earlier 2008 use from the Electronic Intifada platform

<https://electronicintifada.net/content/american-president-and-outposts-zion/7287>

³ <https://x.com/hughsansom/status/59596890550976512>

⁴ <https://electronicintifada.net/people/hugh-sansom>

⁵ <https://x.com/nancykric/status/68260690317676544>

⁶ <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-barrows-friedman/electronic-intifada-weekly-podcast-nancy-kricorian-bds-campaigns-against>

⁷ <https://x.com/AliAbunimah/status/116296099035217920>

⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/24/middleeast-palestinian-territories>

⁹ <https://liberationnews.org/07-12-26-israeli-report-highlights-intens.html>

merely as a critique of state action. It also operated as a rhetorical device aimed at delegitimising political opponents and constraining debate:^{10 11}



Within months, similar usage appeared in leading British anti-Israel activist circles. Diane Langford, another contributor to *Electronic Intifada*, adopted comparable framing, indicating that the terminology was circulating within a transnational activist milieu rather than arising independently in discrete national contexts:^{12 13 14}



¹⁰ <https://x.com/AliAbunimah/status/116297217022754817>


¹¹ <https://x.com/AliAbunimah/status/153940258201944065>

¹² <https://x.com/dianelangford/status/197685871779123201>

¹³ <https://x.com/GarySpedding/status/203607937934036994>

¹⁴ <https://electronicintifada.net/people/diane-langford>


By August 2012, Abunimah was also using platforms associated with the Palestinian Policy Network (Al-Shabaka) to level accusations of *anti-Palestinian racism* against U.S. politicians, further extending the term's application from policy critique to personal and political denunciation:¹⁵



Between 2013 and 2015, accusations of *anti-Palestinian racism* appeared with increasing frequency across this network, including among figures such as Asa Winstanley, Max Blumenthal, and organisations such as the Irish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign. By this stage, the term had become a familiar component of activist rhetoric within these networks.^{16 17 18}

Significantly, this period also saw the early emergence of attempts to frame *anti-Palestinian racism* as a conceptual analogue to antisemitism, with comparisons drawn between the Nakba and the Holocaust, and between alleged “Nakba denial” and Holocaust denial.

These rhetorical parallels would later be formalised within institutional definitions, including the ACLA framework, mirroring the treatment of Holocaust denial within the IHRA definition of antisemitism.¹⁹



The Palestine Live / JVL definition

It is in direct opposition to the IHRA definition of antisemitism among pro-Palestinian activists, that the first concrete definitions of *anti-Palestinian racism* begin to appear online.^{20 21 22}

¹⁵ <https://x.com/AlShabaka/status/232634915487879168>

¹⁶ <https://x.com/ipsc48/status/281491461457973248>

¹⁷ <https://x.com/AsaWinstanley/status/336472766398210048>

¹⁸ <https://x.com/MaxBlumenthal/status/382293234615345152>

¹⁹ <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>


²⁰ <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

²¹ <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-governments-adoption-of-the-ihra-definition-of-antisemitism/>

²² <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/investigation-into-antisemitism-in-the-labour-party.pdf>

By mid-2018, the antisemitism crisis had engulfed the Labour Party, and on 4 September 2018 - after several months of internal dispute, the Labour NEC voted to adopt IHRA in full, including all its examples.^{23 24}

There was an immediate reaction from key pro-Palestinian activist circles in the UK. Just one day after the NEC vote, veteran anti-Israel activist Peter Cohen posted a comment accusing the Labour Party of “anti-Palestinian racism”.^{25 26 27} The timing of the post, and the explicit focus on the NEC in the response, leaves little doubt as to the direct connection with the adoption of the IHRA definition.



Cohen had been one of five original members of a 2013 pro-Palestine discussion group, alongside Elleanne Green, which later evolved into a “secret” Facebook group known as *Palestine Live*.²⁸ Between 2015 and 2018, *Palestine Live* emerged as a prominent pro-Jeremy Corbyn support forum and was subsequently identified as a space in which antisemitic rhetoric, Holocaust denial, and conspiracy theories were commonplace.²⁹

Jeremy Corbyn himself had been an active member of the group prior to becoming Labour leader, and the publication of a report in March 2018 detailing the nature of the discourse within

²³ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/01/timeline-labour-jeremy-corbyn-antisemitism>

²⁴ <https://labourlist.org/2018/09/nec-adopts-full-ihra-antisemitism-definition-plus-statement/>

²⁵ https://wearenotnumbers.org/member/peter_cohen/

²⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/peter.cohen.739>

²⁷ <https://archive.ph/zK6Zn>

²⁸ https://david-collier.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180305_livereport_part1_FINAL.pdf

²⁹ <https://david-collier.com/exclusive-corbyn-antisemitism/>


Palestine Live prompted disciplinary action by the Labour Party against some of its members.³⁰

³¹ ³²

Following this exposure, Green reconfigured the group, after which Cohen rejoined. At the time he published his September 2018 post accusing the Labour Party of *anti-Palestinian racism*, he was once again serving as an administrator within *Palestine Live*.

Later the same month, on 28 September 2018, an anonymously authored definition of *anti-Palestinian racism*, consisting of thirteen clauses, was posted within the *Palestine Live* group:³³

³⁴



The following day, on 29 September 2018, *Jewish Voice for Labour* (JVL), published a version of this definition on its own website, reproducing eleven of the original thirteen clauses.³⁵

JVL was a small group of antizionist activists claiming Jewish heritage, established to defend Jeremy Corbyn against allegations of antisemitism. Providing political and rhetorical cover for those facing such accusations was central to its purpose.³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ ³⁹ ⁴⁰

The Labour Party's formal adoption of the IHRA definition, including its examples, represented a significant setback for JVL. The publication of an alternative framework - presented as a definition of racism - functioned as a direct counter to that adoption.

The JVL definition was clearly written by activists, for activists, and in response to the adoption of IHRA by the Labour Party:

³⁰ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43320296>

³¹ https://david-collier.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180305_livereport_part1_FINAL.pdf

³² https://david-collier.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180305_livereport_part2_FINAL.pdf

³³ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/578281488880847/posts/2288843764491269/> (this is a private post)

³⁴ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43320296>

³⁵ <https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/anti-palestinian-racism/>

³⁶ <https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/app/uploads/2021/10/Labour-Party-fringe-more-or-less-as-delivered.pdf>

³⁷ <https://antisemitism.org/jewish-voice-for-labour-official-previously-accused-of-denying-antisemitism-is-invited-chair-party-disciplinary-panel-on-antisemitism>

³⁸ <https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/a-jvl-statement-on-the-current-attacks-on-jeremy-corbyn/>

³⁹ <https://david-collier.com/conference-jvl-antisemitism/>

⁴⁰ <https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/jewish-voice-for-labour-offer-new-anti-semitism-definition/>

JVL Definition

Anti-Palestinian Racism is hatred towards or prejudice against Palestinians as Palestinians.

Manifestations of Anti-Palestinian Racism might include the denial of Palestinian rights to a state of Palestine as recognised by over 130 member countries of the United Nations.

It frequently charges Palestinians with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Palestinians for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and may employ sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of anti-Palestinian racism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

1. Denying the Palestinian people their right to self-determination and nationhood or actively conspiring to prevent the exercise of this right.
2. **Denial that Israel is in breach of international law** in its continued occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
3. **Denial that Israel is an apartheid state** according to the definition of the International Convention on Apartheid.
4. **Denial of the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians during the 1948 Nakba** and of their right, and the right of their descendants, to return to their homeland.
5. Denial that Palestinians have lived in what is now the land of Israel for hundreds of years and **have their own distinctive national identity and culture.**
6. **Denial that the laws and policies which discriminate against Palestinian citizens of Israel (such as the recently passed Nation State Law) are inherently racist.**
7. **Denial that there is widespread discrimination against Palestinians in Israel** and the Occupied Territories in matters of employment, housing, justice, education, water supply, etc, etc.
8. Tolerating the killing or harming of Palestinians by violent settlers in the name of an extremist view of religion.
9. Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Palestinians - **such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth of a Palestinian conspiracy to wipe Israel off the map.**
10. Justifying the collective punishment of Palestinians (prohibited under the Geneva Convention) in response to the acts of individuals or groups.
11. Accusing the Palestinians as a people, of encouraging the Holocaust.

Textual Lineage: JVL and ACLA

Although the 2022 ACLA definition will be examined formally later in this report, it is necessary at this stage to demonstrate ideological continuity and textual lineage by briefly comparing it with the earlier JVL definition.

Both frameworks:

- Treat denial of Palestinian experience under “occupation” as racism
- Treat denial of systematic discrimination or “apartheid” as racism
- Include defamation and dehumanisation of Palestinians as racism
- Treat denial of Palestinian nationhood as racism
- Include denial of the Nakba as racism
- Include denial of indigeneity as racism
- Treat justification of collective punishment as racism

Taken together, approximately nine of the eleven JVL examples reappear in some form within the 2022 ACLA framework - five almost verbatim, the remainder paraphrased or expanded.

The Canadian definition removes overtly polemical language and repackages the content within the institutional idiom of “structural racism” and diversity policy.

On 2 October 2018, a Dutch anti-Israel activist, Jaap Bosma, commented beneath the JVL definition, criticising its cautious phrasing and arguing that it too closely resembled the IHRA definition it was intended to counter: ⁴¹ ⁴²

“That looks too much like the IHRA-definition of anti-Semitism, which is geared at framing as much legitimate criticism of Israel as possible as anti-Semitism.

A definition of anti-Palestinian racism should have examples that are undisputable examples of racism, not depending on the context. And that is possible, because Zionism is deeply racist.”

⁴¹ <https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/anti-palestinian-racism/>

⁴² <https://www.eupublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hls.2010.0105>

Mondoweiss

A few weeks after the JVL definition appeared, on 16 October 2018, the US-based antizionist outlet Mondoweiss published an article titled *Towards a definition of anti-Palestinian racism* penned by the same Jaap C. Bosma who had posted criticism of the JVL definition.^{43 44 45}

Bosma removed the definition from its immediate UK-based Corbyn-era context, revised elements he regarded as imprecise, and re-presented it in a form intended for broader international application.

In doing so, the definition was adapted to align more closely with the priorities and rhetoric of the global BDS movement.

The internal structure of the definition remained largely intact. The core sequence - self-determination; occupation/apartheid; Nakba; identity; discrimination; dehumanisation; collective punishment - was preserved with only minor reordering and stylistic refinement.

Bosma's version streamlined the JVL text by removing repetition and introduced one additional clause, addressing what he described as "false accusations of antisemitism" directed at Palestinians or their advocates. When compared with the 2022 ACLA definition, the continuity is clear. All ten of Bosma's clauses reappear in some form within the Canadian framework, reworked into the language of legal and policy discourse appropriate to an institutional setting.

Bosma's engagement with the concept of *anti-Palestinian racism* was not confined to definitional work. He was also an active participant in debates surrounding antisemitism in the UK Labour Party during the Corbyn period. When Professor David Hirsh published a critical response to the Chakrabarti Inquiry in 2016, Bosma responded with a personal attack that framed allegations of antisemitism as bad-faith political manoeuvring:⁴⁶

"Obviously, Mr. Hirsh tries to exploit the accusation of antisemitism to whitewash Israeli colonisation-crimes. I'm glad the Chakrabarti-inquiry didn't buy his Zionist-self-justifying-nonsense."

This intervention is indicative of the broader context in which APR definitions were being developed. Rather than emerging from sustained engagement with anti-racist scholarship or empirical study of discrimination, the language and framing associated with APR were being shaped within activist disputes over antisemitism allegations and their perceived misuse.

In this sense, APR functioned less as an analytical framework and more as a counter-discursive response to criticisms that its proponents regarded as politically motivated or unjust.

⁴³ <https://archive.ph/GbWsD>

⁴⁴ <https://mondoweiss.net/2018/10/towards-definition-palestinian/>

⁴⁵ <https://x.com/twinjenin/status/1052937949749436416>

⁴⁶ <https://engageonline.wordpress.com/2016/06/30/preliminary-response-to-the-chakrabarti-inquiry-into-antisemitism-in-the-labour-party-david-hirsh>

Whether explicitly acknowledged or not, the ACLA definition draws heavily on this pre-existing activist lineage.

| Bosma definition: | | ACLA definition: |
|--|--|--|
| Denying the Palestinian right of self-determination in historic Palestine | | An Indigenous people with a collective identity, belonging and rights in relation to occupied and historic Palestine |
| Denying Palestinian refugees of the 1948 Nakba their “right of return” | | Belonging and rights in relation to occupied and historic Palestine |
| Subjecting Palestinians to oppressive military law, denying them basic human and civil rights, | | Erasing the human rights and equal dignity and worth of Palestinians |
| Denying a (possible, future) Palestinian state equal rights and equal sovereignty | | Belonging and rights in relation to occupied and historic Palestine |
| Denying Palestinian citizens equal rights to other citizens of the same state, | | Erasing the human rights and equal dignity and worth of Palestinians |
| Imposing an apartheid regime on the Palestinian people | | Dehumanizes Palestinians |
| Demonizing or dehumanizing Palestinians by making hostile generalizations | | Stereotypes, defames or dehumanizes Palestinians or their narratives |
| Denying the existence of the Palestinian people | | Failing to acknowledge Palestinians as an Indigenous people with a collective identity |
| Denying the large-scale ethnic cleansing of Palestinians | | Denying the Nakba |
| False anti-Palestinian accusations of anti-Semitism | | Defaming Palestinians and their allies with slander such as being inherently antisemitic |

These definitions, circulated through prominent activist outlets, reframed the term as a response to allegations of antisemitism and were rapidly adopted within pro-Palestinian

activism, including BDS-aligned campaigning, where they were used to characterise and challenge pro-Israel individuals and organisations:^{47 48 49 50 51 52}

-  **Electronic Intifada**  @intifada · Aug 20, 2019  ...
Palestinians are calling for a boycott of three **German** clubs for their **anti-Palestinian racism**
bit.ly/31OVXuL
-  **Dimitri Lascaris**  @dimitrilascaris · Dec 2, 2018  ...
Yesterday, at a conference in Montreal on Palestinian self-determination, I explained why I believe that **anti-Palestinian racism** is rampant in [#Canada](#)'s halls of power.
-  **Lamis Deek** **لميس ديك**  @Lamis_Deek · Dec 17, 2019  ...
The Jewish Chronicle published vile **anti-Palestinian racism** by journalist who also supports claim that anti-Muslim racism is a fabrication...color me and all the other Palestinians and allies here shocked
-  **BDS Vancouver/Canada Palestine As...** @bds_van... · Oct 15, 2019  ...
B'nai Brith is one of the leading lobby groups in Canada that promotes **anti-Palestinian racism** and is an apologist for Israeli occupation and war crimes. We expect this candidate to reflect the [@NDP](#) answers to the [#IVotePalestine](#) questionnaire. Or was it just electioneering?
-  **Jonathan Cook**  @Jonathan_K_Cook · Sep 20, 2019  ...
Yes, it really is time to start calling out the unacknowledged – and presumably largely unconscious – **anti-Palestinian racism** of senior journalists like Matt Seaton. It's endemic in western corporate media culture
-  **Jewish Voice for Peace**  @jvplive · Aug 13, 2019  ...
[.@jaketapper](#)'s anti-Arab, **anti-Palestinian racism** has no place on a national platform. JVP and [@MPower_Change](#) call on [@CNN](#) to [#CancelTapper](#)

⁴⁷ <https://x.com/intifada/status/1163817564582973445>

⁴⁸ <https://x.com/dimitrilascaris/status/1069326173430312960>

⁴⁹ https://x.com/Lamis_Deek/status/1206902780738314240


⁵⁰ https://x.com/bds_vancouver/status/1184184719681835008

⁵¹ https://x.com/Jonathan_K_Cook/status/1174829750109556739

⁵² <https://x.com/jvplive/status/1161312654440329217>

In just seven years, the phrase “anti-Palestinian racism” evolved from a niche activist slogan primarily used to describe Israeli policy into a widely adopted term within BDS-aligned activism, increasingly employed in debates surrounding antisemitism allegations, Israel advocacy, and internal movement discipline.

The impact of the introduction and circulation of formalised definitions can be observed in usage patterns on the Twitter platform (now X). The graph below illustrates a marked increase in the frequency of the term following key moments in its activist codification, reflecting its wider uptake within pro-Palestinian activist networks across multiple countries.



By the late 2010s, the activist lexicon that had taken shape across the UK and US began to intersect with policy openings abroad - most notably in Canada.

Canada

Just as the term *anti-Palestinian racism* was becoming established within BDS-aligned activist discourse, Canada introduced *Building a Foundation for Change: Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy 2019-2022*, officially launched on 25 June 2019.^{53 54}

The strategy explicitly committed the federal government to identifying systemic barriers and supporting the development of new approaches to addressing racism and discrimination.

As set out on page 7 of the strategy, the Anti-Racism Secretariat was tasked with “coordinating federal action, identifying and responding to systemic barriers, and helping to develop new approaches to address racism and discrimination.” Pages 18-19 further state that Canada would “provide funding to community-based projects aimed at building capacity, developing new knowledge, and addressing barriers to inclusion for racialised communities, religious minorities, and Indigenous peoples.”

In practical terms, this policy framework created a pathway for non-governmental organisations to propose new conceptualisations of racism and, potentially, to receive public funding to develop and disseminate them.

This policy environment would have been perceived within pro-Palestinian activist networks as an opportunity to advance the emerging framing, and available evidence indicates that Canada increasingly became a focal point for sustained and mutually reinforcing use of the term *anti-Palestinian racism*.

The pattern begins in November 2019, when *Electronic Intifada* - the outlet that had played a central role in introducing the term, published an article asserting that *anti-Palestinian racism* in Canada is an “unquestioned norm.”⁵⁵

On 16 December 2019, BDS Vancouver circulated a statement from the Canada Palestine Association alleging that “anti-Palestinian racism is rampant” in the aftermath of a York University student protest.^{56 57} On 10 February 2020, following public remarks by a Canadian government minister condemning the BDS movement,⁵⁸ Hanna Kawas, then chair of the Canada Palestine Association characterised the statement as an example of *anti-Palestinian racism*.⁵⁹

⁵³ https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/pch/CH37-4-29-2019-eng.pdf

⁵⁴ The URL contains the date 29-4-2019 although the official launch appears to be June 25
<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2019/06/minister-rodriquez-announces-building-a-foundation-for-change-canadas-anti-racism-strategy-20192022.html>

⁵⁵ <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-barrows-friedman/jdl-canada-thugs-attack-york-students-then-cry-anti-semitism>

⁵⁶ <https://cpavancouver.org/2019/12/anti-palestinian-racism-rampant-in-aftermath-of-york-student-protest/>

⁵⁷ https://x.com/bds_vancouver/status/1206651998646333445

⁵⁸ <https://x.com/dimitrilascaris/status/1225983779254218752>

⁵⁹ <https://x.com/HannaKawas/status/1226939737572667393>

Between late 2019 and the launch of the ACLA definition in May 2022, the volume of such claims increased markedly. Dozens of further examples were identified during this period and are documented in Appendix A.⁶⁰

The sequence culminates on 30 April 2022, when Samidoun accused B’nai Brith Canada of “anti-Palestinian racism” after it called for the deportation of Khaled Barakat, a senior figure within the international PFLP network - just days before the formal publication of the ACLA definition on 4 May 2022.^{61 62}

The ACLA report

The Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA), established in 2004, had previously focused on immigration, national security, and anti-Arab racism. Its first use of the term *anti-Palestinian racism* occurs in September 2020 - during the fallout from the Toronto / Valentina Azarova affair.⁶³

From 2020 onwards, ACLA increasingly operated within coalitions that included Independent Jewish Voices Canada (IJV) and Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), both of which had been active in opposing the IHRA definition of antisemitism and in promoting BDS-aligned advocacy. Notably, some founding figures associated with IJV Canada, including Sid Shniad, had previously been members of the secret Facebook group *Palestine Live*, in which an early activist definition of *anti-Palestinian racism* had circulated.⁶⁴



Sid Shniad

★ Rising contributor

Added by Elleanne Green on 15 July 2014

Between 2020 and 2022, actors operating within the broader BDS-aligned media and advocacy ecosystem - including *Electronic Intifada*, *Mondoweiss*, *Samidoun*, IJV Canada, and CJPME - began increasingly framing Canadian foreign policy, public institutions, and civil society debates through the lens of *anti-Palestinian racism*.

Acknowledgements and Ideological Context

In the acknowledgements section, the ACLA report gives special thanks to several key figures:

- Jerry Jareer Khouri, Toronto-based lawyer and activist.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ See Appendix A

⁶¹ <https://x.com/SamidounPP/status/1520183322265088000>

⁶² The ACLA definition is reproduced in appendix B

⁶³ <https://x.com/CanArabLaw/status/1307019939119853573>

⁶⁴ <https://www.sfu.ca/humanities-institute/about/profiles/s-shniad.html>

⁶⁵ <https://x.com/jerryjkhouri>

- Ardi Imseis, former UN legal advisor.⁶⁶
- Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Professor of Political Science, University of Alberta.⁶⁷
- Abigail B. Bakan, specialist in critical race theory.
- Chandni Desai, Assistant Professor at University of Toronto.⁶⁸
- Azeezah Kanji, legal scholar and columnist, Noor Cultural Centre.⁶⁹
- Anver Emon, Professor of Law and History at the University of Toronto.⁷⁰

Several of these figures, most notably Ardi Imseis, Yasmeen Abu-Laban, and Abigail Bakan, have been publicly associated with advocacy in support of the BDS movement for over a decade.^{71 72}

Palestinian resistance and international solidarity: the BDS campaign

ABIGAIL B. BAKAN and YASMEEN ABU-LABAN

Imseis is also a member of *The Global Network on the Question of Palestine*, a transnational coalition of academics, activists, and policy figures engaged in shaping discourse on the Palestinian issue.⁷³

Other contributors listed in the acknowledgements - Kanji, Desai, and Emon, have likewise publicly expressed support for BDS initiatives.^{74 75 76}

Of the seven individuals named, six (Khouri, Imseis, Abu-Laban, Bakan, Desai, and Kanji) were signatories to a 2020 petition opposing the IHRA definition of antisemitism, shortly before their involvement in the development or promotion of *anti-Palestinian racism* as a conceptual framework.⁷⁷

⁶⁶ <https://x.com/ArdiImseis/>

⁶⁷ <https://x.com/yasmeenabulaban/>

⁶⁸ <https://x.com/4cdesai>

⁶⁹ <https://x.com/AzeezahKanji>

⁷⁰ <https://x.com/AnverEmon/>

⁷¹ 2009 Editor in chief of Yearbook - Ardi Imseis <https://www.bdsmovement.net/news/call-papers-bds-means-enforcing-international-law-palestine>

⁷² 2011 Abigail Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban co-authored article promoting the BDS campaign <https://www.usacbi.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/bakan-bds1.pdf>

⁷³ https://ardd-jo.org/networks_and_coaliti/the-global-network-on-the-question-of-palestine/

⁷⁴ <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/11/12/bds-in-the-crosshairs-of-human-rights-colonialism>

⁷⁵ <https://x.com/4cdesai/status/1497569693334482952>

⁷⁶ <https://web.archive.org/web/20211218161933/https://twitter.com/AnverEmon/status/1472240041992798214>

⁷⁷ <https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/palestine-speech-suppression-a-statement/>

Networks and Coordination

Evidence of ACLA's integration within wider pro-Palestinian advocacy networks during this period is substantial.⁷⁸ On 7 October 2020, ACLA partnered with Independent Jewish Voices Canada and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in complaints filed in relation to the University of Toronto hiring controversy. In 2021, CJPME co-sponsored a Canada-wide survey with the ACLA.^{79 80 81}

Further illustration of these connections can be found in an open letter published by *Al Jazeera* on 1 October 2020, co-authored by ACLA President Dania Majid.

The letter explicitly opposed the IHRA definition of antisemitism, referenced anti-IHRA campaigns during the UK Labour Party crisis, and expressed support for the BDS movement. It was signed by over one thousand academics, lawyers, and activists.^{82 83}

Signatories included prominent figures associated with *Al-Shabaka* such as Noura Erakat and Diana Buttu, alongside internationally recognised BDS advocates including Judith Butler and John Dugard. The list also featured UK- and Ireland-based anti-IHRA voices, among them Neve Gordon, Laleh Khalili, Nur Masalha, Ghada Karmi, Avi Shlaim, Ronit Lentin, and Ilan Pappé.

Jonathan Rosenhead, a founding figure of Jewish Voice for Labour who had published the original 2018 activist definition of *anti-Palestinian racism*, was also among the signatories.^{84 85 86}

⁸⁷

Taken together, these overlaps indicate that from an early stage, ACLA's leadership was engaged with many of the same networks and individuals that had been promoting *anti-Palestinian racism* within activist discourse since at least 2012.

Government Funding

Following publication of the ACLA definition, the organisation received Canadian government funding to translate the report into French, followed by a further grant of approximately CAN\$100,000 under a federal multicultural and anti-racism programme to develop educational resources and training materials focused on “inclusive practices.”^{88 89}

⁷⁸ <https://elsc.support/resource/statement-by-j-dugard-on-the-legitimacy-of-the-right-to-boycott/>

⁷⁹ <https://www.ijvcanda.org/rights-groups-file-complaint-against-sitting-judge-accused-of-meddling-in-uoft-hiring-cite-anti-palestinian-racism>

⁸⁰ <https://elsc.support/resource/statement-by-j-dugard-on-the-legitimacy-of-the-right-to-boycott/>

⁸¹ <https://www.cjpme.org/survey2021>

⁸² <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/10/1/repression-of-speech-and-scholarship-on-palestine-needs-to-end>

⁸³ <https://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/2018/07/17/first-ever-40-jewish-groups-worldwide-oppose-equating-antisemitism-with-criticism-of-israel/#english>

⁸⁴ <https://al-shabaka.org/authors/noura-erakat/>

⁸⁵ <https://al-shabaka.org/authors/diana-buttu/>

⁸⁶ <https://www.thejc.com/news/world/outrage-as-influential-feminist-academic-judith-butler-calls-october-7-murder-and-rape-resistance-f15cx658>

⁸⁷ <https://elsc.support/resource/statement-by-j-dugard-on-the-legitimacy-of-the-right-to-boycott/>

⁸⁸ <https://search.open.canada.ca/grants/record/pch%2C016-2023-2024-Q3-1361738%2Ccurrent>

⁸⁹ <https://search.open.canada.ca/grants/record/pch%2C016-2024-2025-Q4-1371509%2Ccurrent>

As a result, a framework that originated within activist contexts and was developed in direct opposition to the IHRA definition of antisemitism has been incorporated into government-funded institutional settings, including education and training environments.

Assessment

Viewed in its entirety, the Canadian case illustrates how *anti-Palestinian racism* moved from activist discourse into formal institutional recognition. The timing of the University of Toronto controversy, coinciding with the growing circulation of the term within pro-Palestinian networks, provided a focal point through which the framework could be advanced.

Canada thus became the jurisdiction in which *anti-Palestinian racism* was transformed from a campaign slogan into a government-recognised, quasi-legal definition - one that has since been cited internationally as a model for adoption elsewhere.

The trajectory of APR in Canada exemplifies a broader trend within contemporary activism: the repurposing of academic and human-rights language to advance political narratives across borders. Tracing this evolution demonstrates how domestic policy environments can be leveraged to facilitate coordinated transnational uptake.

Independent Academic Assessment

This analysis is not isolated. A review published in *the International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* reached similar conclusions regarding the conceptual status of *anti-Palestinian racism*.⁹⁰ The journal characterised APR as a form of political advocacy rather than a legal or analytical framework for addressing racism and questioned the necessity of formulating a distinct APR definition.

The review further argued that, in practice, prevailing formulations of APR function to reframe Jewish identity and expressions of Jewish self-determination as inherently racist, rather than to identify or remedy demonstrable patterns of discrimination. As such, it concluded that APR operates less as a tool for combating racism than as a mechanism for advancing contested political claims within the language of anti-racism.

⁹⁰ <https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/aop/article-10.1163-15718115-bja10228/article-10.1163-15718115-bja10228.xml>

Real-World Weaponisation

Frameworks such as *anti-Palestinian racism* do not operate solely at the level of theory. Once articulated, they remain available for activation when political or institutional conditions permit. In the Canadian context, this transition from concept to implementation has already been illustrated by the CAN\$100,000 government grant awarded to the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) to develop educational resources and training materials based on the framework.⁹¹

Beyond Canada, the subsequent appearance of organisations presenting themselves as specialist bodies focused on *anti-Palestinian racism* indicates an expansion of the framework beyond its original institutional setting. Such organisations allow activist groups in other jurisdictions to reference the Canadian definition indirectly, while citing ostensibly independent entities as sources of expertise and authority.

One such example is the US-based *Institute for the Understanding of Anti-Palestinian Racism* (IUAPR), a registered 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit organisation. IUAPR describes itself as comprising “researchers, physicians, psychologists, and legal, anti-racist and communication experts.”⁹²

IUAPR’s public footprint is recent. Its first Instagram post dates to 5 January 2024, while its website domain was registered on 10 January 2024.^{93 94} Information drawn from LinkedIn biographies suggests that the group was established in or around November 2023.⁹⁵ Available US financial disclosures indicate reported revenue of approximately \$84,500 for 2024, with expenses of around \$13,400.⁹⁶

The organisation’s publicly named co-founders are Jess Ghannam, a Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, and Dr Lama Rimawi, a US-based paediatrician. Available information indicates that many individuals associated with the group are medical professionals rather than specialists in anti-racism research or discrimination studies.^{97 98}

IUAPR has produced a guidance document intended for K-12 educational institutions.⁹⁹ The document cites a 2025 report by the *Council on American Islamic Relations* (CAIR).^{100 101 102}

⁹¹ <https://search.open.canada.ca/grants/record/pch,016-2024-2025-Q4-1371509,current>

⁹² <https://antipalestinianracism.org/>

⁹³ <https://www.instagram.com/antipalestinianracism/>

⁹⁴ https://uk.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?itc=dlp_domain_whois&domain=https%3A%2F%2Fantipalestinianracism.org

⁹⁵ <https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-lama-rimawi-11179714/>

⁹⁶ <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/993032347>

⁹⁷ <https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1655939>

⁹⁸ <https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-lama-rimawi-11179714/>

⁹⁹ <https://antipalestinianracism.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/IUAPR-K-12-Policy-Paper-Final.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ <https://islamophobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Unhostile-Campus-1.pdf>

¹⁰¹ On CAIR <https://www.hstoday.us/featured/cair-and-muslim-brotherhood-terrorists-or-not-experts-weigh-in-on-why-or-why-not-the-groups-should-be-designated-terrorist-organizations/>

¹⁰² On CAIR <https://www.jns.org/cair-the-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing-threatening-american-values/>

CAIR has also contributed to the spread of APR-based framing through the filing of Title VI complaints against schools, alleging *anti-Palestinian racism*.^{103 104} A Title VI complaint is a civil-rights allegation made against a federally funded educational institution and triggers investigation by the US Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, thereby conferring procedural and institutional weight on the claim regardless of its ultimate outcome.^{105 106}

Within the IUAPR K-12 guidance, examples of alleged *anti-Palestinian racism* are paired with proposed classroom "solutions." These include the introduction of teaching materials centred on "Palestine," associated symbols, and maps. Such materials risk introducing contested or historically inaccurate narratives into the classroom, while simultaneously framing resistance to their adoption as evidence of racial prejudice.

The guidance document provides further evidence of the operationalisation of APR in educational settings. One example explicitly criticises the IHRA definition of antisemitism and opposes restrictions on chants such as "from the river to the sea," advocating classroom environments structured around "difficult conversations". The internal logic of this position is contradictory: expansive tolerance is promoted for rhetoric widely regarded as eliminationist, while dissent from activist historical narratives is treated as impermissible.

The effect of this approach is to introduce unresolved tensions into antisemitism education. Rather than addressing antisemitism as a distinct and historically grounded form of hatred, it becomes reframed as one claim among competing identity-based grievances, or as an obstacle to be managed. This risks diluting antisemitism education, redirecting attention away from it, or recasting it in adversarial terms.

Taken together, these developments illustrate how *anti-Palestinian racism* moves from activist discourse into operational use: through educational guidance, institutional complaints mechanisms, and policy-adjacent organisations. The consequences are not theoretical, but practical - shaping classroom content, institutional responses, and the framing of antisemitism itself.

Methodological Drift and Institutional Legitimation

A further feature of this ecosystem is the limited scrutiny applied to research outputs produced within activist-aligned environments. Reports and surveys associated with advocacy organisations are frequently circulated and cited on the basis of headline findings, while underlying methodology and analytical assumptions receive little examination. Within such contexts, numerical claims - such as assertions that a specified percentage of respondents

¹⁰³ https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-sfba-partners-file-new-title-vi-complaint-against-santa-clara-unified-school-district/

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/policy/gen/leg/foia/ca-berkeleyunifiedsd-2-compandnotlet.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/TitleVI>

¹⁰⁶ <https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/opinion/377642/the-campaign-to-get-anti-palestinian-racism-into-k-12-has-begun/>

hold a particular belief - often acquire rhetorical authority regardless of whether the data supports the conclusions being drawn.

This dynamic is reinforced by the increasing overlap between academic institutions and activist networks. As advocacy-driven frameworks become embedded within university settings, events, panels, and publications may be afforded institutional legitimacy even when they fall short of established scholarly standards. The result is not merely the circulation of contested claims, but their normalisation within spaces traditionally associated with academic rigour.

IUAPR provides an illustrative example through its first published report, *Systemic Anti-Palestinian Racism Against US Healthcare Providers*. The report was promoted as documenting “widespread discrimination,” with claims that approximately 80 per cent of healthcare providers reported witnessing *anti-Palestinian racism*, either directly or online.^{107 108}

However, subsequent independent analysis of the study characterised it as “a dangerous study that seems to flout the most basic tenets of academic research.” Among the issues identified were a small sample size, the fact that most participants were neither Palestinian nor healthcare workers, and the framing of clearly skewed results as representative of the broader American public.¹⁰⁹

Despite these methodological concerns, the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) publicly associated itself with the IUAPR research, lending it institutional visibility and credibility.

Educational institutions are not the only settings in which the framework has been promoted. IUAPR-affiliated events have also been hosted by church groups, and the organisation has increasingly appeared within professional disciplinary spaces.¹¹⁰ In 2025, IUAPR helped lead a workshop at the American Psychological Association Convention, which listed as a learning objective that participants should identify at least two actions they could take as psychologists to “resist anti-Palestinian racism.” Such framing encourages the adoption of the concept across multiple professional domains, further embedding it within institutional practice.¹¹¹

2025 - into the Houses of Parliament

By 2025, the term “anti-Palestinian racism” had begun to surface formally within both Houses of Parliament.

On 4 February 2025, Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick submitted a written question in the House of Lords invoking the term:¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ <https://antipalestinianracism.org/pr-study-documents-systemic-anti-palestinian-racism-against-us-healthcare-providers/>

¹⁰⁸ <https://x.com/AliceRothchild/status/1905364219131826578>

¹⁰⁹ <https://standwithus.com/news/uc-san-fran-champions-dangerous-anti-palestinian-racism-study-2/>

¹¹⁰ <https://uucmp.org/events/introductory-workshop-recognizing-anti-palestinian-racism-and-creating-an-environment-of-understanding/>

¹¹¹ <https://www.xcdsystem.com/apa/program/FbFMGhZ/index.cfm?pgid=1923&sid=45197>

¹¹² <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-02-04/hl4710>

Question



Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick

Labour

Life peer

Lords

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of levels of anti-Palestinian racism in the media and political discourse; and what steps they are taking to reduce levels of anti-Palestinian racism.

A similar intervention followed in the House of Commons on 17 March 2025, when Nadia Whittome raised the issue:¹¹³

Question



Nadia Whittome

Labour

Nottingham East

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what steps she is taking to help tackle anti-Palestinian racism in (a) schools and (b) universities.

Whittome returned to the subject a week later, on 25 March 2025, tabling two further questions. One was particularly significant, asking what data the Department for Education holds on incidents of so-called *anti-Palestinian racism* - implicitly treating the term as a recognised and measurable category within public policy.^{114 115}

The escalation continued. Between 28 and 29 April 2025, Baroness Ritchie submitted five further questions in rapid succession, asking:

1. To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will convene a cross-government working group on tackling anti-Palestinian racism.¹¹⁶
2. To ask His Majesty's Government which department is responsible for policy on tackling (1) anti-Palestinian racism, and (2) the dehumanisation of Palestinians.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-03-17/38689>

¹¹⁴ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-03-25/41229>

¹¹⁵ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-03-25/41230/>

¹¹⁶ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-04-28/hl6958>

¹¹⁷ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-04-28/hl6959>

3. To ask His Majesty's Government what is the role of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office on policy for tackling (1) anti-Palestinian racism, and (2) the dehumanisation of Palestinians.¹¹⁸
4. To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of any increases in Israel of (1) incitement to violence, (2) glorifying the killing of Palestinian civilians, and (3) anti-Palestinian racism; and what representations they have made to the government of Israel in this regard.¹¹⁹
5. To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to provide funding to tackle anti-Palestinian racism in the United Kingdom.¹²⁰

Taken together, these interventions are not isolated or exploratory. They represent a sustained effort to introduce *anti-Palestinian racism* into the UK's established anti-racism architecture: to normalise it as a recognised category, to prompt data collection, to justify funding mechanisms, and to embed the term within both domestic and foreign policy discourse.

Misclassification of Violence and the Expansion of APR

The true function of these definitions only becomes visible once they are applied to an actual incident, where rhetoric can be tested against evidence.

With APR, we can now observe this transition in real time: a developing case of real-world weaponisation unfolding in the U.S. state of Vermont.

On 25 November 2023, three students were shot in North Prospect Street, Burlington, Vermont, by Jason J. Eaton, a man who opened fire at them after he “stumbled down the stairs” from a “nearby porch”.^{121 122}

The area is residential. The shooting took place after sunset at approximately 18:30.¹²³

The following day, Eaton was arrested at his second-floor apartment at 69 North Prospect Street, Burlington.¹²⁴

Media reports that the police found a gun and ammunition inside his apartment that matched those from the crime scene.¹²⁵

¹¹⁸ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-04-28/hl6961>

¹¹⁹ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-04-29/hl7022>

¹²⁰ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-04-29/hl7023>

¹²¹ Victim describes a shooter “stumbled down the stairs.” <https://www.courthousenews.com/suspect-in-shooting-of-3-men-of-palestinian-descent-near-the-university-of-vermont-pleads-not-guilty/>

¹²² Victim describes shooter coming from a “nearby porch” as they passed.

<https://www.ctpublic.org/2023-11-29/some-want-the-burlington-shooting-to-be-investigated-as-a-hate-crime-heres-how-the-law-works>

¹²³ <https://vtcynic.com/news/students-call-upon-university-to-stand-with-palestinian-students-following-nov-25-shooting>

¹²⁴ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67561375>

¹²⁵ <https://www.wcax.com/2023/11/27/suspect-arrested-burlington-triple-shooting/>

This image from outside that same address shows the aftermath of the attack. In the background, a white house with pillars and steps is visible.¹²⁶



The image below (white house) is of the shooter's 69 Prospect Street address. The porch and stairs can clearly be seen at the property. It is the only property in this area with the same styling visible in the photograph from the scene of the attack.¹²⁷



The shooting therefore took place directly outside of Eaton's home. He left the porch 'stumbled down' the stairs and opened fire on the three people walking past.

The fact that no other eyewitnesses have come forward suggests the victims were the only people on this part of the street at the time.

Jason Eaton could not have known these specific people were coming. He did not travel to them; he did not seek them out.

¹²⁶ <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/officials-investigate-potential-hate-crime-after-3-palestinian-students-shot-in-vermont>

¹²⁷ <https://maps.app.goo.gl/mq5L81kZzR3JKhEP6>

Two of the three victims were wearing a keffiyeh, and all three had Palestinian heritage.¹²⁸

The identity of the victims meant that this shooting quickly became politicised, with pro-Palestinian politicians and activists using it as an example of a hate-crime even before an arrest had been made.¹²⁹



Husam Zomlot ✓
@hzomlot



Three young Palestinian men, Hisham Awartani, Tahseen Ali and Kenan Abdulhamid, students at Brown and other US universities, were shot last night on their way to a family dinner in Burlington, USA. **Their crime? Wearing the Palestinian keffiyeh.** They are critically injured. And Six weeks ago, 6-year old Palestinian child was stabbed 26 times in a hate crime in Illinois. **The hate crimes against Palestinians must stop.** Palestinians everywhere need protection.
[@POTUS](#) [@SecBlinken](#)

The “hate-crime” theory, while convenient and politically useful for activists, did not have evidentiary support.

The location - outside Eaton’s home - and the apparent spontaneous nature of the attack suggested that this was a random, rather than targeted shooting.

This avenue became even more apparent when it surfaced that Eaton had a long history of mental struggles - and in the weeks prior to the shooting - Eaton had even posted social media messages that appeared to be very supportive of not just the Palestinian cause, but Hamas and the October 7 attacks.¹³⁰

The lack of evidence explains why police and prosecutors refused to seek hate-crime charges, with Chittenden County State’s Attorney Sarah George explicitly stating she does not expect to add hate crime charges to the case.¹³¹


¹²⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20231204042335/https://www.aol.com/news/vermont-shooting-victim-jumped-fence-194816541.html>

¹²⁹ <https://x.com/hzomlot/status/1728796630399234434>

¹³⁰ <https://www.sevendaysvt.com/news/driven-by-hate-man-charged-in-burlington-shooting-was-a-volunteer-with-a-troubled-personal-life-39673363/>

¹³¹ <https://www.vermontpublic.org/local-news/2024-11-12/man-accused-shooting-palestinian-students-burlington-unlikely-face-hate-crime-charges>

In November 2025, Vermont U.S. Senators Bernie Sanders and Peter Welch, and Representative Becca Balint used the two-year anniversary of the shooting to weaponise it into an act of *anti-Palestinian racism*.^{132 133}



The statement condemns “anti-Palestinian hatred” and suggests the three were shot “for no other reason than they are Palestinian”.¹³⁴

Sanders and Welch then introduced a resolution which claims the three were shot “simply for wearing a scarf using a traditional Palestinian pattern and speaking in Arabic” - explicitly linking the attack to “anti-Palestinian hatred”.¹³⁵

When elected officials elevate a narrative of “anti-Palestinian hatred” in direct contradiction to police findings, prosecutorial statements, and the available evidence, the result is not enhanced clarity but the replacement of fact with rhetoric.

The transformation of a spontaneous and tragic shooting into a claimed act of *anti-Palestinian racism* demonstrates how, once institutionalised, such terminology can be deployed to impose a predetermined narrative onto real events.

This episode illustrates the core danger identified throughout this report: that APR is not a tool for understanding discrimination, but a mechanism through which political actors can overwrite reality with dangerous ideological assertion.

¹³² <https://balint.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=627>

¹³³ <https://www.welch.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Welch-Resolution-Condemning-anti-Palestinian-Hatred-12.04.25-12.02.25.pdf>

¹³⁴ <https://balint.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=627>

¹³⁵ <https://www.welch.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Welch-Resolution-Condemning-anti-Palestinian-Hatred-12.04.25-12.02.25.pdf>

Real-World Tragedy

APR operates at the level of moral climate, not action. It relabels moral categories so that Zionism becomes racism, Jewish self-definition becomes exclusion, and safeguards against antisemitism are recast as censorship. It redirects institutional attention away from Jewish vulnerability and toward activist-defined grievance. APR also introduces friction into antisemitism education, rendering the IHRA framework “controversial,” training “political,” and enforcement “censorship.”

While downplaying antisemitism on one side, it simultaneously normalises demonising language, reframing eliminationist slogans as “difficult conversations” and historical falsehoods as “lived experience.” None of this causes violence. Responsibility for murder rests solely with those who commit it. But these frameworks do shape the environment in which antisemitism is understood, contested, and addressed. They change the air people breathe.

Manchester, UK

On 16 July 2025, Manchester City Council adopted a motion recognising *anti-Palestinian racism*.¹³⁶ The motion asserted that APR has “deep historical roots” in the UK, despite the term having been coined by anti-Israel activists only a few years earlier. The council resolved to challenge “anti-Palestinian racism” as it defined it.

Although the adopted motion did not formally incorporate a specific external definition, APR has only one codified definition in active circulation. Under that definition, challenging *anti-Palestinian racism* entails the removal of safeguards against antisemitism, the permissibility of eliminationist language, and the promotion of political narratives that are frequently exaggerated or demonstrably false, and which function to demonise Israel and Zionism.

The motion was introduced by Councillor Amna Saad Omar Abdullatif.¹³⁷ Abdullatif is now an Independent, having resigned from the Labour Party over comments Keir Starmer had made in support of Israel.¹³⁸ In parallel with her role as an elected councillor, Abdullatif is publicly listed as a co-director of *The Three Hijabis*, a campaign group that presents itself as an anti-racism organisation.^{139 140 141}

Other motions Abdullatif has brought to the council: an October 2024 motion to ban arms sales to Israel, and a March 2024 motion opposing placing restrictions to anti-Israel demonstrations taking place in Manchester’s streets.^{142 143 144 145}

¹³⁶ <https://democracy.manchester.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=17133>

¹³⁷ <https://democracy.manchester.gov.uk/mgUserInfo.aspx?UID=1127>

¹³⁸ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-67125964>

¹³⁹ <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/139837/pdf/>

¹⁴⁰ <https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-three-hijabis/posts/?feedView=all>

¹⁴¹ <https://x.com/Amna4A>

¹⁴² <https://democracy.manchester.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=15043>

¹⁴³ <https://democracy.manchester.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=14006>

¹⁴⁴ <https://x.com/AmnaAbdul1983>

¹⁴⁵ <https://x.com/Amna4A>

This overlap between activist frameworks and civic decision-making illustrates the mechanism traced throughout this report: the migration of APR from advocacy spaces into institutional settings.

On 2 October 2025, during Yom Kippur - the holiest day of the Jewish calendar - an Islamist terror attack took place outside the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester.¹⁴⁶ Two British Jews were murdered. In the same period several individuals were convicted in connection with a separate plot targeting the Jewish community in Greater Manchester.¹⁴⁷

There is no suggestion that the council's decision influenced the motives of those who carried out or planned these attacks. The relevance of Manchester lies elsewhere. Just months before Jews were murdered in an explicitly antisemitic act, the city's governing body had formally adopted a framework that downplays antisemitism and increases tolerance for demonisation of the Jewish state. This juxtaposition illustrates a form of institutional misalignment: a moment in which civic attention was directed toward activist-defined grievance while Jewish vulnerability was becoming acutely real.

Sydney, Australia

In September 2025, the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN) published a report on what it described as *anti-Palestinian racism* in Australian schools. The report was launched in Sydney and presented in the language of research, but was produced by an advocacy organisation and relied on a small, self-selecting dataset promoted within activist networks. Its methodology lacked controls, comparative analysis, or alternative explanations, and its conceptual framework reclassified institutional neutrality, safeguarding obligations, and workplace conduct policies as forms of racism.^{148 149 150}

All four authors of the report, Dr Ryan AL-Natour, Dr Sophie Rudolph, Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah and Tasnim Mahmoud Sammak, have publicly pushed back against efforts to combat antisemitism.^{151 152} All four have also supported boycott divestment sanctions (BDS) initiatives.^{153 154 155}

Despite these limitations, the report received extensive national media coverage. Australia's public broadcaster ran a standalone article presenting the report's claims without substantive

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/manchester-synagogue-terror-attack-statement>

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.gmp.police.uk/news/greater-manchester/news/news/2025/december/Three-men-convicted-after-CTPNW-investigation-into-antisemitic-terror-plot-in-Greater-Manchester/>

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/AustraliaPalestineAdvocacyNetwork>

¹⁴⁹ <https://apan.org.au/apr/>

¹⁵⁰ <https://apan.org.au/apr-register/>

¹⁵¹ <https://overland.org.au/2025/07/open-letter-against-the-adoption-of-the-australian-special-envoy-to-combat-antisemitisms-plan>

¹⁵² <https://overland.org.au/2022/08/we-must-resist-the-weaponisation-of-antisemitism-against-student-activists/>

¹⁵³ <https://bdsaustralia.net.au/category/latest/page/6/>

¹⁵⁴ <https://overland.org.au/2024/11/end-scholasticide-in-palestine-an-open-letter/>

¹⁵⁵ <https://web.archive.org/web/20131104021321/https://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/10/31/3880687.htm>

critique or contextual challenge.¹⁵⁶ A second national broadcaster published similarly uncritical coverage.¹⁵⁷ Both journalists involved have a history of pro- Palestinian messaging.^{158 159 160 161 162}

In effect, an advocacy-driven APR framework was elevated into mainstream public discourse and treated as an authoritative account of racism in education.

Less than two months later, on 14 December 2025, during the Jewish festival of Chanukah, terrorists carried out a mass-casualty attack against a Jewish gathering at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Fifteen people were murdered, and many more were injured, in the deadliest antisemitic attack against Jews in Australia in modern history.^{163 164 165}

As with Manchester, no causal link is claimed. APR does not directly produce violence. But it does shape the moral and institutional environment in which antisemitism is recognised and confronted. In the months preceding the Bondi attack, public discourse increasingly centred on claims of *anti-Palestinian racism*, while antisemitism - including threats to Jewish safety - was frequently treated as secondary, contested, or politically inconvenient. When antisemitism moved from abstraction to atrocity, institutions were already operating within a distorted moral frame.

Real-world violence exposes the consequences of conceptual confusion. When anti-racism frameworks redefine Jewish self-protection as oppression and treat antisemitism safeguards as obstacles, institutions lose the clarity required to respond to genuine danger. By reshaping moral priorities and legitimising demonisation, APR weakens the environment in which antisemitism should be unequivocally named and resisted.

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-09-26/report-into-anti-palestinian-racism-in-schools-students-teachers/105809084>

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/anti-palestinian-racism-in-schools-apan-report/8ak0h6ka3>

¹⁵⁸ <https://archive.junkee.com/palestine-australian-guide/295722>

¹⁵⁹ <https://archive.junkee.com/palestinian-australian-diaspora/295345>

¹⁶⁰ <https://archive.junkee.com/tag/palestine>

¹⁶¹ https://x.com/milianne_r/status/1393460026983927812?s=20

¹⁶² <https://x.com/Rashidajourno/>

¹⁶³ <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/australian-police-release-documents-showing-bondi-beach-shooting-suspect-conducted-firearms-training-with-his-father>

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-hold-public-inquiry-into-bondi-beach-attacks-2026-01-08/>

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/video/2025/dec/17/ten-minutes-of-terror-how-the-bondi-mass-shooting-unfolded-in-real-time-video>

Conclusion

This report has traced the emergence of *anti-Palestinian racism* from a marginal activist slogan into an institutionalised framework now embedded within policy, education, and political discourse. The evidence demonstrates that APR did not arise from neutral analysis of discriminatory harm, nor from established anti-racist scholarship. It was constructed within anti-Israel activist networks, refined during the Labour Party antisemitism crisis as a counter to the IHRA definition of antisemitism, and subsequently formalised and publicly funded once favourable policy conditions emerged.

The significance of this evolution lies not merely in language, but in function. As defined and deployed, APR operates to transform contested political and historical claims into matters of racial prejudice, placing them beyond debate. In doing so, it provides a mechanism through which allegations of antisemitism can be deflected or inverted, particularly where antisemitism safeguards are already under political pressure.

Once institutionalised, such frameworks do not remain theoretical. As this report has shown, APR-style framing is already being applied in parliamentary interventions, educational guidance, professional settings, and the interpretation of real-world incidents, sometimes in direct contradiction to evidentiary findings or established institutional standards. In these contexts, the effect is not enhanced protection against discrimination, but the substitution of evidence-based assessment with a predetermined ideological narrative.

The adoption of *anti-Palestinian racism* as a formal framework also reshapes how antisemitism itself is understood and addressed. By introducing a doctrine that conflicts with core elements of antisemitism literacy, including Jewish peoplehood, historical experience, and the legitimacy of Jewish self-determination, APR does not merely sit alongside antisemitism within anti-racism discourse but actively destabilises it. Antisemitism becomes one claim among many, increasingly treated as a matter of competing narratives rather than a distinct and historically grounded form of hatred requiring clear recognition and response.

This has practical consequences. When antisemitism safeguards are reframed as censorship, when eliminationist rhetoric is normalised as dialogue, and when Jewish self-definition is recast as exclusion, institutions lose the clarity required to respond effectively to genuine danger. APR does not directly cause violence, and responsibility for acts of violence rests solely with those who commit them. But frameworks that redefine moral categories, overwrite evidence, or pre-empt judgment do shape the environment in which antisemitism is recognised and addressed.

At a moment of rising antisemitic hostility and violence, the institutional adoption of a framework that further demonises Jewish individuals and communities carries serious and foreseeable risks. If anti-racism frameworks are to retain credibility and moral authority, they must be grounded in evidence, clarity, and universal principles. When they are instead used to override evidence, impose ideological interpretation on real events, or repurpose the language of human rights as a political instrument, they cease to function as protections against hatred and become mechanisms of distortion.

The case of *anti-Palestinian racism* illustrates the dangers of abandoning those standards.

Appendix A

Chronological record of institutional and political adoption of *anti-Palestinian racism* in Canada:

- 16 December 2019. BDS Vancouver posted a statement from the *Canada Palestine Association* claiming “anti-Palestinian racism is rampant in the aftermath of York student protest”.^{166 167}
- 10 February 2020. Following a statement by a government minister in which he condemned the BDS movement, Hanna Kawas, the Chair of the *Canada Palestine Association* used it as an example of *anti-Palestinian racism*.^{168 169}
- 17 September 2020. The Toronto Law Department case. The ACLA - the NGO that would write the definition in 2022 - claimed that the University of Toronto’s decision not to hire a legal academic “over her scholarship on Israel’s occupation”, highlighted that *anti-Palestinian racism* “is very common” in Canada’s legal profession.^{170 171}
- 20 September 2020. Heide Matthews, an assistant professor of law at York University in Toronto, posted an Al-Jazeera piece titled “Anti-Palestinian racism: Appointment row at Toronto university”.^{172 173} The two sources AJ approached to support their article were ACLA, and Corey Balsam, national coordinator for *Independent Jewish Voices Canada*.
- 27 October 2020. “The Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA), Independent Jewish Voices Canada (IJV) and the BC Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) filed a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council regarding the alleged conduct of Justice David Spiro, the judge who allegedly interfered in an internal hiring process at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law in September 2020 involving Dr. Valentina Azarova. This complaint adds to the record by providing context about *anti-Palestinian racism* as it is practiced in Canada.”¹⁷⁴
- 15 April 2021. BDS Vancouver claims a statement by Justin Trudeau standing by Israel and condemning BDS shows APR is “alive and well in Canada”.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁶ <https://cpavancouver.org/2019/12/anti-palestinian-racism-rampant-in-aftermath-of-york-student-protest/>

¹⁶⁷ https://x.com/bds_vancouver/status/1206651998646333445

¹⁶⁸ <https://x.com/dimitrilascaris/status/1225983779254218752>

¹⁶⁹ <https://x.com/HannaKawas/status/1226939737572667393>

¹⁷⁰ Explainer <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/did-a-university-of-toronto-donor-block-the-hiring-of-a-scholar-for-her-writing-on-palestine>

¹⁷¹ <https://x.com/CanArabLaw/status/1306621275729731584>

¹⁷² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/20/anti-palestinian-racism-appointment-row-at-toronto-university>

¹⁷³ https://x.com/Heidi__Matthews/status/1307661811743780864

¹⁷⁴ <https://bcccla.org/2020/10/rights-groups-file-complaint-against-sitting-judge-accused-of-meddling-in-uoft-hiring-cite-anti-palestinian-racism/>

¹⁷⁵ https://x.com/bds_vancouver/status/1382754070985773063

- 19 May 2021. Detention of female protestor at protest / counter protest face-off is used by a Canadian activist / academic as an example of pro-Palestinian racism.^{176 177}
- 6 June 2021. An apparent altercation between a girl with pro-Palestine attire and someone who took offence to it. Unlike other incidents on the C-train - the police do not seem to have used footage to find, arrest and charge offenders - which does cast some doubt on the one-sided narrative.^{178 179 180} On 14 June 2021, a policy analyst at Al-Shabaka used it to suggest this attack was “just the tip of the iceberg of anti-Palestinian racism”.¹⁸¹
- 19 June 2021. Ontario-based BDS account, celebrates a decision by the Canadian Labour Organisation to endorse BDS, by suggesting the Canadian government do not understand *anti-Palestinian racism*.¹⁸²
- 21 June 2021. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East post that “Canada's national media is dripping with anti-Palestinian racism” - over a *National Post* article attacking “pro-Palestinian journalists / activists” working at the state broadcaster.¹⁸³
- 13 August 2021. The Canadian Government’s decision to boycott the UN Durban 2021 conference (the 20th anniversary of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism - Durban I) is described as “shameful” and “a denial of anti-Palestinian racism”, by Michael Bueckert Vice-President of the *Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East*.¹⁸⁴
- 17 September 2021. Muhannad Ayyash (Calgary based policy analyst at Al-Shabaka) uses the about-face by the University of Toronto in the Dr. Valentina Azarova case to claim this is just the “tip of the iceberg called anti-Palestinian racism.”^{185 186}
- 6 October 2021. The Breach (Canadian media outlet) runs article penned by Muhannad Ayyash (Calgary based policy analyst at Al-Shabaka) about the criticism of Desmond Cole (black Canadian journalist / activist) over the “free Palestine” remarks he made during a talk to the Toronto District School Board.¹⁸⁷ The headline claims that the School Board’s real scandal is “anti-Palestinian racism”.

¹⁷⁶ https://x.com/Fadi_S_Ennab/status/1395113990523478017

¹⁷⁷ <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/pro-palestinian-rally-winnipeg-amani-zeid-punched-1.6030467>

¹⁷⁸ <https://calgaryherald.com/news/crime/ctrain-attack-on-girl-wearing-palestine-hoodie-has-community-calling-for-hate-crime-charges>

¹⁷⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/CalgaryPolice/posts/charges-laid-in-hate-motivated-attack-a-threatening-racist-tirade-on-the-ctrain-has/10159750035624530/>

¹⁸⁰ <https://globalnews.ca/video/7711063/calgary-police-charge-woman-after-racially-motivated-hate-crime>

¹⁸¹ <https://x.com/AyyashMohannad/status/1404508763604885507>

¹⁸² https://x.com/Justice4BDS_Ont/status/1406060841061998594

¹⁸³ <https://x.com/CJPME/status/1406983455565565959>

¹⁸⁴ <https://x.com/mbueckert/status/1426187531721269248>

¹⁸⁵ <https://x.com/AyyashMohannad/status/1438908863374258177>

¹⁸⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQ4En1fN258>

¹⁸⁷ <https://breachmedia.ca/the-toronto-district-school-boards-real-scandal-is-anti-palestinian-racism/>

- 15 November 2021. The Desmond Cole affair turns into a campaign. “Pro-Palestine students took to the streets in Toronto, Canada, demanding an end to *anti-Palestinian racism* and for the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) to stop silencing calls to [#FreePalestine](#).”¹⁸⁸
- 18 December 2021. The Samidoun Network promotes a letter writing campaign - writing to Prime Minister Trudeau and other key Canadian figures accusing them of “anti-Palestinian racism”.^{189 190}
- 21 December 2021. Mondoweiss run another article about ending Canadian diplomacy’s *anti-Palestinian racism*, targeting the same “trifecta” as Samidoun, and linking to a wider campaign supported by the Canadian BDS coalition.^{191 192}
- 27 January 2022. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East published a podcast looking at the Toronto School District Board’s long history of APR.¹⁹³
- 11 March 2022. Irwin Cotler (prominent Canadian human-rights lawyer,) gave a speech on 26 January 2022 (Holocaust Memorial Day reflection). Cotler’s speech discussed “systemic racism from a human rights perspective with a focus on addressing anti-Semitism through equality”.¹⁹⁴ His speech prompted 45 complaints from university faculty members who accused him of *anti-Palestinian racism*.
- 18-25 April 2022. CJPME make two separate posts taking news articles (one related to the trial of a JDL activist, the other to the Toronto School Board case) and used them to promote an APR narrative.^{195 196}
- 30 April 2022. Samidoun attack B’nai Brith Canada accusing them of *anti-Palestinian racism* for calling for the deportation of Khaled Barakat - a key figure in the international PFLP network.¹⁹⁷

ACLA launched the report on 4 May 2022

¹⁸⁸ https://x.com/SBPAL_Eng/status/1460337575311384584

¹⁸⁹ <https://x.com/SamidounPP/status/1472339957515792384>

¹⁹⁰ <https://samidoun.net/2021/12/write-a-letter-canadas-trifecta-of-anti-palestinian-racism-diplomats-wettlaufer-and-stadelbauer-and-minister-joly/>

¹⁹¹ <https://mondoweiss.net/2021/12/ending-canadian-diplomacys-anti-palestinian-racism/>

¹⁹² <https://bdscoalition.ca/2021/12/18/canadian-diplomacy-trifecta-of-anti-palestinian-racism/>

¹⁹³ <https://x.com/CJPME/status/1486759683654393856>

¹⁹⁴ <https://nationalpost.com/news/toronto/human-rights-expert-irwin-cotler-accused-of-anti-palestinian-racism-over-speech-on-anti-semitism>

¹⁹⁵ <https://x.com/CJPME/status/1516168437147607046>

¹⁹⁶ <https://x.com/CJPME/status/1518594919144857601>

¹⁹⁷ <https://x.com/SamidounPP/status/1520183322265088000>

Appendix B

The Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) definition of anti-Palestinian racism (2022)

Reproduced here for reference. The definition is analysed comparatively in the main body of the report.¹⁹⁸

WHAT IS ANTI-PALESTINIAN RACISM?

Anti-Palestinian racism is a form of anti-Arab racism that silences, excludes, erases, stereotypes, defames or dehumanizes Palestinians or their narratives. Anti-Palestinian racism takes various forms including: denying the Nakba and justifying violence against Palestinians; failing to acknowledge Palestinians as an Indigenous people with a collective identity, belonging and rights in relation to occupied and historic Palestine; erasing the human rights and equal dignity and worth of Palestinians; excluding or pressuring others to exclude Palestinian perspectives, Palestinians and their allies; defaming Palestinians and their allies with slander such as being inherently antisemitic, a terrorist threat/sympathizer or opposed to democratic values.

¹⁹⁸ <https://www.canarablaw.org/s/Anti-Palestinian-Racism-Naming-Framing-and-Manifestations.pdf>

Support This Research

Help Me Fight Antisemitism

For more than two decades - often working anonymously - I have conducted independent research exposing antisemitism, historical revisionism, and the manipulation of language used to legitimise hate.

In 2017, I was named by the *Algemeiner* in the J100 as one of the "top 100 people positively influencing Jewish life".¹⁹⁹ In 2022, the media watchdog CAMERA awarded me a "Portrait of Courage."²⁰⁰

This research has, on numerous occasions, led to significant public corrections and accountability. By way of example, in 2025 alone, a BBC documentary was withdrawn following findings that exposed links to Hamas, and *The New York Times* issued a retraction after I demonstrated that a widely circulated front-page image presented as evidence of famine in fact depicted a child suffering from severe underlying medical conditions.^{201 202 203 204 205 206}

I am entirely independent. I am not affiliated with any organisation, political party, or funder, and I take no direction from external actors. This work is sustained solely through community support.

If you value this work and are able to help, please consider making a donation. Your support enables me to continue researching, publishing, and challenging antisemitism wherever it appears.

Donations can be made via PayPal using my PayPal.me account.²⁰⁷ Those who wish to provide regular monthly support can also do so via PayPal, or through my Patreon page.²⁰⁸

If you would prefer to support this work via bank transfer, please contact me directly.

Every contribution, at any level, is genuinely appreciated.

¹⁹⁹ <https://www.algemeiner.com/list/top-100-people-positively-influencing-jewish-life-2017/>

²⁰⁰ <https://x.com/mishtal/status/1527544311167995904>

²⁰¹ <https://david-collier.com/bbc-pantomime/>

²⁰² <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2025-02-27/debates/89B386F6-B5B4-4013-B810-B1F4A4A1C741/GazaBBCCoveragehighlight=%22david+collier%22#contribution-6FC6DD2D-4500-4A22-82C6-406732FA3047>

²⁰³ <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2025/feb/21/bbc-pulls-gaza-documentary-iplayer-hamas>

²⁰⁴ <https://david-collier.com/the-truth-behind-the-viral-gaza-famine-photo/>

²⁰⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/30/pageoneplus/editors-note-july-30-2025.html>

²⁰⁶ <https://themedialine.org/headlines/nyt-criticized-for-scaled-response-after-false-reporting-on-emaciated-gazan-boy/>

²⁰⁷ <http://paypal.me/davidhcollier>

²⁰⁸ <https://www.patreon.com/davidcollier>