Full text of Palestine Partition Commission report 1938

Full text of Palestine Partition Commission report 1938
PALESTINE
PARTITION COMMISSION
REPORT

(Available as PDF) Woodhead Commission

 

Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to Parliament by Command of His Mates ty
October, 1938

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2 ; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2 ;
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or through any bookseller

I938

-Price 5*. 6 J. net

Cmd. 5854

PALESTINE PARTITION COMMISSION

Chairman :

SIR JOHN WOODHEAD, K.C.S.I., CLE.

Members :
SIR ALISON RUSSELL, K.C.
A. P. WATERFI ELD , Esq., C.B.
T. REID, Esq., C.M.G.

Secretary :
S. E. V. LUKE, Esq.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE 7

CHAPTER I.— INTRODUCTORY 11

CHAPTER II.— THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND .. ..15

CHAPTER III.— GENERAL MATTERS.

1. Boundaries .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..21

2. Defence 22

3. Population . . . . 22

4. Population and Land Statistics . . . . . . . . 32

CHAPTER IV.— THE BOUNDARIES OF THE ENCLAVE FOR
THE HOLY PLACES AT JERUSALEM
AND BETHLEHEM, AND OF THE
ENCLAVE AT NAZARETH.

1. The Boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . 34

2. The Population and Area of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . 38

3. The Boundary of the Nazareth Enclave . . . . . . . . 38

CHAPTER V.— THE BOUNDARY OF JAFFA, INCLUDING
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TOWNS
OF JAFFA AND TEL AVIV.

1. The Boundary between the Towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv . . 40

2. The Remaining Portion of the Boundary of Jaffa . . 44

CHAPTER VI.— THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PROPOSED
ARAB AND JEWISH STATES UNDER
PLAN A.

1. The Boundary along the Eastern Edge of the Maritime Plain

between the Town of Tulkarm and the Jerusalem Enclave . . 45

2. The Boundary along the Maritime Plain north of the Town of

Tulkarm, across the Carmel Ridge and along the Plain of

Esdraelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3. The Boundary along the Plain of Jezreel . . . . . . . . 46

4. The Boundary in the Plain of Beisan . . . . . . 46

5. The Boundary in the Jordan Valley . . . . . . . . 47

6. The Boundary south of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . 47

CHAPTER VII.— THE FIGURES FOR THE POPULATION
AND LAND OF THE ARAB AND
JEWISH STATES AND THE ENCLAVES

UNDER PLAN A.”

1. Population .. .. ., .. .. .. .. ..48

2. Land . . . . . . 50

(C 31078) b2

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Page

CHAPTER VIII.— THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES AND

‘ TRANSFER OF POPULATION . . . . 52

1. Voluntary Exchanges of Land and Population . . . . . . 53

2. The Possibility of the Transfer of Population 53

CHAPTER IX.— THE JEWISH CLAIM IN REGARD TO

JERUSALEM … ., . … ‘ … 73

CHAPTER X. — A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF PLANS A
AND B.

1. Plan A .. .. 81

2. PlanB … .. .. 89

CHAPTER XL— PLAN C . . 99

1. The Northern Mandated Territory . . 101

2. The Southern Mandated Territory 105

3. The Central Part of Palestine . . . . 107

CHAPTER XII. — JEWISH PROPOSALS FOR THE JEWISH

STATE (APART FROM JERUSALEM) .. Ill

CHAPTER XIII— JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE MANDATED

TERRITORIES UNDER PLAN C .. .. 116

1. The Northern Mandated Territory 118

2. The Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

3. The Southern Mandated Territory . . ….. . . 120

4. The Negative Policy of Control 124

5. The Constructive Policy of Development . . . . . . . . 133

CHAPTER XIV.— JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO THE MAN-
DATED TERRITORIES UNDER PLAN C .. 141

CHAPTER XV.— NAZARETH AND THE SEA OF GALILEE.

1. Nazareth 148

2. The Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) 149

CHAPTER XVI.— THE PROVISION OF SAFEGUARDS FOR
THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS AND

RACIAL MINORITIES 152

1. Religious Rights and Properties . . .. .. .. .. 154

2. Nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

3. Electoral System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

4. Employment in the Public Services . . . . . . . . 156

5. Religious Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

6. Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

7. Land .. .. 160

8. Pious Foundations and Charitable Bequests . . . . . . 161

9. Freedom of Conscience and the Free Exercise of the Activities

of Religious Missions of all Denominations . . . . . . 163

10. Foreigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

11. Orthodox Jewry .. 163

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Page

CHAPTER XVII. — INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

1. Railways . . . . . , . . . . . . . 166

2. Ports . . . . . . …. 170

3. Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services .. .. .. 171

4. The Trans-Jordan Posts and Telegraph Department . . . . 175

5. Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

6. Industrial and other Concessions . . . . . .• 177

CHAPTER XVIII.— FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS

(PART I) . . . . . . 179

CHAPTER XIX.— CUSTOMS.

1 . The Economic Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

2. The Administrative Aspect . . . . . . . . . 205

CHAPTER XX. — PUBLIC DEBT AND OTHER FINANCIAL

OBLIGATIONS 213

1. The Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, 1942-67 215

2. The Liability of the Trans- Jordan Government for their share

of the Ottoman Public Debt .. .. .. .. .. 219

3. The Rights of Public Servants to Pensions or Gratuities . . . 220

4. The Liability of the Palestine Government under the Empire

Air Mail Scheme .. .. . . 221

CHAPTER XXL— FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS

(PART II) 223

1. Formula A 224

2. Formula B 227

CHAPTER XXII.— SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . 232

1. The Size of the Proposed Jewish State . . . . . . . . 233

2. The Attitude of the Arabs and the Jews . . . . 233

3. The Arab Minority in the Jewish State 235

4. Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

5. Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

6. Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

7. Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23&

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY SIR ALISON RUSSELL . . 249
NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY MR. REID . . . . . . 263

(C31078) b 3

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Page

APPENDICES

1. Policy in Palestine (Cmd. 5634) 282

2. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — Plans B and C 290

3. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — -Plan B . . 29 1

4. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — Plan C . . 293

5. The methods by which the Land and Population Figures used

in the Report have been computed . . . . . . . . 294

6. The Boundary of the Jewish State under Plan A in the vicinity

of the Power Station of the Palestine Electric Corporation on

the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami . . . . . . . . 295

7. The Agricultural Absorptive Capacity of Galilee . . . . 295

8. The Boundary of the Haifa Industrial Zone . . . . . . 297

9. Declaration of the Kingdom of ‘Iraq made on the occasion of

the termination of the Mandatory Regime in ‘Iraq . . 298

10. Christian Religious Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

11. Budgetary Forecasts : Reconciliation with Current Estimates 303

MAPS

1.
Palestine Hydrographic Survey . . . . . . Opposite page 53
2.
The Commission’s Tours
At end
3.
Map of the Royal Commission’s Partition Plan (reproduced
from their Report)
At end
4.
The Boundaries of Jaffa
At end
5.
Jewish Land Holdings
At end
6.
Trans-Jordan
At end
7.
Map illustrating Jewish Proposals examined in Chapters IX
and XII ….
At end
8.
The ” A ” Plan of Partition
At end
9.
The ” B ” Plan of Partition
At end
9a.
The ” B ” Plan of Partition, showing Jewish Land
At end
10.
The ” C ” Plan of Partition
At end
11.
Map illustrating Jewish Proposals with regard to Jerusalem ~
In pocket
12.
The Proposed Boundary between Jaffa and Tel Aviv
at end.

Note. — The United Kingdom share of the cost of the Commission is
estimated at ^5,639. The cost of printing and publishing this report is
estimated by His Majesty’s Stationery Office at ^1,020.

7

To the Right Honourable Malcolm MacDonald, M.P.,
His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

PREFACE

1. We were appointed by your predecessor, the Right Honourable
W. G. A. Ormsby Gore, M.P. (now Lord Harlech), in March last.
Our terms of reference, which had been published in a White Paper
(Cmd. 5634) * on the 4th January, were as follows —

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in
Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full
liberty to suggest modifications of that plan, including variation
of the areas recommended for retention under British Mandate,
And taking into account any representations of the com-
munities in Palestine and Trans- Jordan —

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and
Jewish areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently
or temporarily under British Mandate which will — ■

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual estab-
lishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab
and Jewish States ;

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs
and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa ; and

(c) enable His Majesty’s Government to carry out the
Mandatory responsibilities the assumption of which is
recommended in the Report of the Royal Commission,
including the obligations imposed by Article 28 of the
Mandate as regards the Holy Places ;

(ii) to examine and report on the economic and financial
questions involved in partition upon which decisions will
require to be taken, including —

(a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between
the various areas of the public assets and public debt of
Palestine and other ‘ financial obligations legitimately
incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the
period of the Mandate ‘ referred to in Article 28 thereof ;

(b) means to ensure that the financial obligations
referred to above will be fully honoured in accordance with
Article 28 of the Mandate ;

(c) the administration of the railways, ports, postal,
telegraph and telephone services ;

(d) currency arrangements ;

(e) customs administration and tariffs ;

* Published in full as Appendix 1.
(C31078) ~ b 4

8

(/) the budgetary prospects of the various Administra-
tions to be established ;

(g) the preservation of the rights of civil servants in
accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the
Mandate ;

(h) the treatment of industrial and other concessions ;
(*) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and

population, and the prospects of providing by works of
land development room for further settlement to meet the
needs of persons desiring to move from one area to another ;

(j) the provision of effective safeguards for the rights
of religious or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated
to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection
of religious rights and properties.

2. Prior to our departure from London on the 21st April we
held no meetings for the purpose of hearing witnesses, as we were
anxious to defer the taking of evidence until we had had an
opportunity of obtaining some personal knowledge of Palestine.
For the same reason, it was not until some weeks after our arrival
in Jerusalem on the 27th April that we held our first formal session.
In the meantime we had been able to visit different parts of the
country and to gain a general impression of its character which was
of great value to us in our subsequent work. Indeed, we considered
that the nature of our enquiry made it incumbent on us to obtain
as thorough a first-hand knowledge of the country as time would
permit, and during May and the first part of June we covered about
5,000 kilometres (3,000 miles) in Palestine and Trans- Jordan.
Our tours are shown on map 2.

3. We spent nine days in Trans- Jordan during which we were
able to obtain a general impression of the greater part of the cultivated
zone. We welcome this opportunity of expressing our warm appre-
ciation of the hospitality accorded to us by His Highness the Amir
Abdullah and by the Trans- Jordan Government. We are also
greatly indebted to the British Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
Henry Cox, for the excellent arrangements made for our tour,
which enabled us to see so much of the country in the short time
at our disposal.

4. On our arrival in Jerusalem, we arranged for the issue
of a communique announcing that persons who wished to appear
before us would be free to choose whether they would be heard in
public or in private, or partly in public and partly in private. We
received, in fact, only two requests from witnesses who wished to
be heard in public. Of the fifty-five sessions which we held in Jeru-
salem for the purpose of receiving evidence, two were held in public
and the remainder in private. On our return to London, we held
nine further private sessions. No Arab witnesses came forward to
submit evidence to us.

9

5. We left Palestine on the 3rd August, travelling via Haifa
and Trieste, and resumed our sessions in London on the 15th August.
Since our departure from Palestine violence has continued and
intensified, and we have been keenly aware of the fact that we
should be greatly to blame if any delay on our part were to prolong
needlessly the present period of uncertainty. You, yourself, had
also informed us that His Majesty’s Government were most anxious
to receive our report at the earliest possible moment. In these
circumstances, we considered that delay would be avoided if we
postponed for a later stage the examination of certain questions
arising in connection with our enquiry. There are a number of
matters which we have felt that we could not usefully discuss at
this stage, either because to do so would involve needless delay
without affecting the main conclusions of our report, or because a
detailed examination could not be entered upon until the main lines
of a partition scheme had been settled. The matters which we have
left for consideration at a later stage include the following questions
to which specific reference is made in the second part of our terms
of reference — –

(a) the allocation of public assets ;

(b) currency arrangements ;

(c) the preservation of the rights of civil servants.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

1. In this introductory chapter we give a synopsis, by reference
to the succeeding chapters, of our report.

2. After a chapter (chapter II) recording the chief events in„
and in connection with, Palestine since the publication of the Royal
Commission’s Report and a chapter (chapter III) dealing with certain
general matters, we begin our enquiry, as our terms of reference
direct, by taking into account the plan of partition outlined in
Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission ; and for convenience
we reproduce (as map 3) the map which the Royal Commission
attached to their Report in illustration of that plan. But neither the
map nor the brief description of the boundaries of the proposed
areas given in chapter XXII, paragraph 20, of the Report, purports
to do more than give a rough outline of the plan : in order to examine
the Royal Commission’s scheme demographically, that is, with
reference to statistics of population and land, it is necessary to draw
the proposed boundaries exactly, taking the Royal Commission’s
proposals as a guide. We cannot imagine, however, that the Royal
Commission, if they had set themselves to the task of drawing
precise frontiers for their proposed areas, would have ignored the
important problem of defence ; yet when we ourselves examined
the boundaries with this in mind we found it necessary to make
considerable modifications in the outline of the Royal Commission’s
scheme, especially in the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave and
Corridor (which hereafter we refer to as the Jerusalem Enclave), and
in the boundaries on the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain and the
southern edge of the Plain of Jezreel. These modifications were all
made after consultation and in agreement with the military
authorities, and we have no reason to suppose that the Royal
Commission, if they had given a detailed description of their plan,
would have chosen different boundaries. The resulting plan is
shown in map 8. With a few exceptions, which are explained in
chapters IV, V and VI, it merely reproduces the Royal Commission’s
plan as interpreted in the light of the advice which we have received
from the military authorities from the standpoint of defence. We call
this plan A.

3. Chapters IV, V, VI and VII describe plan A in detail.

In chapter IV we describe the modifications necessitated in
the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave, and the boundary we
propose for the Enclave at Nazareth.

Chapter V deals with the boundary of Jaffa, which the
Royal Commission proposed should be included in the Arab State,
including the boundary between the towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv. :

12

4. In chapter VI we describe the boundaries between the
proposed Jewish and Arab States along the Maritime Plain, across
the Carmel Ridge and the Plain of Esdraelon, along the southern
edge of the Plain of Jezreel, across the Beisan Plain, and northwards
along the Jordan Valley.

In chapter VII we give the figures of population and land
for the Arab and Jewish States and the Enclaves under plan A.

5. In chapter VIII we consider the possibility under plan A of
voluntary exchanges of land and population and the prospects of
providing, by means of land development, room for further settlement
to meet the needs of persons desiring to move from one area to
another. The conclusion we come to is that the possibilities under
these heads are small.

6. In chapter IX we examine the Jewish claim that at least a
portion of the city of Jerusalem should be included in the Jewish
State, and give our reasons for rejecting that claim.

7. In chapter X, plan A is subjected to a detailed examination,
and we proceed to explain the reasons which have led us to reach the
unanimous conclusion that we cannot recommend the adoption of
this plan. During the course of this examination a variant of plan A
is considered, which we call plan B. The majority of the Commission
are of opinion that plan B is also unacceptable ; one of the members,
however, considers, for reasons explained in his note of reservations,
that plan B is preferable to the plan put forward by the majority in
chapter XI, which we call plan C.

8. Chapter XI explains in detail plan C, which the majority of
us put forward as the best scheme of partition which we have been
able to devise.

9. In chapter XII we consider proposals put forward on behalf
of the Jews for the inclusion in the Jewish State of certain areas,
apart from Jerusalem, for the extension of the Jerusalem Enclave
so as to include the town of Hebron and the western shores of the
Dead Sea, and explain the grounds on which we consider them
unacceptable.

10. In chapter XIII we consider under what conditions Jews
should be allowed to acquire land in the areas which under plan C are
retained under Mandate, and make recommendations for the develop-
ment of those areas for the joint benefit of both Arabs and Jews.

11. In chapter XIV we consider under what conditions immigra-
tion should be permitted into the areas which under plan C are
retained under Mandate.

13

12. In chapter XV we deal with certain matters of administra-
tion relating to the Nazareth Enclave, and put forward proposals for
safeguarding the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of
Galilee (Lake Tiberias).

13. Chapter XVI deals with the provision of effective safeguards
for the rights of religious and racial minorities in the areas to be
allocated to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection of
religious rights and properties.

14. Chapter XVII deals with internal communications (railways,
ports, and posts and telegraphs), and with industrial concessions.

15. Chapter XVIII deals with finance, and, after examining
the budgetary prospects of the several areas under plan C, so far as
it is possible to forecast them at present, concludes that it is not
possible to recommend boundaries which will give a reasonable
prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab
State.

16. Chapter XIX deals with customs policy and administration,
and concludes that some form of customs union between the Arab
and Jewish States and Mandated Territories is necessary to provide
for the economic welfare of those states.

17. Chapter XX is concerned with the public debt and other
financial obligations of the Palestine Government, and the means
of ensuring that these shall continue to be duly honoured.

18. Chapter XXI examines a suggestion that advantage should
“be taken of the proposed customs union to redistribute the net
surplus customs revenue, after meeting certain common charges,
between the three areas in such a way as to improve the position of
the Arab State, without subjecting it to the necessity of external
financial control. The conclusion is reached that, notwithstanding
the advantages which an arrangement of this kind seemed to offer,
including some reduction in the charges which partition must in
any event impose on the British Exchequer, there are constitutional
reasons which render it impossible to contemplate a customs union
“between the Mandated Territories and the Arab and Jewish States
except under conditions which would be inconsistent with the grant
of fiscal independence to those states.

19. In chapter XXII we summarize the main points which we
think that His Majesty’s Government will find it necessary to
consider before deciding whether they can regard any plan of partition
which we put forward as equitable and practicable. We conclude
that, apart from the question whether plan C, which is the best plan
that the majority of us have been able to devise, will be accepted by
those concerned, the financial and economic objections to that plan,

14

without a customs union between the three areas, are so serious that
we could not recommend it. If, therefore, we were to confine our-
selves strictly to our terms of reference, we should have no choice
but to report that we have been unable to recommend boundaries
which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment
of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. Rather than end our
report with this merely negative conclusion, however, we have
ventured to go further and put forward a suggestion for a modified
form of partition, which we call economic federalism, which, while
it withholds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States,
seems to us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory
basis of settlement, if His Majesty’s Government are prepared to
accept the very considerable financial liability involved.

J

15

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

20. Before we proceed to consider in detail the schemes of
partition to which reference has been made, we feel that it is desirable
to refer briefly to the development of events since the publication
of the Report of the Royal Commission in July, 1937. We do not
feel called upon to furnish in this report anything in the nature of an
historical introduction. The historical aspect of the present problem
in Palestine has already been described in the first part of the
Royal Commission’s Report, and we shall therefore content our-
selves with a short description of the immediate political
background against which our enquiry has been carried out.

21. The Royal Commission were appointed in August, 1936, as a
result of the disturbances which had broken out in Palestine earlier
in the year. They were required by their terms of reference to
ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances, to enquire into
the manner in which the Mandate was being implemented, and
whether the Arabs or the Jews had any legitimate grievances in this
respect ; and if any such grievances were thought to be well-founded,
to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention
of their recurrence. In their Report the Royal Commission reached
the conclusion that the deadlock in Palestine was complete and that
no measures which could be carried out within the framework of the
Mandate would be effective in securing a permanent settlement.
“A continuance,” they wrote, ” or rather an aggravation — for that
is what continuance will be — of the present situation cannot be
contemplated without the gravest misgivings. It will mean constant
unrest and disturbance in peace and potential danger in the event of
war. It will mean a steady decline in our prestige. It will mean
the gradual alienation of two peoples who are traditionally our
friends.”

22. In the light of these considerations, the Royal Commission
concluded that a way out from the deadlock must be sought outside
the existing Mandate : the gravity of the disease required a drastic
remedy. On page 375 they wrote — ■

Manifestly the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or
the Jews all they want. The answer to the question ” Which of them in
the end will govern Palestine ? ” must surely be ” Neither.” We do
not think that any fair-minded statesman would suppose, now that the
hope of harmony between the races has proved untenable, that Britain
ought either to hand over to Arab rule 400,000 Jews, whose entry into
Palestine has been for the most part facilitated by the British Government
and approved by the League of Nations ; or that, if the Jews should
become a majority, a million or so of Arabs should be handed over to
their rule. But, while neither race can justly rule all Palestine, we see
no reason why, if it were practicable, each race should not rule part of it.

16

The Commission, while expressing the view that they would not
be expected to embark on the further protracted enquiry which
would be needed for working out a scheme of partition in full detail,
felt that it would be idle for them to put forward the principle of
partition and not to give it any concrete shape. In chapter XXII
of their Report, therefore, they outlined a plan which conformed,
in their view, to the principles which they had stated to be essential
to any plan. ” It must be practicable. It must conform to our
obligations. It must do justice to the Arabs and the Jews.”

23. The Royal Commission’s Report was published on the
7th July, 1937. On the same day a Statement of Policy (Cmd. 5513)
was issued by His Majesty’s Government. This Statement contained
the following announcement —

In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the
Commission, they [His Majesty’s Government] are driven to the con-
clusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of
Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied
under the terms of the. present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition
on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the
best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.

The Report and the Statement of Policy were debated in the
House of Lords on the 20th and 21st July, and in the House of
Commons on the 21st July when the Secretary of State for the
Colonies moved the following motion —

That this House approves the policy of His Majesty’s Government
relating to Palestine as set out in Command Paper No. 5513.

An amendment proposed by Mr. Winston Churchill was accepted
by the Government, and the following motion was agreed to without
a division —

That the proposals contained in Command Paper No. 5513 relating
to Palestine should be brought before the League of Nations with a view
to enabling His Majesty’s Government, after adequate enquiry, to
present to Parliament a definite scheme taking into full account all the
recommendations of the Command Paper.

24. No time was lost in bringing these proposals before the
League of Nations, and on the 30th July the Thirty-second (Extra-
ordinary) Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission opened
in Geneva for the purpose of hearing the representatives of the
Mandatory Power. After a prolonged examination of the Accredited
Representatives, the Commission, in a Preliminary Opinion sub-
mitted to the Council of the League, expressed the view that ” the
present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly
declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the
twofold authority conferred on it by its impartiality and its unanimity^
and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself. . . . The
Commission therefore considers that it is worth continuing the
examination of the advantages and drawbacks of a new territorial
solution.” The Commission’s Preliminary Opinion was presented

17

to the Council of the League on the 14th September, 1937, when the
British representative sought the general authority of the Council for
the procedure proposed by His Majesty’s Government for the
working out of a detailed scheme of partition.

25. Such were the preliminary steps taken by His Majesty’s
Government to give effect to the policy set out in the Statement
of Policy mentioned in paragraph 23. We must now describe
the reactions of Arab and Jewish opinion to the Royal Com-
mission’s plan of partition. The Arab reaction was immediate
and uncompromising. Arabs of all parties and shades of political
opinion were unanimous in condemning the plan as inequitable and
wholly unacceptable. In a published memorandum addressed to
the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Arab Higher Committee,
after examining the Royal Commission’s scheme of partition in
detail, expressed their unanimous rejection of the proposal, and
announced that the only solution which they could regard as
acceptable ” must be based on the following principles — ■

(a) the recognition of the right of the Arabs to complete
independence in their own land ;

(b) the cessation of the experiment of the Jewish National
Home ;

(c) the cessation of the British Mandate and its replacement
by a treaty similar to treaties existing between Britain and
Iraq, Britain and Egypt, and between France and Syria,
creating in Palestine a sovereign State ;

(d) the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and
of land sales to Jews pending the negotiation and conclusion
of the treaty.”

More than a year has now elapsed since the Royal Commission’s
Report was published, but the Arabs remain inflexibly hostile to
partition… During our stay in Palestine, no Arab came forward to
submit eVKfcSSe or to co-operate in any way with us : the boycott
was complete.

26. The outburst of uncompromising disapproval which was
the immediate result on the Arab side of the announcement of
policy made by His Majesty’s Government on the publication
of the Royal Commission’s Report was followed by an intensifi-
cation of the Arab lawlessness which had continued sporadically
since the end of the Arab general strike in the previous autumn.
During the last days of July, and throughout August and
September, a widespread campaign of murder and intimidation cost
many Jews and Arabs their lives. The culmination of this campaign
was reached on the 26th September, when Mr. L. Y. Andrews, the
Acting District Commissioner, Galilee District, and his police
escort were shot dead by unknown assassins in Nazareth. The

18

Palestine Government took immediate steps to deal with the
situation. On the 1st October the Arab Higher Committee and all
National Committees in Palestine were declared to be unlawful
associations, and on the same day three members of the Committee
and its Secretary were arrested and deported to the Seychelles.
Shortly afterwards Haj Amin Eff. Al Husseini, the President of the
Committee, who had been deprived on 1st October of his office of
President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of membership of the
General Waqf Committee, fled from Palestine to the Lebanon. On
the 10th November, the Palestine Government announced that, in
view of the continuation of the organized murder campaign in the
country, it had been decided, in the interests of public security, to
establish military courts by Defence Regulations under the Palestine
(Defence) Order in Council, 1937. These courts came into being on
the 18th November. In spite of these measures no improvement
had taken place in the security position by the end of the year.

27. The Royal Commission’s proposals were received by the
Jews with mixed feelings, and it soon became apparent that deep
cleavages of opinion existed among the various Jewish parties, both
in Palestine and elsewhere, as to the acceptability of partition in
any form. The whole question was debated at length at the
Twentieth Zionist Congress which was held at Zurich in August, 1937,
and the resolution ultimately adopted by the Congress represented
a compromise between the supporters and opponents of partition.
The following is the text of this resolution —

1. The Twentieth Zionist Congress solemnly reaffirms the historic
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and its inalienable right
to its homeland.

2. The Congress takes note of the findings of the Palestine Royal
Commission with regard to the following fundamental matters : first,
that the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble
and in its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National
Home ; secondly, that the field in which the Jewish National Home was
to be established was understood, at the time of the Balfour Declaration,
to be the whole of historic Palestine, including Trans- Jordan ; thirdly,
that inherent in the Balfour Declaration was the possibility of the
evolution of Palestine into a Jewish State ; fourthly, that Jewish settle-
ment in Palestine has conferred substantial benefits on the Arab
population and has been to the economic advantage of the Arabs as a
whole.

3 . The Congress re j ects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission
that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfilment.
The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the
rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour
Declaration and the Mandate.

The Congress rejects the conclusion of the Royal Commission that tte
national aspirations of the Jewish people and of the Arabs of Palestine
are irreconcilable. The main obstacle to co-operation and mutual
understanding between the two peoples has been the general uncertainty
which, as stated in the Report of the Royal Commission, has prevailed in
regard to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Government, and

19

the vacillating attitude of the Palestine Administration ; these have
engendered a lack of confidence in the determination and the ability of
the Government to implement the Mandate. The Congress reaffirms on
this occasion the declarations of previous Congresses expressing the
readiness of the Jewish people to reach a peaceful settlement with the
Arabs of Palestine, based on the free development of both peoples and
the mutual recognition of their respective rights.

4. The Congress condemns the “palliative proposals” put forward
by the Royal Commission as a policy for implementing the Mandate,
such as curtailment of immigration, fixing of a political high-level in
substitution for the principle of economic absorptive capacity, closing of
certain parts of the country to Jewish settlement, limitations on the
acquisition of land, etc. Those proposals are a travesty of the Mandate
and a violation of international pledges, and would prove destructive of
the future ofgJ^TgNational Home.

5. The Congress enters its strongest protest against the decision of
His Majesty’s Government to fix a political maximum for Jewish
immigration of all categories for the next eight months, thus sweeping
away the principle of economic absorptive capacity, in violation of Jewish
rights and of the undertakings repeatedly given in this regard by
His Majesty’s Government and confirmed by the League of Nations.

6. The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by
the Royal Commission is unacceptable.

7. The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations
with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty’s Government
for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.

8. In such negotiations the Executive shall not commit either itself
or the Zionist Organisation, but in the event of the emergence of a.
definite scheme for the establishment of a Jewish State, such scheme
shall be brought before a newly elected Congress for decision.

28. The League Council were informed in September, 1937, that
the intention of His Majesty’s Government was to appoint a further
special body to visit Palestine and to submit proposals for a detailed
scheme of partition. The terms of reference of the new Commission
were announced on the 4th January, 1938 ; they were then published
in a White Paper (Cmd. 5634), the full text of which is reproduced in
Appendix 1.

29. The new year saw no improvement in the state of public
security in Palestine. Almost every day brought its record of
murder, intimidation, and sabotage. In spite of several successful
operations conducted in March against armed Arab bands, the
situation continued to deteriorate, and on our arrival in Palestine
on the 27th April, we found the atmosphere charged with intense
hatred and bitterness. Against this dark background of racial
hostility, violence and widespread disorder we conducted our enquiry.
During the three months of our stay in the country, nothing occurred
to relieve this tragic picture, and, indeed, when we left at the begin-
ning of August, the tension between the Arab and Jewish com-
munities was probably greater than it had ever been, as the result

20

of two terrible bomb explosions which had occurred in the Arab
fruit market at Haifa during July. The following are figures of
those who were killed or wounded as the result of acts of violence
during the first seven months of the year ; these figures do not
include the casualties suffered by armed Arab bands in encounters
with military and police forces —

Killed. Wounded.

British —

Police
4
10
Military
9
38
Civilians
1
1
Arab —
Police
23
33
Civilians
.. .. 190
338
Jewish —
Police
.. .. 21
33
Civilians
68
275
Total ..
. . 316
728

30. We feel that we may appropriately close this chapter with a
tribute to the members of the administration, the judiciary, and the
police for their forbearance in the face of provocation, and their
courage and devotion to duty in the midst of ceaseless anxiety, and
to the members of the British military forces who are discharging
their duty with traditional coolness and restraint.

J

21

CHAPTER III

GENERAL MATTERS

31. In this chapter we consider certain general matters with
which it is convenient to deal at an early stage of our report.

1. Boundaries

32. Owing to the need of secrecy, it has not been possible to
trace the boundaries of plans B or C on the ground, and accordingly
we have not been able to include in our report a continuous written
description of them in detail, except in regard to the boundary of
Jaffa. The boundaries which we recommend have been shown on
maps deposited with His Majesty’s Government. These include an
original copy signed by our Chairman and one certified copy.

33. For the information of the public there are shown in
Appendices 2, 3 and 4 lists of the village sites (that is, the sites on
which the principal buildings of the village stand) in the vicinity of
the boundaries showing in which state those village sites lie. As a rule
the boundary follows village boundaries, but in some places, owing
to reasons of defence or otherwise, it does not do so.

34. If a scheme of partition is decided upon, the actual boundaries
will have to be demarcated on the ground by a Boundary Commission.
We think that this Commission should consist of two British officers,
with a reference, in case of a difference of opinion arising, to a
third British officer. In delimiting the boundary the Boundary
Commission should adhere closely to the maps ; but they should be
at liberty to make such small changes in the boundary as the economic
or industrial or other requirements of the local inhabitants or the
requirements of defence or the nature of the ground may, in their
opinion, require.

35. As a rule it is desirable that administrative boundaries, and
still more inter-state boundaries, should not cut across the lands
of a village. But, in drawing the boundary between the Arab and
Jewish States, it may happen that defence requirements make it
necessary to include part of the land of an Arab village within the
Jewish State. We asked Government officers what view the villagers
would be likely to take in such a case, and found them all agreed that
the villagers would prefer that the boundary line should run through
the lands of the village rather than that the whole of the village lands
should be included in the Jewish State. We were told that the Arab
villager would much prefer to retain a footing in the Arab State,

22

notwithstanding the risk of inconvenience which the severance of the
village lands might cause him, and that, if the residential site of a
village were included in the Jewish State, the villagers might even
wish to transfer their houses to the part of the lands of the village
in the Arab State. In drawing the boundary between the Arab and
Jewish States we have therefore followed the defensive line in cases
where it cuts through the lands of a village, and have not extended the
boundary so as to include the whole of the village lands in the Jewish
State. As regards villages on the boundary between the Arab State
and an area to be retained under Mandate, the opinion of those we
consulted was not unanimous, but the majority took the view that
the villagers would prefer that the whole of the lands of the villages
should be included within the Mandated area. In such cases,
accordingly, we have followed the boundary of the village lands
unless to do so involved the inclusion of a considerable population
or area of land within the Mandated area.

2. Defence

36. Defence is an important factor in drawing the boundaries of
a state, and it is one which we have borne in mind throughout our
enquiry. In this matter the military authorities have been our
advisers. We put the various plans before them and asked them,
without accepting any responsibility for the plans themselves, to
advise us on purely military grounds what were the most suitable
boundaries for each from the point of view of defence. On this basis,
they have given us advice which we have accepted in every case.
In advising us on the suitability of a boundary from the point of
view of defence, the military authorities have taken into account
the following general considerations. Palestine is a small country
about the size of Wales or Belgium. It is impossible to divide a country
of its size and configuration into areas the frontiers of which, having
regard to the conditions of modern warfare, will have any real
military significance. No strategic line, judged by those conditions,
exists west of the River Jordan. In these circumstances, the guiding
principle which the military authorities have followed is whether a
proposed boundary is tactically suitable for defence against a force
armed with rifles and machine guns.

3. Population

37. The growth of population in Palestine since the War is the
result of a combination of circumstances unique in modern history —
an unusually high (though not unprecedented) rate of immigration,
comparable with the mass immigration movements into Australia
and New Zealand in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and an
abnormally high (and possibly unprecedented) rate of natural
increase in the existing indigenous population.

23

38. There are no vital statistics for Palestine under Turkish
rule, but ” there is no evidence that the population increased or
diminished during the last two centuries.”* If the numbers
fluctuated, the fluctuations cancelled out. Since the War, the
population has doubled, from about 700,000 in 1919 to an estimated
total of just over 1,400,000 in the middle of 1938. Of this increase,
migration accounts for about 300,000, and natural increase for the
remainder ; and of this natural increase, that of the Arabf population
has been about 355,000, that is, from about 635.000J in 1919 to about
990,000| in 1938, an increase of nearly 56 per cent. The following
table gives the official figures of the changes between the census of
1922 and mid-1937, with estimates for 1919 and mid-1938.§

Year
All
Religions
Moslems
Jews
Christians
Others
1919
700,000
568,000
58,000
74,000
1922
752,048
589,177
83,790
71,464
7,617
1937
1,383,320
875,947
386,08411
109,769
11,520
1938
1,415,700
989,500U
401,600
24,600c
1922-37
Total Increase of
population
631,272
286,770
302,294
38,305
3,903
Increase by migration
281,339
25,168
245,433
10,414
324
Natural Increase . .
349,933
261,602
56,861
27,891
3,579

It may be noted that the Arab population is predominantly rural,
nearly 70 per cent, living in rural areas ; whereas the Jewish popula-
tion is predominantly urban, 70 per cent, living in the four large
towns of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jaffa, and 35 per cent, in
the all- Jewish town of Tel Aviv alone.

39. It is worth while to study the vital statistics for some expla-
nation of this astonishing change in the Arab population since the
war, which it is very unlikely that the authors of the Balfour Declara-
tion or of the Mandate foresaw. The following tables, taken from

* A. M. Carr-Saunders, ” World Population,” for 1936, p. 310.
t The word ” Arab ” in this section is used in its strict sense, and not a
equivalent to ” non-Jew.”

% After allowing for some 35,000 Arab immigrants.

§ The figures for 1922 and 1937 are from the Report by His Majesty’s
Government on Palestine and Trans- Jordan, 1937, p. 221, which adds :
” The precision of these figures is not great.” The 1938 figure is an unofficial
estimate made for us by the Palestine Government : the 1919 figure is that
used by Professor Carr-Saunders (” World Population,” p. 307).

|| This differs from the figure of 392,000 given in chapter VII, which makes
some allowance for illicit immigrants. The estimate prepared by the Jewish
Agency gives 416,000 ; the difference is probably due to the inclusion of a higher
figure for illicit immigrants.
.’ % Including Christian Arabs.

Including non-Arab Christians.

24

the Government’s Annual Report on Palestine and Trans- Jordan
for 1937 (Colonial No. 146), page 223, give the figures of birth-rate,
death-rate, infant mortality and natural increase for all Palestine,
excluding the nomadic population, since the census of 1922* : —

ANNUAL RATE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS PER THOUSAND
OF SETTLED POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES, 1922-37

Year.
Birth-rate.
Moslems.
Jews.
Christians.
1922-25 average
50
09
34
81
36
37
1926-30 „ . .
53
45
34
29
38
55
1931-35
50
24
30
33
35
84
1934
46
56
30
21
33
55
1935
52
54
30
80
35
61
1936
53
14
29
74
. 36
34
1937
49
74
26
67
33
55
Average 1922-37t
51
15
32
21
36
47
Death-rate.
1922-25 average
26
83
13
62
16
13
1926-30
28
31
11
66
17
91
1931-35
25
34
9
32
15
04
1934
26
68
9
53
16
25
1935
23
46
8
58
13
99
1936
19
97
8
82
12
63
1937 .. ….
24
82
7
78
13
91
Average 1922-37f
26
14
10
78
15
89

INFANT MORTALITY : DEATHS OF INFANTS UNDER ONE
YEAR OF AGE PER THOUSAND LIVE BIRTHS, 1922-37

Year.
Moslems.
Jews.
Christians.
1922-25 average
190-39
122-90
144-35
1926-30
193-46
95-83
158-56
1931-35
166-41
77-99
136-28
1934 . . . .
175-15
78-13
152-39
1935
148-10
64-15
125-81 ,
1936
136-15
68-70
113-72 J
1937
179-33
57-20
127-34″^

* Vital occurrences in Palestine are at present classified by religion only,
t Not given in the Annual Report.

25

ANNUAL RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER THOUSAND
OF SETTLED POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES, 1922-37

Year.
Moslems.
Jews.
Christians.
1922-25 average
23-26
21-19
20-24
1926-30 „
25-14
22-63
20-64
1931-35 „
24-90
21-01
20-80
1934
19-88
20-68
17-30
1935
29-08
22-22
21-62
1936
33-17
20-92
23-71
1937 ..
24-92
18-89
19-64
Average 1922-37*
25-01
21-43
20-58

* Not given in the Annual Report.

40. The comparative figures of natural increase for certain
other countries may be noted : — –

Non-European Countries

Birth-rate.
Death-rate.
Natural
increase.
Low-
est
High-
est
Average.
Low-
est
High-
est
Average.
Average.
Egypt* (1920-33)
41-8
45-7
43-7
24-9
28-8
26-5
17-2
Ceylon ( 1920-29) f
36-5
41-5
39-2
21-75
31-5
26-8
12-4
Formosa (1920-31)f
38-75
45-25
42-1
19
32
22-23
19-1
Japan (1920-33) f
31-75
35-25
33-66
17-75
23
20-3
13-36
India (1920-30) f
32
37
34-4
24
31
26-7
7-7

* ” The Population Problem in Egypt.” Wendell Cleland, 1936.
t Calculated approximately from graphs in “World Population.”
Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp. 281, 262, 271.

26

Overseas Countries with Population of European Origin*

1921-5
1926-30
1931.
1932.
1933.
1934.
1935.
1936.
U.S.A.—
Birth-rate
22
6
1 a
19
/
A
17-4
16-4
Death-rate . .
11
9
11
8
11
1
1 A

10
9
10
7
Natural
10
7
7
9
6
9
6
5
5
7
6
1
6-0
Increase.
Canada —
Birth-rate
27
1
24
1
2
22
5
20
9
20-4
Death-rate . .
11
1
11
2
10
1
9
9
9
6
9-4
Natural
16-0
12
9
13
1
12
6
11
3
11

10-6
Increase.
Australia —
Birth-rate .
23
9
21

18
2
16
9
16
8
16-4
Death-rate . .
9
5
9
3
8
7
Q
O
O
Q
O
A

9
9
3
Natural
14
4
11
7
9
5
Q

o
q
o
n
J
A

y
7
1
7-0
7-7
Increase.
New Zealand —
Birth-rate
22
2
19
7
18
4
17
1
16
6
16
5
Death-rate . .
8-6
8
6
8-3
8

8

8
5
Natural
13
6
11
1
10-
1
A

9
1
8
6
8

8-0
7-9
Increase.
South Africa —
(European
population).
Birth-rate . .
27
1
26
1
25-4
24
2
23-6
23
5
Death-rate . .
9
7
9
7
9-4
10

9
4
9
7
Natural
17
4
16-4
16-

14
2
14
2
13
8
13-7
14-8
Increase .
Argentine —
Birth-rate . .
32
8
30
4
28-
7
28
1
26

25
3
Death-rate . .
14
6
13
5
12-
5
12

11
7
11
7
Natural
18
2
16
9
16-
2
16
1
14
3
13
6
12-6
Increase.
iH
»^-^

41 . Any conclusions based upon the vital statistics of relatively
backward countries must be made with caution. But from these
figures certain striking facts emerge.

(i) The Moslem Population

(a) The birth-rate is a long way higher than that of any other
country given in the tables, and is probably among the highest in
the world.

* “World Population,” p. 177.

27

(b) Unless the set-back in 1937 should prove to be significant
of a change (which does not seem likely since it applies to the other
religious groups also), there is no indication of any downward
tendency during the period : the rate is fairly stable at a point
just above 50.

(c) The death-rate, though high, is not actually higher than that
of Egypt and of other Asiatic countries on somewhat the same
economic level.

(d) Again apart from 1937, which shows an abrupt upward
turn, there has been in the last ten years a gradual downward
trend in the death-rate, and most notably in the rate of infant
mortality.

(e) As the result of the abnormally high birth-rate and the
relatively low death-rate, the natural increase of the Arab population
is abnormally high.

42. Here, no doubt, lies the explanation, both of the change
since the War from a stationary to a growing population, and of
the abnormal rapidity of that growth. In part the change may be
ascribed to the cessation, under British Mandatory rule, of the
annual conscription of young men for military service in distant
parts of the Turkish Empire — a service from which it is said that
few ever returned. But the effect of a system of this kind upon
vital statistics is apt, Professor Carr-Saunders thinks, to be over-
estimated. Its abolition may have been followed by some rise,
but not a large rise, in the birth-rate.

43. It would seem that the growth of population must be due
mainly to a lower death-rate, brought about, not so much by a change
in personal habits (although in this region also the effect of education
and advice by Government medical officers and clinics is beginning
to be seen), as by general administrative measures, such as anti-
malarial control, under an efficient and enlightened government.
But whether these explanations fully cover the ground it is
impossible to say without knowledge of the facts under the Ottoman
regime. We thus have the Arab population reflecting simultaneously
two widely different tendencies — a birth-rate characteristic of a
peasant community in which the unrestricted family is normal, and
a death-rate which could only be brought about under an enlightened
modern administration, with both the will and the necessary funds
at its disposal to enable it to serve a population unable to help
itself. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the
Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this
result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered
close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been
brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue
contributed by the Jews.

2S

44. How far the Arabs themselves have benefited, as a com-
munity, from these vital conditions, is perhaps open to question-
That the Arabs’ standard of living is higher than before the War is,
we think, certain, if the average condition of the whole community
is considered (though it does not follow that a particular group,
such as the Bedouin, have gained). That there is as yet no pressure
on the means of subsistence is also, we think, proved by the steadily
declining death-rate — unless the sharp upward turn in 1937 proves
to be significant.* ” If a population, which did not control births,
had increased to the point where there was only just enough food
to keep the members alive, it would show high birth- and death-
rates running parallel. For, even if death from disease was controlled,,
deaths would take place from lack of food.”f On the other hand,
it seems certain that the amount of land now under cultivation, by
present methods and on present standards, is insufficient to support
the same percentage of the total Arab population to-day as in 1922.
This would in any case stem probable from the facts that since 1919
(a) the total Arab population, of which the census of 1931 showed
over 60 per cent, to be directly engaged in agriculture, has increased
by about 360,000 persons, and (b) the amount of land available for
Arab cultivation has been diminished by the purchase of about
three-quarters of a million dunums by the Jews, on the greater part
of which Arabs are not employed. But the argument cannot be-
proved in this way without taking into account the amount of
additional land, previously classed as uncultivable, which has been
brought under cultivation since 1919, about which no precise informa-
tion is available. Proof, however, appears to be forthcoming from
the Report on the Census of Palestine for 1931, paragraph 259,
which states that “it is thus clear that nearly a quarter of the
agriculturists would be unable to maintain their present standard
of life if they were unable to find a secondary means of subsistence.”
It is only reasonable to suppose that, as the non- Jewish population
has increased since 1931 by nearly 150,000, the proportion of agri-
culturists in this condition is nqpv considerably larger. ”

* Horowitz (Economic Survey of Palestine, Tel Aviv, 1938, page 34),
ascribes this very marked increase in the death-rate in 1937 (experienced, in a.
greater or less degree, by Moslems, Christians, and the smaller religious groups,
but not by the Jews) to the depression, which in that year ” began to be
severely felt.” No explanation is given in the official report on Palestine for
the year : there was a certain increase in the number of deaths from epidemic
disease, but not enough to account for the percentage increases. On the other
hand, 1937 was a prosperous year for agriculture, and in so far as the Arab
population is directly dependent on the produce of its own lands for subsistence,
this might be expected to prevent any marked rise in the death-rate. But
the rise in 1937 is noticeable chiefly in relation to 1936, when the rate was
exceptionally low, for reasons which we do not know and which may have
been only ephemeral. The 1937 figure is not so far above that for 1935 as to-
justify us in drawing any positive conclusions from it.

f Carr-Saunders, op. cit. p. 272.

29

45. As a rough check on this deduction, we have attempted
to calculate the amount of land in Arab ownership, classed as
cultivable, which is available on average per head of the existing
Arab population who are actually engaged in and directly dependent
upon pasture and agriculture. In the absence of an up-to-date
census, the number of such persons can only be calculated indirectly.
We have used two methods : first, to take the 1931 census figures,
calculate the percentage of the Arab population belonging to the
desired category in that year, and apply the same percentage to the
estimated Arab population to-day ; secondly, to take the total
rural population, as shown by the village statistics, according to
the latest known date (1936), and deduct one-fifth as representing
persons not directly dependent upon agriculture. The number of
persons in the desired category is then divided into the total
amount of Arab cultivable land. The first method gives an
average of 10-5 dunums per head, or (allowing 4-75 persons per
family) 49-87 dunums per family; the second, 12-2 dunums per
head, or 57 ’95 dunums per family.* These figures of 50 and
58 dunums may be compared with those in the table used by the
Director of Agriculture which is quoted in chapter VIII,
paragraph 143, of our report. According to that table, the
average ” lot viable ” for citrus and banana plantations is
10 dunums; the average for fruit plantations 113 dunums; the
average for taxable crop land, 140 dunums ; and the average for
untaxable crop land, 400 dunums. Of the total Arab cultivable
land about 2-4 per cent, consists of citrus and banana plantations ;
about one-sixth of other plantations, about two-thirds of taxable
crop land, and rather less than one-sixth of untaxable crop land. A
sample holding, weighted in the same proportions as the categories
into which the aggregate Arab land is actually divided, would work
out at about 111 dunums. Making every allowance for the roughness
of our method of calculation, it is apparent that the average holding
of 50 or 58 dunums at which we have arrived is far below what the
Director of Agriculture would regard as a reasonable “lot viable”
for a parcel of land so divided between the several categories.

46. If this argument is sound, then, subject to two qualifications,
to be mentioned below, three conclusions follow, (i) First, that if the
sources of present supplementary employment are cut off, even
partially, the consequences for the Arabs affected will be serious,
(ii) Secondly, that if the Arab rural population continues to increase
at its present rate, the demand for such supplementary employment,
and even the pressure to leave the land and seek for whole-time

* The higher figure reached by the second method is probably due to the
fraction of one-fifth deducted for persons not directly dependent upon
agriculture being too high. No calculation of the true proportion is available
for the Arab rural population : 20 per cent, is based upon Jewish economy
(cf. the figures given in chapter XIII), and is probablv inappropriate to
Arab conditions.

30

employment in the towns, will be intensified — quite apart from any
further acquisition of land by the Jews, (iii) And thirdly, that since
such employment can only be provided by capital, and, with few
exceptions, capital is only likely to be invested in Palestine by Jews,
the future for the Arab population is already menacing — unless Jewish
immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue.

47. The two qualifications mentioned above are these. First,
that there is no doubt that Palestine could support a larger
agricultural population if better methods of cultivation were adopted,
if the area under irrigation could be extended, and if markets for the
increased produce could be found. But for these changes capital
is needed, and this the Arab lacks. And in any case the changes
involved can only take place slowly ; and meanwhile the population
will be increasing — if no change takes place, the Arab population
alone will have increased by 250,000 in ten years’ time. The second
qualification relates to the size of the family. Professor Carr-Saunders,
speaking of the same problem in India, says : ” Family limitation
is the only way of escape.” (” World Population,” page 277.)
And again, of another group of Asiatic countries he says, in words
which may prove to be painfully applicable to Palestine : ” It is an
open question whether an increase will cease on account of a rising
death-rate or on account of a falling birth-rate. This means that a
very serious threat hangs over these countries, since a rising death-
rate would imply not only much suffering but also the possibility
of social retrogression.”

48. It may be argued that the proper conclusion to be drawn
from these figures is that there is no room for any further Jewish
immigration into Palestine at all : the whole country, not only the,
land but the openings for urban employment, must all be reserved
to satisfy the needs of the growing Arab population. We are aware
that the Shaw Commission, reporting in 1930, recommended, and
indeed thought it most important, that ” the Government of Palestine,
in deciding the rate at which newcomers are to be admitted to
agriculture, should have regard to fye certain natural increase of the <
present population ” (Cmd. 5.530, gjfge 123). But whatever may have_J
been the position then, we believe that to act in such a way
to-day, even as regards agricultural settlement, and a fortiori as
regards immigration in general, would be an unpractical and indeed

a short-sighted policy. So far as settlement on the land is concerned,
we are convinced that the only practical rule is to have regard solely
to the population existing at any given date. The Arabs would be
no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount
of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively
and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in
the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about
without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital.
The alternative possibility of assistance by the United Kingdom
Government may, we feel sure, be ruled out, for we cannot imagine

31

that, if Jewish immigration were to be completely closed down in
Palestine, His Majesty’s Government would be willing to provide
funds from the British taxpayer’s pocket for the sake of enabling
a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine.

So far as concerns non-agricultural settlement, it would seem
that economic conditions in Palestine are by now so closely bound
up with Jewish immigration, both actual and prospective, that the
Arabs in Palestine would be faced with the prospect of greater
economic hardship if Jewish immigration should be completely
closed down, than they would be even if it should be allowed to
continue.

(ii) The Jewish Population

49. It is not necessary for our purpose to comment at any length
on the Jewish figures, but the following points may be noted.

(a) It is probably not generally realized that in the 15 years
between the 1922 census and 1937 the increase of Jewish population
by migration was less than the natural increase of the Moslem
population, and that the total increase of the Jewish population is still
less than the total increase of Arab (including Christian Arab)
population.

(b) The natural increase of the Jewish population in Palestine
is, for a people who practise family restriction, abnormally high ;
it is also believed to be higher than that of Jewish communities in
other countries. This is no doubt in part accounted for by the
peculiar age composition of the Jewish population. Young adults,
including women of child-bearing age, form an unusually high
proportion of the Jewish community in Palestine : according to the
Statistical Year-book of the League of Nations, the percentage of
the population in the age-group 15-45 is 56-7, as compared with
47 for the United Kingdom, 46 for Canada, and similar figures for
other established countries. Moreover, both this high proportion of
persons in that age-group, in which the risk of dying is lowest, and
the relative scarcity of infants and old people, which is typical of
recent immigrant-communities, tend to keep the death-rate low.

(iii) Trans-Jordan

50. Unfortunately no figures of population or of vital statistics
are available for Trans- Jordan. We do not know what the pre-war
population of the area was, nor do we know with any precision what
the population is to-day. It is usually estimated at about 325,000,
and it is generally thought that there has been a gradual increase
to that figure since the war. If that impression is correct, it would
conform with what we should expect to find, prima facie, on the analogy
of the Moslem figures in Palestine, that is to say, a high birth-rate,
more or less stable, and a death-rate somewhat higher than in

32

Palestine (since the medical and administrative services in Trans-
ordan, though efficient as far as they go, are certainly not so com-
rehensive as in Palestine), but still such as to leave a certain margin
of natural increase. But how large that margin is, and what exactly
the figures of birth- and death-rate are, it is impossible to say.

4. Population and Land Statistics

51. At the time of the Royal Commission’s enquiry no detailed
statistics of either population or land were available. Since that date
figures have been compiled, village by village, for the whole of
Palestine except the Beersheba sub-district, and it is these figures
which we have used in our report. The methods by which these
figures have been compiled are explained in Appendix 5. We
should emphasize that the figures for land and population which
are given in the report are not strictly accurate, though sufficiently
exact for our purpose. The figures for the Arab population relate
to the middle of the year 1937 and those for the Jewish population
to September, 1936 ; the difference in the dates is due to a
difference in the method of compilation. The figures relating to the
land and the ownership thereof show the position as it was on the
1st April, 1935, with the exception of land planted with citrus ;
the figures for the latter are based on an ad hoc survey carried out in
the autumn of 1937. Excluding the Beersheba sub-district, the area
of land transferred by Arabs to Jews between the 1st April, 1935, and
the 31st May, 1938, is, according to the Land Registries, 84,477
dunums. The village statistics give the total area of land in Jewish
ownership in April, 1935, as 1,238,896 dunums. The area of land
owned by the Jews at the end of May, 1938, was, therefore, about
7 per cent, more than it was in April, 1935. The later figures could
not be used because it was not possible to distribute the area
purchased since April, 1935, among the different classes of
cultivable land.

52. Figures of population Mid land are not available for the
Beersheba sub-district in the ‘ iine way as they are for the restjof
Palestine. Beersheba is an eareensive area inhabited, except for the
town of Beersheba, by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin. The
figures for the nomadic population in the Census of 1931 were admit-
tedly only approximate, as it was not possible to apply to them the
procedure adopted in the case of the settled population, and it is,
therefore, impossible to place full reliance on any figure which may
be assumed for the population at the present day. For our purposes
we have taken a figure of 60,000 as the population of the Beersheba
sub-district. This population is entirely Arab. The area of the sub-
district is estimated to be about 12,577,000 dunums (or nearly half
the whole of Palestine). As the urban area alone has been surveyed,
it is possible to estimate only very roughly the area of cultivated land :
the estimates vary between 1 \ and 2 million dunums.

33

53. For the purpose of our report, except where it is expressly
otherwise stated, we have treated the population as falling into two
categories, Arabs and Jews. The Arab section includes persons who
are not Arabs, but as nearly 98 per cent, of the non- Jewish popula-
tion are Arabs, the use of the term Arab, which we prefer to that of
non- Jew, generally causes no distortion of the picture.

‘ 54. The unit of area in Palestine is a dunum. We have used this
term in dealing with land areas. The unit adopted in all the figures
given in the report is the metric dunum and not the smaller Turkish
dunum. A metric, dunum is approximately equal to one quarter of
an acre.

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34

CHAPTER IV

THE BOUNDARIES OF THE EXCLAVE FOE THE HOLY
PLACES AT JERUSALEM AND BETHLEHEM, AND OF
THE ENCLAVE AT NAZARETH

55. We are now in a position to proceed with our examination of the
boundaries which would have to be adopted to give effect to the plan
of partition put forward by the Royal Commission in chapter XXII
of their Report. In this chapter we consider the boundaries of the
Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves, which the Royal Commission
recommended for retention under Mandatory administration.

1. The Boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave

56. Under Article 13 of the Mandate all responsibility in con-
nection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in
Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing
free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites, and the
free exercise of worship, was assumed by the Mandatory Power ; and
under Article 28, in the event of the termination of the existing
Mandate, the Council of the League of Nations is required to make
arrangements for safeguarding in perpetuity the rights secured in
Article 13.

57. The Royal Commission’s proposals in regard to the Holy
Places are to be found in paragraphs 10 and 11 of chapter XXII of
their Report —

10. The partition of Palestine^ subject to the overriding necessity
of keeping the sanctity of JeruMlem and Bethlehem inviolate and of
ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. That, in the
fullest sense of the mandatory phrase, is ” a sacred trust of civilization ” — –
a trust on behalf not merely of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes
in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places.

11. A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with the execution
of this trust as its primary purpose. An enclave should be demarcated
extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem,
and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending to the
north of the main road and to the south of the railway, including the
towns of Lydda and Ramie, and terminating at the sea.

58. The boundary which we propose for the Jerusalem Enclave
(including the Corridor) is shown on map No. 10.

35

59. It will be noticed that the northern boundary under our
proposals falls north of Ramallah, and not between Ramallah and
Jerusalem as proposed by the Royal Commission. The reasons for
this modification are two —

(a) defence ;

(b) the existence of the Palestine Broadcasting Station about

one mile north of Ramallah town.

60. It is clearly necessary that the boundary should be as satis-
factory as possible from the point of view of defence, and we have
been advised that a line between Ramallah and Jerusalem does not
comply with this essential condition, for the following reasons.
First, it is essential that there should be a landing-ground for aircraft
in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and that the distance between the
landing-ground and the frontier should be such as will enable the
former to be assured of reasonable protection from interference from
the neighbouring ‘ State. The landing-ground at Qalandiya — the
only possible site for a landing-ground in the neighbourhood of
Jerusalem — lies a short distance south of Ramallah, and a line south
of Ramallah would not leave sufficient space between the landing-
ground and the frontier. Secondly, the road from Ramallah to
Latrun is considered an essential military line of communication for
the defence of the Enclave. If the line were drawn south of Ramallah,
this road would not be included within the Enclave. Thirdly, the
high point of Beitunya occupies a dominating position and should be
included within the Mandated area. The line north of Ramallah
which we have adopted is one which the military authorities consider
a suitable defensive boundary.

61. As has been indicated, the broadcasting station is situated a
short distance north of Ramallah. This site was selected a few years
ago after a very careful examination of other possible sites in the
neighbourhood of Jerusalem. At our request, the possibility of
finding an alternative site nearer to Jerusalem was again explored,
but with no success. The alternative sites all possess serious
disadvantages as compared with Ramallah. It is obviously right
that the Enclave should possess a suitable broadcasting station and
that this station should be capable of being defended in an emergency.
For this reason also we think it essential that the boundary should
run north of Ramallah.

62. The five Arab villages of Shuqba, Qibya, Budrus, Ni’lin and
Deir Qaddis in the Ramie Sub-District obtain their water supply
under a co-operative arrangement by pumping from a well situated
in the village of Shabtin. Although defence requirements only
necessitate the inclusion of the villages of Qibya and Budrus
within the Enclave, we think it undesirable that these two villages
should be separated from their water supply by an international
boundary, and we consider that the proper course is to include within
the Enclave all the six villages concerned.

(C 31078)

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36

63. That portion of the northern boundary of the Enclave which
lies west of the railway from Lydda to Haifa has been placed about
one kilometre north of the road which runs from the civil airport
(north of Lydda) to Jaffa and Tel Aviv. The object of this is to
include in the Enclave and to exclude from the Jewish State the
Arab villages of Salama, Al Kheiriya, Saqiya, Kafr Ana, and
Al Yahudiya. The German colony at Wilhelma represented to us
that they desired to be excluded from the Jewish State ; it has not
been possible to accede to this request entirely, but the boundary
proposed places the residential area of the colony within the Enclave.
The civil airport, which is situated in the village of Al Yahudiya,
falls within the Enclave.

64. The southern boundary of the Enclave in the hills has been
placed as near the railway as defensive requirements would permit.
In the plains it has been drawn so as to include within the Enclave
the military cantonments at Sarafand and the projected Royal Air
Force base at Aqir. The Royal Air Force base is at present situated
at Ramie. The landing-ground at Ramie is too small and in other
ways unsuitable for use by modern aircraft. It is essential that the
Mandatory Power should have a first-class air base if it is properly
to fulfil the responsibility for the defence of the Enclave and the
responsibilities which it is likely to assume by treaty for the defence
of the states after partition. The Royal Air Force authorities have
investigated very carefully the question of an alternative site to the
existing one at Ramie, and the conclusion they have reached is that
the Aqir site is the nearest site to Ramie which will meet present-day
requirements. The Enclave boundary has therefore been drawn so
as to include the projected air base at Aqir.

65. The Royal Commission proposed that a narrow belt of land
should be acquired and cleared on the north side of the town of Jaffa,
and that this belt should form part of the Jaffa- Jerusalem corridor.
We shall deal with this question of the boundary between the towns of
Jaffa and Tel Aviv in chapter V, and it will suffice to say here thjlt
we do not favour the proposal that these two towns should be
separated by a strip of mandated teqfitory.

66. The Royal Commission also proposed that a similar belt
should be acquired and cleared on the south side of the town of Jaffa.
In their view this belt would serve a double purpose. It would
separate the town of Jaffa — which they proposed should form part of
the Arab State — from the nascent Jewish town of Bat Yam (Bayit
Vegan) and at the same time afford the Enclave access to the sea.
As we shall explain in chapter V in considering the boundary between
the towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, we do not regard the interposition
of a narrow strip of mandated territory between an Arab town in
the Arab State and a Jewish town in the Jewish State as a
satisfactory method of preventing clashes between Arabs and
Jews. We agree that the Enclave should have its own access

37

to the sea, but access by means of such a narrow strip would
serve no useful purpose. We are of opinion that a wider strip of
mandated territory should be interposed between Jaffa and the
Jewish State. In our view the southern boundary of this strip of
mandated territory should be the northern boundary of the village
of Rishon le Ziyon, and this is the boundary which, subject to the
two following provisions, we propose should be adopted.

67. (i) The first of these provisions relates to the utilization of an
area in the Jewish State south of the Enclave for the purpose of
providing modern ranges for the military forces of the Mandatory
Power. The range at present available within the Enclave at Jaffa
is unsuited to modern requirements, and we have been advised that
a project is under preparation for the construction of up-to-date
ranges on the sand dune area on the coast south of the Enclave and
north of the Wadi Rubin. It is clearly essential that the military
forces of the Mandatory Power should have modern ranges available
for their use. We suggest that, instead of the area required for
these ranges being included in the Enclave, the Treaty between the
Mandatory Power and the Jewish State should make suitable
provision for the land required for these ranges being placed at the
disposal of the Mandatory Power, (ii) The second provision relates
to the need for the Mandatory Power to have the right to enter upon
and use the area along the shores of the Jewish State as far south
as the Wadi Rubin for military purposes in the case of an emergency.
If the southern boundary of the Enclave is the northern boundary
of the village of Rishon le Ziyon as we have suggested, the width of the
bridge head position will be inadequate in case of an emergency.
Here again, instead of extending the boundary of the Enclave further
to the south, we propose that the treaty should contain a provision
giving the Mandatory Power the right to enter and use the area in
question for military purposes in case of an emergency.

68. From the Jewish side it has been contended that the Enclave
between Ramie and the sea is unduly wide and that in this area the
Enclave should be limited to a narrow strip just wide enough to
carry the railway and a road. The arguments urged in support of
this proposal are that a wider Enclave will render communication
between the northern and southern portions of the Jewish State
unnecessarily difficult and will seriously interfere with Jewish urban
development in the area south of Jaffa. We cannot agree with this
contention. As the Royal Commission pointed out, the partition
of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of keeping Jerusalem
and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them
for all the world. It is our considered view that, if the Mandatory
is to be entrusted with this paramount obligation, the restriction of
the Enclave between Ramie and the sea to a narrow strip only a few
yards wide would seriously jeopardize the execution of that trust.
In this matter, the necessity of protecting the Holy Places must
override the needs of the Jewish State.

(C 31078) c 3

38

69. It may be urged that the Enclave (including the corridor)
covers an unnecessarily large area. To that we would reply that
the boundaries of the Enclave, with the exception of a part of the
northern frontier — see paragraphs 62 and 63 — have been determined
solely with reference to the question of defence, and that if the
Mandatory is to be entrusted with the protection of the Holy Places
it is essential that the Enclave should have boundaries which are
capable of being defended.

2. The Population and Area of the Jerusalem Enclave

70. The figures are as follows —

Population

Arabs
Jews
Total
Urban . . 90,800*
76,000*
166,800
Rural . . . . 120,600
4,100
124,700
Total . . 211,400
80,100
291,500
Land (in dunums)
Arabs
Jews
Citrus Land
37,900
8,900
Banana Plantations
100
Other Plantations
184,500
5,200
Taxable Cereal Land
502,300
36,500
Untaxable Cereal Land
102,300
1,100
Total Cultivable Land
827,100
51,700
Built-on Areas
29,700
7,800
Uncultivable Land
628,400
19,200
Total Landf
1,485,200
78,700

3. The Boundary of the Nazareth Enclave J

71. After discussing the Mandatory administration which they
had proposed for the Holy Places at JeriSjsalem and Bethlehem, the
Royal Commission went on to say (chapterKXII, paragraph 14) —

We think it would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at

large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee were also covered by this Mandate.

We recommend that the Mandatory should be entrusted with the

administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity

of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias.

We consider elsewhere (chapter XV) the question of safe-
guarding the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of Galilee
(Lake Tiberias) : here we are concerned only with the boundary to

* Note. — The urban population consists of the population of the muni-
cipalities of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahur, Ramie,
and Lydda.

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

39

be adopted for the Nazareth Enclave. It has been suggested to us
that the Enclave should include not only Nazareth itself but should
be extended so as to include —

(a) Kafr Kanna, the traditional site of the miracle in Cana of
Galilee ;

(b) Mount Tabor, the traditional site of the Transfiguration ;

(c) the village of Yafa to the west of Nazareth, the population
of which consists to the extent of almost one-half of Christians.

The inclusion of these places would mean a considerable increase
in the size of the Enclave, and we do not feel that we can support
the proposal. We recommend that the Enclave should be limited to
the area falling within the boundaries of the village lands of Nazareth.
The population and area of the Enclave as thus denned are as
follows —

Arabs Jews

Population 10,000 100

Land (in dunums) : —

Total cultivable land .. .. 6,700 100
Total uncultivable land, includ- 12,700 —

ing built-on areas.
Total land* 19,400 100

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

(C 31078)

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40

CHAPTER V

THE BOUNDARY OF JAFFA, INCLUDING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE TOWNS OF JAFFA AND TEL AVIV

72. The Royal Commission recommended that the town of
Jaffa should be part of the Arab State. We endorse that
recommendation, though Jaffa, being situated in the Jerusalem
Enclave, will thereby be separated from the rest of the territory
of the Arab State.

1. The Boundary between the Towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv

73. There are about 55,000 Arab residents in Jaffa and about
16,000 Jews ; but the town is essentially Arab. Tel Aviv, which
adjoins Jaffa on the north, has a population of about 140,000 and
is entirely Jewish. The two form geographically a single town.
The majority of the Jewish residents of Jaffa live near the boundary
between the two towns. This boundary is a zigzag line running
for the greater part through narrow streets. There has been for
many years discord between the two towns and serious disturbances
have taken place on the boundary. At present, the relations between
the two communities are particularly strained. In the past,
endeavours have been made to secure a better boundary between the
two municipalities, but it has not been possible to reach agreement.
The problem has now become the wider one of devising a suitable
boundary, not only between the two municipalities, but also between
the proposed Jewish State in which Tel Aviv will be situated and
the Arab State of which Jaffa will be a part.

74. The Royal Commission suggested that the boundary
between the two towns should consist of a narrow belt of mandated
territory, and that for this purpose a strip oXland along the boundary
should be acquired and cleared. We havT^examined the problem
presented by this boundary most carefulff in consultation with
officers of the Palestine Administration, and the conclusion we have
reached is • that a boundary such as that proposed by the Royal
Commission would not be a suitable one. It would place the
Mandatory Administration and its officials in a most difficult and
embarrassing position should disturbances break out between the
subjects of the two states. Indeed, in that event the position of
the Mandatory police stationed in a narrow belt of territory between
hostile parties intent on attacking each other might prove to be
untenable. Again, such a boundary would render customs adminis-
tration very difficult, indeed almost impossible, should the Jewish
State and the Mandated area have different customs tariffs or other

41

divergent import and export systems.* In our opinion, the better
course would be to have a road as the boundary between the two
towns. For the purpose of maintaining law and order, and for
general administrative convenience, this road must be as straight
as possible. Down the middle of it a high iron railing must be
constructed which would form the actual boundary and would be
the joint property of the two states. At intervals where the
boundary would cross important roads there would be gates to
allow of the passage of traffic between the two towns. Such an
arrangement would enable the police of each state to patrol the
boundary and would provide a reasonably effective barrier between
two potentially hostile communities. It would also enable traffic
crossing the boundary to be controlled and would greatly facilitate
customs administration.

75. This arrangement may seem artificial, but it appears to us to
offer the best solution of the problem — a problem which has some-
times been described as insoluble — of drawing a boundary between
Tel Aviv and Jaffa. We recognize that it is not perfect. In the
event of disturbances no barrier could prevent shots from being
fired from buildings on each side of the boundary road. The
substitution of a wall for a railing would, it is true, prevent shots
from being fired from street level, but would not prevent the
throwing of bombs. Indeed, it would make the position worse, for
bombs could be thrown over the wall by persons hidden from the view
of those on the other side. It would doubtless also be possible for
small articles to be smuggled through the railing, but again the provision
of a wall instead of a railing would not wholly prevent the smuggling
of such articles. Having regard to all the circmpstances, and after
taking expert advice, we consider that a railing would be decidedly
preferable to a wall. It is also true that persons intent on causing
disturbances could evade any barrier by going round the end of it, and
that smugglers could evade it by transporting goods by boat or round
the end of the railing, but these possibilities of evasion do not diminish
the necessity of special measures in the congested urban area.

76. As regards the line which should be adopted as the boundary
between the two municipalities, it has been suggested, on the part of
the Jews, that the existing boundary, throughout its whole length,
should be moved a considerable distance to the south. According to
this plan the boundary would start on the seashore at a point
north-west of the railway station (near the end of Az Zubeir
Street) and would then take a south-easterly course via the Jaffa
railway station and the German colony to a point on the eastern
boundary of the Jaffa municipality, about one kilometre south of
the road leading to the village of Salama and the civil airport

* This argument will lose its force if the proposals in our final chapter
(XXII) are adopted.

42

(hereafter called the airport road). The effect of adopting this
boundary would be to transfer from Jaffa to Tel Aviv not only
practically all the Jewish property in Jaffa, but in addition the
following Arab areas —

(i) Almost the whole of the Al Manshiya section of the town.
This section is densely populated and is almost entirely owned
and inhabited by Arabs. The important Hassan Bey Mosque
is situated in this area.

(ii) A large area of Arab land in the Saknat Abu Kabir
Quarter.

In terms of population it would mean transferring to Tel Aviv
not only the Jewish population of Jaffa but also a large Arab
population.

77. A scheme has also been put forward on the part of the Arabs,
the effect of which would be —

(a) To transfer to Tel Aviv the northern portion of the
Karton area, which is predominantly Jewish.

(b) To retain in Jaffa the other Jewish areas of that town.

(c) To transfer from Tel Aviv the following entirely Jewish
areas —

(i) an area along the sea shore north of the present

boundary ;

(ii) the Neve Shalom area west of Pinnes Street ;

(iii) an area north of the airport road.

In terms of population, it would mean that the Jewish population of
Jaffa would be considerably increased. . J

78. Both these schemes are clearly open to strong objection.
The Jewish scheme involves the transfer of important Arab areas
to Tel Aviv, while the Arab scheme involve a considerable increase
in the Jewish population and property in j-‘^fa.

79. The boundary which we recommend is shown on map 12.
The width of the boundary road would be 20 metres, except for the
portion between the seashore and Hacarmel Street, where it would
be 30 to 40 metres wide.

80. Starting from the seashore, the boundary road runs
eastwards for some distance along the present common municipal
boundary and then, still proceeding eastwards, it cuts through the
northern portion of the Al Manshiya section of the Jaffa muni-
cipality. The effect of this is to transfer the Karton Quarter of
Jaffa to Tel Aviv. It is estimated that, while the greater part of
the property in the area transferred is owned by Arabs, the Jewish
population exceeds the Arab population by three to two, the approxi-
mate figures being 3,200 Jews to 2,000 Arabs . At present the Karton

43

Quarter forms a salient of the Jaffa municipal area, projecting
into the Tel Aviv municipal area. We consider that it is essential
to remove this salient in order to obtain a suitable boundary.

81. On reaching Hacarmel Street, the boundary road turns
southwards to Pinnes Street and then along that street to the
railway line. The effect of this is to transfer the Neve Shalom area
of Tel Aviv to Jaffa. The Neve Shalom area forms a salient pro-
jecting into Jaffa, and although the population (about 5,400) and
property affected are entirely Jewish, we consider that in order to
obtain a suitable boundary it is necessary to remove this salient.

82. After crossing the railway — a bridge will be needed at this
point — the boundary runs southwards as far as the airport road and
then turns eastwards along that road to the eastern boundary
of the Jaffa Enclave. The effect of this is to transfer froi^ Jaffa
to Tel Aviv —

(a) The area known as the Florentine Quarter. This quarter
is almost entirely Jewish, both as regards population and the
ownership of the land. The population is estimated at about
12,500 Jews.

(b) The part of the Shapiro Quarter (Block 7060) which lies
north of the airport road. This area carries a small population,
partly Arabs and partly Jews, the ownership of the land being
almost equally divided between Arabs and Jews.

83. We consider that the railing need not, at first, be continued
beyond the junction of the airport road and the eastern boundary
of the Jaffa Enclave, though experience may prove that some
extension is necessary. The cost of the road and fence is estimated
at about £115,000. A detailed estimate has not been prepared and
the figure given is therefore only approximate. The question how
the money is to be provided for this and other necessary expenses
incidental to partition will be considered in the chapter on Finance
(chapter XVIII).

84. The effect of our proposals would be the transfer of about
15,700 Jews and about 2,000 Arabs from Jaffa to Tel Aviv, and of
about 5,400 Jews from Tel Aviv to Jaffa. The population figures
are, however, only approximate, precise figures not being available.
We do not expect that the transfer of the areas we have recommended
will give rise to any serious administrative difficulties.

85. The line we have recommended will no doubt be criticized
by both the Arabs and the Jews. On behalf of the Arabs it may be
urged that the inclusion of the Florentine and part of the Shapiro
Quarters in Tel Aviv will deprive the Jaffa municipality of an
important area. Our answer would be that we consider it essential
that, as far as other considerations permit, the boundary should be
drawn so as to effect as large a reduction as possible in the Jewish
population of Jaffa.

44

86. On behalf of the Jews it may be urged that the Jewish area
of Neve Shalom should not be transferred to Jaffa. As we have
said, we consider it essential that the boundary between Jaffa and
Tel Aviv should be as straight as possible. If this essential condition
is to be observed, it follows that the salient made by the Neve Shalom
area must be removed. Again, in the rectification of the present
unsatisfactory boundary, we consider it proper that the sacrifices
involved should be shared as far as possible between the two muni-
cipalities. It may also be urged that our plan retains in Jaffa the
Jewish population and property south of the airport road. This
is so. But we take the view that the existence of this Jewish
population and property would not justify the substitution of a
different boundary for the airport road. In the first place, the cost
of constructing the boundary road — already considerable — would be
largely increased, for it would be necessary to construct an entirely
new road south of the Jewish property. In the second place, it
would be impossible to provide a straight boundary without
transferring further Arab land to Tel Aviv.

87. We feel the less hesitation in recommending in this area
boundaries which necessitate the inclusion of a considerable number
of Jews in the Arab State and of Arabs in the Jewish State, because
it is obvious that the transfer of an urban population from one part
of a continuous built-over area to another is a very different matter
from the transfer of an agricultural population to a completely
different district. Given goodwill on both sides, the transfers
could be arranged, if the inhabitants in question wish it, without
much difficulty, and, we should hope, without hardship to the ‘
individuals concerned.

2. The Remaining Portion of the Boundarjspf Jaffa

88. The remainder of the boundary proposed for%affa is shown
on map 4. From the airport road the eastern boundary follows the
” Urban and Village ” boundary, and on the south the town-planning
boundary has been adopted. The proposed boundary includes a
considerable area outside the present municipal limits of Jaffa town
and therefore provides room for expansion.

45

CHAPTER VI

THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PROPOSED ARAB AND
JEWISH STATES UNDER PLAN A

89. In chapter IV we described the boundary for the Jerusalem
Enclave and the Enclave at Nazareth, and in chapter V we dealt
with the boundary of Jaffa, including the boundary between Jaffa
and Tel Aviv. As has been explained in chapter I, the Royal
Commission gave only a sketch map and a brief description of their
proposed plan. But neither the map nor the description purports
to do more than give a rough outline of the boundaries, and in order
to examine the Royal Commission’s scheme demographically, that
is, with reference to statistics of population and land, it is necessary
in the first place to draw their proposed boundaries more exactly,
taking their outline as a guide. We shall then have plan A. In this
chapter we deal with the remaining sections of the boundary between
the Arab and Jewish States as outlined in the Royal Commission’s
scheme. The boundaries in these sections were made after
consultation and in agreement with the military authorities, and
we have no reason to suppose that the Royal Commission, if they
had given a detailed description of their plan, would have chosen
different boundaries.

1. The Boundary along the Eastern Edge of the Maritime Plain
between the Town of Tulkarm and the Jerusalem Enclave

90. The boundary in this section, according to the Royal Com-
mission’s outline, runs along the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain,
that is along the base of the hills of Samaria. It also lies just east
of the main railway line from Lydda to Haifa, which in this section
runs close to the foot of the hills. The Jewish population and land
are situated in the plain, while the population and land in the hills
are entirely Arab. We have been advised that a boundary along
the foot of the hills would not be a suitable defensive boundary for
the Jewish State and that any defensive boundary in this area must
be drawn some distance within the foothills. The boundary
adopted has been drawn as short a distance within the foothills as
military requirements would permit. This means the inclusion in
the Jewish State of a number of Arab villages situated in the foothills,
but we are satisfied that this is unavoidable if the Jewish State is to
be provided with a suitable defensive boundary.

91 . The boundary outlined by the Royal Commission places the
town of Tulkarm in the Arab State. Tulkarm, which is an entirely
Arab town with nearly 6,000 inhabitants and a centre of Arab
nationalism, is situated just on the edge of the plain. We agree that

46

this town should not be included in the Jewish State. The main
railway line (standard gauge) from Lydda to Haifa runs through
Tulkarm, which is a junction for the narrow-gauge line to
Nablus. It is clearly undesirable that a small section of the main
line should pass through the Arab State at this point. It will
therefore be necessary to divert the main line for a distance of about
10 kilometres, provision being made for maintaining the connection
with the narrow-gauge railway. We have been advised that the
cost of the diversion is estimated at about £10,000 a kilometre ; the
total cost will be about £100,000. The question how this expenditure
should be met will be considered in chapter XVIII (Finance) .

2. The Boundary along the Maritime Plain north of the Town of
Tulkarm, across the Carmel Ridge and along the Plain
of Esdraelon

92. The boundary adopted in this section follows closely the
boundary outlined by the Royal Commission. The boundary in
the Maritime Plain north of the town of Tulkarm has not, like the
boundary south of that town, been drawn inside the foothills for
the following reasons —

(a) the railway line is at a reasonably safe distance from the
eastern edge of the plain ;

(b) a boundary through the foothills would be more difficult
to defend than that adopted, because of the broken nature of the
ground and the presence of very dense olive groves ; j

(c) in order to obtain a suitable boundary*l%iside the foot-
hills it would be necessary to include in the Jewish State an
Arab area almost as deep as the Jewish area to be protected.

3. The Boundary along the Plain of Jezreel

93. The boundary in the Plain of Jezreel as proposed by the
Royal Commission runs along the southern edge of the plain at the
base of a range of hills, the Mountains of Gilboa, which rise steeply
to a height of 300 to 500 metres (about 900 to 1,500 feet). Jewish
settlements lie at the foot of the hills, while the hills themselves are
in Arab occupation. Here also we have been advised that a line
at the foot of the hills would not be a suitable defensive boundary
for the Jewish State. The line adopted on the advice of the military
authorities runs along the crest of these hills. Here again the
inclusion of a certain number of Arab villages in the Jewish State
has been found to be unavoidable.

4. The Boundary in the Plain of Beisan

94. The boundary adopted in the Plain of Beisan follows closely
the boundary outlined by the Royal Commission.

47

5. The Boundary in the Jordan Valley

95. In paragraph 20 of chapter XXII of their Report the Royal
Commission described the boundary of the Jewish State as crossing
Lake Tiberias to the point where the River Jordan flows out of the
lake, and then continuing down the river to a point a little north of
Beisan. The boundary of Palestine in this area, however, runs, not
across, but on the eastern side of the lake and then down the
River Yarmuk to the point where that river joins the River Jordan
at Jisr al Majami. The small triangle of territory which is thus
excluded from the Jewish State by the Royal Commission’s boundary
contains a number of Jewish settlements, including the old-established
colonies of Dagania A, Dagania B, Kfar Gun, Afiqim, and Dalhamiya,
and over 50 per cent of the land is in Jewish hands. It would seem
desirable to include this triangle in the Jewish State, in accordance
with the principle on which the Royal Commission proceeded, of
drawing the boundary between the Jewish and Arab States so as
to include within the Jewish State the existing areas of Jewish
land and settlement.

96. The power-house and certain other works of the Palestine
Electric Corporation on the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami are
situated on the eastern side of the river and are therefore in Trans-
Jordan territory. Only a small part of the electric energy produced
by the Palestine Electric Corporation is sold to consumers in the
Arab State outlined in plan A, by far the greater part being supplied
to the consumers in the Jewish State. It has been suggested to us
that in these circumstances the boundary should be modified so as
to include the power-station within the Jewish State. We agree, and
have modified the boundary so as to include within the Jewish State
the land which the Corporation now hold on the Trans- Jordan side
of the river. This matter is dealt with in detail in Appendix 6.

The railway, which runs from Samakh at the southern end of
Lake Tiberias south along the Jordan Valley to Beisan, and then
west to Haifa, is situated entirely in the Jewish State, with the
exception of a short length north of Jisr al Majami, where it passes
through the land held by the Palestine Electric Corporation on the
Trans- Jordan side of the River Jordan. It is clearly undesirable
that this small section of the railway line should fall outside the
Jewish State. This affords a further reason for the modification
of the boundary dealt with in the preceding paragraph.

6. The Boundary south of the Jerusalem Enclave

97. In this section the boundary lies wholly in the Maritime Plain.
The boundary adopted interprets as closely as possible the boundary
outlined by the Royal Commission.

48

CHAPTER VII

THE FIGURES FOR THE POPULATION AND LAND OF THE
ARAB AND JEWISH STATES AND THE ENCLAVES UNDER
PLAN A

98. The Royal Commission were of opinion (page 385 of their
Report) that it would greatly promote the successful operation of
partition in its early stages, and in particular help to ensure the
execution of the treaty guarantees for the protection of minorities,
if the towns of Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Acre, situated within the
boundaries of the Jewish State, were kept for a period under
Mandatory administration. Although the period of this temporary
Mandate was not specified, it was clearly the intention that these
towns should ultimately pass under Jewish administration, and we
have therefore, for the purpose of plan A, treated them as forming
part of the Jewish State.

99. The Royal Commission’s plan also provided (page 381) for
the union of Trans- Jordan and the Arab area in Palestine. For the
purposes of considering the various plans of partition we have not,
except where otherwise stated, included statistics relating to
Trans- Jordan.

1. Population

100. The populations of the two states and the enclaves
(Jerusalem and Nazareth) are as follows : —

The Arab State
(including the Beersheba sub-district)

Arabs
Jews
Total
Urban
.. 136,500
5,600
142,100
Rural
. . 348,700
1,600
350,300
Total
. . 485,200
7,200
492,400
The Jewish State
Arabs
Jews
Total
Urban
77,500
243,600
321,100
Rural
. . 217,200
61,300
278,500

Total

294,700 304,900

599,600

49

The Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves

Urban
Rural
Arabs
91,000
. . 130,400
Jews
76,000
4,200
Total
167,000
134,600
Total .
. . 221,400
80,200
301,600
All Palestine
Arabs

Arab State (including the

Beersheba Sub-District) 485,200
Jewish State . . . . 294,700
Enclaves 221,400
Jews

7,200
304 900

80,200
Total
492,400
301,600
Total .
.. 1,001,300
392,300
1,393,600

Note. — The urban population is the population living within the
municipal areas.

101. The main facts which emerge from these figures are —

(a) In the Arab State the number of Jews is only about
7,000, or about 1 per cent, of the total population of the State.

(b) In the Arab State nearly three-fourths of the total
population live in rural areas.

(c) In the Jewish State the Arabs are almost equal in numbers
to the Jews and constitute 49 per cent, of the total population
of the State.

(d) In the Jewish State four-fifths of the Jewish population
but only one-quarter of the Arab population live in urban
(municipal) areas. The two towns of Tel Aviv (140,000) and
Haifa (49,000) alone account for three-fifths of the Jewish
population in the State.

50

2. Laud

102. The distribution of the various classes of land in the two
States and the Enclaves between Arabs and Jews is given in the
following tables —

The Arab State
(excluding the Beersheba District)

A 1.

Arabs
Jews
Total
(Dunums)
(Dunums)
(Dunums)
Citrus land
9fi ROfi
97 QOft
Banana plantations . .
3,200
200
3,400
Other plantations
624,300
2,800
627,100
Taxable cereal land . .
1,785,600
24,200
1,809,800
Untaxable cereal land
604,900
1,100
606,000
Total cultivable land
3,044,600
29,600
3,074,200
Built-on area
37,100
4,400
41,500
Uncultivable land
3,926,200
3,000
3,929,200
Total land* . .
7,007,900
37,000
7,044,900

As was explained in paragraph 52 of chapter III, only the urban
area (the town of Beersheba) in Beersheba sub-district has been
surveyed and hence figures corresponding to those given for the rest
of Palestine are not available. The total area of Beersheba sub-
district is 12,577,000 dunums ; the estimates of the cultivated area
vary between \\ million to 2 million dunums. According to the
Land Registration records the area of land purchased by the Jews is
50,385 dunums. In addition 5,160 dunums were purchased before
the War. The total area of land held by the Jews in the sub-
district is therefore 55,545 dunums. There are no Jews settled on
this land.

The Jewish State

Arabs
Jews
Total
(Dunums)
(Dunums)
(Dunums)
Citrus land
78,600
135,900
214,500
Banana plantations . .
600
800
1,400
Other plantations
266,900
61,900
328,800
Taxable cereal land . .
1,700,200
608,900
2,309,100
Untaxable cereal land
185,300
59,100
244,400
Total cultivable land
2,231,600
866,600
3,098,200
Built-on area
31,700
31,400
63,100
Uncultivable land
1,591,400
242,200
1,833,600
Total land*
3,854,700
1,140,200
4,994,900

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

51

The Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclave

Arabs
Jews
Total
(Dunums)
Citrus land
37,900
8,900
46,800
Banana plantations . .
100
100
Other plantations . .
185,100
5,300
190 400
Taxable cereal land . .
508^400
36^500
544 900
Untaxable cereal land
102^300
UOO
103,400
Total cultivable land
833,800
51,800
885,600
Built-on area
34,500
7,800
42,300
Uncultivable land
636,300
19,200
655,500
Total land*
1,504,600
78,800
1,583,400

103. The main points brought out by these figures are —

(a) The amount of Jewish land in the Arab State is very
small, being about 92,000 dunums, including the Jewish land in
Beersheba sub-district.

(b) The amount of Arab land in the Jewish State is very
large, being about 3,854,000 dunums as compared with about
1,140,000 dunums of Jewish land.

(c) Land planted with citrus pays the highest rate of Rural
Property Tax levied on any class of agricultural land, except
banana plantations. The total area of such land held by the
Jews outside the Enclaves is about 137,200 dunums and of this
area 135,900 dunums are included in the Jewish State as com-
pared with only 1,300 dunums in the Arab State. The total
area of such land held by the Arabs outside the Enclaves is
105,200 but of this area only 26,600 dunums are included in the
Arab State as against 78,600 in the Jewish State.

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

52

CHAPTER VIII

THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES AND
TRANSFER OF POPULATION

104. In this chapter we examine, with reference to plan A, the
possibility of voluntary* exchanges of land and population and the
prospects of making provision, by works of land development, for
a larger population than exists to-day and thereby facilitating the
transfer of persons who desire to move from one area to another.

105. The number of Jews and the amount of Jewish Land in
the Arab State under plan A are —

Jews —
Urban
Rural

Jewish land —
Citrus land
Other cultivable land
Uncultivable land

5,600 \ Q

1,300 dunums
28,300 „
7,400 „

37,000

The figures for the Arab population and the Arab land in the
Jewish State under plan A are —

Arabs —

Urban 77,500 \ 9Q . 7nn

Rural 2 17,200 J /y4,/UU

Arab land —

Citrus land . . . . . . 78,600 dunums

Other cultivable land . . . . 2,153,000

Uncultivable land . . . . 1,623,100

3,854,700

* In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine (published
in Cmd. 5634) it was announced that His Majesty’s Government have not
accepted the Royal Commission’s proposal for the compulsory transfer in the
last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area (Appendix 1). On
behalf of the Jews it was also made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be
opposed to the exercise of any degree of compulsion.

53 ■ |

These figures show that, while the Jewish minority in the Arab
State is small, the Arab minority in the Jewish State is large. The
Royal Commission foresaw that there would be a large Arab minority
in the Jewish State, and in item (ii) (i) of our terms of reference we
are directed to examine and report on —

(a) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and
population, and

(b) the prospects of providing by works of land development
room for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring
to move from one area to another.

1. Voluntary Exchanges of Land and Population

106. From the figures given in the previous paragraph it is clear
that there is little scope for the voluntary exchange of land between
the Arabs in the Jewish State and the Jews in the Arab State, and
little possibility of the voluntary exchange of rural population
between the two states.

107. In the Jerusalem Enclave there are 4,000 Jews in the rural
areas and the total amount of land held by Jews is 78,800 dunums.
We consider it unlikely that the Jews in the rural areas in the enclave
will be desirous of moving from the enclave to the Jewish State.
And even if they should be, the number of Jews and the amount of
Jewish land in the enclave are too small for any arrangements for
exchange of land between Arabs in the Jewish State and Jews in the
enclave to have any appreciable effect on the minority problem in
the Jewish State.

2. The Possibility of the Transfer of Population

108. The Royal Commission in their Report drew attention to
the lack of adequate evidence on the question of the amount of land
which could be made available for settlement by the execution of
irrigation, water storage, and development projects in Beersheba,
the Jordan Valley, and Trans- Jordan, where large areas of sparsely
populated country exist which might be capable, if water were
available for irrigation, of supporting a larger population ; and they
recommended that those areas should be surveyed and an authorita-
tive estimate made of the practical possibilities of irrigation and
development . Investigation work estimated to cost £90,000* — £60,000
in Palestine and £30,000 in Trans-Jordan — began in the early part
of this year. The results of these surveys, so far as they had
proceeded up to the end of July, 1938, are described in the following
paragraphs. The sites of bores sunk in connection with the survey
are shown on map 1 opposite.

* Of this amount His Majesty’s Government provided ^60,000.

54

Beersheba Sub-District

109. As we have already stated in an earlier chapter, the Beersheba
sub-district has an area nearly equal to that of the whole of the rest
of Palestine. The greater part of this vast expanse of country,
over 12J million dunums in extent, is an arid wilderness, roamed
over by the Bedouin in search of pasture for their flocks. In the
north and north-west, however, there are extensive undulating
plains on which, when the rainfall permits, the semi-nomadic Arabs
are able to raise substantial cereal crops. It is in the southern part
of these plains, which may roughly be said to lie north-west of a line
drawn from Al Auja to Kurnub, that the traces of ancient settlement’s
are to be found, and it was to this area that Sir John Hope Simpson
referred when he wrote —

Given the possibility of irrigation, there is practically an
inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba area.

Unfortunately the rainfall in this area is low, varying from 5 inches in
the south to 10 inches or 12 inches in the extreme north and north-
west, and so uncertain that it has been estimated that in a cycle of
seven years a cultivable plot produces a good crop in two, some
crop in three, and none at all in the other two years. In a year of
good rainfall, however, it is calculated that from 1,500,000 to
2,000,000 dunums are put under cultivation in this region, and, as
will be seen from map 1, it is here that the bores made in connection
with the survey have been sunk.

110. The line between Al Auja and Kurnub corresponds approxi-
mately to the 5 in. rainfall contour. South of this line the character
of the country changes. It consists of a series of low ranges of
rugged hills extending east and west, with undulating and irregular
gravel plains between them. The lower slopes of the hills are usually
boulder-strewn and covered with gravel, and, although here and
there areas of wind-blown sand and alluvial deposits occur, they are
isolated from each other. This area has not been tested for water as,
even if water were found, the isolation of the individual patches of
soil and their distance from markets make it exceedingly doubtful
whether any part of it can ever be put to economic use.

111. The following is a summary of the results of the bores
sunk in the Beersheba sub-district to the end of August last, when it
was found necessary in view of the risk of attack by Arabs — in July
two attacks were made on boring parties in the Jordan valley
resulting in loss of life — to close down all boring operations in
Beersheba as well as in the Jordan Valley —

(i) Thirteen bores have been completed. Only one, near Gaza,
has proved successful. In eight, water has either not been found
at all or found in such small quantities as to be useless for the

55

purpose of irrigation, and in one the water, although present in
good quantity, is too saline (344 to 353 parts in 100,000) to be
usable for irrigation purposes. In two other bores water,
although present in fair quantity, is of a salinity higher than
that (40 to 50 per 100,000) which has been accepted in the past
in Palestine as the maximum for the cultivation of crops other
than cereal crops. Experience in other countries, however,
tends to show that it is impossible to lay down any absolute
figure. The subject is now being investigated both in the
laboratory and in the field, and until these investigations have
been completed, it will not be possible to say whether the water
from these wells will prove to be usable for irrigation or not.
The remaining bore has been sunk, but has not as yet been
tested for quantity or salinity.

(ii) Eight bores are still in process of being sunk, and on
these work has not proceeded far enough for any conclusions to
be drawn. The well at Al Auja, however, presents points of
some interest. Water has been struck at two horizons. At the
first horizon the water is very saline, but the salinity of the
combined water from the two horizons indicates that the water
from the lower horizon is much sweeter than that obtained from
the higher. If these indications are confirmed by the test about
to be carried out, the upper horizon will be shut off and the
boring continued through the lower strata. There is a hope that,
at this well, water has been struck of useful quantity and quality
and at a moderate depth. If this hope should be confirmed, it
is proposed to sink a second bore to test the extent of the
underlying water.

(iii) In addition to the above bores, three wells were sunk a
year or two ago in connection with the Water Resources Survey
then being undertaken. In one of these bores no water was
found and in two the water was too saline to be usable for
irrigation.

112. The results of the well-boring experiments in the Beersheba
area are thus most disappointing. Of the 16 wells sunk only one, near
Gaza, has proved successful, although it is hoped that the bore at
Khan Yunis, now awaiting test, will also yield satisfactory results.
But both these bores are situated in the coastal sand dune area
where it was fairly certain from the outset that sweet water would
be found in reasonable quantity. Of the fourteen wells further in
the interior, twelve are complete failures and the possibility of
utilizing the water of the other two, in view of its salinity, has yet
to be proved. A final conclusion cannot be reached till the remaining
bores have been completed, but the most that can at present be
said is that the Beersheba area is not one in which it is possible
to sink a bore at random and obtain sweet water. On the contrary,
even when sites are chosen after prolonged geophysical experiments

56

and geological investigation, 75 per cent, of them prove a failure.
The presence of abundant sweet water in the coastal sand dunes
seems likely to be confirmed, and there is evidence that satisfactory
water may be available in the vicinity of Al Auja. But in the
greater part of the area there appears to be little hope of any
improvement in agriculture by means of irrigation from wells.

113. There are indications that, in the distant past, considerable
areas in the close vicinity of the wadis in this region were irrigated
by diverting the flood water of those wadis over the fields by means
of weirs. It is proposed, as part of the general hydrographic investiga-
tion, to construct one or two experimental works of this nature,
and the necessary surveys were nearing completion at the end of
August last. It is interesting to record that, on the site selected
for one of these weirs, remains of a similar work of the Byzantine,
or possibly Roman, period were found, which indicated clearly
that at that period flood diversion works were a feature of the
cultivation of this region. It cannot, however, be expected that
such works could enable extensive additional settlement to take
place in this area.

114. Apart from the question of irrigation, consideration has
also been given to the possibilities of improving agriculture in the
Negeb by the adoption of dry-farming methods. As explained
above, the existing cereal cultivation is wholly dependent on a low
and variable rainfall : the object of dry-farming cultivation is to
ensure, by deep ploughing, the maximum absorption of rainfall in
the ground, and to prevent, by frequent loosening of the upper soil,
the evaporation of the moisture so absorbed. The view has been
expressed to us that dry-farming methods might very greatly reduce
the proportion of years when the winter crops in this region are a
partial or complete failure ; that it might increase the yield by as
much as 25 per cent, or 30 per cent, in a good year ; and that it
might make possible a very considerable increase of the area put under
summer crops. These views must be largely speculative in the
absence of a scientific investigation of the practical application of
dry-farming methods in this area, and such an investigation would
necessarily take some years to complete. The prospects of securing
by this means an improvement of agriculture in the Negeb are,
however, sufficiently hopeful to render the carrying out of an
investigation desirable, and the Palestine Government decided in
August to provide funds immediately for the establishment of a
Dry-Farming Experimental Station. Owing to the state of insecurity
in the sub-district, however, it has not so far been possible to make
further progress with this scheme. In any event, until these
investigations have been carried out it would be premature to
assume that there is scope for additional settlement on any
considerable scale in the near future.

1*

57

The Jordan Valley south of the Sea of Galilee
(Lake Tiberias)

115.

There may be something on the surface of another planet to match
the Jordan Valley : there is nothing on this. No other part of our earth,
uncovered by water, sinks to three hundred feet below the level of the
ocean. But here we have a rift more than one hundred and sixty miles
long and two to fifteen miles broad, which falls from sea level to as deep
as 1,292 feet below at the coast of the Dead Sea, while the bottom of the
latter is 1,300 feet deeper still*

This is Sir George Adam Smith’s description of the Jordan
Valley, which is a part of that tremendous rift in the earth’s surface
which stretches unbroken from the Lebanons to the Gulf of Aqaba.
In this chapter we are concerned only with that section, sixty-five
miles in length, which lies between the southern end of the Sea of
Galilee and the northern end of the Dead Sea. In this distance the
bottom of the valley falls gradually from 600 feet to nearly 1,300 feet
below sea-level. Through its midst flows the swift current of the
River Jordan in its deep-cut and winding channel, the narrow fringe
of luxuriant vegetation on its banks contrasting vividly with the
barren valley and the parched hillsides.

116. The section of the valley between Lake Tiberias and the
Dead Sea falls naturally into two divisions. In the northern part,
which lies between the lake and the southern end of the Beisan plain,
the rainfall, though variable and precarious, may yet be sufficient
in a good year for the cultivation of cereal crops without irrigation.
Moreover, water is available for irrigation from the Jordan, the
Yarmuk and the Wadi Araba. In this section, therefore, there is
some settlement on both sides of the river. In the southern section,
however, the rainfall is negligible and the depth below sea level so
great as to render the summer climate intensely oppressive. In this
section, settlement at present depends entirely on perennial springs
or the few streams which break through the hills on one or other
side of the valley.

117. We shall consider separately the four possible sources from
which the land of the Jordan Valley can be irrigated—

(a) Wells on the western bank of the River Jordan.

(b) Wells on the eastern bank of the River Jordan.

(c) Small perennial streams on the eastern side of the Jordan

Valley.

(d) The Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan and the River

Yarmuk.

(a) Wells on the western bank of the River Jordan^

1 18. (i) One bore in the vicinity of Jericho and two bores in the
valley north of the town have been completed. The bore near Jericho

* The Historical Geography of the Holy Land. Chapter XXII.

| The wells on the western bank of the Jordan are shown on map 1 .

58

was drilled to a depth of nearly 200 metres, at which point work was
discontinued, no water having been found. In one of the bores north
of Jericho the water is too saline to be suitable for irrigation. In the
other the water is of a salinity higher than that accepted in the past
as a maximum for the cultivation of crops other than cereals ; and,
as in the case of the bores in the Beersheba sub-district, it will not be
possible to say whether the water from this bore can be used for
irrigation till the results of the investigations now being carried out
are known.

(ii) Two bores are under construction, but work was abandoned
in July after both had been attacked by Arabs.

(iii) In addition to the above bores, two wells were sunk a year
or two ago. In one water was not found, but the other produced a
good supply of water of a very fair degree of salinity. This is in the
Wadi Fusail and is the northernmost of the bores in the Jordan
Valley. On the evidence at present available, the prospects of
irrigation from wells in this area cannot be considered to be hopeful.

(b) Wells on the eastern bank of the River Jordan

119. A number of wells have been sunk in an area north and
south of the Jerusalem-Amman road on the east side of the river.
On this bank of the river the prospects are better than on the western
side, but the area which can be irrigated from these wells is not large.
It is estimated at 10,000 dunums.

(c) Small perennial streams on the eastern side of the Jordan Valley

120. According to the Fiscal Survey Records the area registered
as irrigated by these streams is 206,300 dunums, while the area
recorded as irrigated seasonally is 87,700 dunums. The reason for
the difference between these two figures is that, in some cases, the
land is cultivated on a two-year rotation and in others on a three-year
or four-year rotation basis. The methods of irrigation followed by
the cultivator are capable of improvement, and, although the
problem of reorganising the supply presents many serious difficulties,
proper canalisation would no doubt enable considerable improvements
to be effected in the use of the available water. In the absence of
data relating to each stream, it is almost impossible to arrive at an
estimate of the additional area which could be irrigated. It has been
suggested that an increase of 20,000 dunums in the area irrigated
annually might be obtained.

(d) The Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan and the River Yarmuk

121. From what has been said in the previous paragraphs it is
clear that no substantial increase in the irrigated area in the Jordan
Valley can be expected either from wells or from the better utilization
of the water of the perennial streams. If large areas are to be
brought under irrigation in the valley south of the Sea of Galilee,
water must be obtained from the other sources mentioned above,

59

namely, the Sea of Galilee itself, the River Jordan and the River
Yarmuk (the principal tributary of the River Jordan). There are,
however, several difficulties in the way of the utilization of the water
from these sources. The first arises out of the concession granted to
the Palestine Electric Corporation. This corporation has a hydro-
electric power station at Jisr al Majami, at the confluence of the
River Jordan and the River Yarmuk, about six miles below the
southern end of the Sea of Galilee. This power station was erected
with the approval of the Palestine Government, and under the terms
of the concession nothing can be done in the way of drawing off
water from the Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan, and the River
Yarmuk, which will diminish the supply of water below the quantity
required for the generation of electric energy at the station. The
flow of water available is not in excess of that required for the
working of the existing plant, and hence this power station
effectively prevents the carrying out of any scheme for the irrigation
of land in the Jordan Valley which involves the abstraction of
water from the Sea of Galilee or from the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers
north of Jisr al Majami. We have been informed that the capital
expenditure incurred on the construction of this power station was
approximately £1,000,000. This figure affords some indication of the
basis on which the Palestine Electric Corporation may be expected
to claim compensation if, in order to overcome the difficulty, it
were proposed to deprive them of their water rights at this place.
It would be necessary to treat the whole of any expenditure on
this account as non-effective, for it would not be safe to assume
that any part of it could be recovered in the charge to be made to
users of the water.

122. The second difficulty is to be found in the absence of any
agreement with the Government of Syria in regard to the allocation
of the annual flow of the Yarmuk River between Palestine and
Trans- Jordan on the one hand and Syria on the other. So long
as that question remains undecided it would not be wise to embark
on any large irrigation scheme based upon the utilization of the water
of the Yarmuk River.

123. A third difficulty arises out of the probable effect of the
abstraction of a large volume of water from the River Jordan on the
level of the Dead Sea, and the effect of a fall in the level of that sea
on the working of the Palestine Potash Company, which has been
given a concession for the extraction of salts and minerals from the
Dead Sea. The sea receives the drainage of the River Jordan and
of areas which discharge their waters directly into the sea. The
evaporation from the surface of the sea is high and a state of approxi-
mate equilibrium now exists. If water is taken from the River
Jordan for irrigation and the inflow into the sea is thereby decreased,
the level of the sea will fall below its present level until a new equi-
librium level has been reached. The data available are, however,

60

not sufficient to enable the new equilibrium level, consequent on the
abstraction of a given quantity of water, to be determined, and it is
therefore not possible at present to estimate the effect of a fall in
level, caused by the abstraction of water for irrigation, on the working
of the Palestine Potash Company. It is, however, probable that a
substantial fall created artificially by the use of water for irrigation
would lead to a claim by the company for the reimbursement of
expenditure (capital and recurring) incurred on account of the
additional pumping costs and, if the evaporation pans had to be
removed, the cost of such removal.

124. There is a fourth matter which requires consideration in
connection with the utilization of the water of the River Jordan
for the purpose of irrigation. The Place of Baptism, situated on
the River Jordan not far from Jericho, is a place of particular sanctity
to the Christian communities and one which in normal times is
visited annually by a considerable number of pilgrims. The abstrac-
tion of a large volume of water from the Jordan for irrigation would
decrease the flow of water at the Place of Baptism, and although the
Christian community would doubtless not object to the water of the
Jordan being used for an object so beneficial to the country as irriga-
tion, Christian sentiment is obviously a factor which must be taken
into consideration in determining the amount of water which can be
abstracted. Here again data are not at present available for
estimating what would be the effect of the abstraction of a given
quantity of water on the level and appearance of the river at the
Place of Baptism.

125. A preliminary investigation has been made into the practical
possibility, apart from the difficulties dealt with in the preceding
paragraph, of an irrigation canal on the east side of the Jordan Valley.
Such a canal would take off from the Yarmuk River some distance
above its junction with the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami, and it is
estimated that, on the basis of the present available discharge from
the Yarmuk River, it would be capable of irrigating an area of about
117,000 dunums. The total irrigable area on the east side of the
valley, exclusive of the area now irrigated seasonally by water from
the perennial streams, is put at about 280,000 dunums. It is
estimated that, if the water supply for the canal could be augmented
by a feeder from Lake Tiberias, it would be possible to irrigate the
whole of this area of 280,000 dunums and yet leave a sufficient
quantity of water to meet the needs of a canal on the western side
of the valley. A preliminary investigation has also been made into
the possibility of a canal on that side. This canal would take
off from the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and it is estimated
that it would command, in the plain of Beisan and the valley
north of that plain, an area of about 70,000 dunums of cultivable
land not irrigable from existing sources. Part of this area, about
one-third, would be in the Jewish State under plan A.

61

126. The engineering problems are likely to be of some magnitude,
for the canals, particularly that on the eastern bank, would have to
negotiate broken country and would have to traverse streams coming
down from the neighbouring hills. Until detailed investigations
have been carried out, it is impossible to form an estimate of the
cost of construction, but it would certainly be a very large figure,
and might easily amount to several million pounds. Further, the
success of every irrigation project depends upon the price at which
water can be supplied to the cultivator, and it will be impossible to
say that canals along the Jordan Valley will be a success until the
cost is known, and it has been determined that water can be supplied
at a rate which will enable the land to be cultivated at a profit.

127. As has been pointed out above, the power-station at Jisr al
Majami effectively prevents the carrying out of projects for high-level
canals taking off from Lake Tiberias and the River Yarmuk north of
that place. The construction of low-level canals taking off from a
point on the River Jordan south of Jisr al Majami is held to be
impracticable for the following reasons —

(a) On the western bank such a canal would have to run
about 48 kilometres (30 miles) in the trough of the river, merely
gaining height, before it would command a single dunum of
land. Even beyond this point the area commanded would not
be large. The best land lies along the foothills and for the most
part this would be too high to be irrigated from the canal. The
irrigable area would not exceed 30,000 to 40,000 dunums. An
area of this extent, situated at the end of the alignment, would
be far too small to justify the construction of a canal nearly
100 kilometres (about 62 miles) in length across most difficult
country. Moreover, the broken nature of the country, through
which it would pass, would not only give rise to grave engineering
difficulties, but would also make the canal very expensive to
construct and maintain.

(b) A low-level canal on the eastern bank would be subject in
genera] to the same disadvantages as a similar canal on the
western bank. As contours are not available, it is not possible
to estimate the area which could be commanded, but it is
unlikely that it would amount to more than a fraction of that
commanded by a high-level canal, and to irrigate this relatively
small area a canal running the whole length of the valley to
the Dead Sea would be necessary.

128. The length of time which would have to be devoted to the
various negotiations described in the preceding paragraphs, the
uncertainty regarding their final outcome, and the impossibility of
estimating in advance the total cost, both effective and non-effective,
of the various methods of construction, render any discussion of the
subject at this stage a matter of mere speculation. Until the various

62

enquiries and negotiations have been completed, it is impossible to
come to a final conclusion as regards the practicability of major
canal irrigation schemes along the Valley of the Jordan, or to
determine the area of irrigable land. But taking the most optimistic
view, the area of land that could be irrigated in addition to that now
irrigated would be approximately 350,000 dunums. At a rate of
30 dunums per holding — this is also considered to be an optimistic
estimate — and 4-75 persons per family, the agricultural population
for which provision could be made in the Jordan Valley south of
the Sea of Galilee would be —

350,000 4 „

— – X 4-75 = 55,416

say 55,500 persons.

Part of the irrigable area, however, falls within the proposed
Jewish State under plan A. In considering the possibility of
providing land for the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State, this
must be excluded. With this modification the figure of 55,500
becomes 51,800, say 52,000. Again, part of the irrigable area is
cultivated at present by rainfall only, and the population supported
on this cultivated but unirrigated portion should be deducted from
the above figure of 52,000. An accurate figure for this population is
not available, but for present purposes it may be roughly put at 3,000.
With this reduction the figure of 52,000 becomes 49,000.

129. If major canal projects proved impracticable, the only alterna-
tive would be to pump water from the River Jordan. The high lift,
the long distances to which the water would have to be carried in
pipes, and the difficult and broken country over which it would have
to be carried are serious obstacles to any schemes for irrigation by
pumping from the River Jordan ; and the only part of the valley in
which such schemes would appear to offer any hope of success is an
area of about 1 18,000 dunums on the eastern bank of the Jordan lying
north and south of the main road from Jericho to Amman. And here
again the effect of pumping on the level of the Dead Sea and the level
and appearance of the River Jordan at the Place of Baptism would
have to be considered.

Adopting the same basis of calculation as under the canalisation
scheme, the additional agricultural population for which provision
could be made by the irrigation of these 1 18,000 dunums would be —

i^-°X 4-75= 18,683
say between 18,000 and 19,000 persons.

130. There is one other matter to which reference should be made
in connection with irrigation schemes in the Jordan Valley : it is
one which is relevant to all irrigation and land development schemes
whether in the Jordan Valley or elsewhere in Palestine. It is the

63

question of markets for the crops produced. If the rate charged
for the water is sufficiently low to permit of holdings being devoted
entirely to the cultivation of cereals, the question of markets is not
of fundamental importance. But if the rate renders such a holding
unprofitable and requires the adoption of mixed farming, including
the growing of more expensive crops such as vegetables and fruit,
markets are of vital importance. Water pumped from the River
Jordan would, we are advised, be too expensive to permit of the
land of a holding being devoted entirely to cereals ; mixed farming
would have to be adopted. For water supplied by gravity from
high level irrigation canals it is not possible to forecast the economic
rate which would have to be charged, but here again it is probable
that mixed farming would be essential. In fact, with a holding
as small as 30 dunums mixed farming is the only method of culti-
vation which assures a livelihood to the farmer. Markets, therefore,
would be a matter of great importance to large irrigation projects
in the Jordan Valley.

The Southern Part of the Beisan Plain

131. A contour survey and a trial water settlement are being
carried out in the Beisan Plain. It is hoped that as a result of
this survey and settlement, it will be possible to effect economies in
the use of water and to make a moderate amount of surplus water
available for further development. It is difficult to estimate the
additional agricultural population which the plain could then
support ; but it is not likely to exceed about 4,000 persons,

Trans- Jordan

132. The land of Trans- Jordan falls into two zones, the cultivated
or rain-fed zone and the uncultivated or dry zone. The cultivated
zone is that in which the rainfall, in a normal year, is sufficient for
the raising of cereal crops. These two zones are shown on map 6.
The heaviest rainfall is experienced on the top of the Jordan escarp-
ment, and the cultivated zone stretches eastward from this
escarpment. The rainfall decreases rapidly towards the east, and
the width of the cultivated zone in its widest part, that is in the north,
is not more than 30 miles. This width decreases rapidly towards
the south, and the zone ultimately tails out a short distance south of
Ma’an into the southern desert. The area of this cultivated zone is
about 7,700,000 dunums and that of the uncultivated zone about
82,300,000 dunums.

133. The fiscal survey of Trans- Jordan, which was completed
about six years ago, was extended sufficiently far, both to the east
and the west, to include land in the eastern desert and on the slopes

(C31078) d

64

of the Jordan Valley which, though usually uncultivated, may be
cultivated in years of exceptionally good rainfall. The total area
covered by the fiscal survey was 10,000,000 dunums, and the
cultivated zone of 7,700,000 dunums falls within this larger area
covered by the fiscal survey. The area to which the fiscal survey
extended falls into the following classes —

(i) the cultivated zone

(a) irrigated 260,000 dunums

(b) vineyards 80,000

(c) rain-fed cereals . . . . 4,150,000

(d) uncultivable land including

forests 2,800,000

(*) the Shera 440,000

Total .. .. 7,730,000

(ii) land bordering the eastern desert
and land of the Jordan Valley
slopes 2,270,000

Total .. .. 10,000,000

134. Within the cultivated zone there is an area of 400,000
dunums which is in a class by itself. This area is situated at an
average altitude of 900 metres (nearly 3,000 feet) and possesses a
rainfall adequate to ensure a good crop. The remainder of the rain-
fed cereal area is not so favourably situated as regards rainfall and
moisture. For instance, the crops in the Husn-Remtha Plain, east
of Irbid, and the Madaba Plain, south of Amman, where the soil is
very fertile, frequently suffer from inadequate rain and high
temperatures, and in some years these adverse factors have a disas-
trous effect on the crops. The Shera lies at the southern end of the
cultivated zone and is used by the Howeitat tribe as their summer
grazing ground. The land of the Shera rises from about 3,000 feet
near Ma ‘an to nearly 5,000 feet in the west and south, and it is only
in the higher ground that the rainfall is at times enough for the
cultivation of cereal crops.

The land bordering the desert and along the Jordan Valley
slopes only gives a crop in a year of exceptionally ample and reason-
ably well distributed rainfall, and the percentage of crop failures is
exceedingly high.

65

135. Land settlement statistics are available for an area of
1,123,000 dunums comprising 80 villages. The whole of this area
lies in the northern portion of the cultivated zone and it falls into
three clearly distinguishable sub-areas —

Total
area.
Cultivated area.
Average area
per landowner.
Vines.
Cereals.
Vines.
Cereals.
Sub-Area A
377,000
39,000
223,000
5
26
B
382,000
261,000
62
c ..
364,000
314,000
117

Sub-area A is situated in the special area of 400,000 dunums
referred to in paragraph 134 ; this sub-area has an adequate rainfall.
The average landowner’s holding is small, being only 31 dunums, of
which 5 dunums are under vines ; 5 dunums of vines may be con-
sidered as equivalent to 10 dunums of cereals and hence expressed in
cereals the average holding is 36 dunums.

In sub-area B the rainfall is less reliable, and the average holding
(62 dunums) is larger than in sub-area A.

In sub-area C the rainfall is much more precarious — the Husn-
Remtha Plain referred to in the previous paragraph falls within this
sub-area — and the average holding is again larger, being 117 dunums.

The average holdings in the three sub-areas are not large ; if
anything they appear to be on the small side and are certainly no
more than reasonable subsistence areas. They do not point to the
land being able to carry a much larger population ; on the contrary,
they appear to indicate that there is a certain amount of land-hunger.

136. Other facts also point to the existence of land hunger in these
sub-areas. During the winter of the year 1937-38 applications were
submitted by about 800 families living in 15 villages of the Irbid
district — Irbid lies in the northern portion of the cultivated
zone— for the settlement of land about 50 kilometres distant in the
State Domain area bordering on the eastern desert. The authorities
in Trans- Jordan are of opinion that the majority of the applications
were genuine and that they are indicative of a desire to obtain
additional land, so that in years of exceptional rainfall the applicants
may be in a position to recoup themselves for losses incurred in
years of poor harvests.

(C31078)

66

137. The following wells have been sunk in the Trans- Jordan
plateau ; they are shown on map 6 —

Depth
Depth to
– Drilled
Water
Remarks.
in Metres, in Metres.
1. Irbid ..
175

No water found.
2. Remtha
182

Ditto.
3. Um Kundur . .
60

Ditto. Abandoned owing
to difficulties in boring.
4. Zubayer Adwan
175
168
Small yield, less than 2 cubic
metres per hour.
5. Teneib
162
152
Ditto.
6. Qatrane
136
114
Small yield ; 1\ cubic metres
per hour.
7. Black Rock . .
67

No water found ; drilling
abandoned owing to boring
difficulties.
8. Ma’an >. .
180
12
Drilled to a depth of 180
metres ; drilling will be
continued somewhat
further ; the prospects of
a useful yield of water are
very small.
9. Mafraq
242
195
Drilled by the ‘Iraq Petro-
leum Co. ; tested at 64

cubic metres per day.

The results have been uniformly disappointing and there appears to be
little likelihood of an extension of cultivation by irrigation. And in
this connection it should again be remembered that it is not economic
to grow ordinary cereal crops on land irrigated by water which has
to be pumped : special crops must be grown on such land, such as
vegetables and fruit, and special crops require an assured market.

Funds have been provided for the sinking of some bores in
the Shera country where there are prospects of finding water. These
bores have not been sunk as yet because it was thought advisable to
take up the Shera tests after work had been completed in the Jordan
Valley. But it is unlikely, even if water should be found at
reasonable depths, that this area will be capable of agricultural
development. The topography of the country does not lend itself
to irrigation from wells, and, although it may be possible to cultivate
part of it, the main benefit accruing from the discovery of additional
water sources will be an increase in the number of animals which can
be supported on the grazing grounds.

138. In our opinion, Trans- Jordan offers small scope for intensive
settlement on the land. We do not suggest that it cannot carry a
larger agricultural population than it does, but we are convinced
that the additional agricultural population which the land can
support is small.

67

139. Apart from the prospects of irrigation schemes in Beersheba
and the Jordan valley, and of development in Trans- Jordan, there
is also the possibility of settlement in other parts of Palestine to be
considered, namely the hill country and the Gaza sub-district,
that is, the maritime plain south of the proposed Jewish State.

The Hill Country

140. The Royal Commission, in summarising under six heads the
general conclusions enunciated by their various predecessors as a
result of their examination of the possibilities of further settlement
on the land in Palestine (chapter IX, paragraph 10), stated the
sixth of these conclusions as follows —

(6) There is already congestion on the land in the hill districts.

141. The Royal Commission’s own conclusion, after seeing two
of the most successful examples of Jewish settlement in the hill
country, and hearing the evidence of the Jewish Agency, is set out
in paragraph 153 of the same chapter as follows —

Having regard to all the foregoing considerations and to the necessity
of providing land for cultivators who may be dispossessed in order to meet
the requirements of any adequate policy of afforestation, a subject with
which we deal in a later Section, we are satisfied that there can be no
expectation of finding accommodation for any large increase in the rural
Arab population in the hills. We therefore have no hesitation in saying
that at present, and indeed for many years to come, the Mandatory
Power should not attempt to facilitate the close settlement of Jews in
the hilly districts generally, though in the immediate neighbourhood of
Jerusalem dairy and fruit farms might eventually prove self-supporting.

142. Our own enquiries lead to the same general conclusion,
that is to say, we are satisfied that, with the existing standard of
cultivation and capital resources of the fellaheen, the land in the
hill districts of Palestine is already congested. As an example, we
give below the results of an investigation made, at our request,
by the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries into the possibilities
of closer settlement in the Hebron sub-district.

143. For the purpose of this investigation the Director adopted
the following areas as representing what in his view might be regarded
as a reasonable lot viable appropriate to each category of land as
given in the Rural Property Tax Ordinance —

„ , ^ …. Lot Viable.

Category. Description. Dunums

1 Citrus 10

3 Bananas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

5 1st grade irrigated land and 1st grade fruit plantation 50

6 2nd grade irrigated land and 2nd grade fruit planta- 57

tion.

7 3rd grade irrigated land and 3rd grade fruit plantation 67

8 1st grade ground crop land, 4th grade irrigated land 80

and 4th grade fruit plantation.
(C31078) d3

68

„ . j, …. Lot Viable.
Category. Description. Dunums.
9
2nd grade ground crop land, 5th grade irrigated land
and 5th grade fruit plantation.
100
10
3rd grade ground crop land, 6th grade irrigated land
and 6th grade fruit plantation.
111
11
4th grade ground crop land, 7th grade irrigated land
and 7th grade fruit plantation.
133
12

9
5th grade ground crop land, 8th grade irrigated land
and 8th grade fruit plantation.
167
13
6th grade ground crop land, 9th grade irrigated land
and 9th grade fruit plantation.
250
14
7th grade ground crop land (untaxable), 10th grade
irrigated land.
400
15
8th grade ground crop land (untaxable)
400
16
Forest, planted and indigenous and uncultivable land
400

We are aware that Jewish authorities claim that in well-watered
hill country, such as Galilee, 40 dunums will constitute a lot viable for
a fruit plantation. But Dr. Ruppin informed the Royal Commission
that for the hill districts he had as yet no data, and we believe that
no experience has yet been gained of a fruit-farm of this size being
operated successfully under such conditions. The more cautious
estimate of the Director of Agriculture for an average fruit-farm in
Galilee is, as stated in Appendix 7, 60 dunums, and this estimate
conforms with the figures for a lot viable adopted by him for the
survey of the Hebron sub-district as given above. We think that
an estimate of 40 dunums must be regarded as based on assump-
tions as to future methods of cultivation and marketing which
at present are largely speculative, and we prefer to follow the
Royal Commission who, in a slightly different context, considered
(chapter IX, paragraph 53) —

that, until the contrary is proved by experience and
practical experiment, the Administration will be wise in
adhering to their own definition. . . .

W|ppropose, therefore, to adopt this method of reckoning in
dealing with questions relating to the present standard of cultivation,
without prejudice to the question what is the appropriate lot viable
for land subjected to a higher degree of cultivation.

-H4. For the purpose of this investigation the Director divided
the sub-district into two portions which are considered separately.

145. A. — The portion of the sub-district north of a line drawn from
Ein Jidi along the northern boundaries of the villages of Yatta, Dura,
Ad Daweima and Al Qubeiba to the boundary of the Beersheba sub-
district. — This portion comprises a total area of 796,000 dunums, of
which 441,500 dunums, or say 55 per cent., are uncultivable. The

69

total population is 52,200, of which 21,400 persons, or 41 per cent.,
live in the town of Hebron and its suburbs. The number of persons
directly supported by agriculture is not known exactly, but is
estimated at about 38,000.

Applying the formula referred to above, the Director has advised
us that the number of families who could be supported by this
area without congestion is about 3,300, and the number of persons,
assuming an average of five persons per family, is 16,500, that is,
less than half of the number which is actually supported by agriculture
on this area to-day. There is no reason to suppose that the classi-
fication of land in the area, which has only recently been reviewed
and brought up to date, is incorrect, or that the standard of cultiva-
tion is in fact much higher than that which has been assumed for
the purpose of the classification. The only reasonable conclusion
is, therefore, that in this area there is already serious congestion on
the land.

This is not to say that there is no room for extending the
cultivable area in this district by clearing and terracing, or that no
provision could be made for closer settlement by the cultivation of
crops which lend themselves to the more intensive utilization of the
land, or by means of mixed farming. In the opinion of the Director,
development in any of these ways might be possible, provided that
adequate capital were made available, that satisfactory arrangements
could be made for the marketing of the new crops, and that, for
mixed farming, water could be provided for irrigation on economic
terms. At the best, however, changes of this kind must be gradual
and spread over a considerable time ; and even if they could be
introduced successfully, it is extremely unlikely that they would do
more than provide a reasonable level of subsistence for the existing
Arab population.

146. B. — The -portion of Hebron sub-district south of the line
referred to in A. — This portion comprises an area of 1,262,500 dunums
and carries a population of 24,000, of which 18,800 live in the four
towns or large villages of Dura, Yatta, Adh Dhahariya and Ad
Daweima. It is estimated that the population directly supported by
agriculture in the area is between 17,500 and 20,000, the higher figure
being more probably the correct one.

Of the total area, 964,800 dunums, or 76 per cent., is classified
as uncultivable, and the land generally is, both actually and
potentially, much poorer than the northern portion under A.

The theoretical lot viable for the various categories shows that
the land should be able to support 3,647 families or 18,235 persons,
of whom two-thirds would be dependent on holdings in the area
classified as uncultivable. As pointed out above, it is probable that
the existing population is already in excess of this number.

(C31078) d 4

70

While something could be done to improve the land by terracing
and similar methods, if sufficient capital were made available, the
prospects of closer settlement depend mainly on the discovery of
water in the area in large quantities. This, we are advised, is un-
likely ; and, that being so, we cannot regard this area as holding
out any considerable opportunity for additional settlement.

147. We have not obtained similar information with regard to
the hill country of Samaria and the rest of Judaea outside the
Jerusalem Enclave ; but we have no reason to suppose that the
conditions there are so different from those in the Hebron sub-
district that we should be led to modify the conclusion reached
by the Royal Commission with regard to the hill country of Palestine
in general.

148. As regards the hill country in the Jerusalem Enclave, we
have already quoted the Royal Commission’s observation that
” in the immediate neighbourhood of Jerusalem (Jewish) dairy and
fruit farms might eventually prove self-supporting.” We have
examined the prospects of such farms, and are satisfied that
the prospects of additional settlement in the neighbourhood of
Jcxusalem of persons dependent on this form of holding are incon-
siderable. For the rest, our observations in the preceding paragraph
apply to the hill country in the Jerusalem Enclave as well as to
the rest of Judaea.

Gaza Sub-District

149. The total area of this sub-district, which stretches along
the Mediterranean coast from the Ramleh sub-district in the north
to the Sinai border in the south-west, and extends on the east to
the boiders of the Hebron and Beersheba sub-districts, is 1,110,697
dunums. The total population, including 858 Jews, is 100,250, of
whom 39,500, or 39 per cent., live in the three towns of Gaza, Khan
Yunis and Al Majdal and their suburbs. The agricultural population,
of which a large part reside in the urban areas, was given in the 1931
census as 67,200 ; but it has probably increased since, and may
perhaps be put at about 72,000.

The theoretical lot viable for the various categories of land under
the Rural Property Tax Ordinance shows that the land should be
able to support 9,173 families or 45,865 persons in all, compared
with an actual population to-day of between 67,200 and 72,000, as
estimated above.

150. Of the total area of the sub-district, only 217,700 dunums,
or barely 20 per cent., are classified as uncultivable, and most of the
cultivable lands are of considerable value for agricultural purposes.
By far the greater part, however, say 77 per cent., is farmed by
primitive extensive methods with cereals ; and with such methods
the agricultural population is already in excess of what the land can

71

support on a reasonable basis of subsistence. If closer settlement is
to be carried out, irrigation is necessary. Irrigation in this sub-
district is, of course, entirely dependent on underground water.
There is evidence that, in a belt stretching parallel to the coast and
having a width varying from about fifteen kilometres in the north to
ten in the south near Gaza, there is generally a good supply of under-
ground water. In regions east of this belt, the prospects of finding
an adequate underground water supply are much less certain.
While some bores in this area proved unsuccessful, others tapped
good underground supplies. There are also certain areas, especially
south of Gaza, where the salinity of the water is comparatively high
and is therefore not suitable for certain crops, such as citrus. If,
however, water of the right quality can be obtained over a sufficiently
large area, it is believed that it would be possible to change a con-
siderable proportion of this land from unirrigated extensive cereal
farms to irrigated intensive plantations, or intensive mixed farming,
for which the lot viable may be as small as ten to thirty dunums, as
the case may be.

151. Even, however, if water should be made available in sufficient
quantities, the process of change in land utilization would at best be
a slow one, and great caution would have to be exercised if the farmer
is to be given a fair chance of success under the new conditions. In
particular, before it is decided to grow deciduous fruits on a large
scale, more experience is needed of their cultivation in Palestine, of
the possibility of controlling certain serious insect pests, and of the
availability of markets. As regards mixed farming, much valuable
experience has been gained already by the operation of the Experi-
mental “Organic Mixed Farm” attached to the Agricultural
Research Institute of the Jewish Agency at Rehovot. But the
question of markets still remains to be dealt with, and until this is
solved we cannot assume with confidence that any large increase in
the area under intensive cultivation in this sub-district will be
possible.

152. The conclusions reached in this chapter may be summarized
as follows—

(i) There is practically no scope for the exchange of land
and population between the Arab and Jewish States or between
the Jerusalem Enclave and the Jewish State (paragraph 106).

(ii) The results of the well-boring experiments in Beersheba
have been most disappointing. In the greater part of this
area there appears to be little hope of any improvement in
agriculture by means of irrigation from wells. This does not
entirely exclude all prospect of closer settlement, but until
further investigation into the possibilities of dry farming has
been carried out it would be premature to assume that there
is scope for settlement on any considerable scale in the near
future (paragraphs 112 and 114).

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(iii) In the Jordan Valley no substantial increase in the
irrigated area can be expected either from wells or from the
better utilization of the water of the perennial streams. If
large areas are to be brought under irrigation, water must be
obtained from Lake Tiberias, the River Jordan and the Yarmuk
River. The problems to be solved before the construction
of major canal irrigation schemes can be undertaken are
difficult and complex, and their solution will involve lengthy
investigations and negotiations. Even, however, if (a) these
problems can be solved, (b) irrigation canals should be proved
to be practicable, and (c) means can be found to finance the
cost, which might amount to several million pounds, the
additional agricultural population for which provision could be
made, would not, on the most optimistic view, exceed about
50,000 persons. If major irrigation canals should not prove
feasible, the alternative would be to irrigate a much smaller
area by pumping from the River Jordan. Again, taking an
optimistic view, the additional agricultural population for
which provision could be made by such a scheme would be
between 18,000 and 19,000 persons (paragraphs 115-129).

(iv) A moderate amount of surplus water can be made
available for development in the southern part of the Beisan
Plain. It is difficult to estimate the agricultural population
which the plain could then support, but it is not likely to exceed
4,000 persons (paragraph 131).

(v) The question of markets for the sale of the agricultural
produce is one of great importance to all large irrigation and
land development projects, whether in the Jordan Valley or
elsewhere in Palestine. Markets must be reasonably assured
for the additional agricultural produce before schemes for
bringing large additional areas of land under cultivation can
be said to be practicable (paragraph 130).

(vi) Trans- Jordan offers small scope for intensive settlement
on the land (paragraph 138).

(vii) The hill country in the Arab State cannot be regarded
as holding out any considerable opportunities for additional
settlement (paragraphs 147-148).

(viii) In the Gaza sub-district intensive cultivation could
be increased over a considerable area, provided water of the
right quality and in sufficient quantity were obtained. The
change from extensive to intensive cultivation would, however,
at the best be a slow one, and great caution would have to be
exercised if the farmer is to be given a fair chance under new
conditions (paragraphs 149-151).

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CHAPTER IX

THE JEWISH CLAIM IN REGARD TO JERUSALEM

153. The Royal Commission’s proposals relating to Jerusalem
have been severely criticized by Jews of all parties on the ground
that they involve the permanent separation of Jerusalem from the
Jewish State, and very strong representations have been made for
the inclusion of part, at least, of the city within that state. The
grounds on which this claim is based are set forth in the following
extract from a memorandum we received from a Jewish source —

There can be no question as to the necessity for entrusting the Holy
Places of Jerusalem to the custody of the Mandatory Power as an inter-
national trustee. Those Holy Places, however, are concentrated within
the Old City and the need of a special regime for that part of the town
cannot justify the exclusion of the whole of Jerusalem from the Jewish
State. It has been truly said that Jewish Palestine without Jerusalem
would be a body without a soul. Jerusalem has throughout the ages
been the spiritual centre of the Jews, dispersed as they were over
the face of the earth. … It is a symbol of Jewish national
life and practically synonymous in the minds of Jews with Palestine.
Throughout the ages, Jews have persisted, in spite of all obstacles, in
attempting to re-establish themselves in Jerusalem. In this latest phase
of the Return to Zion, Jews have built the greater part of the new
Jerusalem outside the city walls. This area outside the walls has a
Jewish population of over 70,000, forming an almost compact unit : it
includes the central Jewish National and religious institutions — the
Jewish Agency and Zionist Organisation, the General Council of Palestine
Jews, the Chief Rabbinate, the Hebrew University and the National
Library and various foundations established by Jewish communities
throughout the world. The separation of this Jerusalem from the
Jewish State is an injustice to both. Apart from the special significance
of Jerusalem, spiritual and political, the loss thereby entailed to the
Jewish State in terms of population, economic position and taxable
capacity would be irreparable.

154. The city of Jerusalem within the present municipal
boundaries falls into three sections—

(a) the Old City,

(b) the predominantly Jewish area, and

(c) the area inhabited chiefly by Moslems and Christians.

155. The Old City is situated within the city walls. In a.d. 135
Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans and its site ploughed up.
Only a few vestiges of ancient Jewish buildings remain : the walled
City as it now stands is the work of the Roman Empire, the Crusaders,
and the Moslems.

156. The predominantly Jewish area, commonly referred to as
the new Jewish Jerusalem, lies north-west of the Old City and on
both sides of the main road leading to the Maritime Plain. The
population of this new Jewish Jerusalem is about 72,000 persons,
of whom 69,000 are Jews.

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157. The area inhabited chiefly by Moslems and Christians lies
north and south of the Old City and also forms a belt between the
new Jewish Jerusalem and the Old City. The combined population of
this area and the Old City is about 53,000 persons, of whom 24,500
are Moslems, 21,500 Christians, and 7,000 Jews. Of the Christians,
6,000 are neither Arabs nor belong to kindred races.

158. Outside the municipal limits the more important Jewish
suburbs are —

(d) the area which lies west of the new Jewish Jerusalem and
along the road from the city to Ein Karim ;

(b) the Hebrew University area on the east of the city ;

(c) the suburbs of Meqor Haiyim and Ramat Rahel to the
south of the city.

The Jewish population in these suburbs is about 3,000 persons.

159. On the part of the Jews it has been suggested that the new
Jewish Jerusalem, together with the western suburbs and an
extension curving round the Hebrew University, should be included
in the Jewish State. This area is shown on map 11. The population
within this area is approximately 74,500 persons of whom 71,000
are Jews. It has been further proposed that the Jewish area at
Jerusalem should be connected with the Jewish State in the Maritime
Plain south of Jaffa by a corridor. This corridor is shown on map 7.
The population of the corridor is predominantly Arab with a very
small number of Jews.

160. The area proposed to be included in the Jewish State lies
close to the Old City on the north and west and (though this is not
brought out in map 1 1) is situated on rather higher ground than the
Old City itself. It also borders on the Moslem cemetery at Mamilla,
and includes within its boundaries a certain number of Christian
churches, hospitals and schools, a monastery, an orphanage, and the
British War Cemetery. Finally, it includes a part of the main road
from Jerusalem to the Maritime Plain, and a further section of this
road, nearly as far as Latrun, lies in the proposed Jewish corridor.

161. It is clear that the partition of the city of Jerusalem,
involving, as it does, the setting up of an inter-state boundary
through the centre of the city, would give rise to administrative
problems of great complexity. In the succeeding paragraphs we
examine these problems at some length, and reach the conclusion
that, although the difficulties are formidable, they are not altogether
insuperable, and might not in themselves be a bar to the inclusion of
a part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State, provided that reliance could
be placed on the mutual goodwill and co-operation of the two
adjoining communities. Unfortunately, past experience does not
justify us in taking a hopeful view on this point ; and in reaching
our final conclusion, therefore, we shall be unable to assume that
these difficulties will be solved. But we have not been tempted to

75

attach undue weight to this argument, since, as will appear, we are
forced to regard the political and religious objections to the Jewish
claim as in themselves insuperable.

162. Turning to the administrative problems, we deal first with
that arising out of the maintenance of law and order. An inter-state
boundary which cuts through the centre of a city must inevitably
create difficulties in regard to police administration. In this
connection, it has been suggested that if provision were made by
which a member of the police force of either Administration was
entitled, when ” in hot pursuit ” of an offender, to chase and arrest
the fugitive on the territory of the other, and if extradition proceedings
were made as simple as possible, the problems arising out of police
administration would be satisfactorily solved. We agree with this
suggestion so far as it goes, but the problem of the maintenance
of law and order on a boundary running through Jerusalem could
not be solved completely by arrangements relating to the hot pursuit
of offenders and by the simplification of extradition proceedings. To
our mind, the chief problem would be the prevention of breaches
of the peace along the boundary between a population which, on
one side, would be composed almost entirely of Jews, and on the
other, very largely of Arabs. As we shall point out later in this
chapter, the inclusion of part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State would
be deeply resented by the Moslems. In such circumstances the
maintenance of peace along a boundary running through the city
and suburbs — along streets and across properties in private owner-
ship — would be a most difficult task. Indeed the problem created
by the setting up of such a boundary would be practically the same
as that created by the contiguity of Jaffa and Tel Aviv {vide
chapter V) and we are of opinion that it would have to be solved in
the same manner, that is, by the construction along the boundary
of a road with a railing down the middle. The construction of such
a road through the centre of the city of Jerusalem would present
much greater difficulties and would be a more disturbing and
expensive operation than that proposed for Jaffa — Tel Aviv.

163. In paragraph 295 of chapter XIV we recommend that, in
order to interfere as little as possible with the freedom of movement
between the Jewish and Arab States on the one hand and the
Mandated Territories on the other, persons residing in those states
should be free, subject only to the requirements of law and order,
to enter the Mandated Territories for short or casual visits but should
not be allowed to reside habitually therein without the permission
of the Government. Under such a system a boundary running
through the centre of the city would not, from the point of view of
immigration, cause any administrative difficulty to the Mandatory.
It is doubtful, however, whether the Jewish State would find it
possible to adopt a regime as liberal as we propose, for presumably
it would desire to exercise control over persons entering the Jewish

76

area in search of employment even of a casual nature. If such should
be the case, a boundary running through the city along streets and
across properties in private ownership would inevitably give rise
to administrative difficulties, for it would be a boundary the crossing
of which the Jewish State would find it extremely difficult to control.

164. Again a customs cordon would be impossible on a boundary
running through the centre of Jerusalem. It has been suggested that
this difficulty would be overcome if the whole of Jerusalem, that is
both the portion in the Jewish State and that in the Mandated area,
were treated as a single unit for customs purposes. This would
necessitate agreement between the two Administrations that the
customs duties in this portion of the Jewish State should be the same
as those in the whole Mandated territory. But there would still
remain the question of determining the allocation between the
respective Administrations of the customs duties collected on the
boundaries. But none of these particular difficulties would arise if
our proposals in chapter XXII with regard to customs should
be adopted.

165. Another set of administrative problems arises out of the
fact that the water supply and drainage schemes have been designed
and constructed as a single unit. The source of the water supply
for Jerusalem is situated at Ras-el-Ain in the Maritime Plain,
about 60 kilometres (38 miles) from Jerusalem, whence water is
pumped to an overhead reservoir at Romema, about 800 metres
(2,500 ft.) above sea-level, within the proposed Jewish area. From
this overhead reservoir it is distributed by gravitation to the
consumer. The works at Ras-el-Ain, the pumping stations and the
pipe-line between Ras-el-Ain and Romema, and the overhead
reservoir belong to the Palestine Administration, which is responsible
for the supply of water to the reservoir at Romema. The distribution
system, on the other hand, belongs to the municipality, and the
latter body is responsible for the distribution of the water to the
consumer. The financial arrangements are that the Government
charge the municipality for water supplied at Romema, and the
municipality charges the consumer for the water he uses. It is
important to note that the pipes by which the water passes from
Romema to the proposed Mandated area pass, and indeed must pass,
through the proposed Jewish area. As regards the drainage system,
the position, generally speaking, is that the drainage from that
portion of the present municipal area which it is proposed should be
included in the Jewish State, discharges through the drains in the
Mandated area and the outfall is situated in this area. We do not
suggest that the existence of these joint systems would create any
insuperable administrative difficulty. Given goodwill and a desire for
co-operation, agreements could be entered into for the working and
maintenance of the joint systems. But, unfortunately, goodwill
and co-operation cannot be assured, and the existence of these joint

77

systems would provide a fruitful ground for misunderstanding and
friction between the Jewish municipality on the one hand and the
predominantly Arab municipality on the other.

166. We now turn to the political and religious objections to the
proposal. As we have already said, the administrative difficulties,
although weighty and serious, are, given goodwill, not insuperable,
and in themselves might not be a bar to the inclusion of part of
Jerusalem in the Jewish State. The political and religious objections
are, however, of a much more serious character and are, in our view,
fatal to the proposal that any part of Jerusalem should be included
in the Jewish State.

167. Jerusalem is sacred not only to the Jews but also to the
Moslems and the Christians. Within the Old City is situated the
Haram-esh-Sherif, an Islamic place of great sanctity and one which
is reckoned next to the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina as an
object of veneration to Moslems. Within the area of the Haram-
esh-Sherif are the Dome of the Rock and the Mosque of Aqsa. The
former is said to be the spot from which the Prophet Mahommed
ascended to Heaven. Within the same area is also situated the place
where, according to tradition, Mahommed’s horse, Baruk, was stabled
when the Prophet made his celestial journey from the Rock. The
Haram area and the buildings on it have been in Moslem ownership
for many centuries and are regarded as among the most treasured
possessions of the Moslem world.

168. Although on this point we have not had the opportunity of
hearing the views of representative Moslems, we have been assured
by persons well qualified to express an opinion that Moslems through-
out the world would be most vehemently opposed to the inclusion of
any part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State, that they would regard
the establishment of a Jewish State overlooking the Moslem Holy
Places as the first step towards the ultimate absorption of the Old
City by the Jews, and that a decision to include part of Jerusalem
with the Jewish State would inevitably lead to disorders of the most
serious kind.

169. We are aware that the Zionist organizations have, on several
occasions, denied that it is the intention of the Jewish people to
menace the inviolability of the Moslem Holy Places, and leading
Jewish representatives assured us that there could be no question
that it was necessary to entrust the Holy Places of Jerusalem
to the custody of the Mandatory Power as an international trustee.
But this does not prove that the view expressed in the preceding
paragraph as regards the Arab attitude towards the proposal to include
part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State is incorrect. In spite of all the
denials issued by the Jews, the Arabs still believe that the Jews
have designs on the Old City, and the Jewish claim for the inclusion
of the new Jewish Jerusalem in the proposed Jewish State tends to

78

confirm them in that belief. Indeed, one leading representative of
Orthodox Jewry informed us that in his view the Old City, with the
exception of the Haram-esh-Sherif, should forthwith be included in
the Jewish State, while another made the proposal that the Old City
with the exception of the Christian and Moslem sacred places should
form part of the Jewish State. And in this connection it should
be remembered that the Wailing Wall, the last remaining vestige
of the ancient Jewish Temple, forms part of the western boundary
of the Haram-esh-Sherif, and that Jewry believes that, when the
true Messiah comes, a Jewish Temple will once again be built on
the ancient site.

170. We ourselves are convinced that Moslems would resent
most deeply the setting up of a Jewish State in close proximity to
the Old City, and that they would regard such a State as the spear-
head of a Jewish attack on the Old City itself. The consequences
would be most serious. Feelings between Arabs and Jews would be
still further inflamed and the maintenance of order between Arab and
Jew in, and in the neighbourhood of, Jerusalem would become one
of the most difficult of tasks. The presence of a Jewish area under
Jewish rule in close proximity to the Old City would constitute a
continuing incitement to breaches of the peace.

171. To anyone who is disposed to think that this conclusion is
based on exaggerated fears, we recommend a careful study of the
detailed narrative of the events leading up to the outbreak in
Jerusalem on the 23rd August, 1928, as given in chapter III of the
Report of the Shaw Commission (Cmd. 3530), together with the
following comment by that body, quoted from chapter IV, page 73
of their Report —

On the other hand, the Mufti or any educated Moslem might —
genuinely and not without reason — have feared that, if at some future
time the Jews became politically dominant in Palestine, they would not
be content to leave the old Temple Area in Moslem ownership. No
declaration by the Zionist Organization could remove such a fear ; the
declared Zionist policy of non-interference with the Moslem Holy Places
by no means commands, even to-day, the support of all Jews, many of
whom as individuals desire to see the Temple of Jehovah rebuilt on its
old site. Chief Rabbi Kook in his evidence before us expressed such a
desire, but said that the event would not take place until the coming of
the Messiah. Nor could the fear, if such be felt, be removed by the
argument that Great Britain, as the greatest Moslem power in the world,
would never permit interference with the Moslem Holy Places ; the Arabs
might well contend that the position of Great Britain in Palestine is by
no means necessarily more permanent than has been the rule of other
great Empires over Jerusalem in the past.

i

This comment, though related to the possibility of Jewish
political dominance as a result of the continuation of the Mandate,
is still, in our opinion, applicable to the situation which would arise
if, as a result of partition, a Jewish State were to be set up in such
close proximity to the Old City.

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172. But it is not only Moslem opinion which is to be considered
in this matter. Jerusalem is also sacred to the Christian faith, and
not only the Old City, within which stands the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre itself and the Way of the Cross, but also many places in
the surrounding area, such as the Mount of Olives and the Sanctuary
of the Ascension, the Garden of Gethsemane, Bethlehem and the
Church of. the Nativity, the village of Bethany, the road to Emmaus,
all places hallowed to the Christian by the most precious associations.
It may be that many Christians, especially in this country, sym-
pathize with the passionate longing of the Jews for Jerusalem and
would be willing to see at least that part of the city which includes the
modern suburb and the Hebrew University incorporated in the
Jewish State, if that could be done by agreement and with goodwill.
But we are convinced that the dominant desire of the whole body of
Christians would be to preserve the peace of Jerusalem and to safe-
guard the Holy City from any change which threatened to provoke
hatred and bloodshed within its walls or in their neighbourhood.
With this in mind, we believe that Christian opinion throughout the
world, realising that such a step would provoke resentment and
disorder, would be deeply grieved by a proposal to entrust a part
of the city precincts to the control of the Jewish community.

173. There is one other matter to which reference should be made.
In a previous paragraph we have pointed out that the main road from
Jerusalem to the Maritime Plain passes through the proposed
Jewish area in Jerusalem and that a further portion of this road is
situated in the proposed Jewish Corridor. But this is not all.
The main road which runs north from Jerusalem to Ramallah and
Nablus passes for a distance through the strip of land which it is
proposed should be included in the Jewish State in order to place the
Hebrew University in that State. In our view the inclusion of
these main roads in the proposed Jewish State constitutes an
important objection to the proposal that the new Jewish Jerusalem
should be incorporated in the Jewish State. Moslems and Christians
approaching the mandated Jerusalem and the Holy Places therein
from the west and north would be required to pass through Jewish
territory. Such an arrangement would inevitably give rise to
incidents leading to disturbances of the peace. Again, if the main
roads leading to Jerusalem pass through Jewish territory the
Mandatory Power would be seriously handicapped in carrying out the
trust of ensuring ” free and safe access ” to the Holy Places for all
the world.

174. We do not wish to be thought insufficiently appreciative
of the profound significance of Jerusalem to Jewry. We have
received exhaustive and eloquent evidence of the intensity of the
devotion felt by Jews to the city throughout their history and of
the unique position which it has occupied in their spiritual and
political thought. We recognize, moreover, that modern Jerusalem

80

as the headquarters of the directing agencies of Jewish activity in
Palestine is the centre of Jewish political and cultural life in the
country to-day and that its exclusion from the Jewish State will
deprive that state of a considerable population and a substantial
source of revenue. After very earnest consideration of all the issues
involved, however, we have no hesitation in concluding that, apart
from the practical difficulties to which reference has been made, the
religious and political objections to the Jewish claim must be held to
be decisive. We feel convinced that the unique character of
Jerusalem as the object of the affection and veneration of the
adherents of three of the great religions of mankind must be recognized
by its retention in trust for the world under Mandatory Government.
We therefore recommend that, as proposed by the Royal Commission,
the entire city should be included in the Enclave for the Holy Places
at Jerusalem and Bethlehem and that no portion should be included
in the Jewish State. Having reached this conclusion it is not necessary
for us to consider further the proposed Jewish Corridor. If no portion
of Jerusalem is included in the Jewish State there is no justification
for such a corridor.

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CHAPTER X

A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF PLANS A AND B

1. Plan A

175. The figures of population and land for the Arab and Jewish
States under plan A were given in chapter VII. For convenience
they are repeated below —

Urban
Rural

Total

Population

Arab State
(Including the Beersheba

sub-district)
Arabs Jews Total
136,500 5,600 142,100
348,700 1,600 350,300

Jewish State

Arabs
77,500
217,200

Jews
243,600
61,300

Total
321,100
278,500

485,200 7,200 492,400 294,700 304,900 599,600

Lund
(in dunums)

Arab State

(Excluding the Beersheba Jewish State
sub-district)

Arabs Jews Total Arabs Jews Total

26,600 1,300 27,900 78,600 135,900 214,500

Other cultivable 3,018,000 28,300 3,046,300 2,153,000 730,700 2,883,700
land.

Uncultivable land 3,963,300 7,400 3,970,700 1,623,100 273,600 1,896,700

Citrus land

Total land* 7,007,900 37,000 7,064,900 3,854,700 1,140,200 4,994,900

Under Section (1) of our terms of reference we are required to
recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas which
will —

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment,
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish
States ;

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa.

It will be seen at once that, while the proposed Arab State complies
with Section 1 (b), this cannot be said of the proposed Jewish State.
The number of Arabs in the Jewish State is very large, being 295,000
as against 305,000 Jews : that is, the Arabs constitute 49 per cent,
of the total population in the Jewish State. The area of Arab land
in the proposed Jewish State is also large : out of a total area of
about 4,995,000 dunums the Arabs own 3,855,000 dunums, or over
75 per cent.

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

82

176. The Royal Commission recognized that the existence of a
large Arab minority in the proposed Jewish State would prove a most
serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of partition,
and they contemplated that the problem created by this large Arab
minority should be solved by the transfer to the Arab State of
the greater part of the Arabs constituting that minority. It does
not seem too much to say that the successful solution of this problem
was a fundamental assumption in their plan ; and that, if it should
appear that no such solution can be found, the greater part of the
case on which their plan rests falls to the ground. It will be seen
from the following analysis that in our opinion it is impossible to
provide, by voluntary exchange or transfer, for the removal of any
but a small fraction of the Arab minority in the Jewish State.

177. As has been indicated in chapter VIII, the problem cannot
be solved by an exchange of population and land. The small
number of Jews (7,200) and the small amount of land (37,000
dunums) held by Jews in the proposed Arab State render this
solution impracticable. Nor is the possibility of a solution being
found by the method of exchange increased by taking into account
the number of Jews and the amount of Jewish land within the
Jerusalem Enclave. Here again, the number of Jews in the rural
areas and the amount of Jewish land are too small to make exchange
a feasible proposition.

178. If the problem cannot be solved by an exchange of land and
population, can it be solved by a transfer on a voluntary* basis of
the Arab population ? The answer to that question must also be
in the negative.

In the first place, even on the most optimistic basis land is not
available for the resettlement of more than a fraction of the number
of Arabs included in the proposed Jewish State, and it is mere specu-
lation to assume that land will become available for even that
fraction. To found a permanent policy on such speculative
assumptions would be most imprudent. We have dealt with this
question of land for resettlement in considerable detail in chapter
VIII and need only repeat our conclusions briefly here —

(a) As regards Beersheba, the conclusion we reached was that
the results of the well-borings recently carried out furnish little
hope of that sub-district being able, through irrigation, to

* In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine (published
in Cmd. 5634) it was announced that His Majesty’s Government have not
accepted the Royal Commission’s proposal for the compulsory transfer in the
last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area (Appendix I). On
behalf of the Jews it was also made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be
opposed to the exercise of any degree of compulsion.

83

support a larger agricultural population than it does at present.
This does not entirely exclude all prospect of closer settlement
in this area, but until further investigation into the possibilities
of dry farming has been carried out it would be premature to
assume that there is scope for settlement on any considerable
scale in the near future.

(b) As regards the Jordan Valley, we pointed out that the
solution — if a solution were at all possible — of the difficulties
which will have to be overcome before major canal irrigation
schemes can be undertaken, must inevitably involve negotiations
and investigations extending over a considerable period of
time, and that, even if such schemes were to prove practicable
and satisfactory arrangements could be made to finance the
cost (which might easily amount to several million pounds),
the additional agricultural population which, on the most
optimistic view, could be provided for was only about 49,000.

(c) As regards the southern part of the Beisan plain, the more
economic utilization of the water from the springs in this plain
would make a moderate amount of surplus water available for
development. It is difficult to estimate the additional
agricultural population which the plain could then support,
but it is not likely to exceed about 4,000 persons.

(d) As regards the hill country in the proposed Arab State, our
enquiries led us to the same conclusion as that reached by the
Royal Commission, that is to say, that there is no room for any
large increase in the rural Arab population in the hills.

(e) As regards the Gaza sub-district, the conclusion we reached
was that, provided water of the right quality and in sufficient
quantity were obtained, intensive cultivation could be intro-
duced over a considerable area. It was, however, pointed out
that the change would at the best be a slow one, and that great
caution would have to be exercised if the farmer is to be given
a fair chance under the new conditions.

(/) In regard to Trans- Jordan, we concluded that there was
small scope for intensive settlement on the land.

179. In the second place, even if it were possible to make land
available for resettlement, it does not follow that the problem would
have been solved, for it is unlikely that the Arabs themselves
would be willing to leave their home lands and start life afresh in
a new area. They have a deep attachment — shared by peasants
all the world over — for their ancestral lands. The lands which
they would be called upon to leave — the Maritime Plain, the plains
of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan, the Huleh Basin and the hill
country of Galilee — constitute the most fertile and best watered
parts of Palestine. Even if lands were available for the resettlement
of large numbers of Arabs in Beersheba and the Jordan Valley,

84

the lands to which they would be asked to migrate are situated in
arid tracts where rainfall is scanty and uncertain and where crops
will depend almost entirely on irrigation. Again, the plains have
a warm but equable climate, and in the hills, while there is a greater
range of temperature, the maximum temperature is a few degrees
lower than in the plains. But the climate of the Jordan Valley
south of the Sea of Galilee is tropical. The Valley is situated
between 200 to 400 metres (600 and 1,200 feet) below sea level, and
in summer the high air pressure and the excessive heat combine to
produce most oppressive conditions. The Arabs dislike the climate
of the Jordan Valley and would not willingly leave their homes
in the healthy regions of the plains and the hills for the heat and
discomfort of the valley.

180. In the third place, it is in any event improbable that the
Arab cultivator would be prepared to migrate in order to create
space for the Jews. The gulf between the Arabs and the Jews has
widened year by year. The Arabs look upon the Jews as foreigners
invading their country, who are able and ready to spend money
regardless of values if only they can acquire land occupied by Arabs on
which to settle Jews. Further, they believe that the Jews intend to
oust them from employment. They know that Jews settled on land
belonging to the Jewish National Fund are prohibited by the terms
of their lease from employing Arab labour ; they know of the
pressure on Jewish employers to employ Jews and not Arabs ; and
they know of the movement to intimidate Jewish farmers who
employ Arab labour. Such being their feelings towards the Jews it
does not seem likely that the Arabs would be willing to migrate in
order to make room for the Jews.

181. After studying the question with particular care, we have
been forced to conclude, for the reasons given above, that the
problem created by the large number of Arabs in the proposed
Jewish State cannot be solved by means of either an exchange
or a transfer of population.

182. If this conclusion is valid, can the problem be solved
by the exclusion from the proposed state of an area which is almost
entirely Arab ? This question brings us to the proposed inclusion
of Galilee in the Jewish State. But before we examine this proposal
it will be convenient to deal with an area at the southern extremity
of the proposed Jewish State. This area is almost entirely Arab
in character and its exclusion from the Jewish State would effect
a desirable though relatively small reduction in the number of
Arabs in that state.

183. The portion of the proposed Jewish State which lies south
of the Jerusalem Enclave falls into two clearly distinguishable
sections, a northern and a southern section. The dividing line

85

between these two sections runs from the Mediterranean Sea along
the Wadi Rubin and then south of the villages of Al Qubeiba
and Zarnuqa till it joins the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave.
The figures of population and land for these two sections are —

Northern Southern

Section Section

Population— Arabs 4,700 18,100

Jews 16,700 1,600

Total .. 21,400 19,700

Land (in dunums)
Arabs
Jews
Arabs
Jews
Citrus land
. . 13,500
35,000
14,600
6,500
Plantations
2,000
5,000
7,600
1,700
Taxable cereal land
. . 22,900
5,000
159,600
17,500
Untaxable cereal land
200
Total cultivable land
. . 38,400
45,000
182,000
25,700
Built-on areas
200
5,000
600
200
Uncultivable land
. . 20,000
20,500
90,500
900
Total land*
. . 58,600
70,500
273,100
26,800

The northern section is predominantly Jewish as regards
population and, to a less marked extent, as regards ownership of
land. The southern section is even more predominantly Arab.
In this section the Arabs form 90 per cent, of the population and
hold about 90 per cent, of the land. The southern section also con-
tains an important Moslem place of pilgrimage — the shrine of
Nabi Rubin — which in the autumn is visited by many thousands
of Moslems. We are of opinion that the southern section should be
excluded from the Jewish State.

184. We now turn to Galilee. Sir George Adam Smith defines
the historic Galilee as follows : —

The natural boundaries of Galilee are obvious. South, the Plain of

Esdraelon ; north, the great gorge of the Litany or Kasimiyeh,

cutting off the Lebanon ; east, the valley of the Jordan and the Lake of
Gennesaret; and west, the narrow Phoenician coast. This region coin-
cides pretty closely with the territories of four tribes — Issachar, Zebulun,
Asher and Naphtali. But the sea-coast, claimed for Zebulun and Asher,
never belonged either to them or the province of Galilee ; it was always
gentile.f

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

f Chapter XX of ” The Historical Geography of the Holy Land.”

86

For our present purpose we use the word ” Galilee ” as referring
to the area lying between the Mediterranean on the west, the
escarpment overlooking the Huleh basin on the east, the boundary
of Palestine on the north and the southern edge of the Galilee hill
country on the south. The area is shown in map 9 and is described
therein as ” Galilee.” Galilee is almost wholly in Arab occupation
as the following figures show*—

Arabs
Jews
Population . . . . . . . .
88,200
2,900
juanu. aunumsj
Arabs
Jews
Citrus land
8,000
Bananas
100
Plantations
120,800
2,100
Taxable cereal land
376,000
8,000
Untaxable cereal land
97,300
6,800
Total cultivable land
602,200
16,900
Uncultivable land, including built-
on areas
718,900
19,000
Total landf
1,321,100
35,900

Of the Jewish population of 2,900, 2,000 live in the town of Safad
and 250 in the town of Acre. Jews form less than 4 per cent, of the
total population (apart from the towns only 1 per cent.) and they
own less than 3 per cent, of the land.

185. We are of opinion that Galilee should not be included in the
Jewish State. Our reasons briefly stated are three. First, the
population is almost entirely Arab and the land is almost entirely
owned by Arabs. Secondly, the Arabs in Galilee are vehemently
opposed to the inclusion of that area in the Jewish State ; they will
certainly resist such inclusion by force ; and we see no justification
for using force to compel this large body of Arabs in what is a purely
Arab area to accept Jewish rule. Thirdly, we consider that it is
likely that, even if their resistance should be effectively crushed,
such pacification would be only temporary, and that this area, by
reason of its purely Arab character and its comparative inaccessibility,
would remain a ” running sore ” in the body of the Jewish State.
We develop these arguments at greater length in the following
paragraphs.

* These figures do not include the population and land of the suggested
Nazareth Enclave (see chapter IV).

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

87

186. The Royal Commission in their Report drew attention
to the fact that the frontier they had proposed necessitated the
inclusion in the Jewish State of the Arab area of Galilee, but they
appear to have taken the view that, as the Arab inhabitants of
Galilee had throughout the recent disturbances shown themselves
less amenable to political incitement than those of Samaria and
Judaea, where the centres of Arab nationalism were located, the
inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State was not likely to lead to
serious friction. Subsequent events have proved that this view
was mistaken. It is true that during the series of disturbances up
to and including those of the year 1936, the population of Galilee
took little part in political activities, and that the disturbances in
that district were largely confined to the towns of Acre and Safad.
With the publication of the Royal Commission’s Report, however,
the situation rapidly changed. Since that date Galilee has been in a
state of incipient rebellion. We do not wish to say anything which
will encourage violence, but on this point we must speak plainly.

We heard the views of officials and other persons well qualified
by experience and knowledge of the country to speak of the probable
Arab reactions to the inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State, and
they were all agreed that such a course would be followed by an
intensification of the present disturbances. The evidence leaves us
in no doubt whatever. We believe that a decision to include Galilee
in the Jewish State would be followed by an increase in disaffection
leading to open rebellion, and that the British Government would
be faced with the ungrateful task of taking the sternest repressive
measures in order to compel the Arabs of Galilee to accept Jewish
rule. The maintenance of peace and order in that area would then
become a military operation requiring a military occupation.

187. It has been suggested to us that these are not matters
which need concern the British people, since, once the Jewish State
has been set up, it would be for the Jews to deal with Arab resistance
within Galilee. We cannot agree with this view.

(a) First, there must inevitably be a considerable interval
between the announcement by His Majesty’s Government of
their policy and the setting up of an independent Jewish State,
during which the British Government as Mandatory Power
would remain fully responsible for security and order. It is
not likely that Arab opposition would wait until the Jewish
State had been set up before breaking out into acts of open
resistance, and during the interval, therefore, the whole burden
of suppressing this resistance would fall upon His Majesty’s
Government.

(b) Secondly, the substitution of Jewish for British forces
would not relieve the British Government of their responsibility
for the policy which put the Jewish forces in a position to
suppress the Arabs who resist that policy.

88

(c) Thirdly, there is the risk that the Jewish suppression of
the Arabs in Galilee might lead to attacks on the Jewish State
from outside. If this were to happen, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment, by virtue of their treaty obligations to the Jewish State,,
could not fail to become involved.

188. We find it difficult to believe that public opinion in this
country would support a policy which renders inevitable either the
continued use of British forces or the use of Jewish forces to suppress
a prolonged and resolute Arab resistance to the inclusion of Galilee
in the Jewish State.

189. In any event we doubt whether any military suppression of
Arab resistance in this area would result in permanent pacification.
Experience does not suggest that a large racial minority forming a
homogeneous block in an isolated and compact area is likely to be
prepared to acquiesce permanently in a foreign rule, imposed upon
it by ruthless repressive measures. In our view, the inclusion of
Galilee in the Jewish State would create a minority problem which,
would endanger, not only the stability of that state, but the prospect
of securing in the future friendly and harmonious relations between
Arabs and Jews in the Middle East.

190. In our opinion the reasons we have given for the exclusion
of Galilee from the Jewish State are decisive. But it has been sug-
gested that the exclusion of this area from the Jewish State wilt
deprive that state of an area which offers considerable room for
settlement by the Jews. Even if this were the case, we should
still regard the arguments we have given as predominant ; but,
in fact, the suggestion is exaggerated. We have examined this matter
in detail in Appendix 7. For the purpose of estimating the additional
population which could be settled on the land in Galilee, Jewish
authorities have told us that they assumed that a suitable lot viable
in the plains would be 25 dunums, and in the hills 40 dunums. They
were, however, careful to explain that this estimate was based upon
the hypothesis that the lands are ” developed and fully utilized at the
highest level of efficiency “, and that the hypothesis was ” theoretical
in so far as it disregards not only the factor of human inertia but
also various difficulties of a financial, legal and political nature
which may in practice have to be taken into account.” For the
reasons given in Appendix 7, we have been unable to accept
the estimate of the appropriate lot viable on which they have made
their calculations ; we consider it too optimistic. Instead, we have
adopted an estimate suggested by the Director of Agriculture*
and working on this basis we conclude that, provided that
capital is available for the necessary works of development and
that the difficult question of markets can be satisfactorily solved
there would at best be room for only a moderate increase (say
15,000 persons) in the agricultural population.

89

There is a considerable element of speculation in any calculation
of agricultural absorptive capacity and we do not claim that the
figure given in Appendix 7 is accurate. It would be subject to
all the reservations made by the Jewish authorities, in regard to
their own estimate, and moreover would depend (as, indeed, would
their own calculation) on the willingness of all the landowners who
possess surplus land to sell it. At best, therefore, it can only be
regarded as largely theoretical, but we think it sufficient to indicate
that Galilee does not offer great scope for closer settlement on
the land.

191. In any case, however, the process of change in land
utilization must be slow, and at best it will be many years before
it could be completed throughout the whole of Galilee. But during
that time it must be expected that the demand for land to meet the
needs of the Arab population will be increasing year by year as the
population grows : indeed, as is brought out in Appendix 7, if the
natural increase in the population should continue at the present
rate, that in itself would be sufficient to absorb in about 10 years the
estimated additional agricultural absorptive capacity consequent
on the best possible utilization of the land. While we have
recommended elsewhere (chapter XIV) that, in estimating the
capacity of the land for absorbing additional immigrants, regard
should be had only to the population existing at any given date,
it is obvious that when the process of settlement is assumed to
be spread over several years, the population to be taken into account
will be larger and the amount of surplus land available for new
settlers will be smaller each year. In estimating to-day what will
be the scope for closer settlement in Galilee during, say, the next
ten years, it is clearly necessary to take this fact into account.

192. For these reasons we are unable to recommend the adoption
•of the Royal Commission’s plan, that is plan A.

2. Plan B

193. We now turn to consider the variant of plan A to which we
referred in paragraph 7 of chapter I and which we have called
plan B. Plan B, shown in map 9, may be described as plan A with
the following areas excluded from the Jewish State —

(a) Galilee;

(b) the southern section of that portion of the Jewish State
lying south of the Jerusalem Enclave.

194. If the two areas mentioned in the preceding paragraph are
excluded from the Jewish State, how should they be treated
politically ? As regards the small section at the extreme south of the
Jewish State there is no difficulty. It should be included in the Arab
State. As regards Galilee, the question is examined in the succeeding
paragraphs.

90

195. If Galilee is excluded from the Jewish State the possible
alternatives are : (i) Arab control and (ii) Mandatory control. As
regards the first alternative, the conclusion we have reached is that
if the Jewish State is to be assured of adequate security against
aggression it would not be possible to allow Galilee to pass under
Arab control.

(i) Possibility of Arab Control of Galilee.

196. With the exclusion of Galilee the Jewish State, besides the
coastal area including the Carmel Ridge, would consist of —

{a) a strip of territory running east and west along the plains
of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North), which at its narrowest
part would be only about 15 kilometres (less than 10 miles)
wide ; and

(b) a second strip running north and south and including
the greater part of the sub-district of Tiberias and the eastern
part of the sub-district of Safad, which at its narrowest part
would be between 7 and 8 kilometres wide (between 4 and
5 miles).

The Jewish State in these sectors of its territory would have little
depth and would be most vulnerable to attack, for it would consist
not only of a narrow strip surrounded by Arab States but would
also be dominated tactically by the Arab State in the hills of Galilee.
That the Jewish State would be so dominated by Galilee is clear
from an examination of the physical features of the boundary which
separates Galilee from the Jewish State. On the eastern boundary
of Galilee, that is on the line east of the town of Safad, the dividing
line between Galilee and the Jewish State would run at the base of
a steep escarpment rising to a height of 2,400 feet at Safad. On
the southern boundary the position would be similar. The Jewish
State would be situated in the plain of Esdraelon and the boundary
would run along the southern edge of the Galilee hills. The position
may be summed up in this way. The boundary of Galilee where it
marches with that of the proposed Jewish State would form a suitable
defensive boundary for the protection of Galilee against an attack
from the Jewish State, but would not constitute a suitable defensive
boundary for the protection of the Jewish State if Galilee should pass
under Arab control.

197. Again, we have been assured by the military authorities
that, in case of war, Haifa would be untenable if Acre were in
hostile hands ; indeed, in their view, the defence of Haifa requires
Acre to be in the hands of the power that holds Haifa. If, therefore,
Haifa is in the Jewish State, Acre cannot be permitted to pass under
Arab control. The reason for this is to be found in the relative
positions of Haifa and Acre. Haifa is situated at the southern end

91

of the Bay of Acre, and the town of Acre at its northern end.
The distance between the two places is only about 13 kilometres
(8 miles), and guns placed at Acre would completely command
Haifa.

These are the reasons which have led us to the conclusion that
Galilee could not be allowed to pass under Arab control.

(ii) Possibility of Mandatory Control of Galilee.

198. If then Galilee cannot be allowed to pass under Arab control
it follows that if plan B is to be adopted it must remain permanently
under Mandate. This proposition raises certain constitutional
questions which require examination, (a) First, the Preamble to
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations implies that in
course of time the people of Palestine, like the other communities
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, would be enabled to
stand by themselves, and according to the Preamble to the Mandate
for Palestine this Article is one of the two obligations on which the
Mandate ;s founded. This obligation is towards the population of
Palestine, the Arabs and the Jews, and it appears to us that the
proposition that Galilee should remain permanently under Mandate
would be inconsistent with the specific terms of Article 22 of the
Covenant. It would mean that the Arabs of Galilee were to be
prevented from acquiring their independence because the security
of the Jewish State would thereby be threatened ; in other words,
the Arabs of Galilee would be denied their independence in order
to ensure the independence of the Jews. Such a state of things
would, it seems to us, be difficult to justify, (b) Secondly, if as a
result of partition, an Arab State were set up in another part of Pales-
tine, the probability is that the inhabitants of Galilee would also
sooner or later claim to be granted their independence, and, for the
reasons given in the preceding argument, we think that it would be
difficult to maintain a complete refusal of such a claim. But it would
be impossible to concede the claim in regard to the whole of Galilee,
for, as has been explained, the boundary between Galilee and the
Jewish State could not be regarded as a suitable defensive boundary
for the protection of the Jewish State in the plain against an attack
from the Arab State in the hills. The utmost that could be conceded
without endangering the security of the Jewish State would be the
independence of an area lying west of a line drawn east of the town
of Safad, north of a line drawn south of the Safad-Acre road, and
east of a line drawn from Majd el Kurum to a point on the coast
about 5 kilometres (3 miles) south of Ras an Naqura. According
to the advice which we have received from the military authorities
no line further south would afford a suitable defensive boundary
against an attack from an Arab State in northern Galilee. Thus
the area to which independence could be conceded would be less
than one-third the size of Galilee.

92

199. But the question would then arise, how should the remaining
area of Galilee, that is, the area between this defensive line and the
southern edge of Galilee, be administered ? Should it be included in
the Jewish State or retained under Mandate ? There are serious
objections to either course. To include this Arab area within
the Jewish State would be to reverse without any justification
whatsoever the earlier decision to exclude it. On the other hand,
to retain it under a permanent Mandate would be open to the objection
stated in the preceding paragraph to the retention of Galilee as a
whole under a permanent Mandate, and to the further objection that,
sandwiched between a Jewish State and an Arab State, it would be
tactically unsound.

200. In our view the problems created by Galilee are in them-
selves fatal to plan B. It appears to us to be fundamentally wrong
that while the Jews in the plains to the south and east are given
their independence, the Arabs in Galilee or any part of it should be
denied their independence in order to ensure the security of the
neighbouring Jewish State. Such a denial would certainly not lead
to peace between the Arabs and the Jews.

201 . Plan B is also, in our opinion, open to other grave objections
with which we now deal.

202. According to plan B the town and port of Haifa are in the
Jewish State. But Haifa is far from being an entirely Jewish town.
It is a ” mixed ” town in which the Arabs as well as the Jews have
considerable interests.

(a) The population of Haifa is divided almost equally between
Arabs* and Jews ; if the suburbs in Haifa Bay are included, the Jews
will be in a slight numerical preponderance. The inclusion of Haifa
within the Jewish State would mean the bringing of about 50,000
Arabs under Jewish rule.

(b) The figures for the urban property tax payable in the year
1938-39 are as follows—

(i) Arabs* 37,800 about 30 ”

(ii) Jews (including certain im-

portant trading concerns
which contain a consider-

(a) Haifa

Tax Payable
5 . Per cent.

able non- Jewish element) . .
(iii) Others, including the Govern-
ment and the Municipality

– 19,500
£P. 127,000

69,700

tt

15
100

55

* Note. — The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as
equivalent to ” Non- Jew.”

93

(c) The following figures show the distribution of municipal
revenue between Jews and non-Jews. Figures are not available
showing the Arab* share in the non- Jewish portion.

1936-37 1937-38

Jews

•J
Non- Jews
Jews
Non- Jews
per cent.
■per cent.
per cent.
per cent.
Municipal property
tcLX • • . .
58
42
59
41
Slaughter fees and
meat transport fees
50
50
50
50
Intoxicating liquor
licence fees
64
36
64
36
Building permit fees
77
23
72
28

(d) The land is distributed as follows —

The The town planning

municipal area {including the

area municipal area)

per cent. per cent.

(i) Jews .. .. .. 43-8 64-6

(ii) Arabs* 26-4 13-0

(iii) Other owners includ-

ing Government .. 29-8 22-4

(e) The capital invested in buildings between the years 1930-31
and 1937-38 (both inclusive) is approximately —

£P.

(i) Jews 7,657,000

(ii) Arabs* 2,039,000

(iii) Others 366,000

Total .. .. £ P. 10,062,000

(/) The approximate capital invested in industrial concerns,
excluding the Palestine Electric Corporation, is —

(i) Jewish, including one firm which

has passed into British ownership,
the management and staff re-
maining Jewish . . . . . . about £P. 1,800,000

(ii) Arab* . . . . … . . „ 180,000

(g) It is estimated that 60 per cent, to 65 per cent, of the import
and export trade of the port is in Jewish hands and 40 per cent,
to 35 per cent, in non- Jewish hands. Figures are not available for
the Arab* share of the non- Jewish portion.

* Note.— The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as
equivalent to ” Non- Jew.”

94

(h) Lighterage work in the harbour is divided as follows —

Arabs* . . 50 per cent, to 65 per cent., according to the
season.

Jews .. 50 per cent, to 35 per cent., according to the
season.

(i) The rich inshore fisheries at Haifa are worked entirely by
Arabs. The number of fishermen is over 300.

(j) According to the Census Report for 1931, nearly a quarter
of the agriculturists in Palestine would be unable to maintain their
present standard of life if they were not able to find a secondary
means of subsistence (paragraph 259 of the Report on the Census) ;
and it is probable that, with the large increase in the agricultural
population during the last seven years, this proportion is even
larger to-day. For persons in this category Haifa is an important
source of supplementary employment : when Haifa is prosperous
and the demand for labour active large numbers of Arabs from the
surrounding country who find it difficult to support themselves by
the produce of their lands come to the town to find employment.
Further, Haifa may expand industrially. The southern pipe-line
from the oil fields in ‘Iraq terminates at Haifa, and we understand
that a refinery, designed to treat not less than 2,000,000 tons of
crude oil yearly, is to be erected there by the oil companies at
a cost of about £5,000,000. The establishment of this refinery may
be followed by the establishment of subsidiary industries, and if
this should be the case the local demand for employment would
expand considerably. The Jews have made it clear to us that once
the Jewish State is set up, Arabs who are not citizens of that state
will not be allowed to enter the Jewish State in search of employment.
This would mean that Haifa would no longer be available as a field
of employment for Arabs outside the Jewish State. The effect of
this on the economy of the territories in which these Arabs reside
would be serious.

(k) Haifa is the only deep water port in Palestine. The Royal
Commission were of opinion that, in the interests of Arab trade and
industry, the Arab State should have access for commercial purposes
to Haifa and recommended that the Jewish treaty should provide
for the free transit of goods in bond between the Arab State and
Haifa. Provision for the transit of goods in bond is a usual inter-
national arrangement ; but it does not give the same sense of security
as would be given by possession or (if possession cannot be granted)
by the knowledge that the port is in the hands of impartial trustees.
To assign the port at Haifa to the Jews is certainly not treating the
Arabs and the Jews on an equal footing in the matter of facilities
for trade.

* Note. — The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as
equivalent to ” Non-Jew.”

95

(Z) While Arab non-agricultural industry is at present only a
small portion of the total non-agricultural industry of Palestine, its
main hope of future expansion lies in Haifa. If Haifa is included in
the Jewish State the prospects of the expansion of Arab industries
will be remote indeed.

203. In view of these facts, we are of opinion that there are
serious objections to the inclusion of Haifa in the Jewish State.
There are equally serious objections to its inclusion in the Arab
State. It cannot be included in the Jewish State without detriment
to Arab interests and it cannot be included in the Arab State without
detriment to Jewish interests. The best course, if that should prove
to be possible, would be to retain it under Mandatory control so
that it can be developed for the benefit of both.

(b) Population and Land

204. If Galilee and the predominantly Arab area at the southern
end of the Jewish State (paragraph 184) be excluded from that
State, the population and land figures of the Jewish State become —

Arabs Jews Total

Population .. .. 188,400 300,400 488,800
Land (in dunums)

Citrus land .. .. 56,000 129,400 185,400

Other cultivable land .. 1,391,400 694,600 2,086,000

Uncultivable land .. 813,100 253,500 1,066,600

Total land .. .. 2,260,500 1,077,500 3,338,000

The number of Arabs in the Jewish State would still be large,
being 188,000 as compared with a Jewish population of 300,000 ;
that is the Arab minority would constitute 38 per cent, of the total
population and would be equal to 62 per cent, of the Jewish
population. The area of Arab land in the Jewish State would
also be large, being 2,260,000 dunums as against 1,077,000 dunums
of Jewish land ; that is, the Jewish State would contain twice as
much Arab land as Jewish land.

205. The Jewish State under plan B may be regarded for the
sake of this present argument as falling into three parts : —

(a) The part in the Maritime Plain south of Haifa and
bounded on the north by a line running approximately east
and west a short distance north of Zikhron Ya’aqov.

Arabs Jews
Population* 54,000 226,000

(b) The town of Haifa. . . T

v ‘ Arabs Jews

Population* 51,000 48,000

* The population figures are approximate.
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96

(c) The remainder, that is the portion which runs east and
west from Haifa to Beisan and then north and south from
Beisan to the northern boundary of Palestine.

Arabs Jews

Population* 83,000 26,000

In the first portion the Jews are in a large majority, the Arabs
forming only 19 per cent, of the total population ; and even if the
town of Tel Aviv (140,000) be excluded, the Jews are still in amajority.

In the second portion the Arabs and the Jews are almost, equally
divided.

In the third portion the Arabs are in a large majority, the Jews
forming only about 24 per cent, of the total population. As we shall
explain in chapter XII, we are of opinion that, if a plan of partition
brings under the political domination of the Jews large numbers of
Arabs in an area where the Jews are not already in a substantial
majority, the operation of the plan will be violently opposed by
the Arabs. Such a plan will not lead to peace. In our view the large
Arab majority in this third portion constitutes a further objection
to plan B.

206. For all these reasons we find plan B no less unacceptable than
plan A.

207. The result of our examination of plans A and B may be
summarized as follows —

1— Plan A

(i) The number of Arabs in the proposed Jewish State under
plan A is almost equal to the number of Jews, the figures being
295,000 Arabs as compared with 305,000 Jews. Further, the Arabs
hold four-fifths of the land in the proposed State, 3,855,000 dunums
out of a total area of 4,995,000 dunums. (Paragraph 175.)

(ii) The problem created by the large number of Arabs in the
Jewish State cannot be solved by means of either an exchange or
a transfer of population. (Paragraph 181.)

(iii) An area, predominantly Arab, at the southern extremity of the
Jewish State should not be included in that state. (Paragraph 183.)

(iv) Galilee should not be included in the Jewish State. The
reasons why it should not be included are three. First, the population
is almost entirely Arab and the land is almost entirely Arab owned.
Secondly, the Arabs in Galilee are vehemently opposed to the inclu-
sion of that area in the Jewish State ; they will resist such inclusion
by force, and there appears to be no justification for using force to

* The population figures are approximate.

97

compel this large body of Arabs, in what is a purely Arab area, to
accept Jewish rule. Thirdly, its inclusion would create a minority
problem which would endanger, not only the stability of the Jewish
State, but the prospect of securing in the future friendly relations
between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. (Paragraph 185.)

(v) Galilee does not offer scope for the settlement of large num-
bers of Jews on the land. At best, there is room for only a moderate
increase (say 15,000 persons) in the agricultural population, and
even this is dependent upon a change in land utilization, which must
inevitably be slow. The natural increase in the population at its
present rate is in itself sufficient to absorb in about ten years this
estimated additional agricultural absorptive capacity. As the process
of settlement on the land must inevitably be slow, it is necessary
to take this fact into account in estimating the scope for closer
settlement in Galilee to-day. (Paragraphs 190-191.)

(vi) For these reasons the conclusion is reached that plan A is
unacceptable. Plan B is then examined.

2.— Plan B.

(i) The predominantly Arab area at the southern end of the
Jewish State should be included in the Arab State. (Paragraph 193.)

(ii) If Galilee is excluded from the Jewish State the possible
alternatives are (a) Arab control, and (b) Mandatory control.
(Paragraph 195.)

(iii) If the Jewish State is to be assured of adequate security
against aggression, it would not be possible to allow Galilee to pass
under Arab control. (Paragraphs 196-197.)

(iv) The retention of Galilee under Mandatory control is open
to the strong objection that it means that all or, at best, the majority
of the Arabs of Galilee would have to be denied their independence
in order to ensure the security of the Jewish State. (Paragraph 198.)

(v) The problems created by Galilee are considered fatal to
plan B. (Paragraph 200.)

(vi) But it is pointed out that Haifa, the only deep water harbour
on the coast of Palestine, is not by any means an entirely Jewish
town and that the Arabs have considerable interests therein. The
conclusion is reached that Haifa could not be included in the Jewish
State without serious detriment to Arab interests and that, similarly,
it could not be included in the Arab State without serious detriment
to Jewish interests. It is suggested that the best course, if that
should prove to be possible, would be to retain it under Mandatory
control so that it can be developed for the benefit of both.
(Paragraph 202.)

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98

(vii) If Galilee and the area on the south were excluded from
the Jewish State the number of Arabs in that state would still be
large, 188,000 Arabs as compared with 300,000 Jews. The Arab
minority would constitute 38 per cent, of the total population of
the Jewish State and would be equal to 62 per cent, of the Jewish
population. (Paragraph 204.)

(viii) It is pointed out that in that portion of the Jewish State
which runs from Haifa east to Beisan and then north to the Palestine
frontier the Arabs are in a majority, the Jews forming only 24 per
cent, of the population. The view (explained more fully in
chapter XII) is expressed that a plan of partition, which brings
under the political domination of the Jews large numbers of Arabs
in an area where the Jews are not already in a majority, will be
opposed by the Arabs and will not lead to peace. The inclusion of
this area in the Jewish State is held to be open to the objection that
the Arab majority will oppose it by force and that it will not produce
peace. (Paragraph 205.)

^–“(ix) The final conclusion is that plan B is also unacceptable.

99

CHAPTER XI
PLAN C

208. In the preceding chapter we gave the reasons why we find
it necessary to reject the Royal Commission’s plan in its original
form, and why the majority of us consider that even the modified
form of that plan, which we have called plan B, is unacceptable.

209. We now put forward as an alternative plan C, which
although certainly not perfect (for it is impossible, if for no other
reason than the geographical distribution of the two races, to produce
a perfect scheme), is the best which the majority of us have been
able to devise.

210. Before describing plan C, it is necessary to consider how far
our terms of reference permit us to depart from the Royal
Commission’s plan. Those terms of reference direct us —

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III
of the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty
to suggest modifications of that plan, including variation of the
areas recommended for retention under British Mandate … to
recommend boundaries, etc.

It has been suggested that the word ” modifications ” should be
interpreted in a narrow sense, as meaning no more than changes of
detail, and that your predecessor’s intention was that the broad
outline of the Royal Commission’s plan should in any event be
retained. We ourselves do not take this view of our instructions.
It appears to us that the word ” modifications ” must be interpreted
with reference to the words ” with full liberty to suggest ” which
immediately precede it, and to the absence from our terms of
reference of any direction to accept the Royal Commission’s plan
as indicating a just settlement between the claims of the two races.

211. Indeed, the clearest indication of governing principles
which we find in your predecessor’s instructions to us is in the
emphasis laid in paragraph (i) (a) and (b) of our terms of reference
upon the need that the Arab and Jewish States which it is proposed
to create should

(i) possess adequate security ;

(ii) be self-supporting ; and

(iii) include the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises
in the Jewish area and vice versa.

We regard ourselves, therefore, as free to suggest any plan of partition
which appears to us to be necessary in order to comply as far as
possible with these governing principles.

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100

212. No one who has spent three months of the past summer in
Palestine, as we have done, can fail to have been profoundly conscious
of the spirit of intense opposition to partition which permeates the
Arab population. In dealing with a people who have no elected
representatives, and with whom, moreover, it was impossible for
ourselves to make any direct contact at all, the difficulty is to estimate
how far what appears to be national action is really the outcome of
deep-seated national feeling, and how far it is, so far as the fellaheen
at least are concerned, an aitificial and temporary movement,
fostered by propaganda and terrorism, and dependent upon the
interested activities of a relatively small number of effendis of the
politician class. It is perhaps needless to say that, before forming
a considered judgment on this question, we have not let ourselves be
prejudiced in eithei direction by the present campaign of terrorism.

213. In our judgment, the recent events in Palestine do represent
a genuine feeling among the Arab population of hostility to partition,
a feeling of which the Royal Commission were clearly unaware when
they put forward their plan, for it was not until the Report and the
Government’s proposals were published that the policy of partition
found open expression. We believe that the position in Palestine
may be fairly summarised thus. If a plan of partition is approved
which brings under the political domination of the Jews large numbers
of Arabs in an area where the Jews are not already in a substantial
majority, the introduction of such a plan will be resisted by the
Arabs with all the force at their command, in other words, by open
rebellion, and will only be carried out if the resistance is suppressed by
superior force. In view of recent experience, that will mean a military
operation on a large scale. What forces will be required for the
purpose, how long it will take to put down the rebellion, how much
the doing so will cost, both in military charges and in indirect loss
to the country, how many lives will be lost, and what will be the
residue of bitter feeling against both the British and the Jews when
order has at last been restored, are questions which we cannot attempt
to answer. But that partition in this form will bring peace to
Palestine we cannot venture to hope.

214. But although we are satisfied of the existence of this wide-
spread antagonism to partition, we do not consider it to be of such
a nature as to oblige us to report that no plan of partition can be
regarded as practicable. It is not within our power to produce a
solution which we can feel confident will meet with acceptance by
both sides : the gulf between their respective demands is far too
wide for that. But it is our duty to put forward the best plan of
partition that we can devise, and we do so, trusting that, if our
proposals should be regarded as a reasonable attempt to do justice,
within our terms of reference, between the claims of both parties,
they may form the basis of a settlement which both Arabs and
Jews will be prepared to accept, notwithstanding that they may
disappoint the expectations which either party may have formed.

101

215. The plan which we put forward is as follows, the boundaries
of the several territories being shown on map 10 —

(a) The Arab State will be as proposed in plan B subject
to the following modifications —

(i) a slight alteration in the north-west corner along the
Carmel Ridge ; and

(ii) the exclusion of the Beersheba sub-district (except
for a small area on the west) and the village lands of Rafah.

(b) The boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave will be as
proposed under plan B.

(c) The Jewish State will consist of the coastal area
between Tel Aviv and the Carmel Ridge, and of the portion
south of the Jerusalem Enclave as proposed in plan B. The
boundary will be as proposed in plan B throughout, except on
the north, where it will be cut off from Haifa about 24 kilometres
(fifteen miles) south of that town.

(d) The whole of the territory, including Haifa itself, north
of this line and of the northern boundary of the Arab State,
will be retained under Mandate under conditions to be described
later (chapters XIII and XIV).

(e) The Beersheba sub-district (except for a small area on
the west) and the village lands of Rafah will also be retained
under Mandate under conditions to be described later (in the
same chapters).

216. For the purpose of this plan Palestine may be considered
as falling into three parts, as map 10 shows : a northern part, to be
retained under Mandate, and known as the Northern Mandated
Territory ; a southern part, also to be retained under Mandate and
known as the Southern Mandated Territory ; and a central part,
consisting of all the territory between the other two, which will be
made the subject of partition. We will now consider each part
separately, and explain the reasons which lead us to our conclusions
with regard to it.

1. The Northern Mandated Territory

217. In chapter X we have criticized, on various grounds, the
proposals of plans A and B with regard to this part of Palestine.
We recapitulate here the main points of the argument.

(i) Haifa

Haifa is a ” mixed ” town in which Arabs as well as Jews
have considerable interests. Out of a population of about
100,000, there are about 50,000 Arabs. It is the only deep-water
port in Palestine : to assign it to the Jews is certainly not
treating Jews and Arabs on an equal footing. It is already an

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102

important source of supplementary employment to the large
numbers of Arabs from the surrounding country who find it
difficult to support themselves by the produce of their holdings
of land ; and if it should expand industrially, as seems probable,
its importance to the Arabs in this respect will increase. But
if Haifa were included in the Jewish State, Arabs outside that
state would no longer be allowed to enter it to seek employment,
and the effect of this on the economy of the territories in which
these Arabs reside would be serious.

Haifa, therefore, cannot be included in the Jewish State
without detriment to Arab interests ; equally it cannot be
included in the Arab state without detriment to Jewish interests.
It should, if possible, be retained under Mandatory control so
that it can be developed for the benefit of both.

(ii) Galilee

It is impossible to put Galilee into the Jewish State without
injury to the Arabs resident in that area, who form some 96 per
cent, of the population and own about the same percentage of
land. Nor can it be put into an Arab State without endangering
the security of the Jewish colonies in the plains to the south and
east of Galilee, which are overlooked by the Galilee hills.

(iii) The Haifa Bay Plain, the Plains of Esdraelon,
Jezreel, Beisan (North), and Huleh

For the reasons given in chapter X, it is not possible to
include these plains alone in the Jewish State ; nor could the
whole area, including both Galilee and the plains, be assigned
to the Arab State without serious injustice to the Jews and a
violation of the charge to include the fewest possible Jews and
Jewish enterprises in the Arab State.

218. Nor is it right to overlook the position of the Christians
(mostly Arabs) of whom there are about 30,000 in the northern area,
outside of Nazareth (which would in any case be kept under Mandate) .
They themselves did not give evidence before us, but representations
have been made to us by those who were well qualified to speak on
their behalf that they would prefer to remain under the British
Mandate, rather than to be included in either a Moslem or a Jewish
State.

219. All these considerations point irresistibly to the conclusion
that it is not possible to partition this northern section of Palestine
without injustice to either Arabs or Jews.

220. What then is to be the political future of this area ? If
it cannot be partitioned, it must evidently remain under Mandatory
control ; but for how long, and under what conditions ?

103

(a) We have already expressed the opinion, in chapter X, that
a permanent mandate for Galilee, that is a mandate with no provision
for its termination under any conditions, would be a violation of
Article 22 of the Covenant. For the same reason we must exclude
a permanent mandate for this larger area.

(b) The Royal Commission recommended that before the four
towns of Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Acre were included in the Jewish
State, they should be retained for an indefinite period under a
temporary Mandate (chapter XXII, paragraph 22 (iii) ) ; and it
might be suggested that the area now in question should likewise
be retained under temporary Mandate, without any attempt to
indicate when or under what conditions the period of control should
come to an end.

We are convinced that this would be a profound mistake.
Uncertainty as to the political future of Palestine has undoubtedly
been from the outset one of the principal causes of the present
unhappy relations between Arabs and Jews. What is needed is a
clear statement of policy which shall enable both races to know as
precisely as possible under what form of government the citizens of
the new areas will live henceforth. The worst possible form of
settlement would be one which left both Jews and Arabs in any part
of Palestine uncertain whether in a few years time either of them
may not be subjected against their will to the political dominance
of the other.

(c) For the same reason we are unable to accept a suggestion which
has been made to us that an area in the north of Palestine should be
retained under Mandate for at least ten years, after which the position
should be reviewed in the light of the conditions then prevailing.

(d) The solution which we recommend is that the Mandate for
the northern section shall continue in being until the Jews and Arabs
in the area agree to ask that it should be surrendered, and the area
be given its independence, either as part of an existing Jewish or
Arab State, or as a separate Palestinian State. By ” agreement ”
we do not of course mean that there must be complete unanimity on
both sides, but that both the Mandatory and the League of Nations
must be satisfied that the greater part of the minority race are in
agreement with the greater part of the majority race.

221. The only reservation which we think it necessary to make in
putting forward this solution relates to Haifa. We have reached the
above conclusions with regard to the northern part of Palestine,
including Haifa, on grounds which have nothing to do with defence.
But to ignore the importance of Haifa from the standpoint of defence
would manifestly leave the argument incomplete. Our terms of
reference do not oblige or authorize us to take into account the needs
of Imperial defence, but they do compel us to look to the security
of the proposed Arab and Jewish States and of the Holy Places ;
and in considering the political future of Haifa it is necessary

104

to bear this point in mind. It was assumed by the Royal
Commission that Treaties of Alliance on the ‘Iraq precedent
should be negotiated between the Mandatory and the repre-
sentatives of the new states (Chapter XXII, paragraphs 4-9),
and should include Military Conventions dealing with the main-
tenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of
ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe-line and so
forth. Assuming such treaties to be entered into, the Mandatory
will have to undertake special responsibilities for the protection
against external attack of the new States, as well as of the Mandated
areas, including the Holy Places. We are advised by the military
authorities that for the discharge of these responsibilities (i) Haifa
is an essential part of the scheme of defence of the Holy Places and
the central and southern parts of Palestine, as well as of the northern
section ; (ii) it is essential that Haifa and Acre should be in the same
hands ; and (iii) it is highly desirable that they should both remain
under a permanent Mandate. The military authorities have also
informed us, however, that they could not regard an arrangement
under treaty with either the Arab or the Jewish State as satisfying
the requirements of the situation in view of the special responsibilities
which His Majesty’s Government as Mandatory would have to
undertake for the protection of Palestine, and especially of the Holy
Places, and which profoundly distinguish our relations with Palestine
from our relations with ‘Iraq.

222. So far as the immediate future is concerned, if plan C is
adopted no difficulty will arise, since both Haifa and Acre will
remain under Mandate — and presumably under a British Mandate—
for an indefinite period, which will only be terminated when the
two races which form the population agree to ask for their
independence. We think, however, that, in view of the special
importance of Haifa for the protection of the whole of Palestine,
including the Holy Places, it should be laid down from the first that
the grant of independence to the towns of Haifa and Acre with a
suitable defensive boundary will always be subject to the condition
that this can safely be done, having regard to the special respon-
sibilities of the Mandatory for the defence of the Holy Places and
the new states against external attack.

223. We believe that the solution which we have proposed for
the future of the northern part of Palestine will commend itself to
impartial opinion as the only satisfactory way to deal with this
area under a partition scheme. But a proposal to retain the area
indefinitely under Mandate goes only a very little way towards
providing for its political and economic future. There still remain
such important and difficult questions as, under what conditions shall
the Jews in future be allowed to immigrate into and acquire land in
the area ; what steps, if any, shall be taken to protect the interests
of the Arabs in the event of Jews being allowed to acquire land

105

therein ; what steps, if any, shall be taken by the Government to
develop the land for the benefit of the Arabs as well as of the Jews ?
A liberal and equitable settlement of these matters forms an essential
part of our plan ; and we shall return to them in chapters XIII
and XIV.

2. The Southern Mandated Territory

224. The Royal Commission suggested (chapter XXII, para-
graph 22 (v) ) that, with a view to providing access for commercial
purposes to the Red Sea for the benefit of both Arab and Jewish
trade and industry, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf
of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory administration ; and
that the Arab Treaty should provide for the free transit of goods
between the Jewish State and this enclave. The rest of the
Beersheba sub-district they proposed to include in the Arab State.

225. At the time when the Royal Commission reported, little was
known of the possibilities of irrigation in the Beersheba area ; and
in the absence of precise knowledge it was still permissible to let the
imagination dwell on the thought of the ” practically inexhaustible
supply of cultivable land ” in that area which might be developed,
if water for irrigation could be made available. Under the Royal
Commission’s plan the development of the land in this area would
be carried out by a Partition Department of the Palestine Govern-
ment with the assistance of a grant from the United Kingdom
Government (chapter XXII, paragraphs 44-46) ; and the Royal
Commission evidently assumed that the assignment of the Negeb*
to the Arab State under partition would constitute no hindrance
to the execution of this project. Since the object of such develop-
ment would be the resettlement of Arabs transferred from the
Jewish State, whose departure would make room for additional
Jewish immigrants, the effect of developing the Negeb would be
indirectly beneficial to the Jews, even though the area were not
actually included in the Jewish State.

226. Since then, however, boring-tests have taken place, as has
already been stated in chapter VIII of our report, with the most
disappointing results ; and it is now clear that in the greater part
of the area no improvement in agriculture which is dependent on
irrigation can be hoped for. In any case, as we have pointed out
in the chapter quoted, the Arab fellah is not likely to be willing to
transfer from the comparatively prosperous and well-watered area
of the Jewish State to settle in the uncongenial conditions of the
Beersheba sub-district, with its heat, its low rainfall and scarcity of
fuel, and its remoteness from any friendly neighbours. The oppor-
tunities for the transfer of population to this area are therefore small.

* We use the term ” Negeb ” merely as a convenient synonym for ” the
Beersheba sub-district,” though we are aware that technically there is a
certain difference in connotation between the two terms.

106

That being so, we feel that to include the Beersheba sub-district
in the Arab State is to condemn it to perpetual poverty, for there is
no doubt that the Arab State will not be able to afford money for
its development, or to effect any substantial improvement in the
present under-nourished condition of its Bedouin inhabitants.

227. To include the Negeb in the Arab State now would, moreover,
mean that the Jews would forthwith be precluded from all hope of
settling in any part of this vast and sparsely inhabited area. Slender
as the prospect of successful Jewish settlement therein may now seem
to be, we think that there are large parts of the sub-district, now
almost entirely unoccupied, which the Jews ought to be given an
opportunity to develop forthwith ; and that, even as regards the
occupied portion of the sub-district, it would be wrong to take such
action as would exclude that prospect entirely until the tests
now being undertaken and any further experiments which it may be
decided to carry out have been completed, and the scope for closer
settlement in that portion of the Negeb can be stated with greater
precision than is now possible. If as a result of such investiga-
tion the Government are satisfied that there are opportunities
for additional settlement after reasonable provision has been
made for the needs of the existing population, we think it only
fair to the Jews that they should be allowed to share in such
opportunities under conditions which will ensure that the rights of
the existing inhabitants are not prejudiced. But for this purpose
an ample supply of funds will be required. Money might be forth-
coming from Jewish sources for a scheme of development which, while
having for one of its objects an improvement of the conditions of the
existing inhabitants, would also facilitate the settlement of Jews in
the area. That would not be possible if the Negeb were included
in an Arab State ; but it could be done if it were either retained
under Mandate or included in the Jewish State. Since, however,
there are at present no Jews at all in the area, the inclusion in the
Jewish State of the 60,000 Arabs in the occupied portion of the
Negeb would clearly be contrary to our terms of reference ; nor
do we favour the inclusion in the Jewish State at this stage of what
we have described above as the unoccupied area. It follows, there-
fore, that if the Negeb is to be developed, as is desirable in the
interests of both Arabs and Jews, it must be retained under Mandate
for the present.

228. Our recommendations for the political future of the country
will follow in the next chapter, when we come to consider its economic
development and the conditions under which Jewish settlement
therein may be permitted. Here we need only say that we propose
to apply to the Negeb the general principle that no independent
State shall be set up in this area in opposition to the wishes of the
minority, unless that minority is so small, either actually or relatively,
or so situated territorially, that its wishes ought not to be allowed to

107

frustrate the wishes of the majority. This principle will, we hope,
make it clear to the Arab inhabitants of the Negeb that there can be
no question of their being placed under the political domination of
the Jews against their will.

229. Provision must, however, be made for the possibility that
at some future date the Negeb, with the consent of the minority,
may acquire its independence, or may desire to unite with the
Jewish State, with which, however, it will have no direct contact
by land. To meet this contingency, we think it necessary to
draw the southern boundary of the Arab State along the boundary
between the village lands of Khan Yunis and Rafah, north of
the Palestine-Sinai frontier, and to include the village lands of
Rafah (39,900 dunums with a population of 1,600 Arabs) in the
Southern Mandated Territory, thus providing for direct access from
this territory both to the sea and to the railway.

230. As stated in paragraph 215 (e) above, the Southern Mandated
Territory will include the whole of the Beersheba sub-district with
the exception of a small area on the west. It will be seen from map 10
that the existing boundary of the sub-district practically coincides,
for some distance between Gaza and Khan Yunis, with the main
railway line from Lydda to Kantara. A line running close to a
railway is an unsuitable boundary between two states, and we
have, therefore, thought it advisable to draw the western boundary
of the Southern Mandated Territory further to the east in this section.

3. The Central Part of Palestine

231. It follows from what has been said above that in our judg-
ment this is the only part of Palestine which, under present conditions,
can be subjected to partition without injury to either Arabs or Jews.
The basis of partition which we recommend under plan C for this
central part is the same as for plan B, with the exception of the
northern end of the coastal area and the Carmel Ridge. Here it
will be necessary to draw two new boundary lines, one cutting off
the Jewish State in the coastal area from the northern section,
which is to be retained under Mandate ; and the other modifying
the line between the Jewish State and the Arab State in the hill-
country of Samaria. For the former we recommend a line drawn
across the southern edge of the Carmel Ridge, from the coast north
of the villages of Tantura, Bat Shelomo, Daliyat ar Rauha and Al
Kafrin till it joins the boundary between the Jewish and Arab
States as proposed under plan B. For the latter we propose a line
striking in a north-easterly direction from the boundary between
the Arab and Jewish States under plan B in the neighbourhood of
the village of Kafr Qari to a point on the northern boundary of the
Jewish State north-west of the village of Al Kafrin.

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232. In chapter X, in the course of our criticism of plan B, we
expressed the view that it was fundamentally wrong that, while the
Jews in the plains to the south and east were to be given their
independence, the Arabs in Galilee or any part of it should be denied
their independence in order to ensure the security of the neighbouring
Jewish State. But, it may now be asked, granted the validity
of this argument against plan B, why does it not apply with equal
force against plan C, under which it is proposed to deny the claim
of the Arabs to be allowed to set up an independent Arab State in the
whole of the northern territory, or at least (if on grounds of defence
Haifa must be retained under Mandate) in the whole of the remainder
of that territory ?

This is an objection which calls for serious treatment, but we
believe that the arguments which follow are sufficient to dispose
of it.

(i) Under plan B, the Arabs in Galilee — a purely Arab
area — would be denied their independence in order that the
Jewish state might be established in the neighbouring plains
to the east and south. The wishes of the Arab majority were
to be ignored, while the wishes of the Jewish minority were
recognized. Under plan C the same problem arises, but the
difficulty is met by refusing to give preferential treatment to
either the majority or the minority ; both must remain without
their independence until they can reach agreement.

(ii) The Jews have entered Palestine under the most solemn
assurances from the League of Nations and from His Majesty’s
Government in particular as the Mandatory Power. It has
never been suggested that those assurances would be violated
by the proposal to include in the Arab State a few thousand
Jews, mostly in the town of Jaffa, who could if necessary be
transferred or exchanged. But it would, in our opinion, be
entirely inconsistent with those assurances to put under the
political domination of an Arab State the 19,000 Jews living
in the numerous settlements up and down the plains east and
south of Galilee.

For these reasons we conclude that the argument in question does
not hold good against plan C.

233. The argument for plan C may now be summarized as
follows —

(i) It is impossible, without injustice to either Arabs or
Jews, to partition the northern territory. Nor can this territory
be handed over intact to either side.

(ii) It is also impossible to hand over the Negeb to the Jews
without a violation of our terms of reference, while it would be
unfair to the Jews to hand it over to the Arabs so long as there

109

remains any reasonable prospect of Jewish settlement taking
place therein without prejudice to the rights of the existing
inhabitants.

(hi) Both the northern and the southern territories must
therefore be retained under Mandate for an indefinite period.

(iv) The only part of Palestine which can be partitioned is
therefore the central portion, within which the boundaries
of the proposed Arab and Jewish States and of the Jerusalem
Enclave will be as on map 10. These boundaries will be identical
with those in plan B, except as explained in paragraphs 229-230
above.

234. The resulting figures of land and population for the whole of
Palestine are given below —

Arab State

Arabs Jews

Population 444,100 8,900

Land .. .. 7,329,700 63,800

Jewish State

Arabs Jews
Population . . 54,400 226,000
Land .. .. 821,700 436,100

Mandated Territory

(i) Jerusalem Enclave

Arabs Jews
Population .. 211,400 80,100
Land .. .. 1,485,200 78,700

(ii) Northern Territory

Arabs Jews
Population .. 231,400 77,300
Land .. .. 2,730,500 677,300

(iii) Southern Territory

Arabs Jews
Population .. 60,000 —
Land .. 1, 944,500 (?) 55,500

Total Mandated Territories
Arabs Jews
Population .. 502,800 157,400
Land .. .. 6,160,200 811,500

Total
453,000
7,393,500*

Total
280,400
1,257,800*

Total
291,500
1,563,900*

Total
308,700
3,407,800*

Total
60,000
2,000,000(?)*f

Total
660,200
6,971, 700*f

* Excluding roads, railways, lakes and rivers.

f Excluding 10,577,000 dunums of desert in the Beersheba sub-district.

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235. It will be noted that the Arab minority in the Jewish State
under plan C, though considerably reduced, will still be substantial.
We shall consider in chapter XVI the question of the provision of
suitable guarantees for this and other minorities. While, however,
we have no doubt that the Jews will be prepared to furnish full
guarantees for the liberal treatment of the Arab minority, we consider
that every effort should be made to encourage and assist the voluntary
transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State. In chapter VIII we reached
the conclusion that land is not available for the resettlement of
of the large number of Arabs who would be included in the Jewish
State under plan A, and we do not suggest that it would be possible
to re-settle in the near future more than a fraction of the much
smaller number who would be included in the Jewish State under
plan C. There are, however, limited possibilities of resettlement ;
moreover, as we shall show in paragraph 269 of chapter XIII, there
is room for a very considerable increase in the number of settlers
on the existing Jewish land in the Northern Mandated Territory,
and it would appear that this might provide a means for facilitating
the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State. We consider that
negotiations should be entered into with the Jews with a view to
obtaining a definite undertaking from them to finance, within
reasonable limits, the cost of such transfer and re-settlement in the
Arab State or the Mandated Territories. As stated in chapter XVIII
(Finance), we were given to understand by Jewish witnesses that this
was a service which they were prepared to undertake.

Ill

CHAPTER XII

JEWISH PROPOSALS FOR THE JEWISH STATE (APART
FROM JERUSALEM)

236. Before reaching our conclusions on plans A, B, and C as set
out in the previous chapters, we had before us certain proposals
made by the Jews for the modification of plan A and gave them
our careful consideration. We have already dealt in chapter IX
with the Jewish proposals relating to Jerusalem. In this chapter
we deal with the remainder. It will be seen from map 7 and the
description in the following paragraphs that some of these proposals
are inconsistent with plan C : there is not, however, the same
inconsistency with plan B. In any case we think it desirable to
examine these proposals in detail.

237. On behalf of the Jews it has been urged that the plan out-
lined by the Royal Commission is open to the objection that the
area of the Jewish State is too small. The following is an extract
from a memorandum submitted to us by them —

The possibilities of new agricultural settlement in this area (the
Jewish State) are extremely limited. The major part of it is occupied
by Arabs. The Royal Commission in assigning this territory to the
Jewish State definitely envisaged the transfer of the bulk of that Arab
population, if need be by compulsory means, as far as the plains are
concerned. If, as would appear from the terms of the Secretary of State’s
despatch, the idea of compulsory transfer has now been abandoned, it is
essential that it should be realized that the area in the Jewish State
available for future Jewish settlement, limited as it is in any case, has
suffered a very considerable further reduction. The narrow margin of
land which may still be available for new Jewish settlement, must be
considered in relation to the imperative need (a) of providing room in
Palestine for large numbers of Jews who are facing ruin in Eastern and
Central Europe, (b) of creating a broad agricultural base for the Jewish
population of the State, and (c) comprising within its borders a population
large enough to serve as a home market for its industries.

238. In order to increase the size of its territory it has been sug-
gested that the following areas should be included in the Jewish
State as outlined by the Royal Commission (plan A) —

(i) an additional area in the Gaza sub-district (under
plan A only a small portion of the Gaza sub-district would be
included in the Jewish State) ;

(ii) a part of the Beersheba sub-district ;

(iii) the southern portion of the Beisan Plain ;

112

(iv) an area on the eastern side of the River Jordan lying
between the Yarmuk River on the north and a line opposite
the southern edge of the Beisan Plain on the south, and bounded
on the east by a line drawn in the hills overlooking the Jordan
Valley. (This area is situated in Trans-Jordan.)

For convenience of reference these areas are hereafter referred
to as areas (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) respectively.

Area (i)

239. The figures for the population and land are —

Population

Arabs. Jews. Total.
24,300 Nil 24,300

Land (in dunums)

Arabs. Jews. Total.

Citrus land 7,000 200 7,200

Other cultivable land 397,400 3,100 400,500

Uncultivable land 55,800 — 55,800

Total land* 460,200 3,300 463,500

This area is predominantly Arab. The population (over 24,000) is
entirely Arab, while the land is held almost entirely by Arabs, the
Jewish land forming less than one per cent, of the total. This area
could not, therefore, be included in the Jewish State without a
violation of the charge in our terms of reference to include the fewest
possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in that state. For this reason
we are of opinion that it should not be assigned to the Jewish State.

Area (ii)

240. If area (i) cannot be included in the Jewish State, neither
can area (ii), for the latter would then form a small island of Jewish
territory entirely detached from the Jewish State. Under plan C
this area is retained under Mandate and provision is made for
Jewish settlement therein, if sufficient land should be available after
the reasonable needs of the existing population have been met.

Area (iii)

241. This comprises the southern part of the Beisan Plain with
an area of about 92,000 dunums, of which, by the middle of the
present year (1938), the Jews had acquired about 17,000 dunums.

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

113

The population consists of about 7,000 Arabs and about 200 Jews.
It is an area which is capable of development. It contains a large
number of springs, the water of which is at present not being used
economically, and, as was explained in chapter VIII, the more
economical use of this water would enable a somewhat larger area
to be brought under irrigation. When we were examining plan B we
gave considerable thought to the question whether this area should
be included in the Jewish State. Our conclusion was that it should
not, for the following reasons, be assigned to that State. First, it is
undesirable that the town of Beisan, which is an entirely Arab town
with over 3,000 inhabitants and a centre of Arab nationalism, should
be included in the Jewish State. Secondly, as we have explained
in chapter VIII, the amount of land available for the resettlement
of Arabs wishing to transfer from the Jewish to the Arab State
is very small, and this fact makes it desirable that this area
should be retained in the Arab State in order to provide holdings to
which, when developed, Arabs might transfer from the Jewish State.
In so far as this object is fulfilled, Jewish settlement in the Jewish
State is facilitated.

Area (iv)

242. The proposal relating to this area involves the extension of
the Jewish State across the River Jordan so as to include within its
boundaries a part of Trans- Jordan. We have decided against this
proposal because — apart from the doubt whether the Government
of Trans- Jordan would agree to the transfer to the Jewish State of
this part of their territory — the military authorities have advised
us that, in order to obtain a suitable defensive boundary for
this area, it would be necessary to draw that boundary a very
considerable distance inside the Trans- Jordan hills. This would
mean the inclusion in the Jewish State, in addition to the sparsely
populated lands in the valley, of a large number of villages in the
hill country of Trans- Jordan, a country inhabited entirely by Arabs.

243. The Royal Commission recommended that the boundary
between the Arab and Jewish States should cross the Carmel Ridge
in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road, and the boundary we
have adopted under plans A and B, in accordance with the advice
of the military authorities, runs just to the north of this road, the
road itself being situated in the Arab State. It has been suggested
on the part of the Jews that the boundary should be drawn south
of this road, so as to include not only the road in the Jewish State
but also the high points in the vicinity and to the east of the village
of Umm Al Fahm. The reasons urged in support of this suggestion
are, first, that the road is an essential line of communication between
the Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime Plain, both of which are
situated in the Jewish State under plan B, and secondly, that from
the point of view of defence it is necessary to include within that state

114

the hills in the vicinity of Umm Al Fahm. We have not been able
to accept this suggestion. The Megiddo road, that is the road
running through the Musmus Pass to Hadera, although it is an
important line of communication, is not the only road across the
Carmel Ridge between the Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime
Plain. There is another road about 13 kilometres (about 8 miles)
to the north which leaves the Plain of Esdraelon a short distance
north of the Jewish settlement of Yokneam and crosses the ridge by
way of the Jewish Colonies of Bat Shelomo and Zikhron Ya’aqov.
This road provides a good means of communication between the
Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime Plain. The country south of
the Megiddo road is entirely Arab, and the adoption of a boundary
which would include in the Jewish State the hills in the vicinity of
Umm Al Fahm would not only mean the inclusion in that state of
a considerable area of Arab land in the hills, but also the southern
portion of the Plain of Esdraelon, an almost entirely Arab area.
The Arab population which would be included in the Jewish State
would be large. The village of Umm Al Fahm itself has a population
of about 4,700, and the total Arab population affected would be
between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. Moreover, we have been
advised by the military authorities that the inclusion of the high
ground round Umm Al Fahm is not essential for the defence of the
Jewish State, and that a boundary drawn along the northern side
of the Megiddo road gives the Jewish State a reasonably good defen-
sive boundary.

244. It has also been proposed that the Jerusalem Enclave
should be extended to the south so as to include the town of Hebron,
29 kilometres (18 miles) south of Jerusalem. For the Jews Hebron
possesses great historical associations : it contains the burial place
of the Patriarchs and was the first capital of King David. Hebron
is, however, an important Arab town with a population of 20,000
persons. There was a small Jewish population there before the
disturbances of 1929, but the survivors have since been compelled
to leave the town. To include Hebron in mandated territory would
mean the extension of the enclave boundary southward by 14 kilo-
metres (9 miles) and would deprive the Arab State not only of an
important town but also of a considerable rural population. We feel
that we should not be justified in proposing such a large addition
to the enclave in order to include therein the Jewish sacred places at
Hebron. Arrangements will be necessary for the protection of places
sacred to the Jews in the Arab State and vice-versa, and the Jewish
sacred places at Hebron will be covered by these arrangements.

245. It has also been suggested that the following areas should
be retained under Mandate —

(a) the area, including Jericho, lying between the eastern
boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave and the River Jordan ;

115

(b) a strip of territory along the western shore of the
Dead Sea ;

(c) the southern part of the Beersheba sub-district.

Under plan C the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, with the
exception of a small part on the west, will be retained under Mandate.
This includes not only the area covered by (c) but also a part of (b).
As regards (a) and the rest of (b), we have not found it possible to
accept the suggestion that they should be retained under Mandate,
which would mean the severance of the Arab area south of the
Jerusalem Enclave from that north of it.

The effect of plan C will be that the works of the Palestine
Potash Company at the northern end of the Dead Sea will be
situated in the Arab State and those at the southern end in
Mandated territory. It has been represented to us that the whole
of the works should be included in Mandated territory, one of the
arguments used being the need of preserving the right of pre-emption
in time of war of the products of the company under their concession,
which the Mandatory Power now possesses by virtue of that concession.
Under our proposals the benefit of this right will fall to be appor-
tioned among the successor Administrations. We should not feel
justified in recommending that the company’s northern works should
be included in Mandated territory on this ground, but we invite the
attention of His Majesty’s Government to the point in case it should
be desired to make provision in the treaty with the Arab State for
the right to pre-empt the company’s products in time of war.

116

CHAPTER XIII

JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE MANDATED TERRITORIES

UNDER PLAN C

246. The facts recounted in the previous chapters have compelled
us to conclude that the central section is the only part of Palestine
which can as yet be given its independence under a plan of partition,
and that the rest of the country should still remain under Mandate.
But what form should this Mandate take, and what provision, if any,
should be made in it for Jewish immigration ? The Royal Commission
recommended that the Balfour Declaration should not apply to the
territory to be retained under Mandate under their plan : all the
inhabitants of that territory should stand on an equal footing ;
and the basis of the new Mandate should be simply the principle of
good and just government without regard for sectional interests.
But the area proposed to be retained under Mandate under the
Royal Commission’s plan was very much smaller than that
proposed under plan C. Under the former the Mandated area
(exclusive of the small enclave of Nazareth) was limited to
the Jerusalem Enclave, whereas under the latter it includes not
only that Enclave but also the Northern and Southern Mandated
Territories. On the other hand, the area proposed for the Jewish
State under the Royal Commission’s plan was very much larger
than under plan C. It is understandable that the Royal Commission
should have felt that the obligations to the Jews under the Balfour
Declaration did not require that any special provision should be
made for Jewish immigration into the area retained under Mandate
under their plan. But the position is different under plan C. It
would seem, therefore, that, if the Royal Commission were right in
regarding their plan as fulfilling the obligations to the Jews under
the Balfour Declaration, suitable provision should be made under
plan C for the continuation of Jewish immigration into a part, at
least, of the areas to be retained under Mandate, provided that the
rights and interests of the existing inhabitants are not thereby
prejudiced.

247. It is worth while to consider more closely what the Arab
reactions to such a policy in the Mandated Territories are likely to
be. The Royal Commission found that the causes of Arab discontent
with the present Mandate were mainly three — (1) fear of political
domination by the Jews ; (2) fear of economic domination by the

117

Jews ; and (3) desire for national independence and consciousness
that it is because of the Jews that they are being denied it. Taking
these points in order —

(1) Under plan C the Arabs in the Mandated Territories will
have a sure guarantee against the fear of Jewish political
domination. It should be laid down in the clearest terms, and
we think that the principle should be embodied in the Mandate
itself, that the Arabs in the Northern and Southern Mandated
Territories cannot be placed under Jewish rule without their
own consent. In the Jerusalem Enclave the question will not
arise, since the Mandate will be permanent.

(2) The Arabs’ fear of economic domination by the Jews is
real and pertinent ; and our plan will not succeed unless we
can devise measures which will remove it, or at least justify
both His Majesty’s Government and the League of Nations in
feeling that there is no longer any reasonable foundation for it.
Our proposals under this head will be set out later on in this
chapter.

(3) Under plan C the Arabs will be given the opportunity to
set up an Arab State in as large a part of Palestine as can be
assigned to them without injury to the Jews. And we are
confident that no impartial person would think the Arabs
justified in claiming sovereign rights over the persons and
property of Jews who have settled in other parts of Palestine
on the faith of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

We consider that, subject to the reservation in sub-paragraph (2)
above, the Arabs, if they are prepared to accept plan C otherwise,
would have no reasonable ground for opposing further Jewish
immigration into the Mandated Territories. On the contrary, for the
reasons given in chapter III in our discussion of the population
problem, and further developed in chapter XXII, under the same
head, we think that the Arabs in the Mandated Territories would be
faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship if Jewish
immigration should be completely closed down, than they would
be if it should be allowed to continue under the conditions proposed
in this chapter.

248. We suggest that one of the advantages of plan C is that it
presents a fresh opportunity to carry out on a smaller scale and, as we
trust, in a more favourable atmosphere than before, the experiment,
which the original framers of the Balfour Declaration must surely
have had in mind, of seeking to build up, by the joint efforts of both
Arabs and Jews, a single state in which the two races may ultimately
learn to live and work together as fellow-citizens. Even to many
persons to whom the thought of partitioning the Holy Land is
abhorrent, it is hoped that such a policy will make an appeal ; and the
British people will, we believe, be ready, notwithstanding their
existing heavy burdens, to make such financial sacrifices as the policy
may require of them if a peaceful settlement can thereby be secured.

118

249. We have said that, if Jewish immigration into the Mandated
Territories is to be permitted to continue under suitable conditions
after partition, it is essential that the causes of Arab fears of economic
domination should be removed. For this two things are in our
opinion necessary : a positive and constructive policy of develop-
ment, designed for the direct benefit of the Arabs as well as of the
Jews, and a negative policy of control over Jewish acquisition of
land, which shall enable the Arabs to know precisely under what
conditions further Jewish settlement in these territories may take
place. It is not enough to rely upon generalities such as the words
of the Balfour Declaration : the Arabs must be told in precise and
unequivocal terms exactly what safeguards are proposed in order
to protect them in future from the economic domination of the Jews.

250. In our opinion immigration policy can only be determined
in relation to Jewish acquisition of and settlement on the land.
Accordingly we begin with the two latter questions and set out
immediately below a summary of our recommendations under each
of these heads, for the Northern Mandated Territory, the Jerusalem
Enclave, and the Southern Mandated Territory respectively. In the
succeeding paragraphs we shall explain and justify these recom-
mendations ; and we shall then proceed in the next chapter to
discuss immigration policy for the Mandated Territories.

251. Our recommendations, then, are as follows —

1. The Northern Mandated Territory

(1) The Mandatory should be empowered under the Mandate,
and should forthwith obtain statutory powers, to control (including
power to prohibit), either generally or in any prescribed area, the
transfer of land to —

(a) any person or persons ;

(b) any class or classes of persons ;

(c) any company, corporation or other body of persons.

This power of control should extend to sale, mortgage, gift,
dedication of waqf of every description, lease and any other disposition
of land except devise by a will.

Land should be denned as including houses, buildings, and things
permanently fixed on the land.

(2) (i) The Mandatory should thereupon declare an area corres-
ponding approximately to Galilee,* as defined in paragraph 184, a
prescribed area for this purpose and prohibit therein —

(a) the transfer of land by a non-Jew to a Jew ; and

* Defence considerations were taken into account in drawing the boundary
of Galilee as shown on map 9. It does not follow that precisely the same
boundaries would be appropriate for the present purpose.

119

(b) the transfer of land to any company, corporation or other
body of persons except with the prior approval of the Admini-
stration. This approval would not be given unless the Admini-
stration was satisfied that the land was being acquired by the
company or other body as the case may be for a purpose other
than Jewish occupation.

(ii) After ten years this prohibition should be reviewed, but should
not be withdrawn or relaxed in the area, or in any part of the area,
to which it has been applied unless the Mandatory and the League
of Nations are satisfied that Arab opinion in the area affected is in
favour of such withdrawal or relaxation. It would be left to the
Mandatory to decide how Arab opinion should be obtained.

(iii) Jews should not be prohibited from residing in the prescribed
area.

(3) There should be no prohibition on the transfer of land to Jews
in the urban area of Haifa (as defined in appendix 8) and in any
other urban area which the Mandatory Government may from time
to time declare to be a free area for this purpose. It is suggested
that Tiberias should be declared such an area from the outset.

(4) As regards the rest of the territory, the transfer of land to
Jews should be prohibited save in the following cases —

(a) transfers with the approval of Government for the
consolidation of existing Jewish holdings, for facilitating
irrigation of existing holdings, and for the parcellation into
individual ownership of masha’a land held in common by Jews
and Arabs ;

(b) any other transfer respecting which the Government are
satisfied —

(i) that there are possibilities of closer settlement on the
land to be acquired ;

(ii) that adequate provision has been or will be made for
the resettlement of the cultivators under conditions which
will enable them to obtain a reasonable livelihood from their
holdings, and that such provision will be carried into effect ;
and

(iii) that, save where the Government are satisfied that
conditions make it impracticable, any surplus land or other
benefits resulting from the promotion of closer settlement
will be shared equitably between Jews and Arabs, if
necessary in consideration of a contribution by Government, in
conformity with the principle enunciated in paragraph 251 (5)
below, towards the capital cost incurred by the Jews in
developing the land or otherwise.

(5) We recognize that the Government are already expending very
considerable sums on agricultural services ; but we fear that these
are not enough for the purposes we have in mind. We propose that

120

in addition, with the object of facilitating Jewish settlement, the
Government should assist, and when necessary themselves undertake,
an active programme designed to benefit both Arabs and Jews
of (a) agricultural development, including drainage and reclama-
tion of lands, provision of water if available, and construction of
roads and bridges, and (b) of agricultural research, experiment and
education ; and that for this purpose they should be prepared to
spend additional sums up to a specified amount.

(6) In so far as surplus agricultural land may be made available
as the direct result of such development, the benefit therein should be
shared equitably between both Arabs and Jews.

2. The Jerusalem Enclave

252. All the above recommendations apply to the Jerusalem
Enclave, except that it is not thought that the Government will
find it necessary to declare any part of this territory a prescribed
area, in which the transfer of land to Jews shall be prohibited, and
that the urban area of Jerusalem should be declared to be a free
area from the outset for the purpose of paragraph 251 (3) above.

3. The Southern Mandated Territory

253. It is not easy to formulate precisely the lines on which
development should proceed in this Territory, with a view both to
the protection of the interests of the existing inhabitants and to the
promotion of Jewish settlement therein. But broadly speaking we
suggest that the Mandatory might proceed on the lines indicated
below.

254. For the purpose of facilitating Jewish settlement therein,
we recommend that the Negeb be regarded as divisible into two
parts, an Unoccupied and an Occupied area, which should be dealt
with separately. The Occupied area would be that portion of the
Beersheba sub-district which the Bedouin tribes are accustomed to
cultivate and over which they claim tribal or hereditary rights of
occupancy. The Unoccupied area would be the rest of the sub-
district. The dividing line between the two might be roughly a line
corresponding with the 5-in. rainfall contour and the change in the
character of the country which we have described in paragraph 1 10 :
it has been suggested to us that it would run more or less from
Al Auja to Asluj and Kurnub.

The Unoccupied Area

255. The Unoccupied area has no settled inhabitants, though
occasionally a few wandering Bedouin pass over it. It is desert,
and desert it is likely to remain, unless Jewish enterprise and
capital can develop it. This area, or any part of it which the
Government are satisfied that the Jews have a serious intention of

121

developing, would be declared by Government to be a public
domain, subject to the obligation to compensate any tribe or
individual who may be able to satisfy the competent court that they
have a right of occupancy therein. A lease of such part or parts of
it as the Government may think fit would be granted by the
Government to a Jewish company, financed entirely from private
sources, which we suggest might with advantage be entrusted with
the promotion of Jewish settlement in the Negeb generally. The
lease would be free of rent, though taxation or royalties would be
payable as usual in respect of the land or its resources, and would be
for such period and subject to such conditions as the Government may
determine, including (i) the repayment by the company of any
expenditure incurred by the Government in payment of compensation
for ownership or occupancy rights in the area covered by the lease,
and (ii) such conditions as the Government may think fit to impose
with a view to maintaining communications with the Gulf of Aqaba,
and the right to construct or provide railways, roads or other forms
of transport, either itself or by any person or body nominated by it.
This will enable the Jews, should they think fit, to try, at least, to
develop the Unoccupied area of the Negeb ; and this opportunity
should not, we consider, be denied to them. This would still leave
the way open to any other interested parties, for example, a
mining company, to develop a part of the area under appropriate
conditions.

256. As regards the political future of the Unoccupied area, we
see no difficulty in the ultimate grant of independence to this portion
of the Territory, in which the number of inhabitants is at present so
small as to be negligible, provided that in the meantime the Jews
have taken advantage of the arrangements now proposed to settle
therein in considerable numbers.

The Occupied Area

257. The Occupied area would be declared by the Government,
under the powers recommended in paragraph 251 (1) above, to be for
the time being a prescribed area in which Jews should be prohibited
from acquiring land. Except for the urban area of Beersheba
itself, we understand that no part of the Beersheba sub-district
has been surveyed and settled. Steps should be taken to survey
and settle this area as quickly as possible, staff and funds being
provided for the purpose in addition to the normal provision for the
completion of settlement proceedings in the rest of the Mandated
Territories. We regard this as important, since until this work has
been completed, no settlement of the Jews in this area can take place,
and no steps can be taken to improve the standard of living of the
Bedouin. We understand that it is estimated that the work of
settlement survey north of 31° latitude, which roughly corresponds
with the line of demarcation between the two areas as suggested in

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paragraph 254 above, would take about years to complete, at a
cost of about £P130,000. The declaration of the area as a prescribed
area should remain in force until the survey is completed.

258. It is most important that the goodwill of the Arabs should be
secured in advance of any direct action for the purpose of facilitating
Jewish settlement in this area, and with this object it is desirable
that steps should be taken as soon as possible to explain the Govern-
ment’s policy clearly to the Bedouin tribes, and to obtain their
general assent to the experiments which it may be desired to under-
take before any general scheme of development can be put into
operation. These experiments are of three kinds, water-boring tests,
conservation of surface water, and an experimental dry farming station,
and have already been described by us in the chapter dealing with the
Possibility of Exchanges and Transfer of Population (chapter VIII).
The nature and purpose of these experiments should be made clear
to the Bedouin, and any suggestions which they may have to make
should receive due consideration. They should be made to realize
that, if the experiments are successful, it is they themselves who will
be the first to benefit in consequence. This may take time, but we
agree with the Royal Commission that it would be a mistake to
proceed too hastily in this matter. The tribes cannot be expected
to acquiesce very readily in a scheme which, if successful, will result
in their being obliged to choose between leaving the country
altogether, and adopting a settled life instead of their present
semi-nomadic habits ; and they must be assured that they will be
given every advice and assistance by Government in the process of
accustoming themselves to the new mode of life which is offered
to them. We think it justifiable to assume that in this way the
goodwill of the tribes will be obtained ; the alternative action,
which we recommend should be taken if this hope should not be
fulfilled, is described in paragraph 262 below.

259. When the goodwill of the tribes has been obtained, we think
that the greater part of the experiments should be undertaken
directly by the Jews, the programme being drawn up with the
approval of Government.

260. If these experiments show that closer settlement on the
land is possible, the Government should make an estimate, in
consultation with the Jews and with representatives of the local
tribe or tribes, of the quantity of surplus land. In view of their
exceptional poverty the local inhabitants should have the first
claim to benefit by any improvements in cultivation which may be
found possible as the result of these experiments and which will
enable them to adopt a reasonable standard of life ; and the Arab
claim under the principle of equitable sharing between Arabs and
Jews, as proposed in paragraph 251 (6) above, should be deemed to
have been discharged when reasonable provision has been made in
this way for the needs of the existing inhabitants.

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261. As soon as the Government are satisfied that the reasonable
needs of the existing inhabitants have been or will be met, the
prohibition on Jewish acquisition of land in this area should be
withdrawn, and Jews should be permitted to acquire land in the
area for purposes of settlement, subject to the approval of Govern-
ment. The Government should be prepared to withdraw the
prohibition gradually in respect of each section of the area as the
settlement survey thereof is complete, provided that they are
satisfied that Jewish purchases of land in that section will not lead
to breaches of the peace.

262. It remains to consider the possibility that the Bedouin will
from the outset oppose any action which, though designed to benefit
themselves in the first place, will ultimately facilitate the settlement
of Jews in the Negeb. We do not think that the Government should
allow their policy to be frustrated in this way by the unreasonable
opposition of backward tribes, occupying an area which, if the
experiments should indicate that a higher standard of cultivation
is possible, will be in excess of their reasonable requirements.
We think, therefore, that in that event the representatives of the
tribes should be told that the Government are nevertheless deter-
mined to carry out the experiments which they have in mind, but
will do so themselves, the Jews not being allowed to participate
at this stage, and that until the experiments are completed the
area will remain a prescribed area, in which no Jew will be permitted
to acquire or settle on land. Meanwhile the settlement survey will
be carried out by Government as proposed. When the results of
the experiments are available the matter will be reconsidered, and it
may be hoped that, if these are favourable, the Bedouin will be ready
to reconsider their attitude when it is explained to them that unless
they do so they must not expect that money will be made available
for improving their own position.

263. As regards the political future of the Occupied area, we are
of opinion that no independent state should be set up there in opposi-
tion to the wishes of trie minority, unless that minority is so small,
either actually or relatively, or so situated territorially, that its
wishes ought not to be allowed to frustrate the wishes of the majority.
In order that there may be no room for misunderstanding it should
be made plain that the Occupied area will not be made an indepen-
dent state if the majority of the Bedouin, assuming their numbers
and territorial disposition to be much the same as at present, are
opposed to that course.

264. In any case we think it desirable that the Mandate for the
whole Southern Mandated Territory should continue for at least
ten years.

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265. At the cost of some repetition, we will now explain the
object and effect of these recommendations.

4. The Negative Policy of Control

On what we have called the negative, or control, side of
future policy, the Jews will be prohibited from acquiring land and
settling (but not from mere residence) in Galilee for a period of at least
ten years from the date of partition. That, we feel sure, is a necessary
measure of precaution if there is to be any chance of the new policy
being accepted by the Arabs. Whether the Jews will ever be allowed
to settle in Galilee or not will depend on whether experience shows
that the various obstacles, human, financial and economic, to
successful settlement in the hill-country, which the Jews themselves
recognize to exist to-day, can be successfully overcome ; the need
for markets, the uncertainty as to underground water supplies, the
doubt whether certain new forms of cultivation will succeed in the
hill-country, the doubts concerning the size of the appropriate lot
viable, the difficulties of training cultivators in the new methods, of
providing the necessary finance, of finding owners willing to sell to
Jews ; and — perhaps most important of all — the doubt whether at
best there will remain after a few years any surplus land in Galilee
for new settlement if the natural increase of population continues at
the present rate. And finally, even if it can be shown by experiment
and by practical experience elsewhere that these obstacles, or most
of them, can be successfully overcome, our scheme still provides that
Jewish settlement cannot take place in this area without the consent
of the Arab population of the area. We are convinced that nothing
short of an absolute guarantee of this kind, in unequivocal terms, can
remove the Arabs’ suspicions of what the Government may intend
to do when the initial period has expired. In the meantime it will
be open to the Jews, by their attitude towards the Arabs elsewhere in
Palestine, to convince the Arabs in Galilee that it is really to their
interest to accept them as neighbours.

266. As regards the rest of the Northern Mandated Territory
and the Jerusalem Enclave generally, the effect of our recom-
mendations is, broadly speaking, to confine* Jewish acquisition of
land within three channels. To take the least important first, the Jews
may, with the Government’s approval, acquire land for the con-
solidation of existing holdings, or for facilitating irrigation of existing
holdings, or for the panellation into individual ownership of land in
which the Jews have already acquired an interest, but which is held
under the masha’a system in common ownership by a number of
proprietors, some of whom are Arabs. The right to acquire land for
these purposes is something which clearly cannot be expected as a
general rule to prejudice the interests of the Arab cultivators, and
cannot reasonably be denied to the Jews. Purchase would, of course,
be subject in all cases to the willingness of the owner to sell, and
to the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance, and the condition that
Government approval must be obtained would be sufficient to ensure
that the cultivator’s interest was duly considered in any special case.

125

267. Before proceeding to discuss the other two means by which
Jews may acquire land in the Mandated Territories after partition,
we pause to consider the suggestion which has been made that all such
acquisitions, except as provided for under the previous paragraph,
should be prohibited for a certain period, in order to give time for
the present bitterness of inter-racial feeling to die down.

268. The total amount of land owned by the Jews in that part
of the Northern Mandated Territory which consists of the plains to
the south and east of Galilee (as defined by us for the purpose of
plan B), or more exactly in the whole of the Territory except Galilee
and the Haifa Bay area, is at present about 500,000 dunums, of
which about 100,000 dunums are classed as uncultivable. The total
Jewish rural population of this area as at September, 1936, is given
by the Jewish Agency in the Census of Jewish Agriculture carried
out in that year, as 13,275, of which the number of persons directly
dependent on agriculture is 10,454, or 78-75 per cent. In addition,
it is understood that a certain number of Arab cultivators remain
in occupation of a part of this land, but we have no information
as to their number and are unable, therefore, to take them into
account in the following calculations. Nor have we taken into
account therein the 100,000 dunums of land which are classed as
uncultivable, although the proportion between uncultivable and
cultivable land thus shown (1 : 4) is much higher than that which
the Jews have told us that, for this part of Palestine generally,
they usually assume to be, from its nature, utterly worthless for
cultivation, even under the most efficient methods of husbandry.
The average amount of cultivable land owned per head of the Jewish

400,000

agricultural population is, therefore, ^ = 38-25 dunums, and

the average per family, allowing 4-75 persons per family, is
181-7 dunums. The average amount of cultivable land per Jewish
family is remarkably high, and indicates clearly that, after allowing
for the existing Arab cultivators and for such portion of the land
now classed as uncultivable as may prove to be cultivable, there is
room for a very considerable increase in the number of Jewish
settlers on the land already owned by them in this part of the
Northern Mandated Territory, if the land proves capable of being
developed to the standard which Jewish witnesses themselves have
used in putting before us their estimate of the absorptive capacity
of the district as a whole. That standard is as follows —

Lot Viable in Dunums
Non-

Irri- Irri- Total
gated gated

For land in the Huleh Basin . . . . . . 25 — 25

Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North) —

(a) From S’deh Ya’akov to Ein Harod . . 10 50 60

(b) From Ein Harod to Jordan . . . . 21 22 43
Hills of Eastern Galilee . . . . — 40 40

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In furnishing us with this estimate the Jewish witnesses were careful
to point out that it was based ” on the hypothesis that [the] agri-
cultural resources [of the several areas], as at present known, are
developed and fully utilized at the highest level of efficiency. This
hypothesis is theoretical in so far as it disregards not only the factor
of human inertia, but also various difficulties of a financial, legal
and political nature which may in practice have to be taken into
account.” And they admitted that many of these factors were in
practice already operating to prevent or delay closer settlement on
the lands which the Jews had already acquired, and much of which
had already been cultivated by Jewish settlers for a number
of years.

269. Notwithstanding these reservations, however, it does not
seem unreasonable to apply those standards to the lands already
owned by the Jews in this area, in order to calculate their absorptive
capacity on the assumption that they will in time be developed and
fully utilized at the highest level of efficiency, according to the
calculations of the Jews themselves. Taking only the most conserva-
tive estimate of lot viable (namely, 60 dunums of cultivable land)
as applicable to the whole area, this would put the maximum
absorptive capacity of these lands at 6,666-6 families, or 31,667
persons, as against 10,454 persons in September, 1936, an increase
of 21,213 persons. If we increase the figure of 31,667 in the
proportion of 10,454 to 13,275 to allow for the resident non-
agricultural population, we get a figure for the total potential
rural population of 40,217 as against 13,275 in September, 1936, or
an increase of nearly 27,000 persons.

270. The increase in the Jewish agricultural population of all
Palestine between 1931 and September, 1936, was 29,031*, or
an average of 5,806 souls per annum. At this rate it might be
expected that, even if all their colonizing energies were concentrated
on these settlements, it would be four or five years before the Jews
had utilized to their fullest extent the possibilities of settlement on
the lands already owned by them in the Northern Mandated Territory.
On these figures it might be argued with some plausibility that no
further Jewish purchases of land should be permitted in any part
of the Northern Mandated Territory for a period of say five years
at least. No great harm, it might be said, could thereby be done to
the Jews, who, according to the evidence, are not likely in any case
to introduce during this period a larger number of agricultural settlers

* Census of Palestine, 1931, Volume II, page 283, Table XVI, gives the
total Jewish population dependent on agriculture as 26,939. According to
the Jewish Agency’s Census of Agriculture, the figure for September, 1936,
was 55,370. It cannot be asserted that the figures are exactly comparable,
but they are probably near enough for the present argument.

127

than could be settled on their existing holdings if these were fully
developed according to the standards at which the Jews themselves
aim ; and there would be much to be said for a pause or standstill
of several years during which no further acquisition by the Jews of
agricultural land whatever (save for the limited purposes mentioned
in paragraph 266 above) would be permitted outside the Jewish State.
This standstill would give time for the present bitterness of feeling
between the two races to die down, and thereafter it would be possible
to review the position in the light of current conditions and to decide
— possibly in agreement with the Arabs, if goodwill should by then
have been sufficiently restored — under what conditions further
transfers of land to the Jews might take place.

271. If our only object were to devise a scheme which would be
likely to induce the Arabs to acquiesce in partition, there would
no doubt be much to be said for this view, although even from that
point of view we doubt if it would be as effective as might at first
be thought. But that is certainly not the only criterion which we
have to take into account in testing the merits of the various
proposals which we have had under consideration. We are bound
also to consider the effect on the Jews, whose claims to special
consideration in the Mandated Territory under plan C we have
already recognized, and we cannot feel that such a policy would do
justice to their present desperate needs. If, in fact, it should be
possible for them during the next few years to increase their past
rate of agricultural settlement, by a rapid development of lands
which are proved to be capable of closer settlement without injury
to the existing cultivators, we do not think that they should be
prevented from doing so on the ground that there may be still room
for closer settlement ultimately on the lands which they already
possess, but on which for one reason or another the process of
utilization to the highest degree of efficiency is taking place more
slowly. Again, it is a cardinal point of our proposals, as will be
brought out later in this chapter, that Government would be
justified in spending substantial sums on land development in the
Mandated Territory after partition as part of a comprehensive
policy the object of which shall be to benefit the Arab while facilitating
Jewish settlement. But if there is to be no assurance of further
Jewish agricultural settlement beyond what can be done on the
land which the Jews already possess, it cannot be expected that
His Majesty’s Government will be willing to spend the United
Kingdom taxpayer’s money on the development of the land for
the sole benefit of the Arabs ; the Jews obviously will not do so ;
and it is quite certain that the revenues of the Mandated Territory
alone will not be adequate for the purpose. Thus the Arab
population would be deprived for the next five years at least, if

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not for ever, of opportunities for improving their standard of
living which they might obtain if facilities for further Jewish
settlement are granted how.

272. A further, and in our opinion a most weighty objection to
the policy of a five years’ standstill, is that it would leave both Arabs
and Jews once again in a state of complete uncertainty as to what will
be the Government’s policy and how it will affect their own position
when the standstill comes to an end. We have already expressed
the opinion in paragraph 220 that Palestine has suffered gravely
in the past from this uncertainty as to the political future ; and
we are convinced that its influence would be equally unhappy in
this case, and that far from leading to appeasement, as the advocates
of the policy hope, it would be more likely to keep alive suspicion
and ill-will between the two races.

273. For these reasons we reject the idea of a standstill, and
consider that provision should be made for the acquisition of further
land by the Jews in the Mandated Territories after partition, outside
any prohibited area, subject to effective and clearly defined safe-
guards in the interests of the existing population. Such provision
will be made under two heads, Urban Areas and Rural Areas.

(i) Urban Areas

274. In considering the question of the effect upon the Arab popula-
tion of Jewish immigration into Palestine, we think it important to draw
a distinction between immigrants who are destined to be agricultural
settlers, and other classes of immigrant. For the Jewish agricultural
settlers, both men and women, judging by the examples of their work
which we were able to see for ourselves, we have only admiration :
their energy, self-sacrifice and enthusiastic devotion to the ideals
they have set before themselves, are deserving of the highest praise.
We know and appreciate the reasons which have led the leaders of
the Zionist movement to insist upon the creation of a Jewish class
of workers in the most strenuous manual occupations, and in agricul-
ture particularly, as the necessary foundation of a healthy modern
State. We are far from seeking to deny the wisdom of this policy,
still less to suggest that it might now be modified. Nevertheless we
think it important, in order to see the problem of Jewish immigration
in its true perspective, to remember that, even in September, 1936,
the total number of Jews directly dependent upon agriculture was
only about 55,000 out of a total Jewish population on the same date
of about 390,000, and that while the net number of Jewish immigrants
recorded as having entered Palestine in the years 1932-6 inclusive
is 172,651, the agricultural population increased during that period
by only 29,000, or just over one-sixth of the total number of

129

immigrants (paragraph 270 above) . In other words, from the point of
view of mere numbers, agricultural settlement is a comparatively
unimportant side of immigration* although it is probably one of the
major causes of the present hostility of the Arabs for the Jews.

275. Far more important to Jewry, which is desperately anxious
to find a refuge for the Jews who are being forced to leave their
homes in Europe, is the right to settle in urban areas and therein to
establish new industries with the help of such capital as they can bring
into the country. The Jews themselves have told us that they cal-
culate that for every Jewish immigrant settled on the land, two
immigrants can be settled successfully in other occupations. We doubt
whether any useful relationship can be established between the two
classes in this direction, though, considering the relationship in the
reverse direction, we think that the number of additional Jews
who can be successfully settled on the land is to an important
extent dependent upon the total number of Jewish immigrants who
will provide them with an assured market. The number of persons
who can be established in industrial and other occupations in Pales-
tine depends upon other factors, principally the supply of capital,
the skill and enterprise of the management and of the skilled personnel
employed, the cost of living and the standard of living of the work
people, the degree of tariff protection afforded, the extent and pur-
chasing power of the domestic market, and the ability to compete
in foreign markets — factors which it is quite impossible to assess.
Admittedly the Jews who wish to establish new industries in the
Mandated Territories will not be able to rely with confidence upon the
same degree of tariff protection as they might do in an independent
Jewish State, able to control its own fiscal policy, and in respect of
this important factor, they may be handicapped. But in other
respects their prospects of success would seem not to be markedly
different from what they would be in a Jewish State, provided that
they are allowed to acquire land in a suitable area with good access
by rail and sea to the home and foreign market. We can see no
good reason why the Arabs should oppose the acquisition by Jews
of land so situated ; on the contrary there is every reason to suppose
that the Arabs will benefit substantially from the additional demand

* Going further back, we may compare the present figures with those for
1922, when there were, according to the Statement of British Policy in Palestine,
dated 3rd June, 1922, about 80,000 Jews in Palestine, ” of whom about one-
fourth are farmers or workers on the land.” Thus between 1922 and 1936

the agricultural population has increased by (55,000 — 80^000^ _ gg qqq

4

persons, out of a total increase of the Jewish community during the same period
by (390,000 – 80,000 =) 310,000, or just over 13 per cent, of the total
increase.

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130

for employment which will be created if new industries are successfully
established thereon. Indeed, we will go further, and say, for the
reasons given in chapters III and XXII under the head of Population,
that unless Jewish immigrant capital is encouraged in this way to
enter the country and to be used for the development of Jewish
industries in the Mandated Territories, the economic position of the
Arab population outside the Jewish State is likely to be serious.
To the prospects of benefits to the Arabs from this source we add one
qualification. It is, of course, impossible to prevent Jewish employers
from exercising a voluntary preference in favour of Jewish labour,
though so long as the Arab standard of living and rate of wages is
below that of the Jews (and while it should be the object of the
Government gradually to raise the former, it will be a long time before
they reach the Jewish level), the temptation to reduce costs by
employing Arabs will be strong. But we assume that, in conformity
with the principles of good and just government, the Mandatory
Power will take strong measures against any attempt by Jewish
organizations or individuals to prevent employers, by intimidation
or picketing, from exercising their freedom of action in this matter.

276. The area in the Mandated Territories which complies most
fully with these conditions is, of course, Haifa. We recommend
accordingly that a suitable industrial zone around the town itself
should be prescribed by the Government as a free zone within which
the transfer of land to Jews should be permitted. The limits which
we would suggest for this zone are indicated in Appendix 8 ; but
the Government should be prepared to vary them from time to time
if necessary to meet industrial requirements.

A similar zone should be prescribed around Jerusalem (for which
we have not thought it necessary to suggest limits ourselves, except
that we consider that it should be larger than the municipal area),
and another, we suggest, around Tiberias. Power should be sought
for the Government to prescribe such a zone for any other urban area
which it may think fit, and to fix the limits and vary them from time
to time.

(ii) Rural Areas

277. It is the acquisition of land by the Jews in the rural areas
of the Mandated Territories, other than any prohibited area, for
purposes not covered by the proposals in paragraph 251 (4) (a)
above which is most likely to provoke suspicion and resentment
among the Arabs ; and it is here, therefore, that the need is greatest
for effective and convincing safeguards of the interests of the existing
population. To this end we recommend that the Government
should undertake the responsibility of satisfying itself, before giving
its consent to any purchase of land by the Jews for such purposes,
first, that the land is actually capable of closer settlement ; secondly
that adequate provision has been or will be made for the resettlement
of any tenant cultivators of the land under conditions which will

131

enable them to obtain a reasonable livelihood from their holdings,
and thirdly, that, save where the Government are satisfied that
conditions make it impracticable, any benefits resulting from closer
settlement shall be shared equitably between both Arabs and Jews.

278. So far as the Arab cultivators are concerned, we think that
these safeguards should be effective. As regards the Jews, we believe
that this part of our proposals is in general conformity with the
Jewish Agency’s own policy. In their Memorandum to the Royal
Commission dated November, 1936, the Agency said —

The Mandate requires the Administration of Palestine to encourage
close settlement by Jews on the land, and to do so in co-operation with
the Jewish Agency. The work about to be executed in the Huleh
marshes provides a striking example of co-operation between the Govern-
ment of Palestine and Jewish public bodies to the advantage of Jews and
Arabs alike. The intensive development of the Beisan area may well
be made to provide another.

The possibilities of such co-operation are not exhausted by what is
being done in Huleh and what can be done in Beisan. If development
is vigorously pressed forward, the Jewish Agency believes that there will
be found to be other parts of Palestine in which both Jews and Arabs
would benefit by what may be described as a tripartite arrangement
between the Government, the Jewish Agency and the Arab cultivators.
The basis of such an arrangement might be that, as suggested above
in the case of the Beisan region, the Jewish Agency would provide water
in exchange for land, while the Government would take steps to procure
the consolidation of holdings in order to facilitate irrigation and the
orderly panellation of the area affected between Arabs and Jews. The
essence of the scheme is that the Arab holding would be reduced in size,
but increased in terms of productivity, by irrigation to be provided by
the Jews. Thus land would be liberated for Jewish settlement, while
the Arab cultivator, far from being prejudiced, would be left with a more
productive holding than before.

Without at this stage going more minutely into detail, the Jewish
Agency believes that it is on some such lines as these that the land
resources of Palestine could be developed for the benefit of Jews and
Arabs alike. It is possible that for the purpose of ensuring the orderly
execution of a development scheme having this end in view, it may be
found necessary to regulate by agreement, in some appropriate manner,
the channels through which land may be bought for Jewish purposes,
or, again, it may be agreed to be desirable that there should be some
understanding as to the areas in which the authorized land-purchasing
institutions are from time to time to operate. Provided that a genuinely
constructive policy is adopted and carried out, the Jewish Agency does
not believe that there will be any insurmountable difficulty in agreeing
upon arrangements which will satisfactorily safeguard all legitimate
interests.

The words in the middle of the second paragraph quoted above,
” while the Government would take steps …. Arabs and
Jews “, are somewhat obscure, but seem to imply that the Govern-
ment would be expected in such a case to make use of the Land
(Expropriation) Ordinance in order to compel an unwilling owner to
sell his land. This difficult question is discussed by the Royal
Commission in paragraphs 26 and 82 of chapter IX of their Report
and is touched upon again in paragraphs 85-93 of the same chapter

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132

in connection with a suggestion that public utility societies might be
formed for developing large areas of land (500 dunums and upwards,
as appears from paragraph 10 (5) (ii) of chapter XIX). They con-
sidered that, with a view to the consolidation of holdings for the
concentration of Arabs in one block, ” recourse should be had, if
necessary, to the Land (Expropriation) Ordinance and that scattered
individual Arab holdings should not be allowed to interfere with the
development of a scheme which has been proved to the satisfaction
of Government beneficial to Jews and Arabs alike ” (paragraph 82
of chapter IX). The scheme for the formation of public utility
societies included a proposal that Government should ” acquire the
land, when the price had not been fixed by negotiation, under the
Land (Expropriation) Ordinance, and take such steps as might be
necessary to consolidate holdings ” (paragraph 85). After answering
the objections which the Palestine Government had brought forward
against the proposal, the Royal Commission observe (paragraph 93) —

The political difficulties form part of the general picture of the
administration of the country, and we do not underrate them. But we
cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, if the Mandate is to continue and
the Mandatory Power is to discharge its obligation, the pace of progress
must not be determined by factious agitators. Where, then, the following
conditions are fulfilled,

(a) there is land available and a general willingness to sell,

(6) it has been proved suitable for intensive cultivation, and

(c) satisfactory financial arrangements can be devised, we do not
think that such a scheme under Government supervision and control
should be held up by calculated obstruction.

We understand from these observations that the Royal Commis-
sion were satisfied that, if a development scheme of substantial
size and promising benefits to both Arabs and Jews was being
obstructed by the refusal of a few isolated individuals to sell their
holdings, and the other conditions mentioned were fulfilled, it was
in the public interest that Government should have recourse to its
powers of compulsory acquisition under the Land (Expropriation)
Ordinance. We agree with this view, and recommend that, where
these conditions are fulfilled, the Government should be prepared to
use its powers under the Ordinance with such amendment as may be
necessary to procure the consolidation of holdings in order to
facilitate development by means of irrigation and otherwise, and the
orderly parcellation of the area affected between Arabs and Jews.

279. As is pointed out in paragraph 331, under the contract by
which land belonging to the Jewish National Fund is leased to Jewish
settlers, the lessee is required to execute all works connected with
the cultivation of his holding only with Jewish labour. In that
paragraph we recommend that the Jewish State should be required

133

to pass legislation providing that any contract or sale or lease for-
bidding directly or indirectly the employment of persons of a.’
particular race or religion shall be null and void. We suggest that
similar legislation should be enacted for the Mandated Territories.

5. The Constructive Policy of Development.

280. We turn now to the positive side of our recommendations.
The idea of a constructive policy of development with a view to
facilitating Jewish settlement in Palestine is, of course, by no means
new. Attention was first drawn to it by the Shaw Commission in
their Report of March, 1930 (Cmd. 3530) on the 1929 disturbances.
It formed the basis of the recommendations of Sir John Hope
Simpson’s Report of October, 1930, (Cmd. 3686) on Immigration,
Land Settlement and Development. In the White Paper of 1930
(Cmd. 3692, paragraph 22) His Majesty’s Government expressed
themselves ” satisfied that, in order to attain these objects ” (that
is, to ensure that the position of the other sections of the population
was not prejudiced by Jewish immigration, and to encourage closer
settlement of the Jews on the land) ” a more methodical agricultural’
development is called for with the object of ensuring a better use
of the land ” ; and in his letter of the 13th February, 1931, to Dr.
Weizmann, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, while
emphasizing that it was to landless Arabs within a particular category
that His Majesty’s Government owed a special obligation, added —
” The recognition of this obligation in no way detracts from the
larger purposes of development, which His Majesty’s Government
regards as the most effectual means of furthering the establishment
of a National Home for the Jews.” While the White Paper made it
clear that it was part of the general policy of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment that Palestine should be self-supporting, it was the intention
of His Majesty’s Government at that time (June, 1931) that the
funds required for the purpose of giving effect to the policy of a
more methodical agricultural development in Palestine should be
found by means of a loan which Parliament would be asked to
authorize the Treasury to guarantee. At the same time Mr. Lewis
French was appointed Director of Development, with instructions
to consider, inter alia,

(i) the improvement and intensive development of land in
the hills in order to secure to the fellahin a better standard
of living without, save in exceptional cases, having recourse
to transfer ;

(ii) the feasibility and advisability of providing credits for
Arab cultivators and Jewish settlers, and if so, the best methods
of achieving this purpose ; and

(iii) proposals for obtaining, irrigating and otherwise re-
claiming land not at present cultivated or cultivated only to a
limited extent.

(C 31078)

134

But shortly afterwards the financial crisis supervened, and subse-
quently, after reviewing the position in the light of financial
conditions both in the United Kingdom and in Palestine, His
Majesty’s Government decided that, in the existing financial circum-
stances, it was impossible for the British Government to make a
contribution to land development in Palestine such as was envisaged
in 1930. The financial position of Palestine itself was, however,
felt to be sufficiently satisfactory to enable it to finance its own
requirements. In addition, an extensive programme of public
works was to be instituted by the Government of Palestine, including
services, such as a survey of underground water resources and
provision for the improvement of village water supplies, which
could properly be classed as development services ; the cost of these
works was intended to be financed to a large extent out of a loan of
£2 millions to be guaranteed by the British Treasury. But that
loan in its turn was never raised, and the services which were to
have been financed in this way from loan funds were in fact financed
out of the current revenue and accumulated surpluses of Palestine.
As a result of this, and of the subsequent need to divert revenue to
expenditure on public security, the Government of Palestine found
themselves unable to provide funds for development purposes on
any considerable scale ; and the various plans to which so much
prominence had been given in 1930 have borne little fruit.

281. The Royal Commission had no definite recommendations
to make with regard to development under Part II of their Report
(in which they assumed the continuation of an undivided Palestine
under a single Mandate), except that they commended the prQposal
for a Government contribution towards the cost of the Huleh
Concession Scheme (chapter IX, paragraphs 120-124), and that, as
stated in paragraph 278, they favoured the setting up, not necessarily
with financial participation by the Government, of public utility
societies for promoting closer settlement on areas of 500 dunums
and upwards in the plains, and the use of the Land (Expropriation)
Ordinance, if necessary, where a scheme, which satisfied certain
specified conditions, was in danger of being held up by calculated
obstruction (chapter IX, paragraph 93). But for the purpose of
facilitating the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area,
which they regarded as an essential step if the minority problem,
” the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation
of Partition,” was to be solved, they recommended ” the execution
of large scale plans for irrigation, water-storage and development ” in
Trans- Jordan, Beersheba and the Jordan Valley (chapter XXII, para-
graph 41), and the payment of the cost, which would be heavier than
the Arab State could be expected to bear, from a grant which Parlia-
ment should be asked to make for the purpose {ibid, paragraph 44).
They made no attempt to estimate the cost of such schemes, but it must
have been clear to them, from the estimates which had been supplied
to them respecting the Huleh Scheme, that the cost was likely to

135

run into several millions of pounds* if the whole of the Arab population
of the plains which were included in the Jewish State under their
plan were to be transferred to the Arab State (ibid, paragraph 43).

282. In chapter VIII we have given our reasons for thinking that
the prospects of such transfer of population are remote ; that the
conditions in the areas named by the Royal Commission are far less
favourable for development and close settlement than the Royal
Commission supposed ; and that even if development were to be
undertaken successfully, it is unlikely that large numbers of Arabs-
would be willing to leave their own homes, even in a Jewish State,
and migrate to these new and, in their eyes, inhospitable districts.
In so far as it may be possible to effect such transfers, we should,
of course, welcome the doing so, for even under plan C there will
still remain over 50,000 Arabs in the Jewish State, constituting a
minority problem which will require the highest wisdom and courage
on the part of Jewish statesmen to handle successfully. But we
cannot agree with the Royal Commission that the cost of development
for this purpose should fall on the United Kingdom Government.
The benefit of such measures will accrue to the Jews even more
than to the Arab State, since every Arab transferred from land in
the Jewish State will make room for a new Jewish settler ; and the
Jews themselves have told us that they would regard this as a far
more suitable way of assisting the Arab State than the direct
subvention recommended by the Royal Commission, and that
they would be prepared to pay the interest and sinking fund on
a loan to be raised for the purpose.

♦Excluding Haifa and Galilee, the Arab population of the Jewish State
as proposed by the Royal Commission may be put at about 150,000, or say
30,000 families. But not all these families would be dependent on agriculture
for their livelihood, and it is assumed that the number so dependent would not
exceed 20,000. Mr. French estimated the cost of resettling an Arab family
at 1931 prices at £P350 to £P400, or £P270 on developed land where flow
irrigation was general, that is, where drainage and reclamation of land,
development of springs, canalization, and construction of roads and bridges
had already been provided by Government agency. Taking the higher figures
(the lower figures are clearly inapplicable, unless the cost of development can
be calculated separately) the cost of resettling 20,000 Arab families may be
put at between £P7 and £P8 millions. It is true that the Royal Commission
only recommended that a Parliamentary Grant should be made to meet the
cost of the proposed irrigation and development scheme, but it is obvious that,
f(5r the successful transfer of an agricultural population having no capital of
their own, provision must also be made for settling each family in their new
home and providing the necessary stock and equipment. Sir John Hope Simpson
puts the cost of this at £P60 per family on average, and Mr. French accepted
this figure and included it in his own estimate of the total cost of
resettlement. In addition there would be the cost of settling the remaining
10,000 families. We have no basis on which to calculate this cost, but it is
unlikely to be less than /P100 a family, making a total of £P1,000,000 to be
added to the above figures. Against this liability must be set the value of
land owned by any of the persons to be resettled, but no figures are available
by which the reduction on this account of the gross liability may be estimated.

136

283. It is clear from this summary of the past history of the
question that in one form or another the idea of a costly programme
of agricultural land development in Palestine, of which a great part
would be financed from United Kingdom funds, has been a feature
of British policy since 1930. This fact gives us greater confidence in
putting forward our own proposals under this head. We defined
those proposals in paragraph 25 1 (5) of this chapter. The obj ect which
we have in mind is, broadly speaking, to ensure that, in the alloca-
tion of the benefits resulting from development expenditure, the
Arab shall not suffer in comparison with the Jew owing to his lack
of capital. We take, as an example of what we have in mind, the
Huleh Basin Scheme. Out of a total of 45,000* dunums within the
Huleh concession area, 13,000* (instead of 10,000* under the original
Concession) are to be reserved for the Arabs by whom they have
hitherto been partially reclaimed. This land is at present flooded
for half the year. In addition, the scheme makes provision for
improving the position of the existing Arab cultivators on 55,000
dunums outside the concession area, by substituting controlled
irrigation for the present primitive arrangements. The part of the
concession area, now covered by lake and marshes, which is to be
reserved for Jewish colonization, is only 32,000* dunums. Thus,
out of a total of 100,000 dunums to be benefited under the scheme,
two-thirds will be in Arab ownership, and only one-third in Jewish.
In this particular case no resettling process will be necessary : the
surplus land will be land reclaimed from under water or marsh,
instead of being made available by a process of ” squeezing up ”
the existing Arab cultivators. It is not easy, therefore, to calculate
exactly in what proportions the scheme will benefit Jews and Arabs.
The Jews will receive 32,000 dunums of land which is entirely surplus ;
the Arabs will have 55,000 dunums of existing holdings improved by
an unknown percentage, and 13,000 dunums improved by at least
100 per cent., and probably more. For these benefits the Jews
will pay £900,000, including the cost of the concession, the Govern-
ment £223,000f, and the Arabs nothing.

284. The principle underlying this arrangement seems to us to
be eminently sound. The Government, before approving any
development scheme involving the acquisition of land in Arab
ownership submitted to them.by the Jews, will first satisfy themselves
that it will result in closer settlement becoming possible on the land
to be acquired. They will then (unless the scheme is so small as to
make these conditions impracticable) negotiate with the Jews
(i) for the allocation between Jews and Arabs of the benefits to be
expected from the development expenditure, on the principle that,
over and above what is needed for resettling the existing cultivators,

*After making allowance for roads, canals and irrigation works,
f According to the figures given in the Royal Commission’s Report, which,
however, are subject to revision owing to later developments.

137

with their existing standard of living, a substantial share in any
surplus land made available shall be assigned to the Arabs (whether
to the existing cultivators, in order to improve their existing standard
of living, or to others who are known to be landless or in greater need
of additional land than the existing cultivators, would be a matter
to be determined by the Government in each case, in consultation
with both Jews and Arabs) ; and (ii) for the allocation of the cost
between the Jews and the Government. For this and for the
determination of the Arabs’ share in the surplus benefits, no fixed
rule can be laid down, but prima facie we see no reason why the
precedent of the Huleh Scheme should not be followed as a general
indication of what is equitable in such cases under both heads,
although we have not in mind any schemes comparable in magnitude
with the Huleh Scheme.

285. This is the method of development, for the joint benefit of
both Jews and Arabs, which we favour at this stage. But other
methods are possible. In particular we would not wish to exclude
the possibility that the Government may decide itself to undertake
works of development, the benefits resulting from which would be
allocated on the same equitable basis between Jews and Arabs, in
return for an appropriate contribution by the former towards the
cost. This, however, would be exceptional ; as a general rule we
should expect that the initiative in a development scheme which
was intended to benefit Jews as well as Arabs should be taken by the’
Jews. The Government would normally, we think, confine its
activities to services which would be intended primarily for the
benefit of the Arab cultivators, such as (i) an enlarged programme of
agricultural research and experiment and of instruction and
education in agricultural matters, (ii) the construction of roads and
bridges for linking up Arab villages with the main roads, (iii) the
extension of the present agricultural development loan scheme* and
(iv) the improvement of Arab marketing arrangements on the lines
of the successful Jewish Co-operative Association, the Tnuva.
Indirectly, however, such expenditure should facilitate Jewish
settlement, since the better educated the Arab cultivator becomes in
agricultural matters, the more quickly and willingly he will learn
to adapt himself to the new conditions of intensive cultivation which
it is necessary that he should accept if settlement of the Jews on the
land is to be made possible.

286. We do not wish it to be assumed, from the picture which we
have drawn above of the possibilities of action under the policy advo-
cated in this chapter, that we are satisfied that there is abundant
scope for development of the land in the Mandated Territories with
a view to close settlement thereon. Apart from the Huleh Scheme,,
we are far from taking an optimistic view of the possibilities of

*The present scheme is limited to ^P50,000, and to cultivators in the-
hill-country.

138

additional agricultural settlement in those parts of the Mandated
Territories to which our proposals apply. That, however, is not the
attitude of the Jews ; and it is the Jews, and not the Government,
who will take the initiative in setting these development schemes in
motion. According to estimates given to us by Jewish witnesses,
the absorptive capacity of the Huleh Plain, including the area to
be developed under the Huleh Concession Scheme, is, in terms of
agricultural population only, 39,000, and that of the Plains of
Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North) 22,100, over and above the
present total population of those areas ; besides these, allowance
must be made for the possibilities of additional settlement in the
Haifa Bay area and in the hills and upland country to the south and
east of Galilee, for which separate estimates are not available. These
figures are of course theoretical in the sense described in para-
graph 268 of this chapter ; and we ourselves do not endorse them.
But it is clearly proper to make provision under our scheme for the
possibility that the Jews may be right, or even partially right, in
their calculations, so long as it is understood that the Government
accept no responsibility for any extravagant hopes that may be
fostered thereby.

287. There is one further point to which we must draw attention.
Our proposals envisage close settlement resulting, as a rule, from
large schemes of development, the benefits of which will, save when
the Government are satisfied that conditions make it impracticable,
be apportioned equitably between Arabs and Jews by the orderly
panellation of the area affected (paragraph 251 (4) (b) (iii) above).
In making this reservation we had in mind that in some cases the
area developed would be so small that the apportionment of the
surplus between Arabs and Jews would be impracticable. In
such cases, in the absence of special arrangements, the whole of
the surplus would go to the Jews, and there would of course be
no contribution from public funds to the cost of development. But
it is conceivable that the greater part of any development which
may take place will be in this form ; if so, there is clearly a danger
lest the policy of sharing the benefits equitably between Arabs
and Jews should be frustrated. To prevent this we think that it
should be laid down that, for the purpose of giving effect to that
policy, the Government reserve the right to aggregate the value of
the surpluses thus created by the Jews for their sole benefit, and at
some suitable stage to require the Jews, as a condition of receiving
Government approval for further transfers of land, to provide a
proportionate amount of surplus land for the sole benefit of the
Arabs. The Government on their part should be prepared to
make an appropriate contribution, on the footing that the ratios
of benefits for Arabs and Jews respectively, and of Jewish and
Government expenditure respectively, shall be roughly the same
under this system of aggregating a number of small development
schemes as they would have been under a single large scheme.

139

288. All this will cost a great deal of money, and it will be clear
from our later chapter on Finance that there is no possibility that the
Mandated Territories will have any margin of revenue to spare for
such a purpose : on the contrary, the indications are that from the
outset they will be faced with a budgetary deficit of about half a
million pounds, which can only be made good by a grant from
the United Kingdom Exchequer. The cost of these development
services, in so far as it is not borne by the Jews, must therefore fall
wholly on the United Kingdom. But there are two conditions
which we think it would clearly be proper to attach to any
recommendation for the grant of assistance of this kind.

(i) First, it should be clearly recognized that the sole
justification for financial assistance from United Kingdom funds
is the existence of our national obligations to the Jews. We have
argued in this chapter that, since the creation of a Jewish
State in the Maritime Plain under plan C, which is the best
plan of partition that we have been able to devise, does not
discharge those obligations, as assessed by the Royal Commission,
in full, it is essential that provision should be made for the
continuation of Jewish settlement after partition in that part
of Palestine which we propose should be retained under Mandate ;
that this will be facilitated if the Government declare it to be
their policy to assist, and when necessary themselves undertake,
an active programme of land development designed to benefit both
Arabs and Jews ; and that this in turn will involve expenditure
on an ample scale from the United Kingdom Exchequer. But
the Arabs have no claim to benefit by this expenditure of their
own right. The offer of that assistance must, therefore, be
subject to the clearly expressed condition that the Arabs must
abandon their present hostility and co-operate peacefully with
the Government in the latter’s policy of facilitating Jewish
settlement, subject to the safeguards proposed, and to the
further warning that the Government are in no way committed
to continue this form of expenditure once they have decided
that the possibilities of further Jewish settlement are exhausted.

(ii) Secondly, Parliament cannot be asked to sign a blank
cheque for this purpose. It is impossible to estimate in advance
the amount of money which might be spent usefully in the
ways we have suggested, and difficult to suggest any figure
which shall be fair to all the parties concerned. It seems to
us relevant, however, to point out that the recommendation
of the Royal Commission with regard to expenditure on develop-
ment for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of Arabs from
the Jewish State — involving, as we point out in paragraph 281
above, a charge on the United Kingdom Exchequer which
might have run into several millions of pounds — was apparently
accepted, among the other conclusions of the Commission, by
His Majesty’s Government in their Statement of Policy of

140

July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513) ; and that according to our proposals the
Treasury should be under no obligation to accept this particular
liability. In its place we recommend that the limits to which
Parliament should be asked to commit themselves in respect
of the whole of the Mandated Territories together, should be —

(i) on non-recurrent expenditure, such as grants for
development in whatever form in the Mandated Territories,
including the Huleh Concession Scheme, a sum not exceeding
one million pounds in the aggregate ; and

(ii) on recurrent expenditure on agricultural services,
including the acceleration of land settlement operations in
the Southern Mandated Territory, as proposed in paragraph
above, a sum not exceeding £75,000 a year for not more than
10 years.

The money would not, of course, be required all at once ; its
disbursement would probably be spread over many years.
In order to mark it out as distinct from the deficiency grants
which will certainly be required to maintain the normal
administration of the Mandated Territories, we suggest that it
might be convenient that it should be shown under a
separate subhead of the Parliamentary Vote.

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CHAPTER XIV

JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO THE MANDATED TERRITORIES

UNDER PLAN C

289. Having set out in the previous chapter our recommendations
in regard to Jewish acquisition of and settlement on the land in the
Mandated Territories, we come now to immigration policy.

290. We are here concerned only with immigration into the
Mandated Territories. It will of course be for the Arab and Jewish
States to determine freely their own immigration policy ; but if the
right of free access from those states into the Mandated Territories
is granted as proposed in paragraph 295 below, we think that there
should be a provision in the treaty with the Arab State that it shall
control effectively immigration from outside the frontiers of what is
now Palestine and Trans- Jordan, and that, if persons from outside
those frontiers do in fact enter the Mandated Territories through the
Arab State, the latter shall be responsible for their deportation.

291. The general principles by which we recommend that
immigration into the Mandated Territories after partition should
be governed are as follows —

(i) The Balfour Declaration should no longer apply. The
object of establishing a national home for the Jews in Palestine
should be deemed to have been fulfilled by the setting up of the
proposed Jewish State, but in order toprovide-f or the immigration
of as many Jews as possible, consistently with good and just
government for the whole population, the Mandatory should
continue to receive Jewish immigrants into the Mandated
Territories or any part of them, either continuously or at inter-
vals, as he may think fit, up to the point when he may decide,
at his sole discretion, that this is no longer possible without
injury to the rights and position of other sections of the
population.

(ii) The rate of such immigration should be decided by the
Mandatory from time to time upon political, social, and psycho-
logical as well as economic considerations.

(iii) Among intending immigrants from outside what is now
Palestine and Trans- Jordan, preference should be given to
Jewish immigrants, permission to settle in the territory being
given to persons of other nationalities only for exceptional
reasons.

(iv) Persons of whatever race habitually residing in the rest
of what is now Palestine and Trans-Jordan should be free,
subject only to the requirements of law and order, to enter the
Mandated Territories for short or casual visits, but should not

142

be allowed to reside habitually therein without the permission
of the Government. In deciding whether residence is habitual
or not, the onus of proof should rest with the person concerned.
Permission to reside habitually in the Mandated Territories
should be granted to such persons within the limits of an
” intra-Palestinian “* quota, to be fixed by Government at the
same time and in the same manner as the quota for ” extra-
Palestinian “* immigrants, but without preference for either
Arabs or Jews, save as provided in paragraph 295 below.

(v) The Mandatory should have the right to grant to an
intending immigrant permission to settle in the territory subject
to the condition that, either for a limited time or indefinitely, he
shall not without special permission reside in any specified part
or parts of the territory, and to prescribe different conditions
for the control of immigration into different parts of the
Mandated Territories.

(vi) Article 4 of the present Mandate (which provides for the
recognition of an appropriate Jewish agency for the purpose of
advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine
in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish national
home) should not be reproduced in the new Mandate, but the
Mandatory should use his best endeavours to consult with
representatives of both Arabs and Jews, as well as experienced
opinion independent of the Government and of both races, before
deciding on the application of these principles.

292. We comment on these proposals in the order in which they
are set out above —

(i) It is quite impossible to foresee what additional number of
Jewish immigrants it will be possible to receive into the Mandated
Territories after partition, without injury to the rights and position
of the rest of the population. The final decision on this question
must rest with the Mandatory at his sole and absolute discretion,
having regard only to the principles of good and just government.
It may be that the closure of these territories to further immigration
will be applied by degrees, one part being declared finally closed
while another is still left open. But the time must come when the
whole of the Mandated Territories will have to be closed to Jewish
immigration, and it must be clearly understood that when this
time has come all obligations of His Majesty’s Government arising
out of the Balfour Declaration will have been fully discharged.

In accordance with our general desire that the Government’s
future policy in Palestine should be as free as possible from
ambiguities, we think it important that, for the purpose of determining

* We use these epithets for convenience to distinguish between (a) persons
habitually residing within the frontiers of what is now Palestine and Trans-
Jordan, and (b) persons habitually residing outside those frontiers.

143

immigration policy in the Mandated Territories, the phrase ” rights
and position of the other sections of the population ” should be
denned more precisely. We suggest that it should be understood
to mean that further Jewish immigration ought not to be permitted
if the Government aie’ satisfied that the result would be to lower
the general standard of living of the population existing at the time.

There remains the exceedingly difficult, but vitally important
question whether the phrase ” rights and position ” should include
the right to have reserved for the existing agricultural population
a margin of land to provide for the probable natural increase of that
population. We have examined this question in chapter III, and foi
the reasons given there we think that the only practical rule is to
have regard solely to the population existing at any given date.

293. (ii) This principle is a repetition of the Royal Commission’s
recommendation (chapter X, paragraph 73).

294. (hi) and (v). We think it important that effective steps
should be taken to prevent illicit immigration into the Mandated
Territories from outside Palestine and Trans- Jordan, especially of
Arabs, who are likely to be tempted to try to enter the Mandated
Territories in large numbers in order to benefit by the development
policy advocated in the preceding chapter. The Royal Commission
had before them certain suggestions, designed to prevent illicit
immigration, of which the most important, and the only one to
which we think it necessary to make specific reference, was a
proposal for the institution of a system of identity cards. On this
they observed : ” We are not sure on the evidence before us whether
it is possible to enforce a system of identity cards. If the system is
administratively possible, it is clear that the control of the police
will be far more effective ” (chapter X, paragraph 46). We think
that every effort should be made to overcome the administrative
difficulties to which the Royal Commission refer, and we trust
that the Jews will be willing to co-operate in this task, since our
proposals assume that it will be possible to lay down different
conditions for the control of immigration into the Southern Mandated
Territory on the one hand and the rest of the Mandated Territories
on the other, and also to prevent persons in the Arab and Jewish
States from residing habitually without permission in the Mandated
Territories, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to achieve
either of these objects without an identity card system.

295. (iv) In recommending the adoption of this principle we have
been influenced mainly by the desire to interfere as little as possible
with the freedom of movement between the Jewish and Arab States,
on the one hand and the Mandated Territories on the other. So far as
Jerusalem and Bethlehem are concerned, the right of free access
thereto is, of course, a. cardinal feature of the Royal Commission’s

144

plan, and it is essential that the ability of all the inhabitants of
Palestine to visit those places freely should remain as far as possible
unimpaired by partition. But there are other places in Palestine
sacred to one or more of the three religions to which a similar right of
access ought to be preserved. And in general it is clearly right, as a
matter of principle and for the sake of friendly relations as well as
business convenience, that every effort should be made to prevent
partition from becoming a barrier cutting off the two races and the
inhabitants of the different areas from easy intercourse with each
other. This principle applies with ‘special force to the Mandated
Territories for a number of reasons. First, because of the size and
importance of the areas which it is proposed under plan C to retain
under Mandate, and of the number of places of religious significance
contained therein ; secondly, because it would clearly be inconsistent
with our conception of the necessity for retaining Haifa under
Mandate that free access to it should be forbidden to either Arabs
or Jews in the rest of Palestine ; and thirdly, because of the ad-
ministrative difficulty of maintaining so effective a control along the
frontiers of the Mandated Territories, where these march with those
of the Arab and Jewish States, as to prevent the illicit entry of
persons from those states. But the principle also applies to the
Arab and Jewish States. Although we cannot expect those states to
adopt a regime as liberal as that we have proposed for the Mandated
Territories — -for instance the Jewish State would presumably not
find it possible to admit Arabs from the neighbouring territories in
search of casual employment — we trust that the regulations which
they will apply to persons entering their own territory for short or
casual visits will be as simple as possible. Indeed, a liberal system
of border passes will be essential, for many Arab villagers will be
left holding land across the border.

296. There is, however, one matter in regard to entry into the
Arab and Jewish States from the Mandated Territories with which
we must deal. We refer to persons wishing to travel from one part
of the Mandated Territories to another. As the three areas of
Mandated Territory have no contact with each other, it will be
impossible to pass from one to the other (except by sea) without
crossing the territory of either the Arab or the Jewish State or
both. We think it essential that provision should be made in the
treaties with the new states that the right of free passage across their
territories should be granted to persons residing in the Mandated
Territories, subject only to the simplest possible form of passport
or identity card.

297. It is clear that these arrangements can be applied more
readily and be made to work more efficiently if an identity card system
can be introduced. It will then be the duty of every person who enters
a territory under a different administration to obtain either, prior to
his entry, from the proper authority in the territory in which he

145

habitually resides, or, immediately after his entry, from the proper
authority in the territory which he enters, a temporary card, authoriz-
ing him to stay in the country for a limited period only : if he fails to
obtain such a card, or if, having obtained it, he exceeds the specified
limit without further authority, he renders himself liable to immediate
deportation, if not to some fine or other punishment as well. To
complete the system, it would seem to follow that persons habitually
residing in the new territories should also possess a card ; but it
would seem scarcely necessary to insist upon this in the villages,
where a stranger can easily be identified ; and it would probably be
found sufficient to enforce the condition only in towns such as
Jerusalem and Haifa which are frequently visited by strangers.

298. The arguments against free access are —

(a) That it will enable Jewish immigrants to enter the Mandated
Territories in unlimited numbers, by way of the Jewish State.

(b) That it will enable Arabs from the Arab State to enter the
Mandated Territories in unlimited numbers and enjoy freely whatever
advantages residence in those territories may offer as compared
with their own countries : for example, employment in Haifa,
better wages, and a share in the benefits of improved cultivation of
the land as proposed in the earlier part of this chapter.

(c) That such Arab entrants will quickly satisfy all demands
for additional labour in such a town as Haifa, and will thereby
virtually leave no room in the labour category for Jewish immigrants
from outside Palestine.

299. We do not deny the force of these arguments, but we think
that they can all be met adequately by our proposal to distinguish
between short and casual visits on the one hand, and habitual
residence on the other, together with the arrangements we have
proposed in chapter XIII for the control of Jewish acquisition of
land. With this in mind, we consider the above arguments in
order —

(a) We see no reason why as many Jews as wish should not enter
the Mandated Territories from the Jewish State, so long as they
are not allowed to reside habitually there. This means that they
are free to enter the territories for pleasure or on a friendly or business
visit, or to seek casual and temporary employment ; but that if
they attempt to convert a short or casual visit into habitual residence
they may at any time be called upon by the police to return to their
own state unless they can satisfy the court that they have not over-
stepped the bounds prescribed by the law. Since the Arabs, whether
in the Arab or the Jewish State, will have exactly the same right,
neither race can reasonably complain of the other’s privilege.

(b) The answer to this argument is generally the same as that
under (i). As regards claims to participate in the benefits to be made
available to Arabs under the proposed land development policy,

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obviously the Government will take steps to satisfy themselves that
these are confined to persons habitually resident in the Mandated
Territories.

(c) This is the most serious objection to our proposals, and we
do not deny that the effect will be to reduce the scope for Jewish
immigration into the Mandated Territories from foreign countries.
On the other hand, there is likely to be a number of openings which
are better filled by Jews than Arabs ; there will probably be many
employers who will give a voluntary preference to Jewish labour ;
and among neutral employers such as the Government and the
Municipality it will presumably be a matter of policy to give em-
ployment in a recognized proportion* to persons of both races.
All these matters will doubtless be taken into account by the
Immigration authority in making up its quota. In any case we are
satisfied that the balance of argument is decidedly in favour of the
system we propose.

300. As regards persons wishing to transfer from the Arab or
Jewish State in order to take up habitual residence in the Mandated
Territories, we should not expect permission to be given as a rule
except for special reasons, and after taking into account the needs
of Jews from abroad to enter under the extra-Palestinian quota.
An exception, however, should be made in favour of Arabs wishing
to transfer from the Jewish State, to “whom a preference should be
given, in accordance with the policy embodied in paragraph (ii) (i)
of our terms of reference, even over extra-Palestinian Jews, since
the latter can just as easily enter the Jewish State in place of the
transferred Arabs.

301. (vi) With reference to the sixth of the general principles
recommended in paragraph 291, we propose, following the suggestion
on page 140 of Sir John Hope Simpson’s Report of 1930, that the
Government should appoint an Immigration Advisory Council,
to include representatives of both Arabs and Jews, of commercial
authorities outside the Government, and of representatives of the
Migration Department of the Government, with a Chairman appointed
by Government. This Council should advise the High Commis-
sioner what number of immigrants should in their opinion be
permitted to enter the Mandated Territories in each six-monthly
period, in each of the categories specified in the Immigration
Ordinance ; their report should take the place of the reports of the
Jewish Agency. The final decision must, of course, rest with the
High Commissioner.

We think that it should be an instruction to the Advisory
Council to take into account in preparing their reports (a) the

* The difference in the standard rates of pay demanded by the two races
will doubtless make it difficult in the future, no less than in the past, to employ
equal numbers of both.

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existence of Arab unemployment, and (b) the extent to which the
acceptance of fresh immigrants possessed of private capital, or the
effect of a liberal immigration policy on the minds of potential
Jewish investors or donors of capital, may result in an increased
demand for labour which would not be created unless immigration
were permitted.

302. It is, of course, out of the question to expect that the
Government’s immigration policy will always be so nicely calculated
that it will never create unemployment. Human foresight being
as fallible as it is, immigration policy is certain to result in alternating
waves of boom and slump. That is not a sufficient reason for
restricting immigration always to a point well foelow the current
labour demand. In these matters statesmanship must be prepared
to take certain risks, provided that there is reasonable ground for
assuming that the underlying economic condition of the country
is sound.

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CHAPTER XV

NAZARETH AND THE SEA OF GALILEE

303. As regards Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias)
the Royal Commission stated as follows — •

We think it would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at
large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) were also covered
by this Mandate. We recommend that the Mandatory should be
entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to
safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias.

1. Nazareth

304. The boundary which we recommend for the Nazareth
Enclave has been described in chapter IV and is shown on map 8.
In this chapter we deal with certain matters relating to the
administration of this Enclave.

305. Under plans B and C Nazareth falls within an area which
it is proposed should be retained under Mandate. Under both these
plans, therefore, the creation of an enclave at Nazareth is a matter
which will not arise unless and until it has been decided to surrender
the Mandate for the area surrounding it. But although this is the
position, we have thought it desirable that we should make our
recommendations in regard to its administration if the enclave should
ultimately be created.

306. On the establishment of the enclave we assume that it
would be administered as a detached part of the Jerusalem Enclave.
Its small size would, however, necessitate special arrangements
in regard to certain matters. For customs purposes it would have
to be treated as part of the neighbouring state, an annual payment
being made by the Government of that state to the Mandatory
Power representing the estimated net amount of customs duties
collected on dutiable goods consumed within the enclave. The
enclave would be too small to support its own postal, telegraph
and telephone services, and it would be desirable that an agreement
should be entered into by which these services would be provided
by the neighbouring state. In paragraph 295 of chapter XIV, we
drew attention to the desirability of preserving as far as possible the
freedom of movement which now exists between one part of Palestine
and another and to the need of maintaining unimpaired the freedom
of access now enjoyed by the inhabitants of Palestine to places
sacred to one or more of the three religions. These arguments would
apply with special force to the small enclave round Nazareth, and
we accordingly suggest that the arrangements we have proposed
in that chapter for facilitating movement between the Jewish and
Arab States on the one hand and the Mandated Territories on the
other under plan C should be adopted for the Nazareth Enclave. We

149

should expect that the neighbouring state would be prepared to
grant the same freedom of movement between the enclave and its
own territory. Finally it would probably be desirable that the
currency of the enclave should be that of the neighbouring state.

#

2. The Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias)

307. Under plan C the Sea of Galilee falls within an area which it
is proposed should be retained under Mandate, and, as in the case
of Nazareth, the question of special arrangements as proposed by
the Royal Commission will not arise unless and until it is proposed
to surrender the Mandate. Under plan B, however, it falls within
the Jewish State. We propose, therefore, to make our recommenda-
tions in regard to the Sea of Galilee in case it should become
necessary to put them in force, either now or hereafter.

308. The Royal Commission in their recommendations drew a
distinction between Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee. In the case
of Nazareth they proposed that the Mandatory should be entrusted
with the administration of the territory, whereas in the case of the
Sea of Galilee they did not recommend that the area should be
administered by the Mandatory but proposed that the Mandatory
should have full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and
shores of the lake. We conclude that the Royal Commission did not
contemplate the creation of an enclave covering the Sea of Galilee.
Nor do we favour the creation of such an enclave. The lake
is about 22 kilometres (14 miles) in length, and an enclave
including it would occupy a considerable stretch of country.
Moreover, enclaves of foreign territory within a state must of necessity
give rise to administrative problems not always easy of solution,
and the defence of such enclaves is a matter of particular difficulty.
In our view the sanctity of the waters and shores of the lake could be
protected by measures which do not involve the creation of an area
under Mandate.

309. A matter which has an important bearing on the protection
of the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of Galilee is
article 8 of the concession granted to the Palestine Electric
Corporation. According to this article it is lawful for the corporation
to dam up the water in the lake to such a maximum level and to
draw off water to such a minimum level as may be agreed upon
between the High Commissioner and the corporation, and to conduct
the water from the lake by means of a canal to the power house at
Jisr al Majami. A dam has been built at the point where the River
Jordan flows out of the lake, and in the year 1935, after prolonged
discussion between the Government and the corporation, it was
provisionally agreed that the maximum level should be fixed at
201 metres and the minimum level at 204 • 5 metres below sea-level.
The effect of fixing these limits is still being studied and in due course
the provisional agreement will come up either for confirmation or
alteration.

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310. Article 8 of the concession refers to levels to be agreed upon
between the High Commissioner and the corporation. If agreement
is not reached, article 50 comes into operation. This article provides
that in the case of disagreement the matter shall be referred to a
board of arbitration consisting of one arbitrator nominated by
Government, one nominated by the corporation and a third arbitrator
agreed upon by the other two arbitrators or, failing agreement, some
impartial person nominated by His Majesty’s Principal Secretary
of State for the Colonies. Provision is also made that, if the
Government or the corporation should so require, the third
arbitrator, to be a person not ordinarily resident in Palestine.

Christian opinion attaches importance to the maintenance of
suitable levels in the Sea of Galilee, and Christian religious sensi-
bilities would be seriously offended if the maximum level were such
as to submerge the sites closely associated with that religion, or if
the minimum level were such as seriously to impair the natural
beauty of the shores of the lake.

The present Administration in Palestine — a Christian Adminis-
tration — has not escaped criticism from the Christian communities
for its attitude towards and its actions in regard to the level of
the waters of the lake. A non-Christian state would be more
liable to criticism in these matters and, if the lake were included
within the boundaries of such a state, we recommend that that
state should be required by treaty to refrain from agreeing, under
article 8 of the concession, to any change in the maximum and mini-
mum levels of the waters of the lake except with the prior approval
of the League of Nations. Further provision would also be necessary
in view of article 50, relating to arbitration. As has been explained,
this article provides for a board of arbitration consisting of three
arbitrators, one of whom is to be nominated by the government
concerned. So long as the lake remains under Mandatory adminis-
tration it is improbable that the arbitrators would fail to pay due
regard to Christian opinion, but, if the lake were to pass under the
control of a non-Christian state, there would be the danger that the
arbitrators might give their award without sufficient regard for
that opinion. To meet this risk it is suggested that the concession
should be amended, by agreement or by legislation, so as to provide
that the arbitration shall be conducted by a single arbitrator, to be
appointed by the League of Nations, with instructions to have regard
to Christian opinion in the matter.

311. The risk of desecration is, however, not limited to changes
in the levels of the waters of the lake. Changes and developments
in other ways might seriously offend against Christian sentiment.
To afford protection against such changes, we recommend that the
state within the boundaries of which the lake is situated should by
treaty be required —

(a) to take powers to control changes in the existing amenities
of the shores and waters of the Sea of Galilee ;

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(b) to agree that no substantial change in those amenities
shall be permitted without the prior approval of the League of
Nations ;

(c) to give every facility for the inspection at all times of the
shores and waters of the Sea of Galilee by a delegate of the
League who, if the League so determine, may be the Mandatory
Power, with a view to making recommendations to the State
and the League ;

(d) to agree that, in the event of a difference of opinion arising
between the state and the delegate of the League as to the
desirability of any change in the existing amenities, such
difference of opinion shall be submitted for the decision of the
League, whose decision shall be final and shall be carried into
effect.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE PROVISION OF SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RIGHTS
OF RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL MINORITIES

312. The Royal Commission, in paragraph 8 of chapter XXII
of their Report, stated that the treaties to be entered into by the
proposed Arab and Jewish States should include strict guarantees
for the protection of minorities in each state, and item (ii) (j) of
our terms of reference requires us to examine and report on the pro- •
vision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious and racial
minorities in the areas to be allocated to the Arabs and Jews
respectively.

313. When ‘Iraq was released from Mandatory control, the
protection of racial and religious minorities in that country was
ensured by means of provisions contained in a declaration made by
the ‘Iraqi Government before the Council of the League of Nations.
This declaration followed the general lines of that made by Albania
when that country was admitted to the League, and the Albanian
declaration was itself based upon the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919.
In considering the measures which should be taken to secure the
welfare of the minorities in the Arab and Jewish States we assume
that the League of Nations will require declarations on the lines of
that made by ‘Iraq. We propose, therefore, to take the ‘Iraqi
declaration as a basis, and to consider the modifications which
appear to be required in order to meet the situation in the proposed
states. We have not worked these out in detail as we presume that
the drafting of the declarations will be done by a committee of the
League, as was done in the case of ‘Iraq.

314. The Articles of the declaration made by the Government of
‘Iraq (which are set out in full in Appendix 9) may, so far as they
relate to minorities, be summarized as follows —

(i) Article 1 provides that the provisions of the declaration
shall be recognized as fundamental laws of ‘Iraq.

(ii) Article 2 (a) guarantees to all inhabitants of ‘Iraq
protection of life and liberty; (b) declares all inhabitants of
‘Iraq to be entitled to the free exercise, public or private, of any
creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with
public order or public morals.

(iii) Article 3 deals with nationality.

(iv) Article 4 provides — •

(a) for the complete legal and political equality of all
‘Iraqi nationals ;

(b) for an electoral system giving equitable representation
to minorities ;

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(c) that difference of race, language, or religion shall not
prejudice any ‘Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoy-
ment of civil or political rights ;

(d) for the free use by any ‘Iraqi national of any language ;

(e) for adequate facilities to ‘Iraqi nationals, whose
mother tongue is not Arabic, for the use of their language
before the courts.

(v) Article 5 grants to ‘Iraqi nationals belonging to minorities
the same rights as are enjoyed by other ‘Iraqi nationals, to
maintain, manage, control, and establish religious, charitable,
social, and educational institutions.

(vi) Article 6 (a) ensures to non-Moslem minorities the
settlement of questions concerning their family law and personal
status in accordance with the customs and usages of the com-
munities to which they belong, and

(b) provides for the League of Nations to be informed of
the measures taken to give effect to (a).

(vii) Article 7 (a) guarantees full protection and facilities
to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious
establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of
minority religious communities.

(b) gives those communities the right to establish local
councils, subject to the supervision of Government, competent to
administer pious foundations and charitable bequests, and

(c) provides for the grant of facilities for the formation of
new religious and charitable institutions.

(viii) Article 8 provides that —

(a) in areas containing a considerable proportion of ‘Iraqi
nationals whose mother tongue is not Arabic, provision shall
be made in primary schools for instruction to the children
of such nationals in their own language, it being understood
that this provision does not prevent the ‘Iraqi Government
from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said
schools, and

(b) in areas containing a considerable proportion of ‘Iraqi
nationals belonging to minorities, those minorities shall be
assured of an equitable share in the public funds devoted to
educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

(ix) Article 9 provides that in certain districts the language
of the majority shall be the official language side by side with
Arabic.

(x) Article 10 declares that the rights secured to minorities
constitute matters of international concern and places them
under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

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315. There will be a substantial Arab minority, mainly Moslems
and Christians, in the Jewish State under any scheme of partition.
Under plan B it numbers about 188,000, and under plan C about
54,000. On the other hand, the minority communities in the Arab
State will be small in numbers, consisting almost entirely of Christians
and Jews.

316. Before proceeding to examine the various matters arising
in connection with the protection of minorities in the Arab and Jewish
States, it is right to state that we have received the most emphatic
assurances from the Jews that they, who are only too f amiliar with the
tribulations of life as a minority, will spare no effort to ensure the.
well-being and happiness of the Arab minority within the Jewish
State. The following is an extract from a memorandum we received
from a Jewish source on the subject —

The Jewish. State cannot rest content with establishing a formal
equality of status between Jewish and non- Jewish citizens. At present
two different standards of life co-exist in Palestine : that of the bulk of
the Arab population and the higher one introduced by Jewish and other
European settlers. It will be incumbent on the Jewish State in its own
interests, as well as in those of the Arab population, to do what can be
done in order gradually to bring about a greater measure of real equality
in education and standards of life.

1. Religious Rights and Properties

317. Our terms of reference specifically mention the protection
of religious rights and properties. The relevant articles of the
‘Iraqi declaration are Articles 2, 5, 7 and 8.

The Royal Commission, in paragraph 15 of chapter XXII of
their Report, recommended that the Mandatory should be charged
with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings,
monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred
to the Jews and Arabs respectively. Although in this regard the
Christian communities are not mentioned, we assume that it was not
the intention to exclude those communities from the benefit of this
recommendation. It appears to us that it would be impossible for
the Mandatory to fulfil such an extensive obligation in regard to
religious endowments and properties situated in territories under the
administration of independent states. Every mosque and grave is
sacred to Moslems, every church to Christians, and every synagogue
to Jews; and the proposal therefore means that the Mandatory
would be responsible, for example in the Jewish State, for the
protection not only of all buildings and places sacred by tradition
to the Moslem and the Christian communities, but also of all places
of worship used at the present time by those communities. In
addition, the Mandatory would be responsible for the protection
of waqf properties and Christian endowments. In our opinion it
would not be proper to place such a burden on the Mandatory Power.
To require that Power to undertake an obligation of this nature

155

would place not only it but the states, particularly the Jewish State
in which the religious minority will be a large one, in a most difficult
position. Complaints might be frivolous as well as numerous, yet
on every occasion the Mandatory, if it were to fulfil its obligations,
would be required to undertake an enquiry, either by the despatch
of an officer into the state for the purpose of holding an investigation
or otherwise. If it were satisfied of the reasonableness of the com-
plaint, it would then presumably be obliged to take some kind of
action to put the matter right. What form of action that could be
if the state, in whose territory the claim arose, were to dispute
the Mandatory’s finding, it is not easy to see. We deprecate the
imposition on the Mandatory of administrative responsibilities
which it would find difficult to carry out and which would seem to be
incompatible with the sovereign rights of the state concerned.

318. We accordingly recommend that the protection of religious
rights and properties in the Arab and Jewish States respectively
should be assured in the same way as was done in the case of ‘Iraq,
that is, by inserting provisions in the declarations to be made by the
Arab and Jewish States corresponding to those contained in the
‘Iraqi declaration. These provisions, subject to certain proposals as
regards Moslem waqfs which we make in a later paragraph, adequately
cover the ground and appear to be suitable for adoption by the Arab
and Jewish States. We have been assured by the Jews that the
Jewish State would be prepared to enter into undertakings corres-
ponding to those in the ‘Iraqi declaration for the benefit of non-
Jewish religious minorities.

2. Nationality

319. The Royal Commission in their Report (chapter XXII,
paragraph 32), made the following proposal as regards nationality —

All persons domiciled in the Mandated Area (including Haifa, Tiberias,
Safad, and the enclave On the Gulf of Aqaba, as long as they remain
under Mandatory administration) who now possess the status of British
protected persons would retain it ; but apart from this all Palestinians
would become the nationals of the States in which they are domiciled.

320. Under the Royal Commission’s proposal a Palestinian
habitually resident in the Jewish State would automatically cease
to be a Palestinian citizen on the establishment of that state and
would ipso facto become a citizen of the Jewish State. Similarly,
a Palestinian habitually resident in the Arab State would ipso facto
become a citizen of that state.

321. An alternative to the Royal Commission’s proposal would
be an arrangement whereby a Palestinian would be allowed a period
in which to elect whether he would or would not become a citizen
of the state in which he habitually resides, it being made clear that if
he elected not to do so, he would not be entitled as of right to remain
in the state in question. Under such a scheme, while the option

156

period was running, a Palestinian who had not elected one way or
the other would be considered to remain a Palestinian citizen, and
at the expiry of the time-limit a Palestinian, who had not exercised
his option, would be considered to have become a national of the
state in which he habitually resides.

322. We see no advantage in this alternative over the Royal
Commission’s proposal, which is in accordance with recognized
principles, and we suggest that the latter be adopted, subject, of
course, to the condition that a Palestinian who did not desire to
become a citizen of the state in which he habitually resides, would
be entitled within a reasonable period to opt for the citizenship of
the other state or the Mandated area, it being made clear that on the
exercise of the option he would not be entitled, as of right, to remain
in the state the nationality of which he had declined.

323. The provision relating to nationality in the ‘Iraqi declaration
would not be appropriate to the Arab and Jewish States. We
suggest that the nationality provision be drafted in accordance with
the Royal Commission’s proposal.

3. Electoral System

324. Article 4 (2) of the ‘Iraqi declaration provides that the
electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial,
religious, and linguistic minorities. As we have said, under any
plan of partition there will be a substantial Arab minority in the
Jewish State. We consider it desirable that this minority should
be represented in the legislature in proportion to its numbers. We
have been informed that this would be in accord with Jewish views
on the matter. We suggest, therefore, that Article 4 (2) be amended
so as to provide that, in the Jewish State, the electoral system shall
be such as to guarantee that the Arab minority is represented in the
legislature in proportion to its numbers. Similar provisions should
be made for the Christian and Jewish minorities in the Arab State.

We would also desire to see any substantial minority represented
in the executive organs of the new states. We have been told that
Jewish opinion would be in favour of such a measure in the Jewish
State. We doubt, however, whether it would be feasible to insert
a provision of this nature in a declaration dealing with the protection
of minorities.

4. Employment in the Public Services

325. Article 4 (3) of the ‘Iraqi declaration provides that differ-
ences of race, language and religion shall not prejudice any ‘Iraqi
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political
rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment. This
question of public employment will be one of considerable importance.
The Jews have told us that in their view it will be incumbent on the

157

Jewish State to ensure that the Arabs shall be equitably represented
in the public services and be given a fair share of the employment
available on public works. But the Government of the Jewish
State will be subjected to intense pressure to find employment for
Jewish immigrants, and there is the danger that this pressure may
prevent the Government from giving to the Arab minority its fair
share in the available employment. We consider it important
that the Arabs should be safeguarded in this matter, and we accord-
ingly suggest that provision should be made in more specific terms
than in Article 4 (3) of the ‘Iraqi declaration for a guarantee that
the Arab minority shall be equitably represented in the public
services and be given a fair share of the employment available on
public works.

5. Religious Courts

326. Under Article 6 of the ‘Iraqi declaration an undertaking is
given that as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns
their family law and personal status, measures shall be taken per-
mitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the
customs and usage of the communities to which these minorities
belong.

In Palestine matters of personal status are dealt with by the courts
of the respective religious communities, and it is essential that this
position should be maintained in regard to the minority communities
in the Arab and Jewish States after partition.

The Jews have told us that they contemplate that in the Jewish
State the Moslem religious courts and the courts of the several
Christian communities shall continue to exercise the same jurisdiction
as at present. And we have been assured that it may safely be
assumed that the Jewish State would be ready to undertake that no
change of any kind should be made in the jurisdiction now exercised
by any Moslem or Christian religious court, save at the instance of
an overwhelming majority of the community concerned.

We recommend that provision be made, similar to the first
paragraph of Article 6 of the ‘Iraqi declaration, in regard to the
settlement of matters of family law and personal status in the
declarations to be made by the Arab and Jewish States.

327. Apart, however, from the general question of the main-
tenance of religious courts for the minorities in the Arab and Jewish
States, there are certain other questions which should be considered —

(i) Appeals. — From the Moslem religious courts of first
instance an appeal lies at present to the Sharia Court of Appeal
at Jerusalem. It is possible that the Jewish State would be
reluctant to allow appeals on the part of the members of so
large a minority to be heard outside the state. It would be a
convenient course, however, if it could be arranged that appeals
should continue to be heard, at any rate for some time, by the

158

Sharia Court of Appeal at Jerusalem, but if experience showed
that this course was unsatisfactory, it would be necessary for
an appellate court to be established within the Jewish State.
The Arab State would presumably have its own Court of Appeal.
In the case of the Christian religious courts in both states the
appellate authority for the courts of some of the communities
is at Jerusalem, while for others it is outside Palestine. A list
of these courts is given in Appendix 10. As regards the Christian
appellate courts, we would suggest that the appellate position
should remain unchanged. The appellate authority for the
Rabbinical Courts is the Rabbinical Council. The number of .
Jews in the Arab State will be small, and may be expected to
decrease. It does not therefore seem necessary to set up
a separate Jewish Court of Appeal in the Arab State, and
we suggest that the Rabbinical Council in the Jerusalem
Enclave should continue to be the appellate authority for the
Rabbinical Courts in the Arab area after partition.

(ii) Financial arrangements in regard to the Sharia Courts
(the Moslem Religious Courts). — The financial arrangements in
regard to the Sharia Courts differ from those governing the
courts of other religious communities inasmuch as the expendi-
ture in connection with these courts is borne by Government.
Provision for this expenditure is included in the Govern-
ment estimates and the receipts form part of the Government
receipts. Further, officials of the Sharia Courts are eligible
for pensions and gratuities under practically the same conditions
as members of the public services. In fact the Sharia Courts
in Palestine are a branch of the Judiciary. It is clearly
desirable that partition should not introduce any change
in the financial arrangements for the Sharia Courts in the
Jewish State. We accordingly recommend that the Jewish
State should undertake to provide funds for the maintenance
of these courts within its territories. The expenditure on the
Sharia Court of Appeal at Jerusalem is also borne by Government.
If this court is retained as the Court of Appeal from the Sharia
Courts in the Jewish State, that state would presumably make
a contribution towards the cost of this appellate court.

(iii) Appointment of Judges of the Sharia Courts in the Jewish
State. — The position in Palestine is that the Supreme Moslem
Council has the power to nominate and, after approval by
Government, to appoint the President and Members of the
Sharia Court of Appeal, the Qadis of the Sharia Courts and
the Inspector of these courts. The Council also exercises
disciplinary action, including dismissal, in respect of the staff of
these courts, subject to Government being notified of the action
taken. Arrangements will have to be made for the appoint-
ment of the Judges for the Sharia Courts and for the

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supervision of those courts in the Jewish State. We do not feel
ourselves in a position to make any proposal as regards the
form these arrangements should take, particularly as we have
had no opportunity of learning Moslem views. The arrange-
ments are clearly a matter for discussion between the Jewish
State and representative Moslems within that state, and we
suggest that they be formulated by a committee composed of
an equal number of representatives of the state and of the
Moslems within the state. In case of disagreement we propose
that the matter be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by
the League of Nations.

(iv) Christian Religious Courts. — It is desirable that a court
exercising jurisdiction in a state should itself be located within
the state. On partition, however, it may not be possible to
insist on this in all cases. We suggest that the following
arrangements should, if possible, be made—

(a) Where in a state there is a substantial body of
members of the community but no religious court of that
community, the religious authority concerned should be
invited to establish a court in that state.

(b) Where in a state the number of the members of a
community is too small to justify the establishment of a
religious court, the members should be treated as being
within the jurisdiction of a court of the community to
which they belong, situated in Mandated territory.

Apart from this no change should be made in the present
position in regard to the Christian religious courts of first
instance.

(v) Rabbinical Courts.- — The arrangements in regard to the
Rabbinical Courts of First Instance in the Arab State should
be the same as under the present Mandate.

6. Language.

328. Arabic will be the official language of the Arab State and
Hebrew of the Jewish State. No language problem will arise in the
Arab State, for there will be very few persons whose mother tongue
will not be Arabic. In the Jewish State there will, however, be a
large minority whose mother tongue will be Arabic and not Hebrew.
Article 4 of the ‘Iraqi declaration provides for the free use of any
language in private intercourse, commerce, etc., and also for adequate
facilities for nationals, whose mother tongue is not the official
language, for the use of their language before the courts. Article 5
gives the members of linguistic minorities the right to use their own
language in their own schools. Article 8 provides that in areas
containing a considerable proportion of such nationals, provision

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shall be made in primary schools for instruction to their children
in their own language, it being understood that this provision does
not prevent the teaching of Arabic being made obligatory in these
schools.

As regards schools, we consider it desirable that the Jewish
State should be required to provide instruction in Arabic to children
whose mother tongue is Arabic, not only in primary schools but also
in secondary schools.

We also consider it desirable that the Jewish State should
undertake that, in areas where a considerable part of the population
is Arab, the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions’, have a
competent knowledge of Arabic. This should offer no difficulty if
the Arab minority is equitably represented in the public services.

329. Subject to these changes we consider the provisions of the
‘Iraqi declaration suitable for the Arab and Jewish States.

We have been assured by the Jews that they contemplate that
(i) Arabic will have full recognition as the language of an important
section of the citizens of the Jewish State, (ii) no attempt will be made
to force Hebrew upon the Arab public, (iii) Arabs will be entitled to
address the Government in Arabic and to receive replies in that
language, (iv) official notices will be issued and official business
transacted in Arabic in areas in which this is required for the benefit
of the Arabic-speaking population, and (v), while a knowledge of
Hebrew will ultimately be made a qualification for Government
employment, this rule will not be enforced until the expiration of a
definite time limit. We are glad to have these assurances.

7. Land

330. In regard to land, the ‘Iraqi declaration affords no precedent
for the protection of the Arab minority in the Jewish State. Under
the Mandate the obligation, on the one hand, to encourage close
settlement by Jews on the land and, on the other, to protect the
rights and position of the Arabs has rendered the land problem in
Palestine one of the most difficult with which the Mandatory has
been called upon to deal. The first ordinance for the protection of
the cultivators was enacted in 1920, and the law on the subject is at
present contained in the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance. We
nave been assured by the Jews that, although one of the paramount
duties of the Jewish State will be the development of the land in order
to find room for new Jewish settlers, existing cultivators will continue
to be protected by legislation embodying the principles of the
Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance now in force. This represents
the best system of protection which the Palestine Government have
been able to devise, though it is not suggested that its provisions
are effective if a cultivator is willing to accept payment for waiver
of his rights. We believe the Jewish State would desire to protect

161

the Arab cultivating tenants from being deprived of their holdings
in order to find room for Jewish cultivators. But the pressure to
provide land for additional Jewish settlers will be very great, and it
is clearly desirable that the Jewish State should be placed under an
international obligation to safeguard the interests of the cultivating
tenants by legislation on the lines of the Cultivators (Protection)
Ordinance. We accordingly suggest that a provision to this effect
be included in the declaration to be made by the Jewish State.

331. According to the terms of the contract by which land
belonging to the Jewish National Fund is leased to Jewish settlers,
the lessee is required to execute all works connected with the
cultivation of his holding only with Jewish labour. The penalty
for the employment of non- Jewish labour is the payment of com-
pensation amounting to £P. 10 for each day such labour is employed
and, when the lessee has contravened the provision three times, the
Fund is entitled to require the surrender of the holding without
paying any compensation whatever. The insertion of this clause is
bitterly resented by the Arabs, and we consider that the Jewish
State should be required to pass legislation providing that any con-
tract or sale or lease forbidding, directly or indirectly, the employ-
ment of persons of a particular race or religion shall be null and void.

8. Pious Foundations and Charitable Bequests

332. Article 7 of the ‘Iraqi declaration reads as follows —

1. The ‘Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities
and authorization to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other
religious establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of
minority religious committees existing in ‘Iraq.

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing
councils, in important administrative districts, competent to administer
pious foundations and charitable bequests. These councils shall be
competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom and
the expenditure thereof in accordance with the wishes of the donor or
with the custom in use among the community. These committees shall
also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans in accordance
with the law. The councils referred to above shall be under the super-
vision of the Government.

These provisions appear to be suitable for the Arab and Jewish
States, subject to one modification. The right of establishing
councils should be a general right and should not be limited to
important administrative districts.

Moslem waqfs, however, raise certain questions which are
discussed in the following paragraphs.

333. Prior to October, 1937, when, in consequence of the
disturbances, special arrangements of a temporary nature were
made for the control and management of Moslem waqfs, the supreme
authority in respect of waqf affairs in Palestine was the Supreme

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162

Moslem Council, an elected body, whose duties (in addition to those
connected with the Sharia Courts) were the administration and
control of Moslem waqfs and the approval of the waqf budget.
Subordinate to the Council was the General Waqf Committee, the
executive authority for the administration of Moslem waqfs. This
Committee consisted of the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Director-General
of Waqfs, all Mamours of Waqfs and one member from each of the
local Waqf Committees.

334. The revenue of the Waqf Administration is about £P.77,000

a year. The chief item of revenue is a sum of £P.30,000 paid •
annually by the Palestine Government on account of assigned
tithes. Another important source of revenue, the collection of
which is also in the hands of Government, is the registration fees
charged in respect of the transfers of lands, the revenues of which are
dedicated as waqfs. The Waqf Administration receives one half of
the fees collected by Government under the Land Transfer Ordinance
in respect of such lands.

The Waqf Administration, besides being in general administrative
control of waqfs, maintains certain mosques and shrines (including
the Haram at Jerusalem), and its social activities comprise the
management and upkeep of schools, an orphanage, and soup kitchens.

335. We take the view that, after partition, it would be necessary
to create in each of the states (Arab and Jewish) separate Waqf
Administrations. In the Arab State the management and control
of waqfs would, no doubt, be entrusted to a department of the
Government. This would not, however, be possible in the Jewish
State. In that state a Council would have to be created by the
Moslem community of the State as contemplated in paragraph 2 of
Article 7 of the ‘Iraqi declaration.

336. After partition the sum of £P.30,000 paid annually by the
Palestine Government on account of assigned tithes will fall to be
apportioned among the areas created by partition. Tithes have been
commuted in Palestine, and an arrangement was reached in 1932
whereby the Government pay to the Supreme Moslem Council
■£P. 23,000 annually in lieu of the commuted tithes. This figure is
made up of the average waqf tithe collections prior to the commuta-
tion, and the apportionment of this sum among the areas will, .
therefore, offer no difficulty. The balance of £P.7,000is an additional
payment sanctioned as the result of an investigation made by
a Committee appointed by Government. This amount cannot
be identified with the tithes payable for any specific land and
should be apportioned among the different areas in the same
proportions as the sum of £P .23,000 is allocated. We recommend
that the Jewish State should give an undertaking to pay its share
of the sum of ^P.30,000 to the Council referred to in the preceding
paragraph. The Jewish State should also give an undertaking to

163

pay to this Council one half of the fees collected under the Land
Transfer Ordinance in respect of the transfers of lands, the revenues
of which are dedicated as waqfs.

337. Upon partition, the Waqf Authority in each area will
administer its own revenue. But it may be that some contribution
may be necessary to the Waqf Authority in the area retained under
Mandate in connection with the support of the Haram Esh Sherif in
Jerusalem or for other special interests of the Moslem community
in Palestine. This is a matter which, we consider, should be settled
by agreement among the representatives of the Waqf interests in
the different areas in the light of the common interests of the
Moslem communities.

9. Freedom of Conscience and the Free Exercise of the Activities
of Religions Missions of all Denominations

338. Article 15 of Chapter II of the ‘Iraqi declaration reads as
follows —

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of
public order and morality ‘Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee
throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free
exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious
missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions
or of their members.

We recommend that the declarations to be made by the Arab
and Jewish States should contain a similar clause.

10. Foreigners

339. Article 8 of the Mandate is as follows —

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of
consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation
or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned
privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously
renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to
their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities
shall at the expiration of the Mandate, be immediately re-established in
their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon
between the Powers concerned.

We draw attention to this Article of the Mandate.

11. Orthodox Jewry

340. We have received representations from Orthodox Jewry in
which it has been impressed upon us that Orthodox Jews —

(a) regard the State and Church as indivisible, and

(b) consider it fundamental that the constitution of the Jewish
State should contain provisions which will ensure that for all

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time the law of the Torah shall be the law of the state, or, as it
was expressed in one representation which we received, ” the
state shall itself adhere to the cardinal requirements of the
Torah.”

The anxieties which have led to these representations appear to
be lest, unless the constitution ensures that the Jewish State is
guided in all its activities by the law of the Torah, it should become an
irreligious state in which Orthodox Jews will not be able to remain
without serious prejudice to their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is feared that, in matters of religion and personal status, the law .
of the Torah will not prevail and that, in particular, marriages and
divorces which are not in accordance with the Torah may be
recognized. Anxiety has also been expressed lest the Jewish Sabbath
should not be observed in public affairs strictly in accordance with
the directions of the Torah, and lest the education imparted in the
state schools should not be in accord with the ” spirit and tradition ”
of the Torah.

In one representation which we received it was suggested that in
order to safeguard their position, Orthodox Jews, or any section of
such Jews, should be guaranteed the right — to be exercised if they
were not satisfied with the actions of the state —

(a) tc set up their own schools,

(b) to establish their own religious courts for the settlement
of matters relating to religion and personal status, and

(c) to adopt their own arrangements for burial and ritual
killing.

In another representation it was suggested that the constitution
should provide that —

(a) the written and oral Torah, as interpreted in the
Rabbinical Codes, shall be the actual law of the State, and

(b) the religious rights of Jewish minorities, who feel and
who can legally prove that the law of the Torah is not duly and
generally observed by the organic bodies of the state, shall be
safeguarded by the grant of autonomous institutions.

341. Article 2 of the ‘Iraqi declaration guarantees to all inhabi-
tants of the state the free exercise, whether public or private, of any
creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with
public order or morals, and Article 15 guarantees throughout the
state, freedom of conscience and worship. We contemplate that these
Articles shall be included in the declaration which the Jewish State
will make before the League of Nations. Orthodox Jews will,
therefore, be assured of complete freedom of conscience and the
free exercise of their, religion, subject, of course, to the maintenance
of public order, and will be entitled to regulate and control their
religious affairs in accordance with their own views and beliefs.

165

342. But these guarantees to every group of nationals of complete
freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion, subject only
to the maintenance of public order, do not satisfy those Orthodox
Jews who have urged their views before us. They desire something
more. What they desire is that the constitution shall be so drafted
as to ensure, not only that the law of the Torah shall prevail, but
also that it shall never not prevail. In fact, what they desire is that,
in matters which they consider vital to the Jewish religion, the will
of the majority, if it does not coincide with the views of the Orthodox,
shall not prevail.

343. We do not propose to express any opinion as regards the
matters raised by the Orthodox Jews. If a Jewish State is set up
Jewish bodies and organizations will have opportunity to give
expression to their views, while the constitution is being framed,
and at that time Orthodox Jewry will be able to bring their
influence to bear on the form of the constitution of the Jewish State,
but it would not be proper for us to intervene in a matter which
seems to us to be essentially one for Jews themselves to decide.

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CHAPTER XVII

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
1. — Railways

344. The railways administered and operated by the Palestine
Railways Administration (a department of the Palestine Government)
fall into the following sections—

Length in

kilometres. Gauge.

{a) The El Kantara-Rafah Railway . . 203 Standard.
(6) The Palestine Railway —

(i) Rafah-Haifa (including the Beit 235

Nabala siding and dual gauge
length east of Haifa)

(ii) Jaffa- Jerusalem .. .. .. 91-5 ,,

(c) The Petah Tiqva Railway .. .. 6-5

(d) The Hejaz Railway —

(i) Haifa-Acre 18 105 cm.

(ii) Haifa-Samakh . . . . . . 88 „

(in) Affula-Nablus-Tulkarm . . . . 98

(iv) Nassib-Amman-Ma’an . . . . 323

The El Kantara Railway belongs to His Majesty’s Government
and is situated in Egyptian territory. It is operated by the Palestine
Railways Administration under a lease.

The Nassib-Amman-Ma’an section of the Hejaz Railway is
situated in Trans- Jordan but is administered and operated by the
Palestine Railways Administration. The Railway connecting
Al Hamma, the terminus of the Haifa-Samakh section, with Nassib
is in Syria and is administered and operated by the Syrian
authorities.

The workshops for all the railways are located at Haifa.
The branch line to Petah Tiqva is owned partly by the Palestine
Government and partly by the residents of Petah Tiqva.

345. The capital expenditure on the railways up to the end
of March, 1938, by the Palestine Government was as follows —

From loan From
funds Revenue ‘ Total

£P- £P- .£?■

El Kantara-Rafah Railway 3,000 18,000 21,000

Palestine Railway .. 2,434,000 1,005,000 3,439,000

Petah Tiqva Railway . . 55,000 — 55,000

Hejaz Railway’ . . . . 1,000 — 1,000

Total . . £P.2,493,000 £P. 1,023,000 £P.3,516,000

167

346. The receipts and ordinary expenditure for the three years
ending 1937/38 were as follows —

Ordinary
Receipts
working
Expenditure
Net

Receipts
£P-
£P-
El Kantara Railway —
1935-36 ..
119,000
111,000
Surplus
8,000
1936-37
181,000
145,000
36,000
1937-38 ..
109,000
109,000

Palestine Railway —
1935^36 ..
589,000
422,000
Surplus
167,000
1936-37 ..
717,000
456,000
261,000
1937-38 ..
479,000
460,000
it
19,000
Petah Tiqva Railway-
1935-36 ..
2,000
1,000
1,000
1936^37 .. ..
6,000
1,000
tt
5,000
1937-38 ..
4,000
1,000
tt
3,000
Hejaz Railway —
1935-36 ..
103,000
108,000
Deficit
5,000
1936-37 ..
101,000
113,000
it
12,000
1937-38
81,000
120,000
St
39,000

. The ordinary working expenditure does not include debt charges
or extraordinary expenditure from revenue but it includes contri-
butions to the renewals fund of the Palestine Railway and the Special
Fund of the El Kantara-Rafah Railway.

The annual debt charges of the Palestine Railway amount to
^P. 125,000, excluding contributions to the Sinking Fund*. If these
are allowed for the net receipts become —

Net receipts
after allowing for
debt charges.

Palestine Railway. £P.

1935- 36 Surplus 42,000

1936- 37 „ 136,000

1937- 38 Deficit 106,000

347. The railways are suffering severely from road competition.
The road from Jaffa and Tel Aviv to Haifa was opened in September,
1937, and this is reported to have caused a considerable loss in
revenue to the railway. Failing some measures of control and
co-ordination, road competition is likely to increase throughout
Palestine.

* As the Palestine Railway makes provision for renewals through a
Renewals Fund, it could not properly be ‘charged in addition with Sinking
Fund contributions on the loan.

168

348. Under plan C the railways are divided among the Arab and
Jewish States and the Mandated Territories as follows —

1. The Palestine Railway —

(a) Rafah-Haifa. — This section is divided into six parts —

(i) a short length of about 8 kilometres from Rafah north-
ward, which is situated in the Southern Mandated Territory ;

(ii) a length of about 80 kilometres in the Arab State ;

(iii) a length of about 8 kilometres in that portion of the
Jewish State which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave ;

(iv) a length of about 17 kilometres in the Jerusalem
Enclave ;

(v) a length of about 70 kilometres in the Jewish State ;

(vi) the remainder (as far as Haifa) in the Northern
Mandated Territory.

(b) Jaffa- Jerusalem — This section lies in the Jerusalem
Enclave except for a short length, including Tel Aviv Station,
in the Jewish State and another short length, including the
terminal station at Jaffa, in the Arab State.

2. The Petah-Tiqva Railway is wholly in the Jewish State.

3. The He jaz Railway —

(i) the Haifa-Acre and the Haifa-Samakh sections are in
the Northern Mandated Territory ;

(ii) the Affula-Tulkarm-Nablus section is situated almost
entirely in the Arab State ;

(iii) the Nassib-Amman-Ma’an section is in Trans- Jordan.

4. The railway workshops are situated at Haifa in the Northern
Mandated Territory.

349. The volume of traffic carried by the various sections of
the railways is very unequal —

(a) On the Rafah-Haifa section, the northern portion from
Lydda to Haifa carries a much heavier traffic than the southern
portion from Rafah to Lydda. We have been furnished with a rough
calculation distributing receipts and working expenditure for this
section for the years 1936-37 and 1937-38 between these two
portions. This shows that, for both years, there was for the northern
portion an excess of receipts over working expenditure, and for the
southern portion an excess of working expenditure over receipts.
In fact, the line from a point a short distance south of Lydda north-
wards to Haifa is the revenue-earning section of the Palestine
Railways.

(b) The traffic on the Nassib-Amman-Ma’an section is very
small : there is a train — goods and passengers — three times a week
from Nassib to Amman and once a week from Amman to Ma’an.

169

(c) The traffic on the section between Haifa and Samakh is light :
with one train a day each way. Road competition is increasing
with the improvement of the road down the Valley of Jezreel.

(d) The line from Affula to El Mas-udiya near Nablus was
closed in 1932 owing to the lack of traffic. It is still closed.

(e) There is very little traffic on the line from Tulkarm to Nablus.
There is an engine and a few wagons at Tulkarm and a train is
run when there is a load.

350. Under plan C the administration and operation of the Hejaz
Railway presents no difficulty. The sections from Haifa to Acre
and from Haifa to Samakh are situated in the Northern Mandated
Territory and would be administered by the Mandatory. The
Nassib-Amman-Ma’an section lies entirely in Trans- Jordan and the
greater part of the Affula-Nablus-Tulkarm section falls in the Arab
area. These sections would be administered by the Arab State,
which would be free to keep them open or close them as it thought
fit. The absence of workshops would not create any serious difficulty,
for the state would be able to arrange for repairs being carried out
either at the Haifa workshops or at those of the Syrian Railways at
Damascus. The provision by the Arab State of the supervisory
staff necessary to ensure the efficient working of these lines might,
however, be inconvenient, and that state might prefer an arrange-
ment by which the Mandatory administered these sections as its agents.

351. Although short lengths of the Jaffa- Jerusalem section are
situated in the Jewish and Arab States, the line should be operated
throughout its length by the Mandatory Power, provision being made
in the treaties with the Arab and Jewish States for the grant to the
Mandatory Power of the necessary facilities for working the line in
those states.

352. The southern portion (Rafah to Lydda) of the Rafah-Haifa
section runs for the greater part through the Arab State, small
lengths lying in the Jewish State and in the Southern Mandated
Territory. This portion is an important link’ in the Mandatory
Power’s line of communication between the Jerusalem Enclave and
the Suez Canal, and connects with the railway line belonging to His
Majesty’s Government which runs from Rafah to El Kantara on
the Canal. It is run at a loss. According to the rough calculation
referred to in paragraph 349, working expenses (excluding loan charges
and extraordinary expenditure from revenue) exceeded the receipts
in the year 1936-37 by about £P.5,000 and in 1937-38 by about
£P.22,000. Including extraordinary expenditure from revenue,
the estimated loss in the current year may be put at £P.35,000. As
will be explained in the chapter on Finance and Budgetary Prospects
(chapter XVIII) the Arab State will be faced with a large and con-
tinuing deficit and will have to receive substantial assistance in some
form or another from His Majesty’s Government. The money for

170

the upkeep of the line, if it should continue to be run at a loss, must,
therefore, in effect be provided by His Majesty’s Government. In
view of the importance of this portion of the railway as a line of
communication for the Mandatory Power, we think that it would be
more satisfactory that this portion (Rafah-Lydda), including the
small section in the Jewish State, should remain the property of the
Mandatory Administration, and that it should be administered and
operated directly by that Administration, the Arab State being
relieved of all financial responsibility in regard to it. Provision would
need to be made in the treaties with the Arab and Jewish States for
this purpose. The Mandatory Administration would then continue
to administer the line from Rafah to El Kantara.

353. As regards the northern portion, Lydda to Haifa, of the
Rafah-Haifa section, we propose that the Mandatory and the
Jewish State be charged with the administration and operation of the
railway line falling within their respective territories. Some joint
working arrangement in regard to locomotives, rolling stock and
running staff would, however, be essential, since the distance from
Lydda to Haifa is only about 100 kilometres, of which about 70 would
be in the Jewish State, and Haifa is the station to and from which the
majority, if not the whole, of the goods and passenger trains would run.
We have left the working out of such an arrangement to be dealt
with by railway experts. Repairs to engines and rolling stock
belonging to the Jewish State could be carried out at the railway
workshops at Haifa at the expense of the Jewish State. It would
also be necessary to provide by agreement for the transit over
the line in the Jewish State of engines and rolling stock belonging
to the Mandatory and used on the line south of Lydda or on the
Jaffa- Jerusalem section, which were being despatched to the Haifa
workshops for repairs.

354. The line from Lydda to Haifa, like the section from Lydda
to Rafah, is an important line of communication for the Mandatory
Power, for it is the line which connects Haifa, the only deep water
port, with the Jerusalem Enclave. As we explained in Chapter XI,
the military authorities attach the greatest importance to Haifa
from the point of view of the obligations of the Mandatory Power
to defend the Arab and Jewish States against external aggression
and to safeguard the Jerusalem Enclave. The maintenance of the
railway connection between Lydda and Haifa is, therefore, a -matter
of importance to the Mandatory Power, and we suggest that the
treaty with the Jewish State should require that state to maintain
the line within its territory in good working condition.

2. Ports

355. We do not suggest any special arrangements for the adminis-
tration of the ports. A port should be administered by the
Government of the area in which it is situated.

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356. In paragraph 31 of chapter XXII the Royal Commission
wrote as follows —

We should regard it as highly undesirable that the provision recently
made for loading and landing goods at Tel Aviv should be expanded
into a substantial harbour quite detached from Jaffa. If the need for a
second deep-water port besides Haifa be established, we recommend the
adoption of the plan for a joint port for Jaffa and Tel Aviv. In the
event of Partition such a port should be controlled by a Joint Harbour
Board, composed of representatives of the Arab and Jewish States and
presided over by an officer of the Mandatory Government.

We agree that, if the need for a second deep-water port besides
Haifa be established, the construction of a joint port for Jaffa and
Tel Aviv instead of a separate port at Tel Aviv would in many ways
be desirable. The construction of such a joint port must, however,
depend upon agreement between the Arab and Jewish States.
Failing such agreement it would not be possible to prevent the
Jewish State from constructing a separate deep-water port at
Tel Aviv.

3. Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services

357. By far the greater part of the business of the Posts and
Telegraphs Department of the Palestine Government has been built
up out of current revenue surpluses. Out of a total expenditure on
capital account of £P. 1,075,055, the amount defrayed from loan
funds has been only £P.232,025 (£P.208,372 from the proceeds of the
5 per cent, guaranteed loan, and £P.23,653 from Ottoman Public
Debt Administration funds) ; and the amount of the public debt
charges attributable to the Department is only £P.13,140 per annum.
Until 1935 the aggregate revenue showed a net cash surplus over
aggregate expenditure, including capital as well as recurrent expendi-
ture, of over £P.300,000 ;* but in the last three years the trend has
been reversed, as the following figures show : —

Revenue.
Expenditure.
Recurrent.
Capital.
Total.
£P.
£P-
£P-
419,000
311,000
136,000
447,000
477,000
352,000
151,000
503,000
509,000
429,000
265,000
695,000
516,000
413,000
110,000
523,000

1935- 36 (actual)

1936- 37 (actual)

1937- 38 (actual)

1938- 39 (estimated)

This heavy capital expenditure in recent years has been due, we
are informed, almost entirely to the expansion of services needed to
meet the needs of a rapidly developing community. The earning
capacity of the plant and buildings provided for these services may
be expected to last for many years to come.

* On a cash basis, without taking credit for interest on surplus balances,
which are in fact treated by the Treasury as current revenue.

172

358. Since 1931 no part of the capital expenditure has been
charged to loan funds, and the whole of the current year’s expenditure
of the Department, whether of a recurrent or a capital nature, has
been treated as part of the expenditure of the year in the current
budget, under one or other of the following heads — Posts and Tele-
graphs ; Posts and Telegraphs Extraordinary ; and Public Works
Extraordinary. In each of the three years 1935-37 the net result, as
shown above, has been a deficit on the whole account ; and as in the
two latter years the Palestine budget as a whole has shown a deficit
in excess of the Post Office deficit, the effect has been during those
years to meet the latter deficit out of the accumulated surplus
balances of the Treasury in general. Now that these balances are
becoming exhausted, it would seem that, if there is any likelihood of
capital expenditure continuing on the recent scale, the policy will
have to be reconsidered, for it is plainly impossible for a Government
to continue indefinitely to meet from its current revenue relatively
large capital outlays on a revenue-producing service such as the
Post Office.

359. Meanwhile, however, the service has been treated, for the
purpose of the budgetary forecast made in chapter XVIII, as self-
supporting over the whole of Palestine, after meeting the charges for
public debt attributable to it, as noted above. But this will not be
the case with each of the partitioned areas taken separately. Exclud-
ing the debt charges (which, as proposed in chapter XX, will be paid
like the rest of the financial obligations of the present Government
out of a central fund), the effect on each area is estimated to be —

Surplus* Deficit*

Arab State — 20,000

Jewish State 18,140

Jerusalem Enclave . . . . 10,000
Northern Mandated Territory. . 5,000
Southern Mandated Territory. . —

360. The division of the postal administration of Palestine — the
Trans- Jordan administration is separate — into three distinct admini-
strations, although it is certain to give rise to many matters of detail
requiring adjustment and settlement, would not, we believe, present
any insuperable administrative problems. But division into three
small units must inevitably be accompanied by some loss in efficiency
and by an increase in cost. It would be impossible for three small
administrations to be run as efficiently and economically as a single
administration. For instance, the introduction of international

* Resulting in an estimated net surplus of £P.13,140, equal to the public
debt charges, on the assumption that the service over the whole of Palestine
is self -balancing after meeting all charges.

173

boundaries must tend to reduce expedition in the postal, telegraph,
and telephone services between one place and another, and the crea-
tion of three administrative units, instead of one, must inevitably
lead to some increase in staff. The public service will, we fear,
inevitably suffer some inconvenience ; and this will not be confined
to persons resident in Palestine, but will extend to those wishing to
communicate with Palestine from abroad.

361. We do not propose to enter on an examination of the adjust-
ments and agreements in regard to postal, telegraph and telephone
matters which would be necessary if Palestine were partitioned.
We should hope, however, that every endeavour would be made to
maintain, as far as possible, charges at their present levels. At
present, correspondence posted in any part of Palestine and Trans-
Jordan for any other part is treated, as far as rates of postage are
concerned, as inland correspondence. The rates of postage in
the two countries differ slightly, but could be assimilated without
difficulty if Trans- Jordan should be included in the Arab State.
We should consider it unfortunate if the rate of postage for a letter
from, say, Jerusalem in the Mandated Territory to Tel Aviv in the
Jewish State or Jaffa in the Arab State were increased from the inland
rate to the international rate.

362. Palestine is at present a party to a number of contracts
for the conveyance of mails and of telegraph agreements with other
administrations, which it will be necessary for the successor
administrations to take over and adhere to so long as they are valid.

363. Our attention has been drawn to the Postal Union which
has been established in Malaya. This Union is constituted by the
Colony of the Straits Settlements and certain of the Malay States.
The main features of this Union are as follows —

(a) the constitution of a single postal area styled ” Malaya ”
for the territories of the Colony and the States ;

(b) the creation of a Postal Board consisting of the Director
General of Posts and Telegraphs, of one representative of each
administration and of four representatives appointed by the
High Commissioner ;

(c) each administration has the right to have its own stamps
provided the word ” Malaya ” appears on postal stamps ;

(d) the Director General (appointed by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies) is entrusted with the control of the postal
departments of the administrations, including revenue and
expenditure ;

(e) each administration contributes to the cost of the
headquarters organization in proportion to the revenue of
its Posts and Telegraph Department ;

174

(/) each administration appoints and is in control of its own
postal staff other than the senior staff, but the Director General
controls, subject to the advice of the Board, the numbers of the
monthly paid staff working in each administration and has
power to transfer officers from one administration to another,
subject to the approval of the administrations concerned;

(g) the Director General deals with changes and transfers
in the senior staff, and appointments and promotions in the
staff are made by the High Commissioner on the recommendation
of the Director General ;

(h) all purchases and repairs for or on behalf of any adminis-
tration are made by the central stores and workshops which are
under the charge of the Director General.

It would, we think, be conducive to efficiency and economy if
the Mandated Territory and the states, on partition, were to form
themselves into a similar union.

364. Our attention has also been drawn to the policy of His
Majesty’s Government in regard to Imperial communications, as set
out in the White Paper of April, 1938 (Cmd. 5716). We understand
the position to be, in brief, that since the Imperial Wireless and Cable
Conference of 1928 it has been the policy of His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom to provide for co-operation among all the
Governments concerned, in the Dominions, in India, and in the
Colonial Empire, for the maintenance and development under
British control of the overseas cable and wireless telegraph system
of the Empire, operating through Cable and Wireless Limited,
a British private enterprise working under quasi-public utility
conditions. A settlement was made last spring, with the general
assent of the Governments of the Dominions and of India,
between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and
Cable and Wireless Limited, as a part of which the Governments
concerned were asked, in confirmation of the policy agreed in 1928,
to accord their fullest support and co-operation to the company’s
system, thus enabling the company to provide with . greater
confidence for the future development of its services. His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom as their special part in the
settlement made certain financial concessions to the company,
and acquired a substantial share-holding in it. In return Cable
and Wireless Limited agreed to reduce ordinary rates within the
Empire to a maximum of Is. 3d. a word, and this reduction took
effect from the 25th April last. Cable and Wireless Limited are the
only overseas communications company established in Palestine ;
and Palestine,, in view of its special relationship with His Majesty’s
Government as the Mandatory Power, has enjoyed the benefit
of this concession, and in return has subscribed to the general
policy of His Majesty’s Government, which may be described as

175

one of voluntary preference exercised in support of a common
imperial objective. It may be taken for granted that, after partition,
the Government of the Mandated Territories will continue to
subscribe to the common policy ; but it would be open to the Arab
and Jewish States as independent states to enter into different
arrangements with other cable or wireless companies if they should
choose to do so. Clearly in that event they would lose the benefit
of the cheap Empire rate ; but that would not necessarily be an
effective deterrent if a rival company were to offer them the same
rate as at present, if not over the whole of the Empire routes, at
least over those routes on which much the greater part of the
present outward traffic of Palestine is carried. That is a possibility
which must be taken into account. But the knowledge that they
could reasonably anticipate a common policy of support for their
services from the whole Empire was, we understand, a governing
consideration in the grant of the lower rates by Cable and Wireless
Limited last spring. We think that the observance of this common
policy must be regarded as one of the obligations of the Palestine
Government which it is necessary to preserve by treaty under the new
conditions ; and we accordingly recommend that the treaties with the
Arab and Jewish States should provide that those states shall
continue to follow, in the matter of cable and wireless communi-
cations, the policy enunciated in Cmd. 5716 which the Palestine
Government have already accepted.

4. Trans-Jordan Posts and Telegraph Department

365. This is a comparatively small service, the gross cost of which,
though it has risen by nearly 50 per cent, since 1932, is still only
£F. 18,500 per annum. As is only to be expected when the undertaking
is on so modest a scale, the service is not fully self-supporting. In the
six years 1933-38, the total amount by which ordinary expenditure has
exceeded, or is estimated to exceed, revenue is £P.2,498 ; while in
addition there has been charged against annual revenue as part
of the Trans- Jordan budget services, extraordinary expenditure
amounting to £F. 17,580*. A more favourable picture is presented,
however, if account is taken of the estimated value of services rendered
by the Posts and Telegraph Department to other Government
Departments, for which no payment passes in either direction. In
the three years for which records are so far available these resulted
in an average credit to the Post Office of about £P.2,200 per annum.
We think the position may fairly be summed up by saying that, as
at present constituted, the Department provides a service which is
reasonably adequate for the needs of a poor country such as Trans-
Jordan, and at relatively small cost to the state. But to bring it up

* Including an abnormal item of £P.6,131 in 1935-36, being Trans-
Jordan’s share of the Haifa-Baghdad telephone circuit.

176

to the standard of the Post Office services as now provided in the
area of the Arab State in Palestine, would involve considerable
expenditure, both capital and recurrent, which it is not likely that the
state would be able to recover from the consumer for a long time to
come, if at all.

5. Broadcasting

366. The Palestine broadcasting station is situated at Ramallah,
and will be included in the Jerusalem Enclave under our recom-
mendations for the boundary of that area. Its capital cost was
£P.34,472, made up of—

£P.

Site .. .. .. .. .. .. 725

Buildings .. .. 5,346

Equipment and installation .. .. 28,401

Total .. .. .. £P.34,472

Further expenditure amounting to £P.7,700 on the provision of
improved accommodation for the studios in new premises is, we
understand, in contemplation.

367. The service is at present run at a loss of £F. 11,700, the
figures being —

Income, including ^P. 14,932 for wireless

licence fees, less cost of collection . . . . 15,068

Expenditure, including £P. 1,034 for interest

on capital outlay and £P.2,300 for renewals 26,784

Excess of expenditure over revenue . . ^P. 11,716

The number of licences issued has been steadily increasing. On

the 31st May, 1938, the total in issue was 32,547, distributed by
races over the whole of Palestine as follows —

Number. Percentage.

Arabs .. 6,265 19-3

Jews 24,253 74*5 *

Others 2,029 6-2

32,547 100

The number of licence-holders in the Arab State is estimated at
about 10 per cent, of the whole. Figures are not available for the
distribution of holders between the Jewish State and the Mandated
Territories.

177

368. It is probable that the Jews will wish to set up their own
broadcasting service in the Jewish State ; and while the result
must be to increase substantially the net cost of running the
Ramallah station, we doubt if any satisfactory arrangement could
be made for providing a Jewish service from Ramallah on agency
terms. The Arab State will certainly not be able to set up its own
station, but will probably object to contributing to the cost of that
at Ramallah.

369. Now that the Ramallah station has been provided, it is
undesirable to close it entirely, notwithstanding the cost. But it is
hard to believe that it would have been established at all for the
benefit of the comparatively small number of listeners who reside in
the proposed Mandated Territories. It does not seem satisfactory
that the British taxpayer should be paying, on the one hand, through
the deficiency grant-in-aid a considerable sum for the maintenance
of this station in Palestine, and on the other hand, through the
Parliamentary grant to the British Broadcasting Corporation, a
very large sum (so we understand) for the provision of the Arabic
broadcast service from Daventry. We suggest that further considera-
tion might be given by His Majesty’s Government to the possibility
of reducing the total cost by amalgamating these services in some way.

6. Industrial and other Concessions

370. In paragraph 34 of Chapter XXII of their Report the Royal
Commission wrote as follows —

In the event of partition, agreements entered into by the Government
of Palestine for the development and security of industries {e.g., the agree-
ment with the Palestine Potash Company) should be taken over and
carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States.
Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security
of the Electric Power Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly
guaranteed.

And item (ii) (h) of our terms of reference directs us to examine
and report on the treatment of industrial and other concessions.

371. The following concessions have been granted by the
Palestine Government —

(a) Concessions which have been validated by Ordinance —

(i) the Dead Sea Concession (the Palestine Potash
Company) ;

(ii) the Palestine Electric Corporation ;

(hi) the Jerusalem Electric and Public Service Corporation ;
(iv) the Auja Concession (the Palestine Electric Corporation).

178

(b) Concessions which have not been validated by Ordin-

ance-

(i) the drainage of Lake Huleh and the adjacent marshes
(the Palestine Land Development Company) ;

(ii) the Tiberias Hot Baths (the Hamei Tiberia Company) ;

(iii) Lighthouses (Administration Generate de Phares de
Palestine) ;

(iv) El Hamma Mineral Springs (Suleiman Bey Nassif) ;

(v) Bonded Warehouses (Levant Bonded Warehouse.
Company) ;

(vi) the Transit of Mineral Oils through Palestine and
the Establishment of an Oil Refinery at Haifa (Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company) ;

(vii) the Transit of Mineral Oils through Palestine (the
‘Iraq Petroleum Company).

We understand that it is the intention to validate Concessions (vi)
and (vii) by Ordinance.

372. The concessions which will fall wholly within one of the
states under either plan B or C are—

Plan B.
Jewish State
Jewish State

(a) the Auja Concession . .

(b) the drainage of Lake

Huleh and the adjacent
marshes.

(c) the Tiberias Hot Baths

Plan C.
Jewish State.

Northern Mandated
Territory.

(d) the El Hamma Mineral
Springs.

Jewish State
Jewish State

Northern Mandated.

Territory.
Northern Mandated

Territory.

373. We consider that it will be necessary to deal with each
concession separately, and when necessary to apportion the rights
and duties under the concession between the several administrations ;
and provision will then have to be made in the treaties that the
several administrations will by contract or, if necessary, by legislation,
give effect to the terms of the concessions so far as they are
concerned.

179

CHAPTER XVIII

FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART I)

374. Our terms of reference require us to recommend boundaries
for an Arab and a Jewish State, which, when set up, shall be self-
supporting, and further to enquire into and report upon the budgetary
prospects of the proposed new Administrations. The term ” self-
supporting ” needs to be defined. The Royal Commission realized
that the Arab State could not be expected to be self-supporting in
the usual sense, for they recommended that that state should be
granted assistance in two forms : a subvention of unspecified amount
from the Jewish State, and a subvention from the Government of the
United Kingdom consisting of a capital grant of £2 million in discharge
of the British Government’s present financial liabilities in respect of
Trans- Jordan, which the Royal Commission proposed should be
included in the Arab State. His Majesty’s Government, in the
Statement of Policy issued in July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513), made it clear
that the Arab State would be able to rely on financial assistance on a
substantial scale from both the United Kingdom and the Jewish State.
We have assumed, therefore, that those facts should be taken
into consideration in interpreting the meaning of the term
” self-supporting ” ; and that a plan of partition should not be held
to be impracticable merely because the Arab State would be unable
to support itself without subventions of the nature contemplated by
the Royal Commission.

375. The Royal Commission also realized that the revenue obtain-
able for the upkeep of the Mandatory Government might prove
insufficient for the normal cost of administration, and they expressed
the belief that in that event Parliament would in all the circumstances
be willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit.

376. The figures given in this chapter will show that under
plan C, and indeed under any Other conceivable plan of partition,
the Arab State will be far from self-supporting in the strict sense,
and further that the Government of the territories to be retained
under Mandate will be unable to balance its budget without a very
large amount of assistance from the Mandatory Power. In judging
whether these deficiencies in plan C are such as to render the plan
wholly impracticable, we consider ourselves entitled, for the reason
given above, to some latitude in the interpretation of our terms of
reference : in particular we shall think it relevant to consider to
what extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and how far
that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result of partition.

180

377. The figures given in this chapter are based on estimates
furnished at our request by the Treasurer of Palestine. As far as
the budgetary prospects of the new Administrations are concerned,
the estimates do not profess to do more than indicate how much of
the existing revenue and expenditure of the present Administration,
as provided in the estimates for the year 1938-39, adjusted as
described in paragraph 380 below, is attributable to each of the several
areas. No allowance has been made for the possibility that the
Palestine estimates on which these forecasts are based may have to
be revised in the course of the year as the result of the continuation
of the present disturbances. Nor is any allowance made for any *
increase of expenditure directly consequent on partition, such as
pensions of officers prematurely retired from service, or for such
normal increases as pension charges and increments (both growing
liabilities in a youthful administration) ; and, with only a few
exceptions, which will be noted hereafter, nothing is allowed for
savings in the cost of administration, including police, or for increase
in revenue on the assumption that partition will be followed by peace.
Nor has any allowance been made for the possibility of changes,
either upwards or downwards, in the standard of social services or
the scale of public administration generally, or in the rate and scope
of taxation. Nor have we included in the budget of the Mandated
Territories in particular the additional expenditure from public
funds which would have to be incurred in those territories as the
result of the development programme recommended in chapter XIII,
since, although this is an item which must obviously be taken into
account in weighing the cost of partition as a whole, We have recom-
mended that it should be borne by His Majesty’s Government
as a separate charge. Further, the Treasurer has impressed upon us
that even within these limits the estimates are only provisional since,
for reasons of secrecy, he was obliged to prepare them himself, with
the assistance of only one confidential officer in his own department :
it was not possible for him to consult the spending or revenue-
collecting departments on matters for which they would be mainly
responsible.

378. We draw particular attention to three points which affect
the figures of net surplus or deficit for each Administration—

(i) The principle on which the cost of debt service and of pensions
has been apportioned between the several Administrations is
explained in the chapter on Public Debt and Financial Obligations
(chapter XX). The effect is to divide the cost equally between the
three areas, the share of the. Mandated Territories being divided
again equally between the Jerusalem Enclave and the Northern
Mandated Territories. Since we propose that those liabilities should
be met from. a common or central fund, there is no advantage in
attempting to apportion the charges in detail, especially as the
apportionment might well give rise to dispute, particularly as
regards pension charges arising out of partition. »

181

(ii) No provision has been made in the forecast for the cost of
defence, or for the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, which is regarded
as a defence force. The reason for this is that it seems impossible
at this stage to foresee how the defence of the two states will be
provided, and what will be the cost to each state and to the Mandatory
respectively ; and rather than insert a token or arbitrary figure it
seems better to omit this item altogether, bearing in mind that if
each state is to be set up with full sovereign rights, an unspecified
amount must be added on this account to its estimate of budgetary
expenditure. The defence of the Mandated Territories will naturally
be entrusted to the British forces stationed in those territories. The
question whether in the circumstances the British Treasury will
desire that the budget of the Mandated Territories should include
provision for a contribution to the Defence Votes of the United
Kingdom on account of the service thus provided, the grant-in-aid of
the Mandated Territories being increased by a corresponding amount,
or whether they would be content to forgo any such contribution,
is a matter of financial technique with which we need not concern
ourselves. For the purpose of comparison with the budgets of the
Arab and Jewish State, it is sufficient to omit any provision for defence
in the forecast for the Mandated Territories, and to assume that the
whole cost of the British troops in Palestine after partition, including
the cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, will fall on United
Kingdom funds.

(iii) It will be necessary to make provision for expenditure to be
incurred in giving effect to partition, of which the principal items
we have noted are the cost of the boundary between Jaffa and
Tel Aviv (estimated at £P. 115,000), and the cost of diverting the
railway at Tulkarm (estimated at £P. 100,000). We see no alterna-
tive but for this to be- met out of United Kingdom funds, and we
have, therefore, shown £P. 250 ,000 (in round figures) on this account
in the estimate of the cost to His Majesty’s Government of plan C in
paragraph 401 below.

379. The most, therefore, that can be said of these estimates is
that they give a picture in broad outline of the probable financial effect
of partition on the several new Administrations, based on the
existing standard of public administration in Palestine, but without
making any provision for defence.

380. As stated above, the existing estimates of revenue and
expenditure of the present Administration have been adjusted in
certain respects in order to produce figures of revenue and
expenditure which may be regarded as “distributable”* between

* The term ” distributable ” as used in this chapter is explained in
Appendix 11.

182

the proposed new Administrations. A full explanation of these adjust-
ments, with a statement showing how the ” distributable ” figures are
reconciled with the figures in the latest revised estimates of revenue
and expenditure for the current year, will be found in Appendix 11,
which also contains a brief indication of the bases on which the
apportionment of the main heads of charge between the several
Administrations has been made.

381. The following statement shows the estimated ” distributable ”
revenue and expenditure for Palestine as a whole for 1938-39, together
with the estimated distribution of revenue and expenditure between
the several proposed Administrations —

REVENUE

Estimated
Distributable
Revenue.
Distributior
i between —
(2)

Arab
State.
(3)

T «aix7i c r\
I CWlbJU.

State.
(4)

T £^i”n col om
J CI U a exit 11 J.

Enclave.
(5)

Northern
Mandated
Territory.
(6)

Southern
Mandated
Territory.
(7)

Total
Mandated
Territories.
Tax-Revenue —
£P.
£P-
£P.
Customs Duties (less Draw-
backs and Refunds).
1,815,000
213,000
850,300
340,830
392,870
18,000
751,700
Other Tax Revenue
985,000
155,950
396,520
189,860
233,770
8,900
432,530
Other Revenue Receipts —
Recurrent
865,000
139,550
224,440
194,660
302,600
3,750
501,010
Non-Recurrent
15,000
2,250
6,500
3,000
3,000
250
6,250
Total Revenue
3,680,000
or say
510,750
510,000
1,477,760
1,478,000
728,350
728,000
932,240
933,000
30,900
31,000
1,691,490
1,692,000

EXPENDITURE

(1)

Estimated
Distributable
Expenditure
Distribution between —
(2)

Arab
State
(3)

Jewish
State
(4)

Jerusalem
Enclave
(5)

Northern
Mandated
Territory.
(6)

Southern
Mandated
Territory.
(7)

Total
Mandated
Territories.
A. Departmental Services . .

B. Direct Departmental

Supervisory Services.

C. Pensions

D. Public Debt and Loan

Charges.

E. Railways (net)

F. Posts and Telegraphs (net)

G. Central Administration

H. Public Works Extra-

ordinary.

Total Expenditure (net)
V 3,150,000

72,775
(a) 283,660

86.000

+ 13,140
(surplus)
134,000
350,000
£P-

807,286

24,258
94,553

5,000

22,000

37,810
75,000
653,754

24,258
94,553

+ 50,000

(surplus)
+ 18,140
(surplus)
27,980
150,000
724,087

12,130
47,277

91,000

+ 10,000
(surplus)
30,770
100,000
£P-

896,111

12,129
47,277

40,000

+ 5,000
(surplus)
34,280
25,000
£P-
68,762


3,160
£P-

1,688,960

24,259
94,554

131,000

+ 15,000
(surplus)
68,210
125,000
4,063.295
4,063,000
1,063,907
1,064,000
882,405
882,000
995,124
995,000
1,050,337
1,050,000
71,922
72,000
2,117,383
2,117,000

i(a) Including ^P. 13, 140, being the share of debt charges attributable to Posts and Telegraphs. This item is balanced by the
net surplus of ^P. 13, 140 showji under head F, the postal service for all Palestine being regarded as self-balancing, after debiting
it with its share of the debt charges.

SUMMARY

All
Palestine
Arab
State
Jewish
State
Jerusalem
Enclave
Northern
Mandated
Territories
Southern
Mandated
Territories
Total
Mandated
Territories
Revenue
Expenditure
£P-
3,680,000
4,063,000
£P-

510,000
1,064,000
£P-
1,478,000
882,000
£P-

728,000
995,000
£P-

933,000
1,050,000
£P-

31,000
72,000
£?■

1,692,000
2,117,000
Estimated Surplus
or Deficit
383,000
554,000
596,000
267,000
117,000
41,000
425,000

The estimates of distributable revenue and expenditure for Trans-Jordan for 1938-39 are given below. A statement reconciling
these figures with those of the published estimates, will be found in Appendix 1 1 . They excltide both the general and the specific
grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom ; the expenditure met out of the specific grants, including (for the reasons explained in
paragraph 454 in the chapter on Public Debt) the Trans- Jordan share of the Ottoman Public Debt ; and the cost of pensions
(now ^P. 12,400) —

Revenue . . . . . . £P.348,000

Expenditure . . . . 404,000

56,000

If, therefore, Trans- Jordan should be included in the Arab State, account must be taken of these figures. This will mean that
there will be included in the budget of the Arab State, besides the figures of revenue and expenditure given above, one third
(£P.4,133) of the pension charge of ^P. 12,400, a corresponding sum being debited to the other two Administrations, for the
reasons given in the chapter on Public Dept. In addition, for the reasons explained in the same chapter, the Trans- Jordan share
of the Ottoman Public Debt (£P.31,073) will be shown, for convenience, as debited to the Mandated Territories (under the
head of the Jerusalem Enclave) . The inclusive figures for all three Administrations will then become —

Arab
Jewish
Mandated
State
State
Territories
£P-
£P-
£P-
Revenue
858,000
1,478,000
1,692,000
Expenditure
1,472,000
886,000
2,152,000
Surplus
592,000
or Deficit
614,000
460,000

186

382. Thus, on the existing standards of public administration in
Palestine, and without making any provision for defence, in the sense
of the cost of military forces for maintaining internal security and
resisting external aggression, the financial effect of partition will be
that, in round figures —

(a) The Jewish State alone of the new Administrations will
be able to balance its budget, and that with the handsome
surplus of nearly £P.600,000 per annum, equal to about
66 per cent, of its estimated expenditure on the present basis.

(b) The Mandated Territories will be faced with a deficit of .
about £P.425,000 per annum, or £P.460,000 if Trans- Jordan

is included in the Arab State, which will have to be made good
by the Mandatory itself, out of United Kingdom Funds.

(c) The Arab State, far from being able to balance its budget,
will have an annual deficit of about £P.550,000, or £P.610,Q0O
if Trans- Jordan is included, amounting to more than the whole
of its estimated revenue, without Trans-Jordan, or 71 per cent,
of the revenue if that of Trans- Jordan is included.

383. These figures are not only extremely disquieting, but so
startling that they may well provoke doubts of their accuracy, or at
least of their relevancy to the present issue. These doubts may be
examined under four heads —

(i) First, it may be asked by those who have been aware that
until recently Palestine was, with certain recognized exceptions,
a fully self-supporting country, how it comes about that a net
deficit of over £P.380,000 is shown on the budgets of the three
successor administrations, taken together, although no allowance
is made for expenditure on defence or for increased expenses due
to partition. The explanation is that the financial position of
Palestine has now changed for the worse, and that under present
conditions it is no longer able to balance its budget. The following
table shows the budgetary position for 1938, with the actual
outturn for the years 1937 and 1936 and the average revenue and
expenditure of the financial years 1933-36 —

Palestine : Budgetary Position

Revenue . .
Expenditure

Surplus
or

Deficit . .

Average
actual outturn
1933/4-35/6

. 5,069,527

Actual

outturn,

1936-37

4,640,821

Actual
outturn,
1937^38

4,897,356

Esti-
mates,
1938-39

4,520,145

3,390,356 6,073,502 7,297,688 5,445,760

1,679,171 — —
— 1,432,681 2,400,332

925,615

187

Included in the above are the
attention may be drawn —

/P
Customs Duties . .
Defence
133,177
.Police
506,928
Trans- Jordan Frontier
188,938
Force (gross)
Public Works Extra-
347,427
ordinary

following items, to which special

2,019,479
1,999,697
1,900,010
1 9Q7 AAA
744,619
941,975
1,022,068
189,201
188,010
203,954
705,094
1,614,885
755,651

It will be observed that from 1936 onwards the budget has not
been balanced. The worsening of the position in the last three years
has been due mainly to the increased cost of defence and police
owing to the present emergency (the greater part of the extra pro-
vision for Public Works Extraordinary in these years is on account
of emergency services), and to a lesser extent to the decline in
customs revenue consequent on the falling-off in immigration,
accompanied by a decline in the importation of immigrants’ capital,
and the trade depression.

The reduction in the estimated deficit and the apparent
reduction in the cost of defence in the current year require explana-
tion. The item ” Defence ” in previous years covers the excess cost
of the Army troops stationed in Palestine and one half of the excess
cost of the Royal Air Force stationed in both Palestine and Trans-
Jordan, together with the capital cost of works services in Palestine
for both Forces. By ” excess ” cost is meant the excess over the
cost of such Forces at their normal stations. Since 1930 the Palestine
Government has, by agreement with the Government of the
United Kingdom, been liable in principle to repay these items
to the Home Government, subject to their ability to pay, leaving
the other half of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force, together
with the capital cost of works services in Trans-Jordan, to be
borne by the United Kingdom. Under this arrangement it has
been decided not to call upon the Palestine Government to make
any contribution to the United Kingdom on this account in 1938.
The amount which would have been provided in the Palestine
Estimates on this account in 1938, but for this relief, is £577,000*,
but since the beginning of the financial year the number of troops
stationed in Palestine has been increased, and considerable expendi-
ture has had to be incurred on military works in order to cope with
the disturbances. It can hardly be doubted that the excess cost
at the present time is at a rate substantially in excess of £577,000
per annum. If, therefore, in order to compare like with like, account

* Civil Estimates of the United Kingdom for the year endin 31 March, 1939,
CI. II, 9, Subhead H.l.

188

is taken of this item, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine budget
for 1938 must be put at not less than £1,500,000 ; indeed if allowance
is made for the additional emergency measures involving expenditure
under other heads (Police and Public Works Extraordinary), the
figure will more probably be not far short of £2,500,000.

(ii) Secondly, many who had realized that the Jewish State
was likely to be better off than the Arab State may be surprised
at the vast difference in budgetary prospects between the two,
notwithstanding the small size of the Jewish State under plan C.
The explanation is that the per capita rate of contribution to tax-
revenue among the inhabitants of the Jewish State, -of which the
Jews form the great majority, is very much higher than that among
the inhabitants of the Arab State, who are almost entirely Arabs,
as the following table shows —

Jewish State

Total Revenue Total Tax Total Ex P endi ‘
Population. p . , , Tax Revenue. Expendi- ture

Arabs. Jews. Total. uevenue – r er neaa – Revenue, per head. ture. per head.

£P- £P- £P. £P. £?: £?■
54,400 226,000 280,400 1,478,000 5-27 1,246,820 4-44 882,000 3-14

Arab State]

444,100 8,900 453,000 510,000 1-12 368,950 0-81 1,064,000 2-35

Mandated Territories
502,800 157,400 660,200 1,692,000 2-56 1,184,230 1-79 2,117,000 3-20

In other words, the taxable capacity of the proposed Jewish State
is about 5£ times as high as that of the proposed Arab State.

(iii) Again, it may be urged that the method of allocation
may be open to challenge, since the Treasurer himself admits that
his estimates are only provisional and liable to correction. We agree
that the estimates are liable to correction on this account.’ But
whatever corrections it may prove necessary to make, we are con-
vinced that they will not be of such magnitude as in the aggregate
to modify the general conclusions to be drawn from the provisional
figures.

(iv) Lastly, it may be argued that these budgetary forecasts
are mere academical exercises, and cannot be used as a ground for
estimating the true budgetary prospects of the new Administrations,
since they are admittedly based upon existing conditions and make
no allowance for the changes which will take place after partition,
especially if this leads to a restoration of settled conditions. ^For
example, it may be said, the figure of £P. 1,815,000 which is taken as
the estimated revenue from customs duties for the purpose of the

f Excluding Trans- Jordan.

189

forecasts is based upon a state of trade depression and restriction
of immigration which is necessarily accompanied by a curtailment
of imports. But the restoration of order will presumably be followed
by a revival of trade activities, and the setting up of the Jewish
State by a large influx of new immigrants and capital, leading to an
increase in the demand for imported goods and. an expansion of
customs revenue. Again, the provision for police and prisons in
the forecast of distributable expenditure is £P. 1,022,068, the same as
that actually provided in the 1938 Estimates for Palestine to meet
the requirements of the present disturbed condition of the country,
and twice as much as the average expenditure on these services
(£P.506,928) in the three years 1933/4-1935/6, when conditions may
be said to have been normal. Surely, it may be said, it is reasonable
to assume that, sooner or later, partition will lead to a return to
normal conditions in Palestine, and a reduction of the present
extraordinary provision under this head. Finally, it may be
contended that, if the Arab State once acquires its independence,
it will organize its administration on lines which are likely to be
simpler and less costly, but not necessarily less satisfactory to
the Arab population, than those followed by the Mandatory
Government : in this way it should prove possible to reduce
the cost of public services so considerably that, if order is restored
and trade revives, a balanced budget may not be wholly out of
the question.

384. These are weighty arguments, and call for careful
examination.

(a) For the sake of the present argument, let it be conceded that
the establishment of the Jewish State will be followed by a rapid
influx of new immigrants, including the same percentage of persons
with private capital as in previous years of active immigration ;
and. that we may reckon on a consequential expansion of imports
and a restoration of customs revenues for the whole of the successor
states to the level of the average for the whole of Palestine of the
three years 1933-36, (£P.2,406,738) or say £P.2,400,000 per annum,
for the time being. But even if this increase could be relied upon,
the benefit of the increase in customs revenue will, under a partition
scheme such as our terms of reference contemplate, be limited to
those states in “which immigration is taking place, that is, the
Jewish State in the first place, and the Mandated Territories in so
far as immigration into them may be permitted after partition, but
will not extend at all to the Arab State, from which it must be
assumed that Jewish settlers will be entirely excluded. The only
benefit that the Arabs in that state will derive therefrom will be if
the assumed prosperity of the Jewish State should result in an
increased demand at higher prices for the agricultural produce of
the Arab State. But even if this should happen — and it cannot be
relied upon with confidence, because it may well be the policy^of

190

the Jewish State to satisfy this increased demand by an increase,
under a protective tariff, in their own agricultural output, to be
provided by additional Jewish agricultural settlements in their
state — and even if it were assumed that the total customs revenue of
the Arab State would increase, in a time of general prosperity, in
the same ratio as we have suggested above for Palestine as a whole
(that is from £P.1,800,000 to £P.2,400,000 or say by 33| per cent.)—
a liberal estimate, considering how little the Arab fellah can afford
to devote to the purchase of imported goods in comparison with
the average Jew — the resulting gain in the revenue of the Arab
State would be only £P.70,000 per annum.

(b) It is not unreasonable to expect that the restoration
of normal conditions should enable law and order to be maintained
without the present high rate of expenditure on police services.
But if account is to be taken of savings consequent on partition,
account must also be taken of the consequential increase in expendi-
ture. Pension charges are increasing rapidly, as is inevitable in the
early years of any young administration ; and in addition to the
normal increase, account must also be taken of the abnormal increase
which will probably result directly from partition : as we shall see
in chapter XX (Public Debt and other Financial Obligations), the
Treasurer of Palestine, working on certain assuniptions, estimates
the average cost of pensions over the first ten years after partition
to be, for all Palestine, as much as £P.250,000 per annum, an increase
of over £P. 175,000 on the provision in the 1938-39 Estimates. If
independent Arab and Jewish States are to be set up, they must
satisfy the League of Nations that they can provide for their own
internal security, and for this purpose they must be able to maintain
adequate military forces as well as police. The average cost of
defence and police together per head of the population in ‘Iraq,
Egypt, Syria and Trans- Jordan, compared with the Arab State, is —

‘Iraq (1938)

Egypt (1933-37, average)
Syria (1933-37, average) J
Trans- Jordan (1938) . .
Arab State
Jewish State
Mandated Territories . .

Defence,

&>■

0-387
0-137

157

0-175

0-14

0-393

0-516

0-75

0-875

Police.

0-544

0-312

0-36

0-493

0-516f

0-75t

0-875f

Total.

0-22
0-1*

?
?
?

* Trans- Jordan Frontier Force. f Police only.

J Francs converted at 124 to the £.

191

If applied to the population of the Arab and Jewish States and of
the Mandated Territories, these capitation rates would produce the
following figures of total expenditure on police and defence together —

Capitation
Arab
Jewish
Mandated
rate.
State.
State.
territories.
£P-
£P-
£P-
‘Iraq
0-544
246,432
152,537
359,148
Egypt
. . 0312
141,336
87,484
205,982
Syria
0-36
163,080
100,944
237,672
Trans- Jordan
0-493
223,329
138,237
325,478

as against an actual provision in the forecasts on account of police
only, of £P.233,771, 210,430, 577,867, respectively.

These figures suggest that, even after making provision for defence,
there may be room for considerable saving on the cost of police and
defence together in the Jewish State and in the Mandated Territories,
but less so in the Arab State. And in each case allowance must be
made for the probable extra cost of policing the frontiers.

(c) It is one thing to build up an administration with a simple
system of public services which will satisfy the needs of a population
which has never known anything more elaborate and costly : it
is quite another thing to expect that a newly created Government
should abandon an existing system to which the public has become
accustomed, and ask its citizens to accept instead something which
is manifestly inferior, on the ground that it is the best that under
the new conditions they can afford. Doubtless certain economies
will be effected, under the pressure of circumstances, and it may
well be that in certain respects the present standards can be lowered
without real hardship to the public, though probably not without
some loss of administrative efficiency. But there will be a limit to the
possibilities of economies by this means, and at the utmost it could
not be expected that the new Arab Government would do more than
reduce the amount spent on social services in the Arab State to the
rate per head of the population of expenditure on corresponding
services in the neighbouring countries. We asked the League of
Nations to supply us with information respecting the rate of
expenditure on various services per head of population in ‘Iraq,
Egypt and Syria. In complying with our request they drew our
attention to the need of caution in comparing financial data for
different states owing to the variations in practice which may be
followed in such matters as the division of activities between central
and local authorities, the principle of gross and net accounting and
the distribution of services between the various departments. The
figures given below must be used subject to this reservation, and
subject also to the qualification that expenditure on education and
health services in particular appears to have doubled in ‘Iraq and

(C31078)

H

192

nearly doubled in Egypt in the last five or six years, and to be
still rising. Moreover it must not be readily assumed that a given
rate of expenditure per head in a state with a population of over
15 millions, such as Egypt, or of nearly 4 millions, such as ‘Iraq, can
be equalled in one with a population of less than half a million.
Yet even so the figures are worth studying.

Trans-
Pales-
Avab\
‘Iraq.
Egypt.
Syria*.
Jordan.
tine.
State.
(Estimates for the year)
1938
1937
1936
1938
1938
1938
Cost per head of popu-
{?•
lation of —
£P-
£P-
£P-
£P-
£P-
Education
•177
•258
•07
•087
•23
•243’
Health
•087
•193
•022
•063
•176
•189
Other General Civil
Administration
Services^
•425
•655
•42
•52 •
1-278
•76
Total
•689
1-106
•512
•67
1-684
1-192

(*) Francs converted at 124 to the £.
(t) Without Trans-Jordan.

(+) Excluding (besides Health and Education), Defence, Police, Public
Works, Public Debt, and Posts and Telegraphs.

It will be seen that the rate per head of expenditure in the forecast
for the Arab State in Palestine is high compared with ‘Iraq, Egypt
or Syria. Yet even if, to take the extreme case, the per capita rate
of expenditure on education, health and other peace-time services
in the Arab State could be brought down to the same level as in
Syria (that is, £P.O -512 per head instead of £T.l ■ 192, a reduction to
less than one half of the existing rate of expenditure), the total
saving would be only about £P.308,000 per annum, and the budget
would still be very far from being balanced. On the equity of an
arrangement which would in effect require the Arab State to reduce
its standard of social services so drastically, we shall have more to
say later in this chapter (paragraph 398). We know of no precedent
for a dependency being required to curtail its services permanently
on such a scale, however extreme its financial difficulties.

385. Our considered view is that it is not practicable to give a
more precise estimate, for the purpose of our task, than the forecast
given in the early parts of this chapter of the budgetary prospects
of the several Administrations under plan C, excluding provision for
defence. The indications are that there are prospects of considerable
savings in the cost of police and defence together in the Jewish State
and the Mandated Territories, and to a less extent in the Arab
State ; but against these must be set an uncertain, but substantial,
liability for pensions.

193

386. Since the majority of us are unable to support plan B,
we do not think it necessary to set out in full or to comment in detail
on the corresponding figures for that plan. It will be enough here
to say that the general picture is very much the same, the financial
position of the Arab State being rather worse than under plan C ;
and our conclusions with regard to its financial aspects would be the
same as under plan C.

387. The situation under plan C is, therefore, that as a result of
partition, and leaving out of account the cost of defence, while the
Jewish State will enjoy a surplus of nearly £P.600,000 per annum,
the Arab State will be faced with a deficit of about £P.550,000, or
£P.610,000 if Trans- Jordan is united with the Arab area west of
Jordan, and that even after making every allowance for a reduction
of expenditure by the substitution of simpler standards of government
it is impossible to look forward to a time when the Arab State will be
able to balance its budget. The Royal Commission foresaw this
possibility (though it must be remembered that they had not before
them the forecasts which have been prepared for us, nor any estimate
of the budgetary prospects of the new administrations), and made
certain proposals to deal with the situation. We will now proceed to
consider whether these can be regarded as furnishing a satisfactory
solution of the problem before us. The Royal Commission proposed
that financial assistance should be given to the Arab State in
two forms — -(a) by a subvention from the Jewish State, and (b) by
a capital grant of £2,000,000 from United Kingdom funds which
Parliament should be asked to vote.

(a) The Proposed Subvention from the Jewish State.

388. The arguments by which the Royal Commission justified
this proposal were that (i) the Jews would acquire a new right of
sovereignty in the Jewish area; (ii) that street, cis the Royal Commission
defined it, would be larger.than the existing area of Jewish land and
settlement ; (iii) the Jews would be freed from their present liability
for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that area. We
find it difficult to subscribe to the first of these arguments since the
Jew’s would be entitled to retort that they are already paying for
the right of sovereignty in the Jewish area by surrendering their
claims under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate in respect
of the rest of Palestine ; and that under the Royal Commission’s
proposal, therefore, they would be required to pay twice over. The
second argument will have lost all its force under plan C, since under it
the area of the Jewish State, though far larger than the land in Jewish
ownership in that area, is no larger than the amount of land in Jewish
ownership in the whole of Palestine. The case for a subvention,
therefore, rests entirely on the third argument ; and we cannot say that
we find it convincing. That a minority class or section of a nation
should contribute to the national revenues far more largely than the
rest of the community is by no means unusual ; but while the Jews

(C31078)

194

would have no good ground of complaint of this process so long as
they remain citizens of a united Palestine, it seems to us that they
cannot reasonably be asked to continue to make the same contribu-
tion after partition, unless partition gives them some uncovenanted
benefit for which they may fairly be asked to pay. In this form the
argument seems to us merely to repeat the first argument, which
we have already felt obliged to reject. It is, of course, true that from
the budgetary point of view the Jews in the Jewish State will be
better off by being enabled, as a result of partition, to devote the
whole of their tax-contribution to the benefit of their own citizens.
But that seems to us to be simply one of ‘the incidental advantages •
of partition : apart from the first argument we can see no reason
why the Jews should be required to surrender that advantage for
the benefit of the Arabs.

389. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews have welcomed the Royal
Commission’s suggestion. The Arab press has rejected with scorn
what they describe as a bribe to induce them to assent to partition.
The Jews told us in evidence that they would be willing to assist
the Arab State in any constructive arrangement which is consistent
with the dignity of both races, but they object to being required to
pay an annual tribute simply as the price of partition. We under-
stand that the kind of constructive arrangement which they have
in mind is the payment of the annual charges on a loan to be devoted
to the development of an area in the Arab State for the resettlement
of Arabs from the Jewish State whose transfer would make room
for more Jewish immigrants. We think that it would be unwise
to require the Jewish State to make a direct subvention to the Arab
State. The payment of the money would be likely to provoke .
resentment and humiliation on both sides, while experience shows
that such arrangements seldom endure for long, and cannot prudently
be made the foundation of a permanent settlement. And in any
case the deficit is far too large to be made good by any subvention
which the Jewish State could reasonably be asked to make.

390. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Royal Commission’s
idea of bridging the gap between the income and expenditure of
the Arab State by means of a direct subvention from the Jewish
State must be set aside as impracticable. The possibility that Jewish
assistance may be provided in another and more constructive form
will receive further consideration later in our report ; meanwhile,
it will be enough to say that in the form which the Jews themselves
suggested to us — that is, the development of land in the Arab State
in order ultimately to facilitate Jewish immigration — we think that
the possibilities are limited by the considerations indicated in
chapter VIII of our report (The Possibility of Exchanges and
Transfer of Population). In any case it cannot be expected that the
increase in the taxable capacity of the Arab State which would
follow therefrom would be so great as to make any appreciable
reduction in the budgetary deficit of the Arab State.

195

(b) The Proposed Capital Grant from United Kingdom Funds.

391. In making their second recommendation the Royal
Commission had in mind the proposal that Trans- Jordan should be
united with the Arab area west of the Jordan to form the Arab State,
and that in consequence the United Kingdom would be relieved of
its present liability to assist the Trans- Jordan Government with
annual grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds, amounting on the
average of the years 1921 to 1937 to £78,000 per annum excluding the
Trans- Jordan share of the cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force.*
The capital grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State which the Royal
Commission proposed that Parliament should be asked to make in
discharge of this liability would, if invested in trustee securities,
produce an annual income approaching this amount. The Statement
of Policy issued by His Majesty’s Government in July, 1937
(Cmd. 5513) confirmed the intention that the Arab State should
receive financial assistance “on a substantial scale ” from His
Majesty’s Government ; and we feel justified, therefore, in assuming
for the purpose of our plan, that if Trans- Jordan should be included

* The actual amount provided in United Kingdom Votes of Parliament
for 1938-39 in respect of Trans- Jordan is considerably higher, as will be seen
from the following statement : the provision for normal services is —

£

(a) Grants-in-aid of expenses of local administration . . 90,000

(b) Loan to enable the Trans- Jordan Government to meet their

liability in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt settlement 31,009

(c) Contribution towards the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier

Force (shown as part of a total grant, under Subhead H.3
of the Colonial and Middle Eastern Services Vote of
£145,000) . . .. .. .. .. .. 33,397

(d) Salaries and expenses of British Resident and Staff . . 8,040

162,446

In addition provision is made for the following special services —
(e) Grant towards cost of improvement of roads . . . . 200,000
(/) Grant-in-aid of the cost of hydrographic surveys in

Trans- Jordan _ 21,000

(g) Joint survey of the Trans- Jordan-Nejd Frontier .. .. 20,000

241,000

Under a standing arrangement the net liability of the Palestine Govern-
ment for the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force is limited to one-quarter of the
recurrent cost and the whole of the non-recurrent expenditure in Palestine,
the United Kingdom being responsible for the rest ; the net liability of the
Trans- Jordan Government is nil, as its gross share (one-sixth of the recurrent
cost) is wholly covered by the credit to it of an equivalent sum out of the
United Kingdom contribution.

(C31078)

196

in the Arab State, assistance will be forthcoming from the United
Kingdom Government to this extent, though not necessarily in the
form proposed by the Royal Commission, which appears to us to be
open to objection on more than one ground. This, however, will
at best only make good the additional deficit in the budget of the
Arab State created by the inclusion of Trans- Jordan : the. main
deficit will still remain.

392. We may now sum up the position as far as we have gone.
Even after allowing for assistance from the United Kingdom • .
Government to the extent recommended by the Royal Commission,
the budget of the Arab State as forecasted under plan C will show

a deficit of over £P.550,000 per annum. To balance the budget
it is not possible, in our opinion, to look to a direct subvention from
the Jewish State. We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that
it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend
boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual
establishment of a self-supporting Arab State.

393. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan
C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve
the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number
of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable
that state to balance its budget.

#

394. At the beginning of this chapter we observed that, in judging .
whether this deficiency in plan C was such as to render the plan
wholly impracticable, it would be relevant to consider to what
extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and
how far that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result
of partition.

395. We have already pointed out, in paragraph 383, that, in-
cluding the cost of defence, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine
budget in 1938 is not less than £P.1J millions, and probably nearer
to £P.2| millions. Towards this the United Kingdom Government .
is already contributing the whole cost of defence, and we under-
stand that it is proposed, in addition, to ask Parliament to approve x
a substantial contribution towards the abnormal cost of police and
of other emergency services. We understand that present indications
are that the total cost in 1938 to the United Kingdom taxpayer
of the emergency in Palestine is likely to be of the order of

millions, in addition to the normal provision for the Trans-
Jordan Frontier Force, and for the various grants-in-aid of local
revenue and other services in Trans- Jordan as mentioned. in the.

197

footnote to paragraph 391 above. It is worth while to compare
these figures with the average corresponding cost for the three
years 1933-35—

Cost of Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the United Kingdom

Average

1933-35.
1938.
£
£
Defence and emergency measures
28,166
?2,500,000
Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, grant-in-aid . .
138,416
145,000
Trans-Jordan, grants-in-aid of local revenue
53,461
121,009
Trans- Jordan, other services
8,165
249,040
Total ..
228,208
3,015,049

396. It is, of course, quite impossible to foresee how long these
liabilities will continue to fall upon the United Kingdom Exchequer :
everything depends upon the duration of the emergency and the
form which it may take before order is restored. It is clear, however,
that a settlement which involved a very considerable charge, of a
continuing nature, upon United Kingdom funds might be worth
while from the financial point of view alone if it were accompanied
by the restoration of peace.

397. We realize that at a time when the charges on the United
Kingdom Exchequer are already exceptionally heavy, the Treasury
may naturally be most reluctant to accept an additional liability
which is not only burdensome in itself, but may be held to
constitute a precedent of serious import for claims by other colonial
administrations which may find themselves in financial distress
hereafter. We submit, however, that there is a fundamental
difference between Palestine and the Colonial Empire in general.
When a colony is in financial difficulty, the Treasury is free to call
upon it to reduce its standard of expenditure before it can be given
assistance by the Mother Country. The process may be painful, but
but it accords with accepted ideas of what is equitable between
the head of a family and a dependant. Subject to this obligation
to put its own house in order if required to do so, every colonial
dependency or mandated territory has a well-recognized right to
apply to the Government of the United Kingdom for assistance in
time of financial stress. In Palestine alone of all our dependencies
there exists the special relationship with the United Kingdom
arising out of the Balfour Declaration, which we feel bound to take
into account in considering whether we should be justified in recom-
mending a plan of partition of which an essential feature is a heavy
and continuing charge upon the United Kingdom Exchequer.

(C31078)

196

in the Arab State, assistance will be forthcoming from the United
Kingdom Government to this extent, though not necessarily in the
form proposed by the Royal Commission, which appears to us to be
open to objection on more than one ground. This, however, will
at best only make good the additional deficit in the budget of the
Arab State created by the inclusion of Trans- Jordan : the. main
deficit will still remain.

392. We may now sum up the position as far as we have gone.
Even after allowing for assistance from the United Kingdom* .
Government to the extent recommended by the Royal Commission,
the budget of the Arab State as forecasted under plan C will show

a deficit of over £P.550,000 per annum. To balance the budget
it is not possible, in our opinion, to look to a direct subvention from
the Jewish State. We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that
it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend
boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual
establishment of a self-supporting Arab State.

393. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan
C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve
the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number
of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable
that state to balance its budget.

394. At the beginning of this chapter we observed that, in judging,
whether this deficiency in plan C was such as to render the plan
wholly impracticable, it would be relevant to consider to what
extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and
Ilow far that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result
of partition.

395. We have already pointed out, in paragraph 383, that, in-
cluding the cost of defence, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine
budget in 1938 is not less than £P.1| millions, and probably nearer
to £P.2J millions. Towards this the United Kingdom Government .
is already contributing the whole cost of defence, and we under-
stand that it is proposed, in addition, to ask Parliament to approve x
a substantial contribution towards the abnormal cost of police and
of other emergency services. We understand that present indications
are that the total cost in 1938 to the United Kingdom taxpayer
of the emergency in Palestine is likely to be of the order of
£l\ millions, in addition to the normal provision for the Trans-
Jordan Frontier Force, and for the various grants-in-aid of local
revenue and other services in Trans- Jordan as mentioned. in the.

197

footnote to paragraph 391 above. It is worth while to compare
these figures with the average corresponding cost for the three
years 1933-35—

Cost of Palestine and Trans- Jordan to the United Kingdom

Average
1933-35.
1938.
£
£
Defence and emergency measures
28,166
?2,500,000
Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, grant-in-aid . .
138,416
145,000
Trans- Jordan, grants-in-aid of local revenue
53,461
121,009
Trans- Jordan, other services
8,165
249,040
Total
228,208
3,015,049

396. It is, of course, quite impossible to foresee how long these
liabilities will continue to fall upon the United Kingdom Exchequer :
everything depends upon the duration of the emergency and the
form which it may take before order is restored. It is clear, however,
that a settlement which involved a very considerable charge, of a
continuing nature, upon United Kingdom funds might be worth
while from the financial point of view alone if it were accompanied
by the restoration of peace.

397. We realize that at a time when the charges on the United
Kingdom Exchequer are already exceptionally heavy, the Treasury
may naturally be most reluctant to accept an additional liability
which is not only burdensome in itself, but may be held to
constitute a precedent of serious import for claims by other colonial
administrations which may find themselves in financial distress
hereafter. We submit, however, that there is a fundamental
difference between Palestine and the Colonial Empire in general.
When a colony is in financial difficulty, the Treasury is free to call
upon it to reduce its standard of expenditure before it can be given
assistance by the Mother Country. The process may be painful, but
but it accords with accepted ideas of what is equitable between
the head of a family and a dependant. Subject to this obligation
to put its own house in order if required to do so, every colonial
dependency or mandated territory has a well-recognized right to
apply to the Government of the United Kingdom for assistance in
time of financial stress. In Palestine alone of all our dependencies
there exists the special relationship with the United Kingdom
arising out of the Balfour Declaration, which we feel bound to take
into account in considering whether we should be justified in recom-
mending a plan of partition of which an essential feature is a heavy
and continuing charge upon the United Kingdom Exchequer.

(C31078)

198

398. Further, it may be asked whether His Majesty’s Government
or the League of Nations would be content with an arrangement
which would in effect compel the Arab State, as the result of par-
tition, to carry out a drastic reduction in the existing standard of
social services in Palestine. We can see no ground for imposing such
a condition upon the Arabs unless it could be shown that the Arabs
themselves had demanded their independence in the area which is
offered to them, and were prepared to pay this price for it, with full
knowledge of the consequences. But that, of course, is not the
position. The Arabs demand the independence of Palestine, it is^
true, but not the independence of a separate Arab area in a par-
titioned Palestine : on the contrary, all the indications point to
their vehement opposition to independence limited to such an area ;
and their opposition will not be decreased if independence is to be~
accompanied by a severe contraction of expenditure on such matters
as health, education and other forms of public service. In this
connexion we have not overlooked the questions put to your pre-
decessor by the Permanent Mandates Commission (Minutes of Fifth
Meeting of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session, pp. 44-5) and
his answers, which showed clearly that he himself had every hope
that the existing standard of social and educational services in the
Arab as well as the Jewish State would be maintained .after par-
tition. It is also relevant to point out that in dealing with the
position of Trans- Jordan the Royal Commission observed that ” the
Mandate for Trans- Jordan ought not, in our opinion, to bejelin-
quished without securing, as far as possible, that the standard of
administration should not fall too low through lack of funds to
maintain it” (chapter XXII, paragraph 26). They made no.
explicit reference to this question in relation to the Arab area in
Palestine, but the fact that they contemplated the payment of a
subvention to the Arab State by the Jewish State suggests that they
assumed that here also partition should not be allowed to bring with
it an inevitable lowering of the standards of public service.

399. If this argument is sound, and if we were right in holding,
as we have done in paragraph 388, that the Jews cannot fairly be
asked to come to the relief of the Arab State simply as the price of
receiving sovereignty in their own state, then only one conclusion
is possible. In the long run it is necessary to face boldly the
question whether it is worth while for His Majesty’s Government
to bear the full cost, whatever it may be, of making good the-
deficits of both the Mandated Territories and the Arab State after
partition, rather than to abandon the idea of partition as imprac-
ticable on this ground. In considering how this question «hou)d
be answered, it is relevant, we think, to take into account the
argument in the preceding paragraph as indicating that a part
at least of the aggregate deficit represents a charge for which
His Majesty’s Government cannot easily escape a certain responsi-
bility. But we do not put the case higher than this ; and the

199

real issue is clearly whether an annual charge on United Kingdom
funds, which may at the outset be put in the neighbourhood of
£1,250,000* (apart from the cost of defence), is in itself sufficient to
render plan C (and, indeed, any other conceivable plan of partition)
impracticable. The answer to this question can only be given after
taking into account not only the present cost of Palestine to the
British taxpayer, which we have indicated above, but also the
consequences, political as well as financial, of the rejection of partition.
The former it is neither within our terms of reference nor within our
power to estimate, and we do not feel, therefore, that we can usefully
express an opinion on the question of the practicability of plan C from
this aspect. But as regards the latter, we offer the following
observations.

400. It is, we think, impbssible to make any estimate of the cost
of any alternative to partition without knowing exactly what form
the alternative is to take, and in particular what restrictions, if any,
it is likely to impose on Jewish immigration. The whole of the
financial and economic system of Palestine is so closely interwoven
with the expectation of continued Jewish immigration, that any drastic
interference with its flow must be expected to have far-reaching
budgetary and other consequences, the gravity of which is likely,
generally speaking, to be in proportion to the degree and duration
of the interference. It would certainly not be prudent to assume
that the cost of non-partition can be measured simply by the figures
of distributable revenue and expenditure for all Palestine, on which
our forecasts of the financial effect of partition are based, that is a
deficit of £P.383,000, apart from the cost of defence.

401. For this reason we feel that the only comparison that
we can usefully make is with the cost of Palestine to the British
taxpayer to-day, and this we have done in paragraph 395 above.
It may, however, be relevant also to compare what the cost to the
United Kingdom Exchequer is likely to be under plan C with what
we calculate that it would probably have been under the Royal
Commission’s plan, if that could have been carried out in its entirety.

* Made up as follows —

£

Arab State (including Trans- Jordan) deficit . . . . 614,000

Mandated Territories, normal deficit . . . . . . 460,000

Mandated Territories, cost of special development pro-
gramme, etc. (paragraph 288) including capital expen-
diture at the rate of, say, ^100,000 per annum for

10 years . . . . 175,000

1,249,000
or, say, 1,250,000

200

although the most important item in the latter calculation is
highly speculative as no detailed estimates were worked out at the
time; This may be shown in tabular form as follows —

Royal Commission’s

Plan. Plan C. *

Capital Recurrent Capital Recurrent

£ £ £ £

i. Capital grant-in-aid of Arab 2,000,000 — — —

State (on account of
Trans- Jordan) .

ii. Capital grants on account 4/5,000,000[| — — —

of development in Arab
State to provide for
transfer of Arab minori-
ties, say

iii. Capital grants on account — — 1,000,000 —

of development in Man-
dated Territories.

iv. Annual grants on account — — — 75,000*

of development in Man-
dated Territories and of
cost of settlement survey.

v. Annual grants on account — 267,000f — 460,000

of deficit in Mandated
Territories^.

vi. Annual grants on account — — — 614,000

of deficit in Arab State {
(including Trans-Jordan)

vii. Expenses of partition (say) 250,0001f — 250,000^ —

Total— Capital . . 6/7,250,000 — 1,250,000 —
Recurrent . . — 267,000 — 1,149,000

* For 10 years {see chapter XIII, paragraph 288).
f In respect of the Jerusalem Enclave only.
{ Excluding cost of defence.

|| See footnote to chapter XIII, paragraph 281. In order not to exaggerate,
we have assumed that the gross estimated cost would be reduced by half from
the proceeds of the sale of land by transferee owner-cultivators.

‘ f Including the cost of diverting the railway at Tulkarm, and the cost of
the boundary between Jaffa and Tel Aviv.

402. On the assumption that His Majesty’s Government will decide
not to reject partition as impracticable on financial grounds alone, if it
should be desired to proceed with the policy on other grounds, we
offer the following observations on the consequences of the grant of<
financial assistance by the United Kingdom to the Arab State after
partition —

(i) First, we take it for granted that Parliament would in no
circumstances be prepared to vote a fixed annual grant in perpetuity
to a state which is completely independent and over which it has no
financial control. The natural procedure in such a case would be to
insist upon the exercise of Treasury control through the appointment

201

of a Financial Adviser to the Government of the state, whose
approval would be required for (a) the annual budget, including the
detailed estimates of the several Departments and proposals for the
raising of revenue, (b) any services involving substantial expenditure
which it may be desired to undertake in the course of the financial
year and for which no provision was made in the approved estimates,
and (c) the amount of the grant which Parliament would be asked
to make in aid of the local revenue of the state. The Financial
Adviser would in turn seek authority from the Colonial Office and
Treasury, who in their turn would be responsible for submitting the
necessary estimate to Parliament. The annual grant, to such amount
as Parliament might approve, would then be paid to the account of
the local Government in the form which is technically known as a
grant-in-aid, the distinctive feature of which is that the expenditure
therefrom is not accounted for in detail to the Comptroller and
Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, though the latter is furnished
by the Colonial Office with the audited accounts and with any report
of the Director of Colonial Audit thereon, and that any balance of the
sum issued which may remain unexpended at the end of the financial
year is not liable to surrender to the United Kingdom Exchequer,
though account would naturally be taken of it in estimating the
next year’s requirements. Such in brief is the present form of
financial control in Trans- Jordan, which, as already stated, is in
receipt of regular assistance from United Kingdom Parliamentary
Votes (c/. Civil Estimates for 1938, Class II, 9, Sub-Head H.4), and in
grant-aided colonies and territories in the Colonial Empire generally.

(ii) It is obvious that such control is not consistent with
independent sovereignty, and we have, therefore, given some
thought to the possibility of an alternative arrangement. We have
been unable, however, to find any which would be likely to satisfy
the requirements of the Treasury and of Parliament, if the assistance
were to be given in the form of a direct subsidy. At a later stage
in our report (chapter XXI), we shall examine the possibility of
giving such assistance in an indirect form, so that, while Parlia-
mentary authority would be necessary for the amount to be provided
in each year, the credit to be granted to the Arab State would be
determined automatically as part of the constitutional relations
between the new areas after partition.

202

CHAPTER XIX
CUSTOMS

403. Among the matters which we are directed to examine and
report on are customs administration and tariffs. We shall consider
these from two aspects, the economic and the administrative.

1. The Economic Aspect

404. The Royal Commission contemplated that ” the Arab and
Jewish States, being sovereign independent States, would determine
their own tariffs ” (chapter XXII, paragraph 28). They added that
” it would greatly ease the position and it would promote the interests
of both the Arab and Jewish States if they could agree to impose
identical customs duties on as many articles as possible, and if the
Mandatory Government, likewise, could assimilate its customs
duties as far as might be with those of one or both of the two States.
We regard it as an essential part of the proposed Treaty System
that a commercial convention should be concluded with a view to
establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of
imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible interchange of
goods between the three territories concerned ” (ibid, paragraph 29).

405. With the general principles stated by the Royal Commission
we fully agree ; but their application raises a number of questions
which call for careful consideration. It will simplify discussion if we
examine the position of each of the three areas separately.

(i) The Jewish State

406. The development of the Jewish State will be principally in
the form of industrialisation, and accordingly this state may be
expected to pursue a policy of high tariffs, with adequate protection
for-its nascent industries. As regards agricultural products, especially
intensively grown farm produce such as fresh milk and butter,
vegetables and fruit, the Jews will have a difficult choice to make
between protection, in the interests of their agricultural settlers, and
low prices, in the interests of their industrial population ; but wheat,
of which the Jewish farmer in the coastal plain grows little, they will
doubtless wish to buy as cheaply as possible. On the other hanti, it
will be of the utmost importance to them to have an assured domestic
market, without which as a basis for an export trade they cannot hope
to provide employment for additional immigrants in the numbers at
which they are aiming. In a memorandum submitted to us on the
general question of the economic future of the Jewish State, Jewish
witnesses said that what they ” believe to be a practical possibility
is that the Jewish State will supply the Middle Eastern market with
a part of its general industrial requirements and the world market

203

with certain specialities. … It is anticipated that the industrial
development already noticeable will gain momentum with the growth
of the home market for manufactured goods. . . . The expansion
of the home market for local manufactures will, it is thought, create
a broader base for the gradual development of an export trade in
certain lines. But while it is anticipated that the production of
manufactures for export will come in course of time to provide a
fair amount of employment, industrial employment is not necessarily
employment in industries catering “for and dependent upon the
foreign market. The Jewish Agency believes that there is, and will
be for some time to come, ample scope for the replacement in the
home market of imported goods by locally produced manufactures,
protected, where necessary, by tariffs.” In the memorandum quoted
by us in the chapter dealing with the Jewish proposals for the Jewish
State (paragraph 237), responsible Jewish witnesses spoke of ” the im-
perative need …. of comprising within its borders ” (that is the
borders of the Jewish State) ” a population large enough to serve as a
home market for its industries.” That memorandum was written
with the object of proving to us that the area comprised in the Jewish
State under the Royal Commission’s plan, containing a population of
about 600,000 persons already, was far too small for this purpose ;
a fortiori, the Jews would regard the Jewish State under plan C, with
its population of less than 300,000 and its area of about one-quarter
the size of the Jewish State proposed by the Royal Commission, as
altogether inadequate. It does not follow that plan C must be
regarded as impracticable on this ground ; but it does follow that the
Jewish State cannot hope to expand economically, and possibly
cannot even survive, without a larger home market than can be
provided by the population of the state alone.

407. A responsible Jewish witness, whose opinion we had invited
on the possibility of a customs union between the proposed Arab and
Jewish States, told us that an examination of the economic structure
of the Jewish and Arab areas respectively, as proposed by the Royal
Commission, establishes that even under the present conditions of
complete free trade the Arab area offers a relatively small market for
the products, whether agricultural or industrial, of the Jewish area.
He doubted whether, after political separation, trade between the
two areas was likely to expand ; and he concluded that the possibility
of an increase in such trade ought not to be a determining factor in
considering this particular suggestion. On the other hand, he ex-
pressed himself as having no fundamental reluctance to further the
closest possible commercial relations between the Jewish State and
the adjacent countries, including the Arab State. The question put to
him related to the two states as proposed under the Royal Com-
mission’s plan, and he was not asked to consider the possibility of
close commercial relations between the Jewish State and the
Mandated Territories, on the assumption that a much larger and
more important area might be retained under mandate as in plan C.

204

We do not, therefore, feel that his answer excluded the possibility
that, if he had had plan C before him at the time, he would have
recognised the advantage of a commercial agreement in some form
between the Jewish State and the Mandated Territories, in view of the
size and importance of the market offered by them to manufacturers
in that state.

408. As regards the Jewish State, therefore, the position may be
stated thus. The creation of the Mandated Territories as’ a separate
political area has been found to be essential to any scheme of partition
which we can recommend, upon grounds which in our opinion take
precedence of all others. But the creation of those territories, with
their prosperous and increasing Jewish population, as a separate
tariff area, will be a severe blow to the economic prospects of the
Jewish State. It is not, however, a blow which need be regarded as
fatal to plan C, because it is possible to avert it by a customs agree-
ment between the two areas. Such an agreement is, in our opinion,
essential to the economic welfare of the Jewish State, if it is to provide
room for large numbers of additional immigrants.

Whether the need of the Mandated Territories for a customs
agreement with the Jewish State is equally great, we shall consider
in paragraphs 411-412 below.

(ii) The Arab State

409. Left to itself, the Arab State, with its predominantly agri-
cultural population, may be expected to prefer a moderately low
tariff, designed mainly for revenue purposes, but with at least as
much protection as at present for its wheat, barley, olive oil, and
perhaps one or two other agricultural products.* The Arab State,
including Trans- Jordan, will have a large exportable surplus of
wheat, and unless it can find a market for that surplus outside its
territories, its economic situation will be serious, for the domestic
consumers alone cannot absorb the quantity now produced. It may
occasionally happen, as in 1937, that the Syrian wheat harvest
fails while that in Trans- Jordan and Palestine is plentiful, and in
such a year the Arab farmer would be able to sell his wheat at a
good price in the Syrian market. But that would be exceptional.
As a rule, he must find his market in the rest of Palestine. The
produce is taken mostly to Haifa for marketing, but its ultimate
destination we were not able to learn exactly, nor how its ton-
sumption would be distributed between the Jewish State and the
Mandated Territories under plan C. Similarly, as regards the other
surplus agricultural produce, the Arab farmer must find a market
in the rest of Palestine.

* At present, the price of home-grown wheat in both Palestine and
Trans- Jordan is maintained by a sliding-scale duty at a fixed price of
£P.9 per ton. The prices of rye, and of wheat and rye flour, are similarly
fixed by sliding-scale duties. Barley, tomatoes and potatoes are also
protected.

205

410. We are satisfied, therefore, that to the Arab State under
plan C, economic survival depends upon finding a market outside its
borders. We do not go so far as to say that this market must
necessarily include the area of the proposed Jewish State, with its
population of 280,000 ; but we are satisfied that it must include
the Mandated Territories, with their population of 660,000, and
their important urban markets in Haifa and Jerusalem. A customs
agreement of some kind between the Arab State and the Mandated
Territories is, therefore, essential ; but we cannot say that such an
agreement between the Arab State and the Jewish State is essential
to the Arabs, though it may be an advantage to them.

(iii) The Mandated Territories

411. The interests of the Mandated Territories will be mainly
agricultural, but Haifa is already an important industrial centre, and
its industries are likely to expand, as we have seen (chapter X).
In the matter of tariffs, the needs of the Mandated Territories
would seem to be a compromise between those of the Arab State
and of the Jewish State. They will wish to protect their agricultura-
lists in the same way as the former ; but they will also be pressed
by the Haifa manufacturers to afford a considerable measure of
protection for industry, and they will probably find it possible to
grant such protection for a number of articles without raising the
cost of living appreciably for the fellah, who is too poor to buy
many imported goods.

412. Without more exact information than is available as to
the distribution of markets it is not easy to speak with confidence ;
but we are inclined to think that the Mandated Territories could,
if need be, stand alone inside a customs frontier. As a matter of
economic prudence, the Mandated Territories should find it to their
advantage to have their trade with their neighbours hampered as
little as possible by tariff barriers ; but their need of a customs
agreement with either the Jewish State or the Arab State is almost
certainly less insistent than the need of either of those states for an
agreement with them.

2. The Administrative Aspect

413. We turn now to the administrative aspect of the question.
We take it as axiomatic that in a country like Palestine, where the
state boundaries would follow no natural frontier and would run
mostly across dimcult hill country, offering golden opportunities to
the smuggler, it will be to the interest of all three areas to eliminate
customs control as far as possible, not only with a view to facilitating
trade, but also in order to reduce the cost of administration and the
loss of revenue from smuggling. Here again, however, the needs
of the three states will be different : the prevention of smuggling,
for example, will be of most importance to the Jewish State, with.

206

its presumably high tariff, and will hardly concern at all the Arab
State whose duties are not likely to exceed those of its neighbours
except, possibly, on cereals, a commodity not easily smuggled.
Nor is the cost of administration likely to trouble the Arabs as much
as the Jews, although the frontiers of their state are much more
lengthy and difficult to control than those of the Jewish State.
Here also the Mandated Territories are likely to find themselves
in an intermediate position, being less likely to be troubled with
inter-area smuggling than the Jewish State, but having long and
difficult frontiers which it will be necessary, but costly, to control
for revenue purposes.

414. Assuming that some kind of customs agreement is desirable
between each of the three areas, there are three forms on which
it might be modelled : the Palestine-Syrian Agreement ; the
Indo-Burma Agreement ; and the Belgium-Luxemburg Agreement.

(a) The Palestine-Syrian Agreement

415. Under this agreement, there is (save for certain commodities
subject to local excise, and certain other articles mutually agreed
upon) complete free trade between the two countries for goods
manufactured in either country entering the other, whether or not
the primary material used in the industry had been imported from a
foreign country. The two countries are, however, free to fix their
own tariffs on foreign goods ; so that the agreement can only
benefit that country which is able to sell its products to the other
more cheaply than the other can produce itself or buy elsewhere.
The agreement also provides that imports into Syria of foreign goods
on which the Syrian duty is lower than the Palestinian duty shall,
on re-export from Syria into Palestine, be liable to the difference in
duty between the Syrian and the Palestinian duties, and that the duty
collected in Syria shall, on a certificate that the goods have been
received in Palestine, be paid over to Palestine. A reciprocal
arrangement is made by Palestine, and accounts between the two
countries are balanced by monthly payments. It was hoped when
the agreement was made that the provision for the entry into either
country free of duty of goods manufactured locally in whole or in
part from foreign material would be of considerable benefit to Pales-
tine’s young industries, but these hopes have not been fulfilled, and
the agreement has proved to be of far greater benefit to Syria than
to Palestine.

(b) The Indo-Burma Agreement

416. This agreement, made under the India and Burma Trade
Regulation Order in Council, 1937, was designed to prevent the
dislocation of trade which, if, after the separation of Burma from
India, both countries were left free from the outset to fix their own
tariffs, might be caused in the trade of the two countries which had
hitherto passed freely from one to the other. It was recognized

207

that, notwithstanding the disturbance of their domestic economy,
which might follow from the imposition of barriers on trade and
immigration between the two countries, revenue requirements
might be so strong as to induce them to impose duties on goods
imported from each other.

Accordingly it was decided, by agreement, to recommend that,
for an initial period of three years, free trade between Burma and
India should be continued, and the preferential position of India
in the Burmese market and of Burma in the Indian market should
be maintained. So the Order in Council which gives effect to the
agreement maintains,- during the currency of the agreement, free
trade between India and Burma, and provides that, during this
period, neither country can, without the consent of the other, be
deprived of the preferential position which each now enjoys for
its produce or manufactures in the market of the other. But
either country is free, as regards goods which are not produced or
manufactured in the other country, to reduce or abolish its duties
on foreign imports, after two months’ notice. And either country
is free to raise its duties against such imports if it wishes to do so.
There is, of course, nothing to prevent the agreement from being
renewed after the three years have elapsed, but that would only be
possible by agreement between the two countries.

(c) The Belgium-Luxemburg Agreement

417. This agreement provides not only for complete freedom of
trade, but for complete identity of tariffs, between the two countries.

418. How then can the tariff needs of the three areas, as described
in the earlier parts of this chapter, best be satisfied ? It is obvious
in the first place that, assuming the states to be sovereign and
independent, with the right to determine their own tariffs, this
can only be done by agreements freely entered into on both sides,
and subject to determination on specified terms. It would no
doubt be possible, as in the case of the Indo-Burma Agreement,
to provide in advance of the establishment of the new states
that certain arrangements shall remain in force for a limited
period, with the object of preventing immediate dislocation of trade
and of giving the new administrations a lead in a desired direction.
But such a period should preferably be short, and certainly could
not be continued indefinitely without depriving the states of one
of the chief characteristics of sovereignty, the right of fiscal self-
determination.

419. Secondly, if our analysis of the economic position of the
Jewish State was correct, two things are necessary to satisfy its
tariff needs : first, freedom of trade within as large an area as
possible ; and secondly, an assured market within as large an area
as possible. Neither condition alone will satisfy its requirements
for the economic expansion at which it aims, it needs both.

208

420. That means that agreements between the Jewish State and
the Mandated Territories on the lines of the Palestine-Syrian or the
Indo-Burma models are not enough to provide for the economic
expansion of the Jewish State. Under the former, the Jewish State
could not hope to obtain protection for its own industries except as
regards such articles as the Mandated Territories also produced or
wished to produce ; while the latter would only be satisfactory 11 each of
the areas concerned were content with the margin of preference already
enjoyed by its manufacturers in the other area under the pre-separa-
tion tariff : it is not appropriate to the needs of a state, such as the
Jewish State, which intends to introduce immediately after partition
a much larger degree of protection for its industries, and wishes that
protection to extend over a larger area than its own state. And
neither of these forms of agreement could give more than a temporary
protection. Indeed nothing short of the Belgium-Luxemburg
agreement, with complete free trade and with the assurance of a
tariff that will give it an adequate measure of protection over the
whole area covered by the agreement can really satisfy the needs
of the Jewish State.

421. The Arab State, as we have already seen, does not require
any trade agreement with the Jewish State in order to preserve
it from economic difficulties, but it does require an agreement with
the Mandated Territories. Its special needs would probably be
satisfied by an agreement on the Palestine-Syrian model; but on
general grounds it would be better served by an agreement which
got rid entirely of all customs barriers.

422. The Mandated Territories on their part have no special
need of a trade agreement with either of the states, although on
general grounds it would be to their advantage to eliminate any causes
of interference with trade and to escape the cost of a customs barrier.
But the economic position of this area does not seem to be such that
it would be justified, in the interests of its own inhabitants, in
making any tariff sacrifice for the sake of agreement with either of
the other areas. ‘ »

423. So far as the Arab State is concerned, however, it would
seem that the Mandated Territories would be making no sacrifice
if they were to enter into a trade agreement with that state, and that,
on general grounds, it would be to the advantage of both areas that
such an agreement should be one which ensured complete freedom of
trade and eliminated customs barriers. That can only be provided by
an agreement on the Belgium-Luxemburg model, with complete
identity of tariffs by agreement between the Arab State and the
Mandated Territories. If tariffs are to be fixed by agreement, one
side must obviously be prepared on occasion to give way to the other ;
and it is probable that the Arab State will not be in a position to
insist on its views prevailing over those of the Mandated Territories
in a matter of this kind. But so long as provision is made in the

209

agreement for its being determined under certain conditions by
either party, we do not think that this fact should be regarded as
inconsistent with the fiscal independence of the Arab State.

424. It would seem necessary, therefore, that it should be a
provision of the Treaty with the Arab State that there shall be
(i) identity of tariffs, and (ii) complete freedom of trade between the
Mandated Territories and the Arab State, to continue indefinitely,
subject to the right of the Arab State to give notice of termination,
if it thinks fit, after not less than, say, ten years.

425. This would dispose of the awkward question, whether Jaffa
ought not to be treated for tariff purposes as part of the Jerusalem
Enclave, notwithstanding that the tariffs for the enclave and the
Arab State generally might not be identical (Royal Commission,
chapter XXII, paragraph 29). If the suggested arrangement were
carried out the question will not arise.

426. Under this arrangement there would be no need of any
customs control between the Mandated Territories and the Arab
State, except for the purpose of statistical record with a view to the
allocation of duty between the two areas. Even this, moreover, will
not be necessary if it should be decided to allocate customs revenue
in accordance with an automatic formula as suggested below.

427. It remains to consider how the Jewish State should be
provided for. We have said that the Government of the Mandated
Territories would not be justified, against the interests of their own
inhabitants, in making any sacrifice for the benefit of either the
Jewish or the Arab State ; and the case against doing so will be
still stronger if the Arab State is included with the Mandated
Territories in a single customs union. On the other hand the value
to the Jewish State of the market afforded by the two areas together
will be pro tanto greater ; for, notwithstanding the remarks of the
Jewish witness quoted earlier in this chapter, we think that the right
of access to the Arab market after partition may be considered as
potentially of some value.

428. Such being the case, it seems only reasonable that the Jews
should be asked to make some contribution in return for the
advantages they will secure by joining the union formed by the
other two areas. That contribution should, we think, be arranged
in the following way. The whole of the customs duties of Palestine
and Trans- Jordan should be collected by a single customs service,
responsible to a central authority consisting of representatives of all
three areas, and should be paid into a central fund under the control
of that authority. Out of the fund would be paid the expenses of
the central authority itself and of the customs service, and any other
charges which it might be decided to meet from that source (as
to which we shall have further proposals to make) ; and the residue
should be apportioned between the several areas in accordance with
an agreed formula designed to produce the desired result.

210

429. On this hypothesis, it would follow that, as with the Arab
State, the Treaty with the Jewish State should provide for a customs
union between the Jewish State and the Mandated Territories and
(so long as the Arab State forms a customs union with the latter) with
the Arab State, to continue indefinitely subject to the right of the
Jewish State to give notice of termination after not less than ten
years ; and that the fiscal policy of the union should be settled by a
tariff board on which all three areas should be represented in equal
numbers, the chairman being the High Commissioner himself or his
nominee. Each of the areas would be bound by the treaty to give
effect to the decisions of the board.

430. At this point several objections may be raised on behalf of
the Jews.

First, it may be asked — if this agreement is as much in the
interests of the Jews as is contended, why not leave it to them to
press for it instead of forcing it upon them by treaty ? If they do
so, that will be the test of their willingness to pay the price, whatever
it may be, for the privilege of joining the proposed union.

Secondly, it may be pointed out that the Jewish State repre-
sentatives on the tariff board will always be liable to be outvoted,
so that even within the area of this larger market, they will not be
able to study their own interests. They will have to compromise with
the other areas, and in the result the tariff policy of the proposed
union cannot be expected to possess that flexibility and forcefulness
which are essential to the rapid industrial expansion of the Jewish
State.

431. These objections cannot be answered without reference to
the financial situation as we have described it in chapter XVIII. In
that chapter we saw that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we
might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self-
supporting. In round figures, and without making any provision! for
the cost of defence, the Arab State would be faced with a deficit of
about £P.6 10,000 per annum, which would have to be made good by
the United Kingdom, while the Jewish State would be in receipt of a
surplus of about £P.600,000. In addition, the United Kingdom
Government would be obliged, in accordance with recognized practice,
to vote grants of £P.460,000 in order to enable the Government of the
Mandated Territories to balance its budget. It is impossible to
regard such a situation as satisfactory from the standpoint of the
British taxpayer ; and we could not be content to omit from our
plan any proposal which offered a reasonable opportunity for adjusting
a financial balance so unfavourable to the United Kingdom. In
chapter XVIII we gave our reasons for thinking that it was not
possible to require the Jewish State to make a direct subvention to
the Arab State, and we adhere to that conclusion. But those argu-
ments do not hold good against a business arrangement such as we
now propose, in which the contribution which the Jews would be asked

211

to make would be in consideration of value received, in the shape
of the right of free entry to the market afforded by the Mandated
Territories and the Arab State — a market in which they would
otherwise be treated in the same way as any other foreign state.

432. As regards the second objection, it would seem that from the
tariff standpoint the development of Jewish industry is not likely
to be seriously hampered by a customs union, for the following
reasons — (a) In the interests of the Haifa industrial zone, the
Mandated Territories might not be opposed in principle to a protec-
tive tariff, (b) The fellaheen, who form the great majority of the
population of the Arab State, are too poor to buy any but a very
few imported articles, and would not be likely to suffer if a protective
duty were imposed on many articles which the Jewish State would
like to manufacture under protection, (c) The Arab State under a
formula such as we have in mind for the allocation of revenue would
have a direct interest in the prosperity of the Jewish State, and might
be not unwilling to support Jewish policy designed to that end.
(d) A protective tariff would be of little use to the Jewish manu-
facturers so long as they have only a small domestic market and must
rely mainly on exports. It is the large and assured home market
that is essentia] to them if they are to expand their output.

433. The objections which we have supposed to be put to us may
also be answered in general terms. The Jews cannot, of course, be
forced to enter a customs union against their will, any more than they
can, presumably, be forced to set up an independent Jewish State
against their will. But they can be told the terms on which
His Majesty’s Government are willing to introduce a plan of partition.
In our opinion, one of those terms should be the provision in the
treaty for a customs union between the three areas, subject to an
apportionment of net surplus customs revenue in accordance with a
formula to be agreed. The exact nature of the formula would, we
suggest, be a matter for negotiation between His Majesty’s
Government and representatives of the Jews and Arabs ; but
in chapter XXI below we have set out in detail the results of
the particular formula which we worked out for our own guidance,
and which seemed to us equitable.

434. As will be shown in that chapter, we do not claim that,
even with this formula, plan C is entirely satisfactory from either
the financial or the economic standpoint. We can only say that
in drawing the boundaries we have thought it right to give priority
to political considerations, and that it is better that the Jews should
suffer certain financial and economic restrictions than that large
numbers of Arabs should be subjected to alien domination in a
Jewish State.

435. There remain, however, two important constitutional points
which must be taken into consideration before the arrangements
suggested in this chapter can be regarded as satisfactory. The first is

212

mainly a matter for the League of Nations. Article 18 of the present
Mandate lays down the principle that there shall be no discrimination
in Palestine against the nationals, companies, ships, aircraft, or goods
of states-members of the League. If that Article were included
in the new Mandate for the Mandated territories, it would be
impossible for those territories to be included in the suggested
customs union without the same restriction being applied to the
whole area. The Royal Commission, however, took the view that
the provisions of Article 18 are out of date ; and it is certain that
the Jews, who have long pressed for an alteration of that Article,
would hold that their industrial development in the new state was •
being unfairly hampered if they are given no greater measure
of freedom under the new conditions than the Palestine Govern-
ment now possesses under the Mandate. It would therefore seem
to be a necessary condition of the formation of a customs union
including the Mandated Territories that under the new Mandate
those territories should be given the same freedom as other
countries to make their own commercial bargains with the rest of
the world.

436. The second point concerns His Majesty’s Government only.
If a customs union is to be formed between the Mandated Territories
and the Arab and Jewish States under conditions which are to be
consistent with the sovereign independence of those states, the
Mandatory Government will be liable to have its fiscal policy dictated
by a combination of the Arab and Jewish representatives, who will
form a majority on the tariff board. In this respect the Mandatory
Government could not claim greater privileges than the other
members of the union if these are to be sovereign states : it could
not be given a majority voting power without infringing the fiscal
independence of those states ; and it could not claim the right to
reject, for its own territory, a decision of the majority without
conceding the same right to the others and thereby rendering
impossible the operation of the common tariff scheme. Such an
arrangement between a mandated territory and an independent
foreign state or states would be, so far as we know, unique, and
would give rise to constitutional difficulties which might be regarded
as insuperable. In particular it would leave the financial position of
the Mandated Territories precarious, since the policy of the tariff
board might be in conflict with the revenue needs of the Mandatory
Government, and the latter might therefore be obliged to ask the
United Kingdom Government for a larger measure of financial
assistance than would be necessary if the Mandatory Government
were free to determine its own fiscal policy.

We shall return to this difficult question in chapter XXI, when
we examine the financial consequences of the whole scheme.

213

CHAPTER XX

PUBLIC DEBT AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

437. Our terms of reference require us to examine and report
upon the economic and financial questions involved in partition,
including —

(ii) (a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between
the various areas of the public assets and public debt of Palestine,
and other “financial obligations legitimately incurred by the
Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate ”
referred to in Article 28 thereof ; and

(b) means to ensure that the financial obligations referred
to above will be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28
of the Mandate.

438. In this chapter we deal only with the public debt and other
financial obligations of Palestine, leaving the allocation of public
assets to be considered on a later occasion.

439. Apart from certain minor items which we do not think it
necessary to deal with now, the financial obligations with which we
are concerned consist of four items only —

(i) the Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan,
1942-47, of which the amount issued and outstanding is
£4,475,000;

(ii) the liability of the Trans- Jordan Government under a
settlement reached with the Ottoman Public Debt Council,
for its share of the Ottoman Public Debt and certain sums
outstanding on this account under Article 55 of the Treaty
of Lausanne ;

(iii) the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities,
of which mention is expressly made in Article 28 of the Mandate ;
and

(iv) the liability of the Palestine Government for a contri-
bution towards the cost of the Empire Air Mail Scheme.

440. The wording of our terms of reference implies that it was
your predecessor’s intention that both the public assets and the
public liabilities of the Palestine Government should, in general,
be taken over by the successor Administrations as a matter of
principle, and that all that is required of us is to recommend an

214

equitable basis of apportionment, as far as apportionment may be
necessary. That appears to us to be the right principle to apply
in such a case, and to be in conformity with precedent (for example,
the apportionment between the Governments of the Irish Free State
and of Northern Ireland of public assets and liabilities relating to
Ireland). It has been suggested to us, however, as an alternative,
that, instead of regarding the existing Government as being taken
over by the successor Administrations as a going concern, we should
regard it as a concern to be wound up, the present Administration
retaining full responsibility for the liabilities as well as full rights
of proprietorship in the assets, which it will then sell to the incoming
Administrations at an agreed valuation. We are not aware of any
precedent for this procedure, which is, moreover, open to two
obvious objections. First, the present Administration, the Govern-
ment of Palestine, will cease to exist, and will, therefore, have no
resources out of which to discharge the liabilities which it would be
supposed to take over. In effect, the arrangement would result in
transferring the liability to His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom ; but we see no good reason for this, and considerable
objections to it. And secondly, the valuation of the assets would
be likely to give rise to dispute between the parties, the one contending
that the basis of valuation should be the present earning capacity
or value as a going concern, and the other that it should be the
original cost. Anything short of the original cost of any item provided
out of borrowed monies would obviously mean a free gift by His
Majesty’s Government to the new Administrations, for which we
can see no justification ; while if the original cost basis is accepted,
there is little advantage in the ” winding-up ” procedure over that
of the ” going concern.” We, therefore, recommend that the principle
to be adopted should be that of the transfer to the new Administra-
tions, in general, of the assets and liabilities of the existing Palestine
Government.

441. As regards the basis of allocation between the new Adminis-
trations, the natural principle would be to relate the liabilities as far
as possible to the physical assets acquired thereby, and to apportion
both liabilities and assets between the several areas according to
the distribution of the physical assets. The whole of the proceeds
of the loan of 1927, with the exception of the cost of raising the
loan itself, was devoted to the acquisition or provision of physical
assets which can be identified, and as far as these liabilities are
concerned, therefore, an apportionment in accordance with the
aforesaid principle should not be difficult. But an apportionment
of pension charges, particularly of charges arising directly out of
partition, is a different matter, and is likely to give rise to disputes,
which we should prefer to avoid if possible. We shall return
to the question of apportionment of liability later in this chapter
(paragraph 450), when we have considered how to provide means for
ensuring that these financial obligations shall be duly honoured.

215

1. The Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, 1943-67

442. This consists of £4,475,000 of 5 per cent, stock, of which
the principal and interest are guaranteed by the Treasury under
the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 1926 (16 and 17 Geo. V,
chapter 62). The issue was made in London in November, 1927,
at an issue price of £100 10s. Od. per cent. The prospectus stated
that the stock would be paid off, at par, on the 1st November, 1967,
but that the Palestine Government reserved to themselves the right
to repay the loan at par on any half-yearly interest date on and
after the 1st November, 1942, on giving three months’ notice. The
Palestine Government undertook to provide a sinking fund approved
by the British Treasury as sufficient to provide for the repayment
of the loan on the due date. The approved amount is at present
£58,548 per annum ; and the amount accumulated, with interest
to the 5th July, 1938, is in round figures £522,000.

443. The object of the loan was to raise a sum not exceeding
£4,500,000 of which part was to be spent on the construction of a
harbour at Haifa, on the improvement of the port of Jaffa and on
railway capital improvements and public works. Of the remainder,
£1,000,000 was to be paid to His Majesty’s Government for railway
and other capital assets taken over by the Palestine Government and
the balance was to be used partly to defray the cost of raising the
loan and partly to repay money temporarily advanced and spent on
railway equipment and improvement, on other public works, and
on the acquisition of the Jaffa- Jerusalem railway. The following
table shows the amounts authorized to be spent on these services
by Parliament under the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act,
and the actual expenditure in accordance with a revised allocation
as approved by the Treasury and the Secretary of State —

Allocation Actual

authorised expenditure

by the to

Act o/1926. 31/3/1938.

Service. £P. £P.

1. Railways 1,640,000 1,639,021

2. Purchase of Railway and other Capital

Assets from His Majesty’s Govern-
ment 1,000,000 1,000,000

3. Harbour Construction and Port

Improvements 1,115,000 1,489,032

4. Public Buildings, Telegraphs and

Telephones, surveys, minor works
of development, and the raising of

the loan . . 745,000 369,071

£P.4,500,000 £P.4,497,124

216

The allocation of items 3 and 4, as finally approved by the
Treasury and Secretary of State, was —

£P-

Item 3. Haifa Harbour Construction .. . . 1,210,412
Jaffa Port Improvements . . . . 278,870

1,489,282

,, 4. Telegraph and Telephones . . . . 188,127
Government Offices and Construction

and Equipment of Printing Press . . 60,642

Cost of raising loan . . . . . . 120,303

£P.369,072

444. The prospectus stated that the principal and interest and
the sinking fund payments were secured upon the general revenu.es
and assets of the Government of Palestine with priority over any
charges thereon not existing at the date of the passing of the
Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 1926, namely the 15th December,
1926. The prospectus went on to give the figures for the revenue
and expenditure of the Palestine Government for the five previous
years.

445. It is necessary to consider (a) the position of those who lent
the money to the Palestine Government ; (b) the position of the
British Treasury as guarantors of the loan ; and (c) the question of
finding means to ensure that the financial obligations thus legitimately
incurred by the Palestine Government shall be fully honoured after
partition.

(a) The Position of the Lenders

446. Those who subscribed their money for the loan did so on
a two-fold security : the security of all the revenues and assets of
the Palestine Government ; and the security of the Consolidated
Fund of the United Kingdom under the guarantee of the British
Treasury. It is true that the prospectus lays stress upon the nature
and reality of the former ; but so far as the lender is concerned, it
is difficult to deny that in this case the greater comprehends the less,
and that few of the lenders are likely to have troubled themselves to
consider what was the value of the former security, knowing that,
whether it was good or bad, they were completely protected by the
latter.* We do not think therefore, that the lenders of the money

* We understand that the arrangements made by the Treasury and the
Bank of England in the case of a loan guaranteed by the Treasury are such
that, whatever happens to the borrower, there can be no default, even
momentarily, so far as the lender is concerned : the Treasury guarantee
operates automatically and instantly.

217

would have any equitable ground of complaint if the liability for
the principal and interest of the loan were apportioned among the
three Administrations, and in place of the security afforded by the
revenues and assets of the whole of Palestine, there were substituted,
for each portion of the loan, the security of the revenues and assets
of one of the three Administrations. Nevertheless it may be said
that technically there has been an alteration of the contract, which
may necessitate legislation. We think that we may properly leave
the question to His Majesty’s Government.

(b) The Position of the British Treasury

447. On the other hand it is clear that the substitution for the
original prior security for the loan of the several revenues and
assets of the successor Administrations would substantially affect
the position of the Treasury as guarantor. The security afforded
by the revenues and assets of the Jewish State may be ample cover
for the portion of the loan which is allocated to that state ; but it
is obvious from the forecasts of the budgetary position of the Arab
State and the Mandated Territories that neither of those Administra-
tions would be able to meet, out of their own resources, any part of
their liabilities in respect of the portions of the loan allocated to them,
and that the whole cost, both of interest and sinking fund, would,
therefore, fall on the United Kingdom Exchequer. In this respect,
however, there would be no real difference between this particular
liability and the other budgetary expenses which create deficits for
both those Administrations ; and the effect of this particular trans-
action would become merged in the general question of the financial
effects of partition, which we discussed in chapter XVIII. If,
however, it should be found possible to substitute for these separate
charges some arrangement for the payment of the whole of the
existing public obligations of Palestine out of a single central fund
with priority over all other charges, that would obviously be
preferable. Here again, however, the legal position would seem to
require careful consideration by His Majesty’s Government : since
the suggested arrangement would involve the substitution of a
new security for that upon which the Treasury were authorised to
give their guarantee.

(c) Means to ensure that the financial obligations of each
Administration shall be duly honoured

448. Fortunately the machinery for such an arrangement could
be readily provided as a part of the scheme for a customs union which
we have described in chapter XIX (Customs) ; and this arrangement
would automatically provide the means to ensure that all the
financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Palestine Govern-
ment shall be duly honoured. The details of the arrangement are
described more particularly in chapter XXI (Finance, Part II).

218

449. But while it would be possible in this way to ensure that’ all
the obligations in question are fully and promptly met, without calling
upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom to meet any
part of them under the Treasury guarantee, the arrangement for
paying these charges out of a central fund does not in itself dispose
of the question of apportioning the liability between the several
new Administrations. There are two ways in which that question
might be settled. One would be to make an exact apportionment
of the several liabilities, on whatever basis might seem most appro-
priate (e.g., in the case of public debt, on the basis of the situation
of the physical assets acquired or provided out of the proceeds of
the loan), and to take those liabilities into account in apportioning
to each Administration its share of the net surplus of the central
fund. The other would be to make no attempt to apportion the
liabilities in detail, but to apportion the whole of the net surplus
of the fund in accordance with whatever formula is decided upon for
that purpose : in other words, to apportion the financial obligations
in accordance with that same formula.

450. The latter is simple and convenient, and gets rid of the
difficult task of apportioning the various financial obligations in
detail. We recommend that it should be adopted for all those
obligations, with one exception. That exception is the liability for
the Trans- Jordan Government’s share of the Ottoman Public Debt,
which, for the reasons given in paragraph 454, we think should be
dealt with separately.

451. To anticipate the arrangement described in chapter XXI, we
may state here that the effect of that arrangement is to apportion
all the liabilities in question, excluding the Trans- Jordan debt, in
equal shares between the three Administrations ; and it is on this
basis that the budgetary forecasts in chapter XVIII have been
prepared.

452. The Treasury have power, under section 25 of the Finance
Act, 1934 (24 and 25 Geo. V, cap. 32), to guarantee the interest
and sinking fund of a new loan to be raised for the purpose of redeem-
ing before maturity a loan already guaranteed by them, provided
that the amount required to pay the interest on the new, or conver-
sion, loan is less than the amount payable for interest on the old
loan, and that the Treasury are satisfied that the substitution of
the guarantee of the conversion loan for that of the old loan will
benefit the Exchequer. Inasmuch as the liability for the shares
in the loan charges allocated to the Arab State and the Mandated
Territories will fall, directly or indirectly, on the Treasury, it would
seem that this is a case in which the Treasury would be empowered
to guarantee a conversion loan, and would no doubt decide to do
so if market conditions should permit. It is, of course, impossible
to foresee what reduction in the Treasury’s liability may be brought
about in this way.

219

2. The Liability of the Trans-Jordan Government for their
Share of the Ottoman Public Debt

453. This liability consists of an undertaking by the Trans-
Jordan Government under an agreement dated the 29th July, 1936,
between that Government and the Ottoman Debt Council for the
settlement of the liability of the Government of Trans- Jordan for
its share of the Ottoman Public Debt under the Treaty of Lausanne.
The agreement provides for the payment to the Ottoman Public
Debt Council of twenty half-yearly instalments of £15,504 6s. 9d.,
payable at the end of May and November in each year beginning
with 1936. Thus by the 31st March, 1939, six instalments will have
been met. The balance outstanding after that date will be £217,061,
and will be fully paid off by the 31st March, 1946. In order to enable
the Government of Trans- Jordan to meet this agreed liability, it
has been necessary to ask Parliament in each year to provide
equivalent amounts, at the rate of £31,008 13s. Gd. per annum,
by way of a loan-in-aid to Trans- Jordan. As stated on the face
of the estimates,* the loan is to be upon terms to be prescribed by
the Treasury, but we understand that so long as Trans- Jordan is
in receipt of a grant-in-aid for ordinary purposes the question of
prescribing terms is likely to remain in abeyance.

454. If Trans- Jordan is included in the Arab State, it would be
necessary, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary,
for arrangements to be made to treat this liability in the same way as
the other financial obligations of the Palestine Government, that is
for payment to be made through the proposed central fund, the
effect being, as explained above, that the liability would be shared
equally between the three Administrations. But we think that it
would be difficult to justify the imposition of any share in this
liability upon the areas which formerly comprised the territory of the
Palestine Government, since that Government has already dis-
charged its liability for its own share of the Ottoman Public Debt,
and the effect of such an arrangement would, therefore, be to make
the taxpayer in those areas make a second contribution to the
Ottoman Debt Council. We, therefore, think that as a matter of
equity this item must be treated separately. It would be possible
to arrange for it to be paid out of the central fund notwithstanding,
but debited wholly to the Arab State. But this would merely
introduce an awkward complication into the formula which
we propose in the following chapter for the allocation of the net
surplus revenue of the central fund ; and the British Treasury would
gain nothing thereby, since they would be obliged, under the same
formula, to take account of this debit in etimating the amount of
assistance to be given to the Arab State. We recommend, therefore,
that this liability should be taken over directly by the British

* Civil Estimates of the United Kingdom, 1938, CI. II. 9. Subhead H.4.
(Colonial and Middle Eastern Services.)

220

Treasury, and either discharged by a lump sum payment, suitably
discounted ; or met by direct payment of the outstanding instalments
to the Ottoman Debt Council out of moneys which Parliament
should be asked to provide for the purpose as required. In effect, nq,
new liability will be imposed on the Treasury under this arrangement,
since we can see no prospect whatever of the present Government
of Trans- Jordan ever being in a position to repay the so-called loan
now being made to them by the Treasury for this purpose : for all
practical purposes it may be regarded as a free gift.

3. The Bights of Public Servants to Pensions or Gratuities

455. Article 28 of the Mandate reads as follows —

In the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby
conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of
Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed
necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of
the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall
use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League,
that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial
obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of
Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights
of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

456. The article does not define further the ” rights of public
servants to pensions or gratuities ” ; but, following recent precedents,
we conceive the term to mean (a) the right of public servants to be
paid, fully and punctually, the pensions or gratuities earned by them,
under their existing conditions of service, in respect of service in
Palestine prior to partition ; and (b) the right to such additional
payments, if any, as may be deemed fair and reasonable in com-
pensation for their premature retirement from service by reason of
partition or for any radical change in their conditions of service
caused by partition.

• 457. We do not propose at this stage to make detailed recom-
mendations regarding the rights to be given to Palestine civil
servants under head (b). In the meantime it will be enough to
estimate the liability of the new Administration under both (a)
and (b), and to recommend how means may be provided for meeting
this estimated liability.

458. The Treasurer of Palestine has furnished us with such an
estimate, based on certain assumptions as regards (i) the average ages,
salaries and length of service of the existing staff ; (ii) the proportion
of such staff who will retire on partition ; and (iii) the rates of
special compensation which will be payable to officers whose service
in an Administration under the Mandatory Power is terminated or
whose conditions of service in future are radically changed. We
have not at this stage examined critically any of these assumptions,

221

and must not be understood to have accepted any of them,
particularly the third. For our present purpose it is enough to
accept the Treasurer’s estimate as a rough indication of what the
liability may be expected to be at its highest. The estimate is for a
total average liability, on an annuity basis, over the first ten years
after partition, of about £P.250,000 per annum, including the
£P.72,800 now in course of payment. Under the arrangements
which we have proposed already in this chapter, any part of this
liability as it falls due will be met from the proposed central fund,
and the net effect will be that each Administration will contribute
one-third of the cost. In our opinion it is neither necessary nor
desirable to attempt to apportion the liability upon any other basis.

4. The Liability of the Palestine Government under the Empire

Air Mail Scheme

459. The Governments of Palestine and Trans- Jordan have
agreed to participate in the Empire Air Mail scheme, under which
all first class mail exchanged between participating countries is
carried by air without surcharge. The scheme came into force in
so far as Palestine and Trans- Jordan are concerned at the beginning
of March, 1938, when the non-surcharge system was extended to
the England-India-Malaya air route, and will continue in force for a
period of 15 years from the 28th July, 1938, when the scheme was
extended to Australia and came into full operation.

460. Under the scheme, His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom have contracted to pay, under the authority of the Air
Navigation Act, 1936, certain subsidies to Imperial Airways Limited
in consideration of their undertaking to provide improved, accelerated,
and more frequent services for the carriage of all first-class air mail
as required by the scheme ; and in addition the company will
receive, as remuneration for the carriage of mails, a minimum payment
of £900,000 per annum during the period of the agreement. The
general effect is that this payment, representing the postal contribu-
tions of the United Kingdom and the other participating countries,
will be made by His Majesty’s Postmaster-General from the Post
Office Vote, the amounts of the postal contributions .received by
him from participating countries being brought to account as an
appropriation-in-aid of that Vote.

461. The Government of Palestine and Trans- Jordan have agreed
to make a joint postal contribution of £P. 12,000 per annum for
the whole period of the scheme, the Trans- Jordan share being
assessed at £P.50 per annum. In addition, Palestine has agreed
to make a special additional payment of £P. 1,928 per annum in
lieu of the privilege of exemption from landing and housing charges
at aerodromes in Palestine, which other countries have been required
to grant to the operating company as a condition of participating
in the scheme.

222

462. The total liability of the two Governments under the scheme
is therefore ^P. 13,928 per annum, and we are informed that, as far
as can be foreseen at present, this will continue unchanged for the
whole period of 15 years from the 28th July, 1938.

463. In our opinion this is a financial obligation legitimately
incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of
the Mandate, which must continue to be honoured after the surrender
of the Mandate ; and we consider that the best means of ensuring
that this shall be done is to provide for the payment of this amount
from the central fund, as proposed in this chapter.

223

CHAPTER XXI

FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART II).

464. In chapter XIX (Customs) we considered the possibility
of a customs union between the Arab and Jewish States and the
Mandated Territories, to be entered into by treaty for an initial
period of ten years. The object of this union would be twofold :
first, it seemed to us that without the assured market for their
produce which the Mandated Territories would afford, the economic
situation of the Arab state, and the prospect of economic expansion
in the Jewish state, would be precarious ; and, secondly, we felt
that the financial effects of partition, as disclosed in chapter XVIII,
were so unsatisfactory that we ought to take advantage of any
proposal which seemed to offer a prospect of improving the financial
position of the Arab State, and therewith of reducing the liability
of the British Treasury. The idea of a customs union seemed to offer
such an opportunity, for it seemed to us that it would be fair and
reasonable to require the Jewish State, in return for the advantages
of an assured market in the whole of Palestine and Trans- Jordan
which the scheme would offer them, to sacrifice some portion of the
customs revenue contributed by the taxpayers in the Jewish State,
with a view to rectifying, at least partially, the disparity between
the budgetary prospects of the Arab and the Jewish States, and to
agree to a formula for allocating the net surplus customs revenue
between the three areas so as to produce this result. At the same
time we observed that, whatever the exact formula might be, the
financial situation might still be unsatisfactory, and in the last
paragraph of the chapter we noted one particular factor in
the scheme as outlined which, besides giving rise to possible
constitutional difficulties, might jeopardize the financial position
of the Mandated Territories.

465. We will now consider the operation of a possible formula
and then, in the light .of the financial results and of the possible
consequences of the factor referred to above, estimate whether the
proposed customs union can be regarded as affording a satisfactory
solution of the financial difficulties of partition.

466. We desire again to make it clear that the formula which
we have tentatively considered should be regarded rather as a
working hypothesis, intended to illustrate the financial effects of
the customs union proposal, than as a considered recommendation.
We presume that before any final arrangements are made, negotiations
will take place with both Arabs and Jews.

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224

1. Formula A
467. The formula (A) then is as follows —

(i) It would be provided by treaty, as an essential condition
of the surrender of the present Mandate, that the area now
comprising Palestine and Trans- Jordan should, for a period
of at least ten years, form a single customs union, within which
there should be complete and unfettered free trade.

(ii) The tariff policy of the three areas forming the union
would be determined by a central authority consisting of an
equal number of representatives from each area, under the
chairmanship of the High Commissioner or his nominee.

(iii) Each of the areas would be bound by the treaty to give
effect to the decisions of the central authority.

(iv) The customs revenues of the whole union would be
collected by a single customs service, responsible to the central
authority, and paid into a central fund under the control of
that authority.

(v) Out of this fund there would be paid, by the central
authority —

(a) the expenses of the central authority itself ;

(b) the expenses of the customs service ; and

(c) the whole of the financial obligations of the Palestine
Government, consisting of (1) the service of the public debt
of Palestine, (2) the whole cost of any superannuation benefits,
now being paid or falling due in future, attributable to
pre-partition service in Palestine, and (3) the contribution
of the Palestine Government, under its current agreement
with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
towards the Empire Air Mail service.

(vi) After these charges have been met in full, the net
surplus revenue would be paid over by the central authority
to the three Administrations in equal shares.

(vii) Except as provided below, these arrangements would
remain in force for ten years at least, and thereafter would
continue subject to notice of termination by any of the three
Administrations. But the principle of division of the net surplus
revenue into three equal shares would be subject to review
after not less than five years, and would thereafter take such
form as might be agreed.

468. The initial financial effects of this formula, using the figures
given in the Treasurer’s budgetary forecasts as shown in chapter
XVIII, and assuming that Trans- Jordan will form part of the
Arab State, are as follows —

225

(1) The Revenue of the central authority, based on the
1938-39 Estimates, would be—

(i) Customs Duties — £P.

(a) Palestine (after allowing for drawbacks) . . . . 1,815,000

(6) Trans- Jordan 136,000

(ii) Total Revenue 1,951,000

(2) The Expenditure of the central authority would be —

(iii) Expenses of Customs Service —

(a) Palestine 100,472

(6) Trans- Jordan 27,984

(iv) Charges for Public Debt —

Palestine* 283,660

(v) Pension Charges (payable in 1938) —

{a) Palestine 72,775

(6) Trans- Jordan 12,400

(vi) Empire Air Mail Service . . . . . . . . . . 14,000

(vii) Total Expenditure .. 511,291

(viii) Net Surplus Revenue . . . . • 1,439,709

of which one-third is 479,903.

469. Each Administration would therefore receive £P.479,903, or
say£P.480,000, as its share of the customs revenue of the union, in
place of the share attributed to it in the forecast given in chapter
XVIII. In addition it would be relieved of the cost of customs
collection, public debt and other financial obligations included in
the forecast.

470. The consequential adjustments to be made in the budgetary
forecast of each Administration would then be as follows —

Arab State

Revenue.

(i) Customs —

(a) Palestine
(6) Trans- Jordan

{ii) Total Revenue

Expenditure.

(iii) Customs Collection —

[a) Palestine

(6) Trans- Jordan

(iv) Public Debt Charges —

Palestine

(v) Pension Charges—

(a) Palestine

(b) Trans- Jordan . .

(vi) Total expenditure
Total be-

Shown in r . …

forecast of Formula A. ^ M V\

PlanC. orLoss{-)

£P- £?■
213,000
136,000

349,000 480,000 +131,000

12,188
13,265

94,553

24,258
4,133

148,397 — +148,397

lg of budgetary position . . . . +279,397

* Including £P. 13, 140 for Post Office share of charges.
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226

Jewish State

Shown in Gain (+)

Revenue. forecast of Formula A. T „„y \

PlanC. orLoss\-).

£P- £P.

(i) Customs 850,000 480,000 -370,000

Expenditure.

(ii) Customs Collection 43,380

(iii) Public Debt Charges . . . . 94,553

(iv) Pension Charges

(a) Palestine 24,258

(b) Trans-Jordan .. .. 4,133

(v) Total Expenditure 166,324 — +166,324

Net worsening of budgetary position .. .. —203,676

Mandated Territories

(i) Customs . . ‘ 752,000 480,000 -272,000

Expenditure.

(ii) Customs Collection 44,904

(iii) Public Debt Charges

(a) Palestine . . . . 94,554

(b) Trans- Jordan 31,073* 31,073

(iv) Pension Charges

(a) Palestine 24,259

(b) Trans- Jordan 4,133

(v) Total Expenditure .. .. .. 198,923 31,073 +167,850

Net worsening of budgetary position .. .. —104,150

471. The budgetary forecast for the several areas would then

become : — ■

Arab State — £P.

Net deficit as shown in Chapter XVIII 614,000

Deduct total bettering of position as shown in paragraph 470 279,397

Revised deficit 334,603

Jewish State — £P.

Net surplus as shown in Chapter XVIII 592,000

Deduct net worsening of position as shown in paragraph 470 203,676-

Revised surplus .. 388,324

Mandated Territories — • £P.

Net deficit as shown in Chapter XVIII 460,000

Add net worsening of position as shown in paragraph 470 . . 104,150

Revised deficit 564,150

* The intention is, as stated in the chapter on Public Debt, that this
item shall in future be debited to the United Kingdom Exchequer. But
for convenience it is here shown as an item in the budget of the Mandated
Territories, where it will, of course, go to swell the deficiency grant-in-aid.

227

472. But, though the position of the Arab State would thus have
been substantially improved, its budget would still show a deficit of
nearly £P.340,000 ; and before we could regard the proposed customs
union as opening a way to a satisfactory solution of the financial
difficulties of partition, it is necessary to consider whether any
further means might be devised for balancing the budget without
falling back on a direct grant-in-aid from United Kingdom funds,
which, as we pointed out in paragraph 402, would necessitate
Treasury control. The relief so far provided has been partly at the
expense of the Mandated Territories, whose deficit (to be made good
by the British Exchequer) has been increased by over £P. 100,000,
but mainly at the expense of the Jewish State. The arguments in
favour of this have been discussed in chapter XIX (Customs) ;
and we do not think that they would justify an attempt to obtain
a larger contribution from the Jewish State than is provided by the
principle of dividing the net customs revenue into three equal shares,
as suggested in the formula set out in paragraph 467 above. Any
further relief to the Arab State must therefore be provided at the
expense of the British Exchequer ; and the question is whether it
will be possible to devise means of doing so which will be consistent,
as a direct grant from the British Exchequer could not be, with the
natural desire of the Arabs to be free from financial control and to be
able to look forward to some improvement in their public services.

2. Formula B

473. We must admit that there is no really satisfactory solution
of this problem. Nothing can wholly disguise the fact that now
and so far as can be seen in the future, the Arab State will be unable
to support itself out of its own resources. The best that we can hope
to do is to suggest an arrangement which, assuming that it is desired
to pursue the task of settlement along these lines, will fulfil the
conditions indicated above in the manner least open to constitutional
objection. With this object in view we would tentatively suggest
that, while the Jewish share of the net customs revenue should
remain at one-third, the other two-thirds should be treated as the
joint shares of the Arab State and the Mandated Territories, and as
such should be pooled and re-allocated between those two Admini-
strations on the principle that, in addition to the Arab State’s fixed
share of one : third, there should be credited to that state a supple-
mentary share calculated on a formula (B) which would be designed
broadly so as —

(i) to make good, up to an amount to be approved, the
estimated initial deficit in the Arab State’s budget in the first
year after partition ;

(ii) to provide for the abatement of the supplementary share
by regular annual reductions until a point has been reached
when it may be assumed that the budget has received the full

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228

benefit of such economies in administration and such increase,
if any, of revenue, as the Arab State may reasonably be expected –
to make after partition ; •

(iii) to provide for the additional abatement of the supple-
mentary share by one-half of any amount by which the Arab
State’s one-third share of the net customs revenue in any
subsequent year exceeds that share in the first year after
partition.

(iv) to provide for the increase of the supplementary share
in any year by an amount equal to the excess of (a) one-third
of the amount actually charged in that year to the central fund
in respect of pension payments over (b) the amount which was
taken into account, as representing the Arab State’s share of
such charges in the first year after partition, in estimating the
initial deficit of the Arab State under sub-paragraph (i) above.

474. Under this formula the Arab State would be given a revenue
which, subject to the obligation to bring about as quickly as possible
such reduction of expenditure and increase of revenue as it may
reasonably be asked to make, should enable it to balance its budget
so long as the net customs revenue for the union remains at its present
level. If that level falls, the Arab State will of course be worse off,
but it cannot expect to be guaranteed against all contingencies ;
and it may be noted that the level of customs revenue which has been
used for the purpose of these budgetary forecasts is abnormally
low. If, however, the net customs revenue of the union increases,
owing to an expansion of trade and prosperity in the rest of Palestine,
the Arab State would be able to look forward to a share in that
increase, whereas without a customs union its prospect of any
considerable increase in revenue and prosperity within its own
borders is, as we have seen, very remote. While the state would
still be unable to balance its budget from its own resources and
would have to rely upon outside assistance, that assistance would
be given in accordance with a definite formula and under conditions
which, we should hope, would free it from the necessity of submitting
to financial control by a foreign state. Since the various accounting
adjustments to be made between the Mandated Territories and the
Arab State under formula B would be purely automatic, it would
not seem to be necessary that the Arab State should be required
under this arrangement to submit to any form of financial control
by the Treasury, whether by the appointment of a Financial Adviser
or otherwise.

475. In addition, the machinery proposed will enable the central
authority to meet all the financial obligations of the Palestine
Government out of the central fund, as recommended in chapter XX
(Public Debt). Special provision will, however, have to be made to
make good to the Arab State the loss of revenue from which it would
otherwise suffer as the result of charging to the central fund the

229

cost of any further pension charges which may become payable on
account of pre-partition service with the Palestine Government, in
excess of the amount of such charges of which account will have
been taken in estimating the initial deficit in the Arab State’s budget
under sub-paragraph (i) of formula B. Since the effect of this will
be to throw upon the Arab State a charge which it is not within
its power to control or avoid, it is only fair that account should be
taken of it in determining the amount of the supplementary share.
Sub-paragraph (iv) of the formula is designed to give effect to this.

476. So long as it is necessary for His Majesty’s Government
to ask Parliament to vote a grant-in-aid of the Mandated Territories
for the purpose, inter alia, of enabling the Government of those
territories to pay over to the Arab State the appropriate share of
customs revenue under the formula, the arrangement will come
under the notice of Parliament each year, and Parliamentary
authority for each year’s payment to the Arab State will be required,
no less than if Parliament were asked to vote a grant direct to that
state. We understand, however, that an arrangement of this kind,
involving a financial commitment extending over a series of years,
would require in addition the authority of a specific statute.

477. The effect of formulas A and B together may be stated
concisely thus. In the initial year, the liability of the British
Exchequer will be reduced from about £1,250,000 to £1,075,000*. that
is, by about £175,000 per annum. In the future, other things
remaining equal, then under formula B for each increase of £P. 100,000
in the net surplus revenue of the central authority due to expansion
of revenue from the customs union, so long as the Arab State is in
receipt of any supplementary share —

the Arab State will retain

m 100,000 , p1ftfifift
£P. — g — = £P. 16,666

the Jewish State will retain

^lOWOO _ lf 33333

the Mandated Territories will retain

(1 + i) X £P- 100,000 = £P.50,000.

478. To the Arab State and the Mandatory Power, therefore,
the formula offers substantial attractions. The former may look
forward to some expansion of revenue, beyond that attributable

* Made up of (i) grant-in-aid of Mandated Territories (a) to meet their
own normal deficit under formula A, ^564,000, and (b) for the supplementary
share of the Arab State under formula B, ^334,000, total ^898,000, or, say,
^900,000 ; and (ii) grants for development in the Mandated Territories,
^175,000.

(C 31078) 1 4

230

to the modest resources of its own territory, proportionate to and.
dependent upon an increase in the prosperity of the whole of Palestine.
The latter, besides the saving of £175,000 per annum dating from
the initial year, will have a similar interest in the general growth of
prosperity in Palestine, and in addition may look forward to some
relief, from the same source, in the burden of supplementary
assistance which under formula B it will provide for the Arab State.
Too much importance must not be attached, however, to the figures
we have given. It must be remembered that the formula A is put
forward as a working hypothesis ; and while we think that it repre-
sents the utmost that the Jewish State could fairly be asked to
contribute in return for the right of joining the proposed union,
we fully realize that in the course of negotiation some other basis
of contribution may be agreed upon, the financial results of which
would differ from those that we have indicated in this chapter.

479. On the other side of the account there must be set the
following drawbacks —

(i) The future advantages offered to the Arab State and the
Mandatory Power are likely to be provided chiefly at the expense
of the Jewish State, by which the greater part of the assumed
increase in customs revenue is likely to be contributed ; and it
is not possible to foresee how long the formulas will continue to
operate equitably as between the Jewish State and the rest of
Palestine, after making due allowance for the benefit to the
former of an assured market in the territories of the latter.

(ii) The financial position of the Arab State therefore will
still remain precarious. After five years it may be necessary to
modify formula A to the advantage of the Jewish State ; and
after ten years the Jewish State may give notice to put an end
to the customs union altogether. In either event it is likely
that the British Treasury will be asked to come to the rescue,
and to make good the consequential loss to the Arab State ;
and allowance must be made for this risk in estimating the value
of the formula to the Treasury.

480. But a more serious difficulty lies in the fact that, as was
noted at the end of chapter XIX, the scheme of a customs union is
open to constitutional objections. If each of the states-members
of the union was financially self-supporting, we are inclined to think
that these need not be regarded as insurmountable, although we
know of no precedent for an association of this kind between a
mandated territory and a foreign state. But the fact that one of
the members will be financially dependent upon the United Kingdom
Government is, we fear, a fatal objection ; for we cannot suppose
that His Majesty’s Government would acquiesce in a scheme winch
would deprive them of the right to insist on any changes in that

231

member’s fiscal policy which they may think necessary on revenue
grounds as a condition of their continuing to vote a grant-in-aid to
make good the member’s budgetary deficit.

481. Our conclusion on the matters discussed in this chapter and
in chapter XIX is, therefore, as follows — We find that a contribution
such as might under formula A be made by the Jewish State in return
for the advantage of joining a customs union with the Mandated
Territories and the Arab State, will be of considerable benefit while
it lasts to both the Arab State and consequently to the British
Exchequer ; but the exact amount of this benefit will depend upon
the formula ; and it cannot be assumed that formula A will neces-
sarily be adopted. Moreover, the benefit is liable to be modified
after five years, and to be withdrawn entirely after ten. And
finally, while the Arab State cannot hope for economic survival,
nor the Jewish State hope for economic expansion, as independent
states without an assured market in the Mandated Territories, there
are constitutional objections to a customs union between them and
the Mandated Territories, which in view of the financial dependence
of those territories on His Majesty’s Government appear to us to
be decisive.

482. We find ourselves unable, therefore, to recommend a customs
union under these conditions between the Mandated Territories and
the Arab and Jewish States, which will leave unimpaired the
sovereign rights of those states in the matter of fiscal policy. If
partition is carried out, a customs union in some form between the
Arab and Jewish States and the Mandated Territories would seem to
be necessary to preserve the economic stability of the former and to
provide the latter with scope for economic expansion ; but the form
of union would have to be one in which the will of the Mandatory
was enabled to prevail on questions of fiscal policy ; and that would
not be consistent with the proposed grant of independence to the
two states.

232

CHAPTER XXII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

483. In order to explain the form in which we shall present our
conclusions, we find it necessary to say what, in our view, was
intended by our terms of reference. Those terms of reference require
us first to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish
States and Mandated areas which will comply with certain specified
conditions ; and secondly to examine and report on the economic
and financial questions involved in partition. _ In your predecessor’s
despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, to the High Commissioner,
covering our terms of reference, it is expressly said that our functions
will be ” to act as a technical Commission, that is to say (they) will
be confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the
practical possibilities of a scheme of partition ; ” and again ” to
submit to His Majesty’s Government . . . proposals for a detailed
scheme of partition.” After setting out our terms of reference the
despatch goes on to indicate that it will be for His Majesty’s Govern-
ment to decide whether, as a result of our investigations, a scheme
of partition is equitable and practicable. We ourselves are nowhere
directed to report upon the equity or practicability of partition in
general. The majority of us have interpreted these directions to
mean —

(i) that His Majesty’s Government desire us in any case to
produce the best scheme of partition that we can ; but in so far as it
may fail to satisfy any of the specified conditions, or may seem to
be impracticable, to say so and give our reasons ;

(ii) that we are not directed, or entitled, to call in question the
equity or morality of partition as a general principle. We 1 were
appointed as a technical body, and we conceive that we shall best
assist His Majesty’s Government if we are careful not to let our views
on technical matters be coloured by any views that we may have
formed as individuals on the question of principle involved.

Further, we wish to emphasize that the question of practicability
is one of degree, on which it is not possible to express a final
opinion without taking into consideration other matters, such as the
consequences oi rejecting partition and the equity and practicability
of any alternative solution, which were left outside our terms of
reference.

484. In chapters XI, XIII and XIV, we have described, under
the title of plan C, the best plan of partition which we have been
able to devise. We will now summarize, under different heads, the
chief points which in our opinion His Majesty’s Government will
have to take into account in deciding whether this plan can be
regarded as equitable and practicable or not, and will indicate our
views on each.

233

1. The Size of the Proposed Jewish State

485. The Permanent Mandates Commission in their Report to the
Council of the League on the work of their Thirty-second (Extra-
ordinary) Session expressed the opinion that —

Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs
of as small a number as possible o’f the places to which they attach
particular value, either because they are their present homes or for
reasons of religion. And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should
be sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view
of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic
development, and consequently of dense and rapid settlement ….

The facts adduced in our report show that these objectives are
irreconcilable. If the Arabs are to be deprived of the smallest
possible number of their homes, and if the fewest possible Arabs
are to be included in the Jewish State, as our terms of reference
direct, the Jewish State cannot be a large one, nor can it contain
areas capable of development and settlement in the sense which
the Permanent Mandates Commission evidently had in mind. Does
this fact alone render the plan impracticable ? We think not, so
long as provision can be made for the continued immigration of Jews,
subject to control, into the greater part of those areas which we
propose should be retained under British Mandate, and for the develop-
ment of those areas with a view to Jewish settlement therein, also
under control. But this will necessitate heavy expenditure from
public funds on development and other services in the Mandated
Territories, and this expenditure (which we suggest should be
limited to sums not exceeding £1 million on non-recurrent services,
and not exceeding £75,000 per annum for 10 years on recurrent
services) can only be provided by the United Kingdom Government,
since the Government of the Mandated Territories will be unable
anyhow to balance its budget. The effect of this will be considered
below as part of the general problem of finance under partition.

The size of the proposed state as a factor limiting the domestic
market open to Jewish manufacturers will be considered separately
in paragraph 494.

2. The Attitude of the Arabs and the Jews

486. We have said that in our opinion there is a deep-seated
hostility to partition in any form among the Arab population of
Palestine, and that we are convinced that the plan recommended by
the Royal Commission would lead to an outbreak of general rebellion
which could only be put down by stern and perhaps prolonged military
measures. But what will be the Arabs’ reaction to plan C we do
not know. Of the official witnesses whose opinions we sought on
plan C shortly before we left Palestine at the beginning of August,
one took the view that, no matter what plan was adopted, it would
be resisted by the Arabs with violence. None was prepared to say

234

that the Arabs would acquiesce willingly in the plan. Their
evidence was given in camera and in such a form that it would be
undesirable to attempt to convey their views by brief selected
quotations ; but the general impression that we received from the
evidence of those whom we examined on plan C was that, while
none of the witnesses was optimistic, some at least would not exclude
the possibility of a settlement on these lines: We realise, however,
that if they were consulted again to-day, they might take a more
pessimistic view. Unfortunately, no Arab came before us to state
the Arab view, and although plan C demands of the Arabs much less
sacrifice than the other plans which we have considered, we think
the only prudent conclusion is that, until plan C is published, it
is impossible to say what the Arabs’ attitude towards it will be.

487. The resolutions of the Twentieth Zionist Congress at Zurich
in August, 1937, include the following passages —

The Congress rejects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission
that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfilment.
The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the
rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour
Declaration and the Mandate.

The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by
the Royal Commission is unacceptable.

The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations
with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty’s Government
for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.

In such negotiations the Executive shall not commit either itself
or the Zionist Organisation, but in the event of the emergence of a definite
scheme for the establishment of a Jewish State, such scheme shall be
brought before a newly elected Congress for decision.

The Jewish Agency more than once urged that we should take
them into our confidence in order to ensure that any plan which
we might put forward should be such as they would be able to
recommend for acceptance by the Zionist Congress, and they con-
tended that the wording in your predecessor’s despatch ” after
consultation with the local communities ” implied that this was
the intention of His Majesty’s Government. We were unable to
accept this view. If it had been possible to consult representatives
of Arabs as well as of Jews, in the hope of producing a scheme which
was likely to be acceptable to both parties, such consultation in some
form might have been thought desirable. But as matters stood,
that was impossible, and we felt that in the circumstances consulta-
tion as desired by the Jewish Agency would do more harm than
good. We, therefore, confined our consultations with the Jewish
Agency to asking, both orally and in written questionnaires, for their
opinion on any matter on which we felt that it would be of assistance
to us. These matters did not include the detailed proposals under
either plan B or plan C, either as regards the boundaries of the several
areas or the development, with a view to Jewish settlement therein,

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of the areas to be retained under Mandate. In evidence we were
told that the Jews would not be prepared to accept a plan which
gave them a state inadequate for their needs, and in particular
none that did not include Haifa, Galilee, and part of Jerusalem. It
would seem, however, that their final decision must depend upon
what alternative His Majesty’s Government may be prepared to offer
them in the event of their declining partition ; and until that is
known it seems to the majority of us premature to advise you
what that decision is in our opinion likely to be. It is not easy to
see, however, how the establishment of a self-supporting state in
either the Arab or the Jewish area can be regarded as practicable,
whether from the administrative or the political standpoint, if the
community concerned should refuse to accept the offer of independ-
ence under such conditions.

3. The Arab Minority in the Jewish State

488. The Royal Commission assumed that provision would be
made for the transfer of the greater part of the Arab population in
the Jewish State, if necessary by compulsion under a scheme to be
agreed between both states. But in his despatch of the 23rd Decem-
ber, 1937, your predecessor made it clear that His Majesty’s Govern-
ment have not accepted the proposal for compulsory transfer ; and
we have found it impossible to assume that the minority problem
will be solved by a voluntary transfer of population. It is largely
because of the gravity of the situation that would thus be
created that we have felt obliged to reject the Royal Com-
mission’s plan, under which at the outset the number of Arabs in the
Jewish State would be almost equal to the number of Jews. But, it
may be said, if it is wrong in principle to put nearly 300,000 Arabs
against their will under the political domination of the Jews under
the Royal Commission’s plan, how can it be right to do the same
with 50,000 Arabs under plan C ? The ethics of this question are
certainly very difficult to determine. Pushed to its logical extreme,
the argument would obviously rule out all possibility of partition,
since it is impossible to draw boundaries in such a way as to include
no Arabs at all in the Jewish State. But it is inconceivable that
either the Royal Commission in advocating partition, or His Majesty’s
Government in accepting it as the best and most hopeful solution of
the problem, regarded this fact as in itself a fatal objection to any
partition scheme ; and indeed our terms of reference imply that
His Majesty’s Government were prepared for the inclusion of Arabs in
the Jewish State, and vice versa, albeit the fewest possible. It would
seem to be recognized, therefore, that the question is one of degree,
rather than of principle ; and from that standpoint we feel that we
should not be justified in rejecting plan C solely on the ground that it
necessitates the inclusion of some 50,000 Arabs in the Jewish State.

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4. Defence

489. The Jewish State under plan C, though small, is compact,
and is as easily defensible as any state could be into which Palestine
might be partitioned. But the military authorities have impressed
upon us that no boundary can be found west of the Jordan which
affords a satisfactory strategic line, judged by the conditions of
modern warfare. The most that can be done under any partition
scheme is to find a line which is tactically defensible against rifle and
machine-gun fire ; and it is only from this point of view that the
boundary under plan C can be regarded as providing adequate
security for the proposed areas. The only real security for any
partitioned area in Palestine is to live at peace and in friendship with
its neighbour. At the outset of our enquiry we felt reasonably
hopeful that it might be possible to provide a plan of partition
which would bring about this result ; but the events of recent months
must clearly be taken into account in considering what the result
is likely to be of putting any scheme of partition into actual operation.

5. Administration

490. It may be taken for granted that services which can be
wholly partitioned, such as education, will give less value for the
money spent than before ; and that services which provide com-
munication between or through the partitioned areas, such as
railways, posts and telegraphs, will, taken as a whole, be less efficient
as well as more costly. As regards personal freedom of movement
between the several areas, even under the conditions which we
recommend in chapter XIV, some restriction on those who are now
Palestinian citizens will be inevitable ; and the inconvenience and
expense, both to the individual and the state, of any system of
control will be considerable. Finally, the separation of the Jerusalem
Enclave from the other two areas of Mandated Territory by the
Arab and Jewish States will give rise to administrative inconvenience.
These difficulties are not, however, insuperable, and cannot be said
to be sufficient in themselves to make plan C impracticable.

6. Finance

491. This is a major difficulty. In chapter XVIII we found that
it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set
up an Arab State which should be self-supporting. The forecast
made for us by the Treasurer of Palestine, which we accept,
with certain adjustments, as the nearest approach that it is
feasible to make to an estimate of the budgetary prospects
of the several Administrations under plan C, shows, in round
figures, and without making any provision for the cost of
defence, deficits of £P.610,000 per annum for the Arab State
(including Trans- Jordan) and of £P.460,000 per annum for the
Mandated Territories, but a surplus of £P.600,Q00 per annum for the

237

Jewish State. We have found that it is not possible to call upon the
Jewish State for a direct subvention to the Arab State, and neither
practicable nor equitable to set up an Arab State with a budget
so very far from being balanced. We conclude that, if partition
is to be carried out, there is no alternative but that Parliament
should be asked to provide, in some form, sufficient assistance to
enable the Arab State to balance its budget.

492. In addition, of course, the United Kingdom Government
would be obliged, in accordance with recognized practice, to assist
the Government of the Mandated Territories to balance its budget,
including say £175,000 per annum for the cost of the development
services in those territories referred to in paragraph 288.
Altogether this would mean that partition would cost the United
Kingdom taxpayer say £1,250,000 per annum without including
any provision for defence. On the other hand, the Jewish State
would-be able to look forward to an annual surplus of say £P.600,000
apart from the cost of defence. Broadly speaking, the result would
be much the same under any conceivable plan of partition.

493. Manifestly, such a position would be highly unsatisfactory
to the British Treasury. But before deciding that this conclusion
renders partition wholly impracticable, it is necessary to take
into account the cost of Palestine to the British taxpayer under
existing conditions. In the judgment of the majority of us, the
cost of partition cannot rightly be compared with an estimate of
what the financial position of an undivided Palestine might be,
assuming the restoration of peace and normal conditions. Doubtless
it would be possible to obtain peace in Palestine to-morrow under
certain conditions ; but whether those conditions are such as would
not involve a complete change in the financial and economic structure
of Palestine, necessitating a drastic curtailment in the present standard
of public services, if the budget is to be balanced, is quite another
matter. The only valid comparison, therefore, is with the cost to the
United Kingdom under existing conditions. This may be taken to be
in the neighbourhood of £2| to £3 millions in 1938 ; and while it is
impossible to foresee how long our liabilities will continue at this
rate, it is clear that the substitution for the present position of a
plan which involves, apart from the cost of defence, a continuing
annual payment from the British Exchequer of sums amounting
even to as much as £1,250,000, should not necessarily be ruled
out on financial grounds, if in other respects the plan should appear
to be practicable. If, however, this were voted subject to the usual
conditions of financial control applicable to a grant-aided dependency,
the Arab State could not be called independent, and we have been
unable to devise any means of overcoming this difficulty if the
assistance is given in the form of a direct subsidy.

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7. Economic Interests

(i) Tariffs and Customs Administration

494. In considering the boundaries of the proposed areas under
our terms of reference we have found the creation of the Mandated
Territories as a separate political area to be essential to any scheme of
partition which we could recommend. But the creation of those
territories as a separate tariff area will be a severe blow to the
economic welfare of the Jewish State, which, if it is to provide work
for additional migrants in large numbers, must expand industrially,
and cannot hope to do so without an assured market larger than can
be provided by the population of that state alone. The economic
survival of the Arab. State also depends upon its finding a market
outside its territory for its agricultural products, in particular wheat,
of which it has a large exportable surplus. We conclude that a
customs agreement of some kind between either state and the
Mandated Territories is essential, and that as far as the Jewish
State is concerned, nothing short of a complete customs union, with
both free trade and identity of tariffs, will really satisfy their require-
ments, while between the Arab State and the Mandated Territories
a similar arrangement, though not essential, is very desirable.
It is true that the tariff requirements of the Arab and Jewish States
are likely to be fundamentally different, the Arab State, with its
predominantly agricultural population, being likely to prefer a
moderately low tariff for revenue purposes, with at least as much
protection as at present for its cereals and other agricultural
produce, while the Jews may be expected to pursue a policy of high
tariffs for the protection of their industries, and to wish to keep the
price of wheat, if not of agricultural produce generally, as low as
possible. Nevertheless, we feel that there is sufficient common
ground between the two states and the Mandated Territories to
make the operation of a common tariff practicable ; and that in
any case the needs of both states in this respect are so’ urgent that
there is no other way by which the economic survival of the one or
the economic expansion of the other under plan C can be assured.

495. Further it seems to us that a customs union would give an
opportunity to relieve, if only partially, the financial strain which
would be imposed on His Majesty’s Government as the result of
partition. We consider that the provision of an assured market
for the Jews in the rest of Palestine would justify the payment
by them in return of some special revenue contribution to be
credited to the Arab State, thus reducing the call by that state on
the British taxpayer. Working on a formula which we have described
in chapter XXI, and using the figures given us by the Treasurer for
the budgetary forecasts shown in chapter XVIII, we find that this
arrangement might be expected to reduce the net charge on the
United Kingdom taxpayer by about £175,000 in the first year, that is.

239

from about £1,250,000 to about £1,075,000. This credit would
be provided partly at the expense of the Mandated Territories,
whose deficit (to be met from the British Exchequer) would be
increased by over £P. 100,000, but mainly at the expense of the
Jewish State, which, however, would still be left with a surplus
of about £P400,000, apart from the cost of defence.

496. The Arab State’s position would be improved by a corres-
ponding amount, but it would still show a deficit of £334,000 ; and
the only way in which we can suggest that this might be met is
by an arbitrary redistribution of the customs revenue representing
the joint shares of the Arab State and the Mandated Territories
in such a way as to make good the deficit at the expense of the
latter. This would, of course, mean a corresponding increase in the
grant-in-aid to be made by the United Kingdom to the Mandated
Territories, but the formula which we have suggested in chapter XXI
(formula B, paragraph 473) provides for the possibility of gradual
reductions in this supplementary charge as the net surplus revenue
from the customs union increase.

497. The same formula provides also for the possibility of the
Arab State sharing, to some extent, in any increase of customs
revenue arising from an expansion of trade and prosperity in the rest
of Palestine. One of the main arguments against partition is, we
think, the fact that, under any plan of partition which is based
on the inclusion in the Arab State of the fewest possible Jews and
Jewish enterprises and on the creation of a Jerusalem Enclave and
Corridor, the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine is
necessarily left outside the Arab State (whether in the Jewish
State or the Mandated Territories) ; that state is therefore found to
be singularly lacking both in natural resources, in created assets,
and in inherited wealth, and is likely to remain a very poor country.
Its relative backwardness will become still further marked if as a
result of the development proposals in plan C the material conditions
of the Arabs in the Mandated Territories should be substantially
improved. Any arrangement, therefore, which holds out to it the
possibility of some increase of revenue which it will not have to
receive in the form of a subsidy from a foreign Power, with its
necessary accompaniment of financial control, is to be welcomed.
Under this arrangement there would seem to be no need for any
such control : the settlement of accounts with the Arab State under
formula B, as set out in chapter XXI, would be automatic.
It seems to us, therefore, that an arrangement of this kind would
go a considerable way towards solving the financial difficulties
inherent in partition, while at the same time providing the necessary
economic stability for both the Arab and Jewish States.

498. Unfortunately, however, we have found ourselves unable, on
constitutional grounds, to recommend a customs union except under
conditions which would ensure that in tariff policy the wishes of
the Mandatory should prevail ; and as this would be inconsistent

240

with the grant of fiscal independence to the Arab and Jewish States,
we have been obliged to abandon the idea of a customs union between
independent states as a solution of the financial and economic
problems of partition.

(ii) Reactions on the rest of Palestine of the Immigration policy
of the Jewish State

499: This is an aspect of partition under plan C to which we
think it necessary to draw special attention, both for its economic
and financial consequences. The economic future of the Jewish
State, depending as it will upon a unique combination of economic,
political, racial, and emotional factors, is exceptionally difficult to
foresee. Jewish witnesses have agreed with the suggestion that, if
the Jewish State should adopt an active immigration policy, it
must expect to encounter set-backs and to pass through periods
of depression, but our impression is that they were inclined
to under-estimate the violence of the economic fluctuations to
which the Jewish State is likely to be exposed when as an
independent state it takes over full responsibility for immigra-
tion. The same witnesses, anxious to explain to us the future
policy of the Jewish State on this subject, assured us that ” the
volume of immigration to be admitted at any given time will, so
far as immigrant workers are concerned, fall to be determined by
reference to the openings for employment that are in sight and to the
resources available for financing such employment.” We do not
doubt that such will be the intention of the leaders ; but we feel
considerable doubt whether they will be able to maintain so rigid
a line in the face of the urgent pressure that will be brought to
bear upon the newly-formed state to receive the hundreds of
thousands of distressed Jews who will be demanding a refuge in
the Jewish State as a national right.

500. It is true that, once the Jewish State has been set up,
these matters will become a Jewish responsibility entirely ; indeed,
it is one of the special attractions of partition that this controversial
but crucially important subject will henceforth be dealt with by
the Jews themselves. But this argument assumes that the Jewish
State alone will stand the risks, as it will be entitled to the benefits,
associated with an active immigration policy. Under whatever
conditions a Jewish State might be set up, it is doubtful whether
experience would prove this assumption to be well-founded. But
under plan C, in which a customs union between the three areas is
essential, with all the financial and economic associations which that
involves, it is certain that the Administrations of the Arab State
and the Mandated Territories could not view with indifference the
possibility of an economic collapse in the Jewish State, and that if
such an event were to happen, both the economic systems and the
budgets of those areas could not fail to suffer gravely from the
consequences.

241

501. The case then is this. If a Jewish State is set up, with full
responsibility for immigration policy, the risk of an economic
depression in Palestine of exceptional gravity must, in our opinion,
be acknowledged. The same Jewish witnesses argued that, even so,
depressions do not last, for ever and that it is reasonable to expect
that the Jewish State will ultimately recover its prosperity, as other
countries have done ; and in any case the Jewish community would, no
doubt, consider that the political advantages will outweigh the risks,
however great. From the point of view of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment, however, the question is whether the risks to the Arab
population, to the Administration of the Mandated Territories, and
to the British Government in the background, are so great as
to render it inadvisable to proceed with partition. As far as the
Arabs are concerned, the answer would seem to be that, if they are
likely to suffer from a depression in the Jewish State, they are likely
also to benefit when that state is prosperous ; indeed, that is a part
of the case for the formulas proposed in chapter XXI. And if it is
thought probable that the general economic trend of the Jewish
State will be towards greater wealth and prosperity as time goes on,
the Arabs are likely to gain rather than lose in the long run by close
economic association with the Jewish State. Much the same argument
applies to the Government of the Mandated Territories and to the
British Government. Neither can expect to enjoy the benefits
which the proposed formulas would bring without being prepared to
accept the attendant risks. But the risk does not depend wholly upon
the acceptance of those formulas, though its consequences would be
intensified if they are accepted. The risk is, in our opinion, inherent,
to a greater or less degree, in any form of partition. Before deciding
whether plan C or any other plan of partition is practicable, His
Majesty’s Government must ask themselves whether they are pre-
pared to enter into an arrangement under which communities, for
one of which they must accept full, and for the other a partial,
financial responsibility, are liable to have their economic and financial
systems injuriously affected, at any rate temporarily, by a policy
pursued by a neighbouring state, for reasons which are primarily
racial, and over which His Majesty’s Government will have no
control.

(iii) The need of Part-time emplpyment to supplement agricultural
earnings in the Arab State

502. In chapter X, we noted the importance of Haifa as
providing a source of supplementary employment for fellaheen,
whether normally resident in the Mandated Territories or the Arab or
Jewish States, who were either landless or unable to earn an adequate
livelihood from their lands. But Haifa is not the only source of
such employment at present. All along the coastal plain, the demand
for extra labour in the citrus-groves during the picking season from
October to April attracts casual labour from many Arab villages.

242

lEven now, notwithstanding partisan attempts to banish all but
Jewish labour from the Jewish plantations, the r.elative cheapness
of Arab wages* leads to a considerable demand by Jewish employers
for Arab labour ; and it must be remembered that of the total amount
of citrus land in the proposed Jewish State, about 56,000 dunums
are owned by Arabs. Jewish witnesses have, told us that immigration
of casual Arab labour will not be permitted into the Jewish
State. How many of the Arabs who find casual employment in the
orange-groves are residents of villages which will tall outside the
Jewish State we cannot say ; no statistics are available. But we
think that it is not an exaggeration to say that many Arab villagers
outside that state will after partition find themselves and their
families deprived of an important subsidiary means of livelihood,
“the loss of which will have a serious effect on their economic position.

* • (iv) The Growth of Population

503. We have seen in chapter III that, owing to the abnormally
high rate at which natural increase has been taking place in the
Arab population under the Mandatory administration, it can already
be said that the economic position of that population will be menaced
in the future unless one or other of the following developments
should take place : an increase in the standard of cultivation,
•enabling a larger population to be maintained on the land ; an
increase in industrial activity, providing opportunities for secondary
employment ; a limitation of the size of the family ; or migration.
Under partition, the economic situation of the Arab State will
continue to be subject to the same threatening conditions ; and
the possibility of relief from either of the first two quarters mentioned
will be reduced. The opportunity of finding secondary employment
in the Jewish State will be denied to them ; and the chances of
improvement in the standard of cultivation will be remote, for the
funds that would be needed to bring about such improvement will
no longer be available. Nor is it likely that the size of the family
will be limited, or that the rate of natural increase in the population ;
of the Arab State will be reduced by any marked rise in the
death-rate due to a material lowering of the standard of adminis- .
trative services. If, indeed, the Arab State were obliged to rely
entirely upon its own resources, and no migration were to take place,
a rise in the death-rate might be expected to occur in due course
owing to pressure on the means of subsistence. But before that
happens it is probable that increasing pressure will drive the surplus
population to rely more and more upon the neighbouring Mandated
Territories to provide relief in the form of supplementary employ-
ment, the amount of which from time to time will in turn depend,

* In March, 1937, according to the Government Wage-rate Statistical
Bulletin No. 3/1937, the wages of permanent Jewish workers in orange
groves were 200-300 mils per day, as against 150-200 mils per day for Arabs.

243

first’ upon the amount of capital introduced by Jewish immigrants
into those territories, and secondly, upon the fluctuations between
prosperity and depression brought about by Jewish immigration
policy in general (see paragraph 499.)

504. From these observations the following conclusions emerge —
(a) There is no reason to suppose that the present high rate
of natural increase of the Moslem population will diminish
in the Arab State after partition, unless a rise in the death-rate
should be brought about by positive starvation.

(6) Owing to this continued increase in the population, the
• economic situation of the Arab State, if left entirely to its own
resources, would become increasingly serious as time goes on.

(c) This makes it all the more necessary to provide
opportunities for supplementary employment for the surplus
Arab population in the Mandated Territories.

(d) But such employment can only be provided in sufficient
quantity through the importation of Jewish capital, brought by
Jewish immigrants, into the Mandated Territories. It is a
matter of urgent interest, therefore, to the Arabs themselves
that such immigration should be permitted, and even encouraged,
subject, to control as proposed in chapters XIII and XIV. It
seems safe to say that the Arabs outside the Jewish State would
be .faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship, if the
development of the Mandated Territories were to be checked
by a closing down of immigration, than if immigration should
be allowed to continue, subject to the conditions proposed in
those chapters.

(e) As pointed out in paragraph 501, the economic inter-
dependence of the Arab State and Mandated Territories with the
Jewish State, which will inevitably continue under partition, is
liable to cause painful reactions in those areas when the
inevitable periodic set-backs occur in the economic cycle of the
Jewish State. The greater the economic dependence of the
Arab State on the Mandated Territories, the more serious the
effect of such set-backs is likely to be for the Government of
the latter, and through them for the United Kingdom
Government itself.

505. Taking all these matters into account, we should, if we were
to adhere strictly to our terms of reference, have no alternative
but to report that we are unable to recommend boundaries for the
proposed areas which will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual
establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. But
we do not believe that it would be in accordance with your wishes,
or with the public interest, that we should end our enquiry with a
merely negative conclusion. We propose, therefore, to carry the
matter a step further, even though by doing so we exceed in one
respect our terms of reference.

244

506. We, therefore, now suggest that, rather than abandon the idea
of partition altogether as impracticable, His Majesty’s Government
might think it well that, as a condition of the’ surrender of the
existing Mandate, not to be altered hereafter without the approval
of the League of Nations, the proposed Arab and Jewish States
should be required to enter into a customs union with the Mandated
Territories, on the following terms —

(i) The customs service for the whole of Palestine should be
administered by the Mandatory Government.

(ii) The fiscal policy of the customs union should be deter-
mined by the Mandatory as he thinks fit, after consultation
with representatives both of the Arab and the Jewish States,
and after taking into account the interests (a) of all the areas
comprised in the union, and (b) so long as any deficiency grant
continues to be made by the United Kingdom Government to
the Administration of any part of Palestine, of the United King-
dom Exchequer. It would be implicit in this arrangement that
the Mandatory should not direct the fiscal policy of the union
so as to give preferential treatment to British trade.

(hi) In other respects the financial arrangements between the
several areas should be as proposed under formulas A and B in
chapter XXI, subject to such modifications, if any, as may be
decided upon in the course of negotiations between His Majesty’s
Government and the Arab and Jewish representatives.

507. States established under these conditions, deprived of the
right to settle their own fiscal policy, would certainly not be sovereign
independent states, in the sense contemplated by the Royal Commis-
sion. Nor could we regard even an arrangement on these lines as
wholly satisfactory to His Majesty’s Treasury, for the calculations
we have made are in any case speculative ; the duration of any
formula which may be agreed upon must be regarded as uncertain ;
and in any case the amount which Parliament would have to be asked
to vote as a deficiency grant to the Mandated Territories (including
what we have called the “supplementary share” of the Arab
State) would be in excess of £1,000,000 to begin with. The best
that we can hope for is, as pointed out in chapter XXI, to find
an arrangement which will enable these deficiency grants to be
provided in the manner least open to constitutional objections.
Such an arrangement will undoubtedly intensify the risk, described
in paragraph 500, that an economic depression in the Jewish State,
caused by Jewish immigration policy, may spread to the Arab State
and Mandated Territories, with serious results to their financial and
economic systems. But that risk, to a greater or less degree, must
be accepted if partition is to be proceeded with at all : it cannot be
eliminated entirely. Subject to these reservations, however, we
think that the financial and economic needs of the Arab and Jewish
States may now be said to have been provided for satisfactorily ;

245

and we should be prepared with the aforesaid reservations to
report, that the boundaries which we have recommended under
plan C will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment
of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. It would then
p remain for His Majesty’s Government to consider whether, if the
plan of partition which we have put forward should in other respects
appear to them equitable and practicable, it is better to accept the
financial liability involved than to reject partition entirely in favour
of some other alternative.

508. We add two brief comments before concluding this part of
our report —

(i) If His Majesty’s Government should decide that an
arrangement of this kind offers a satisfactory means of
overcoming the financial and economic difficulties of partition,
it is tempting to go further and provide a similar solution
for certain of the administrative difficulties which we have
noted in the course of our enquiry. If inter-area communi-
cations — railways, posts and telegraphs (including telephones) —
were reserved for administration by the Mandatory, at any
rate for a period of say five years in the first place, there is no
doubt, we think, that the public would be better served than
if they were split up among the three Administrations. We
realise, however, that, for political reasons, broadcasting could
not be made a reserved service, except by agreement between the
States concerned.

(ii) If any term were needed to describe the constitutional
procedure which we have suggested, it might be ” economic
federalism ” ; and that, in fact, was the term used of a some-
what similar scheme by a Jewish witness who had made a
special study of this subject. The same witness, when asked
why he was not content that the states should be set up under
partition and then left to form an economic federation if they
wished, replied : “I am convinced . . . that that would be
a policy of suicide. The first thing that would inevitably
happen would be the pull of the Arab State towards Damascus
and Baghdad instead of towards Jerusalem and Haifa. It is
inevitable.” That is a pregnant comment. We are far from
wishing to hinder a movement in the direction of closer union
between the Arab State and the other Arab countries ; but we
are convinced that if that should come about it will be to the
interest of the Jewish State that room should be made for them
to be included in the same political and economic circle. It
seems to us to be one of the advantages of the plan we have just
proposed that, if the political outlook for such a development
should be favourable, but it should be thought prudent to move
tentatively in the matter and to encourage the parties to enter
as a first step into an economic agreement, such an arrangement

246

will be far easier to bring about if the areas comprising Palestine
and Trans- Jordan are already grouped together in a customs
union than if they had been economically isolated. There is
force in the criticism that has often been made against partition
that, considered merely as an abstract policy, it is retrogressive.
Whether economic federalism will lead ultimately to political
federation we cannot venture to prophesy ; but that it should
do so would not be altogether surprising ; and we think that
meanwhile both Jews and Arabs may be disposed, after the
weary and bitter struggle of the past year, to look with some
favour on a plan which provides that in one respect at least,
if only in the form of a customs union and a common system
of communications, Palestine shall still remain whole and
undivided.

CONCLUSION

509. We can now sum up the position. The question whether
partition is practicable involves considerations of two kinds :
practical and political. The former concern chiefly finance and
economics ; the administrative difficulties are great, but they
cannot be called insuperable, if the will to find a solution is present.
But the financial and economic difficulties, as described in this
chapter, are of such a nature that we can find no possible way to
overcome them within our terms of reference. Rather than report
that we have failed to devise any practicable plan, we have proposed,
in paragraph 506, a modification of partition which, while it with-
holds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States, seems to
us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of
settlement, if His Majesty’s Government are prepared to accept the
very considerable financial liability involved.

There remain the political difficulties. We cannot ignore the
possibility that one or both of the parties may refuse to operate
partition under any conditions. It is not our duty, as a fact-finding
Commission, to advise what should be done in that event. But
there is still the possibility that both sides may be willing to accept
a reasonable compromise. We cannot feel confident that this will
happen, but we put forward the proposals in this chapter in the
hope that they may form the basis of a settlement by negotiation.

247

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

510. From the officers of the Palestine Government, and particu-
larly from the Heads of those Departments with which our enquiry-
was especially concerned, we received every assistance. Our numer-
ous requests for information must have involved a large volume of
additional work, much of which of necessity could only be done
by the Heads of Departments in person, at a time when all officers
in Palestine were working under conditions of great stress. We
appreciate greatly the promptness and readiness with which our
requests were complied with. We are also indebted to the military
authorities in Palestine for their valuable assistance. The most
complete arrangements were made for our tours and we desire to
express our thanks for the ready help and co-operation which
all officers extended to us on these occasions.

511. We are very grateful to the police and military authorities
for the measures which they took for our protection, and without
which it would not have been possible for us to have toured the
Districts with safety. Our police escort, which was in constant
attendance, rendered excellent service.

512. We desire to make specific mention of those officers who
were attached to us during our visit : Mr. D. G. Harris, Com-
missioner on Special Duty, whose constant help and advice were
of the utmost value to us ; Mr. H. Player, who was responsible
for the arrangement of our tours and who most efficiently discharged
his duties as a member of our staff ; and Mr. M. G. Ionides,
Director of Development in the Trans- Jordan Government, who
accompanied us throughout our tour in Trans- Jordan.

513. Our two reporters, Mr. C. W. Dawson and Mr. F. E.
Dawson, had to work at high pressure and their speed and accuracy
greatly assisted us in our work.

514. We are very grateful for the assistance rendered to us by
Mr. W. W. Clark and Miss I. G. Campbell, the members of our
office staff who accompanied us from England. They discharged
their duties, which throughout entailed working very long hours,
with great efficiency and to our entire satisfaction. Miss M.
Ruthven, who joined our office staff on our return to London, was
of great assistance in dealing with the large amount of typing
which had to be done.

248

515. Finally, we desire to place on record our appreciation of
the services of Mr. S. E. V. Luke of the Colonial Office, who acted
as Secretary to the Commission. He had to bear an exceptionally
heavy burden, and our special thanks are due to him. Knowledge,
tact and devotion to duty are to be expected of a Secretary, and
Mr. Luke possesses all these in abundance ; but in him we found
also an ability and judgment which have been of the greatest value
to us throughout our enquiry.

J. A. WOODHEAD (Chairman),

ALISON RUSSELL (Subject to
the reservations in the Note
below),

A. P. WATERFIELD,

T. REID (Subject to the
reservations in the Note
below)

S. E. V. LUKE,

Secretary

19th October, 1938.

249

NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY SIR ALISON RUSSELL

1 . For the following reasons it seems to me that plan B is to be
preferred to plan C. By the terms of our reference we are required
to take into account the plan of partition outlined by the Royal
Commission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications of that
plan ; and it is submitted that plan B is more in accord with the
plan of the Royal Commission ; that it makes much less complete
changes ; that it is more likely to secure peace ; and that it is more
equitable and practicable than is plan C.

2. Our terms of reference commence as follows —

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III of the
Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest
modifications of that plan, including variation of the areas recommended
for retention under British Mandate,

4t $ * * £ $ lie

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas
and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under
British Mandate which will —

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment,
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States ;

(6) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa.

3. The Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the
Council of the League contained the following conclusion —

Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs
of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach
particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons
of religion. And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be
sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view
of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic
development, and consequently of dense and rapid settlement …. (a).

4. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Ormsby Gore,
now Lord Harlech) stated before the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission that —

…. the basic principle of any partition scheme would be to leave
as few Jews as possible in the Arab State ; indeed, even under the
proposals of the Royal Commission, that seems to be the main basis
upon which it has acted, and would, I believe, be the only possible basis
on which a frontier could be drawn. But, however you draw that frontier,
it is inevitable that there will be a large Arab minority in the Jewish
State. . . .*

(a) Policy in Palestine, January, 1938 (Cmd. 5634), Appendix 1.
* id., Appendix 1.

250

5. The Royal Commission stated —

The natural principle for the partition of Palestine is to separate
the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those
which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs.*

The Royal Commission drew their map so as to include the areas
in which the Jews have acquired land and settled. (Map 3.)
It will be observed that this map did, in fact, include areas which,
are mainly or wholly occupied by Arabs.

6. As regards the establishment of the Jewish State, there are
two principles to be considered, and these principles often conflict —

(a) that the Jewish State should contain such areas as afford
a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with
adequate security, of a Jewish State ;

(b) that the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises
should be included in the Jewish State.

The problem is this —

(a) if the areas allotted to the Jews are to afford a reasonable
prospect of the eventual establishment of a Jewish State, then
those areas must of necessity include areas which are wholly or
mainly occupied by Arabs ;

(b) if areas which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs
are not to be included in the Jewish State, then no Jewish State
can, in my opinion, be established.

It is a question of degree and whether in each case : —

(a) the establishment of a Jewish State, or

(b) the exclusion from the Jewish State of areas wholly or
mainly occupied by Arabs,

is to be the governing factor in deciding whether an area is or is not
to be included in the Jewish State.

7. It is not possible to understand the position in Palestine
without a knowledge of the historical events which have led to that
position. Those events have been finally recounted in the Report of
the Royal Commission. It is essential to bear in mind the Jewish,
support which was given to the Allies in the Great War, and that the
Jews have expressly been declared to be in Palestine ” as of right and
not on sufferance.”f There are 400,000 Jews in Palestine, one
third of the total population.

* Report of the Royal Commission, page 382.
t June, 1922. Cmd. 1700, page 19.

251

8. As regards the Arabs, the Royal Commission wrote —

Their co-operation was unquestionably a factor in the success of the-
campaign which culminated in the capture of Jerusalem on the 9th.
December, 1917, and in the final expulsion of the Turkish forces from
Palestine in the following autumn. The open revolt of the Sheriff
moreover, had a marked effect on the wavering sympathies of other
Arab tribes than those of the Hedjaz. It was the Sherif’s own people,
however, who bore the brunt of the actual fighting. The Arabs of Palestine
did not rise against the Turks, and, while some Palestinian conscripts
deserted, others continued fighting in the Turkish army. But it must
be remembered that to revolt in the desert was far easier than to revolt
in a country still in Turkish hands and subject as the British invasion
proceeded to increasingly rigorous treatment. As it was, the Turks
were seriously embarrassed by their inability to count on the loyalty
of the population ; and within their lines the Syrian nationalists were
engaged in active sedition for which some of them paid the price on the-
gallows.*

As regards the Jews, the Royal Commission wrote—

The fact that the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917 in order to
enlist Jewish support for the Allies and the fact that this support was
forthcoming are not sufficiently appreciated in Palestine. The Arabs do
not appear to realize in the first place that the present position of the
Arab world as a whole is mainly due to the great sacrifices made by the
Allied and Associated Powers in the War and, secondly that, in so far
as the Balfour Declaration helped to bring about the Allies’ victory, it
helped to bring about the emancipation of all the Arab countries from
Turkish rule. If the Turks and their German allies had won the War,
it is improbable that all the Arab countries, except Palestine, would now
have become or be about to become independent States. f

9. Partition is an attempt to do justice between the conflicting
claims of different nationalities ; and under our terms of reference
it was clear from the first that any plan of partition must necessarily
involve the inclusion of minorities in the states to be created. It
does not seem, therefore, that it is admissible for the Commission to
consider whether, as an abstract principle, it is or is not just in any
circumstances to subject any minority to any majority without the
consent of that minority.

10. The Commission have been appointed to gather ” the
necessary materials on which, when the best possible scheme has
been formulated, to judge of its equity and practicability. “J

11. (a) As regards plan A, I agree that that plan cannot be
adopted.

(b) As regards plan C —

(i) Instead of the partition of Palestine into an Arab State,,
a Jewish State, and an Enclave safeguarding the Holy Places,.

* Report of the Royal Commission, page 21.
f Report of the Royal Commission, page 24.
X Policy in Palestine, January, 1938, (Cmd. 5634), Appendix 1.

252

the figures of population and land for the areas under plan C
are as follows —

Land in

Population. dunums.

Jewish State 280,400 1,257,800*

Arab State 453,000 7,393,500*

Three Mandated Territories . . 660,200 6,971,700*t

(ii) The Arabs decline to discuss partition in any form.

(iii) In my opinion, an offer to the Jews of a state of the
size proposed in plan C does not comply with the obligations
to them.

(iv) Our terms of reference instruct us to take ” into account
the plan of partition outlined in the Report of the Royal Com-
mission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications of that
plan.” It is not suggested that these modifications must be
confined to no more than matters of detail ; but to cut out
three-fourths of the entire Jewish State, as that state was
proposed in the Royal Commission’s plan, cannot, in my opinion,
be held to be a ” modification ” of that plan within our terms of
reference. I do not feel that it is necessary for me to criticise
plan C in detail.

(c) As regards plan B —

Having regard to our terms of reference and to all the
circumstances which we have to take into account, it is con-
sidered that plan B is, for the reasons hereafter appearing,
much more in accord with the plan proposed by the Royal
Commission, and also that it may be held by some of the
authorities concerned in the matter to be a more equitable and
practicable plan of partition than is plan C.

: 12. The figures of population and land in the Jewish State
under plan B are as follows —

Arabs. Jews. Total.

Population .. .. 188,400 300,400 488,800

Land (in dunums) —

Citrus land . . . . 56,000 129,400 185,400

Other cultivable land .. 1,391,400 694,600 2,086,000

Uncultivable land .. 813,100 253,500 1,066,600

*Totalland .. 2,260,500 1,077,500 3,338,000

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

t This estimate does not include 10,577,000 dunums of desert land in the
Southern Mandated Territory.

253

13. The differences between plan B and plan C can be seen on
comparing maps 9a and 10. They may be summarized as follows —

(a) Under plan C, the Galilee highlands, the Huleh Basin, the
Beisan area, the Plain of Jezreel, the Plain of Esdraelon, and Haifa
and the surrounding areas, are excised from the Jewish State as
proposed by the Royal Commission, and are to be a Mandated area
until such time as the Arab and Jewish inhabitants agree to some
other form of government. All the evidence in our possession
points to the conclusion that it will be some time before such an
agreement can be arrived at, and the Mandate may be considered
as a continuing Mandate.

(b) Under plan B, those areas, with the exception of the Galilee
highlands, are to remain in the Jewish State. The Galilee highlands
only are to be constituted a Mandated area.

(c) The Sharon Plain area of the Jewish State is the same in
plan B and plan C, save that, as maps 9a and 10 show, a small
triangular area in the north-east is included in plan B and excluded
from plan C. This small triangular area in plan B has the better
military boundary : it would have the effect in plan C of making an
awkward salient.

(d) The area of the Jewish State south of the Jerusalem Enclave
is the same in both plans.

(e) Apart from the Southern Mandated Territory, and apart
from the small triangular area mentioned in (c), the Arab State is
the same in both plans.

(/) The Jerusalem Enclave is the same in both plans.

(g) As regards the Negeb.

This has been divided into two areas : the Unoccupied area and
the Occupied area. I agree with what is proposed for the Unoccupied
area ; but, for reasons given in paragraph 18 I consider that the
Occupied area should form part of the Arab State.

14. Plan B is now to be considered. It. is shown on map 9a.

15. As regards the Galilee highlands.

(a) It will be observed that the whole of the Galilee highlands
are cut out from the Jewish State as proposed by the Royal Com-
mission, and constituted a Mandated area. I have great doubt
whether the cutting out of more than one-third of the entire Jewish
State as proposed by the Royal Commission’s plan, without sub-
stituting any other substantial area in compensation, can properly
be considered a ” modification ” of that plan ; but here what has
been called the second principle is encountered. In the Galilee
highlands so excised there are 88,200 Arabs and 2,900 Jews ; and
of these 2,900 Jews, 2,000 live in the town of Saf ad, and 250 in the town

254

of Acre*. I feel driven to the conclusion that this area cannot
properly be included in the Jewish State, and should form a Mandated
area. This mandate would no doubt be a continuing mandate in
the same way as the mandate dealing with this area under plan C.
It is not desired to write anything which may be deemed to
encourage resistance on the part of the Arabs, but it is Considered
that in these mountainous regions the Jewish State would find
it difficult to enforce order without employing means which could
not be approved.

(b) Palestine has been searched for areas which, if allotted to
the Jewish State, might in some measure replace the Galilee
highlands, but, save in the empty desert, every area is inhabited
by Arabs, with few Jews or none ; and such areas could not properly
be included in the Jewish State. I regret it, but the facts are so.

16. As regards the Huleh Basin, the Beisan area, the plain of
Jezreel, the plain of Esdraelon, and Haifa and the areas surrounding
it (in this paragraph for convenience called ” these areas “) —

(a) as shown on map 9a, these areas are to form part of the Jewish
State in plan B. These areas are substantially as proposed by the
Royal Commission, except that they are slightly increased by
including an area to the east of Lake Tiberias, and an area to the
south of the Hejaz Railway.

(b) The figures of population and land for these areas are as
follows—

Arabs.
Jews.
Total.
Population
132,900
74,300
207,200
Land (in dunums) —
Citrus land
500
3,600
4,100
Other cultivable land . .
835,900
485,200
1,321,100
Uncultivable land
584,300
154,500
738,800
fTotal land
, 1,420,700
643,300
2,064,000

It is clear that, while there is a preponderance of Jews over Arabs
in the whole Jewish State as proposed by plan B (300,400 Jews and
188,400 Arabs) there is at present a considerable preponderance of
Arabs over Jews in these areas. We are informed, however, that the
Jews are ready and waiting to bring in very great numbers of
immigrants into these areas. These immigrants will be employed
on military and police duties, in making roads, in reclaiming land,
in afforestation, and the like, pending their settlement on the land
or their employment in urban occupations.

* These figures do not include the population and land of the suggested
^Nazareth Enclave [see chapter IV).

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.

255

(c) In plan C, as shown on map 10, in addition to the Galilee
highlands, the whole of these areas has been cut out of the Jewish
State as proposed by the Royal Commission. Here the two principles
are clearly shown in conflict, and it is to be decided whether —

(a) the establishment of a Jewish State, or

(b) the exclusion from the Jewish State of areas wholly or
mainly occupied by Arabs,

is to be the governing factor in deciding whether these areas are or
are not to be included in the Jewish State. If these areas, in addition
to the Galilee highlands, are to be excluded from the Jewish State,
then about three-fourths of the entire Jewish State as proposed by
the Royal Commission’s plan are to be cut out of that state. To
reduce the area of the Jewish State as proposed by the Royal Com-
mission’s plan to one-fourth of its original area cannot, it is sub-
mitted, be considered as a ‘.’ modification of that plan,” however
widely our terms of reference may be construed.

(d) The Royal Commission’s plan was based, as they themselves
state in chapter XXII of the Report, upon what they called the
natural principle for the partition of Palestine, namely, the separation
of the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from
those which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs. Map 9a shows
how this principle applies in plan B.

(e) It is to be observed —

(i) In these areas 643,300 dunums are owned by Jews : a
much greater area than the area, 436,100 dunums, owned by
Jews in the whole of the proposed Jewish State under plan C,
though, of course, the latter contains a large area of citrus land.
It is not, in my opinion, conceivable that the Jews will agree
that these considerable areas of land actually owned by them
should be excluded from the Jewish State.

(ii) These areas contain in all 2,064,000 dunums,* of which
643,300 dunums are actually owned by Jews ; and the total
area of the Jewish State under plan C is 1,257,800 dunums,*
of which 436,100 dunums are actually owned by Jews; the
proportion in each case is thus nearly the same, namely,
one-third.

(iii) The total area of the proposed Jewish State under plan C,
1,257,000 dunums* (including both Arab and Jewish land), is
very little greater than the area of the land actually owned by
the Jews in the Jewish State under plan B, 1,077,500 dunums.*

(/) As regards the possibilities of additional agricultural settlement
in these areas. As has been stated in paragraph 286, according to
estimates given to us by Jewish witnesses, the absorptive capacity
of the Huleh Plain, including the area to be developed under the

* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes.
(C31078) k

256

Huleh drainage scheme is, in terms of agricultural population
only, 39,000, and that of the Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and
Beisan (North) 22,100 over and above the total present population
of those areas. Besides these, allowance must be made for additional
settlement in Haifa Bay area and in the hills and upland country
to the-south and east of Galilee for which separate estimates are not
available, but which must amount to a considerable number. We
do not take such a favourable view of the possibilities as do the Jewish
witnesses, and it is a matter which is beyond my knowledge, but
I agree with the Director of Agriculture when he writes—

I do not think too much importance should be attached to any
estimates at the present time as they doubtless depend largely on the
interpretation by individuals as to what is or may be cultivable, and
these figures may be subject to considerable modification when proper
soil surveys of the land have been undertaken.

The Jews take a sanguine view, and we have seen ourselves the
work which has been done by them in Palestine. Jerusalem
developed ; Haifa developed ; Tel Aviv created on a piece of sand,
a feat which the Royal Commission rightly describe as startling ;
the maritime plain, which was only sparsely populated and only
thinly cultivated, now turned into a rich province, thickly populated,
green, and flourishing ; Esdraelon, stated by the Royal Commission
to have been for the most part marshy and malarious, now drained
and supporting healthy agricultural communities ; and the settle-
ments showing irrigated plantations, hillsides cleared of rocks and
planted with vines, and the uncultivable hilltops planted with
trees. It has been alleged that the Jews have acquired the best land
in Palestine. It does not appear to me a fair statement. That
much of the land now in possession of the Jews has become the best
land is a truer statement. The Royal Commission described the
position at the end of the War as follows —

The population, still overwhelmingly Arab in character, eked out a
precarious existence mainly in the hills. On the plains, where life and
property were less secure, such irrigation works as had existed in ancient
times had long disappeared. Oranges were grown round Jaffa, but most
of the maritime belt was only sparsely populated and only thinly
cultivated. Esdraelon for the most part was marshy and malarious.*

It was impossible not to be impressed when inspecting some of the
bare rocky places where Jewish settlements have been or are in course
of being made. Such remarkable efforts may well disturb statistics.

(g) As regards the question of Jewish settlers replacing Arabs in
these areas. In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner
for Palestine (published in Cmd. 5634)f it was announced that His
Majesty’s Government had not accepted the Royal Commission’s
proposal for the compulsory transfer in the last resort of Arabs

* Royal Commission Report, page 6. f Appendix 1.

257

from the Jewish to the Arab area. On behalf of the Jews it was also
made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be opposed to the
exercise of any degree of compulsion. No large scale voluntary
transfer appears to us to be possible. But it seems to me that a
movement, considerable if slow, of Arabs who possess capital would
take place from these areas into the Galilee highlands, into Arab
Palestine, and into the great areas of the other Arab States. An
experienced official who came before us stated that the effect of
offering Arabs high prices for their land would be that they would
take the money and would emigrate and buy land in Trans- Jordan,
and that this would be done gradually. I cannot share the view that
it is always necessary to treat the Arab as if he were a person unable
to look after his own interests. As has been said in paragraph 179
the Arab has a deep attachment to his ancestral lands, and so far
as I can judge, he is not less shrewd than a peasant in any other
country ; and the peasant, as a rule, has a very lively sense of his
own advantage. It does not appear to me that to permit an Arab
to sell his land for three or four times its value, and to go with the
money to a different part of the Arab world where land is cheap, can
be said to ” prejudice ” his rights and position within the meaning
of Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine. Indeed, the attempts
that have been made to prevent the sale of land by Arabs have
been resisted. It is right, however, that the greatest care should be
taken to ensure that, on a sale of Arab land, Arab tenants should
be provided with sufficient land on which to live, as prescribed by
such legislation as the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance.

(h) It is urged in paragraph 205 that the inclusion of these
areas in the Jewish State would be opposed by the Arabs and that it
would not lead to peace. But as has rightly been said, paragraph 220,
uncertainty as to the political future of Palestine has undoubtedly
been from the outset one of the principal causes of the present
unhappy relations between Arabs and Jews ; and what is
needed is a clear statement of policy which shall enable both races
to know as precisely as possible under what form of Government
the citizens of the new states will live. It seems to me that it is of
the utmost importance to get the maximum certainty over the
maximum area as rapidly as possible. In the Jerusalem Enclave
different considerations as to immigration of Jews and Arabs arise,
and as regards the Jerusalem Enclave I agree with what has been
proposed. But in these areas it is essential that decisions should be
clean cut. Any scheme for ” facilitating Jewish settlement ” in the
Northern Mandated Territory (within which territory these areas are
proposed to be included under plan C), no matter what provisions
are made for safeguarding the Arabs ; or for the acquisition of
land by the Jews for the consolidation of existing holdings ; or for
purchasing or leasing land with the permission of the Mandatory
Power ; or for reviewing the position after ten years, or the like, will
be regarded by the Arabs as mere subterfuges for the purpose of

(C31078)

k2

258

bringing in further Jews, so that ultimately the whole area will
become Jewish ; and, encouraged by the result of their efforts, the
Arabs will continue strenuously to resist the further immigration
of the Jews into these areas. The only hope of peace seems to me
to be a clean-cut decision as to the areas in which Jews can own or
lease land, and as to the areas in which they cannot own or lease
land at all. This decision being made and enforced, it is hoped that
the position will be recognized and peace gradually ensue ; but if
the matter is left in doubt, then, in my opinion, there is little or
no hope of matters settling down. If that is so, then there is a greater
chance of peace if these areas are to be within the Jewish State
than if they are to be included in an entity with such an uncertain
political and practical future as is proposed for the Northern Mandated
Territory.

(i) No further land in the Mandated area of the Galilee highlands
should be sold or leased, either directly or indirectly, to a Jew or any
Jewish body. No further Jews should be admitted into the Mandated
area of the Galilee highlands for the purpose of cultivating land.
The small areas in the Mandated area of the Galilee highlands
already owned by Jews might be allowed to be cultivated by the
Jews at present upon those areas ; but no additional Jews to be
admitted upon those areas, which could well be used for the purpose
of exchange with areas held by Arabs in the Plain of Esdraelon.

As regards the entry of Jews into the Arab State or Arabs into
the Jewish State, that will form a question for the states to determine
when they are set up. Until the Arab State is set up, no further land
in the area proposed to form the Arab State should be permitted to
be sold or leased, either directly or indirectly, to a Jew or any Jewish
body. Until the Jewish State is set up, no further land in the area
proposed to form the Jewish State should be permitted to be sold or
leased, either directly or indirectly, to any Arab or Arab body living
or carrying on business outside that area.

– (j) The question of a defensible boundary of these areas is
discussed in paragraphs 196 to 197. It is not always clear to me
whether the defensible boundary is for defence against a force armed
only with rifles and machine guns ; or is for the Jews against an
attack by the Arabs, or for the Arabs against an attack by the Jews, .
or for the Mandatory Power against or in accord with the Arabs or
Jews ; or whether the topographical features of the country only were
being considered ; or whether the combatants were assumed always
to be on an equal footing as regards personnel and equipment ; or
whether foreign powers were envisaged as taking part in the matter.

It is not possible for me to express an opinion on these military
matters, but I venture to agree with the opinion of the military
authorities expressed in paragraph 36 that it is impossible to divide
the country into areas which, having regard to the conditions of
modern warfare, have any real military significance.

259

It is clear that Arabs in the highlands have a better defensible
boundary than Jews in the plains ; but it would seem that the ques-
tion of equipment must also be considered. The Arabs, if they can
be formed into a state, will have little money to spend on armaments ;
whereas the Jewish State, if it were attacked by the Arab State,
could no doubt command trained troops led by experienced army
officers, and aided by the resources of modern military equipment,
such as aeroplanes, heavy guns, and mechanized transport. Hitherto
the Jews have defended their settlements with success, and there is
no reason to suppose that they would be less successful in the future.
In any case the question of a defensible boundary for the Jewish
State should not be an argument to deprive the Jewish State of an
area which the Royal Commission considered should be allotted
to them, if the Jewish State feel that they are quite competent to
defend that boundary. The evidence is that the Jews have no
fear at all that they would not be able to take over the security of
any area handed over to them.

(k) As a reason for excluding these areas from the Jewish State
and making them a Mandated area, it has been urged in paragraph
198 that it would be unfair to deny their independence to the Arabs
of Galilee in order to secure the safety of these areas of the Jewish
State ; but, in my opinion, the position is precisely the same
under plan C, and I find it difficult to accept the arguments adduced
in paragraph 232. Under plan C the Galilee highlands are no less
a homogeneous area almost entirely inhabited by Arabs, and their
claim to independence is no less and no greater than under plan B ;
nor could their claim be any the more easily resisted because the
safety of a Mandated area is concerned instead of the safety of a
Jewish area. The question of a defensible boundary is also dealt with,
paragraph 197 ; but if Haifa is to remain under Mandate, as pro-
posed in paragraph 221, then the military authorities advise that
an additional defensible boundary, about half-way across Galilee,
will be necessary for its safety. The remaining part of the Galilee
highlands would be so small as to be incapable of being made into a
state or part of a state.

(I) It has also been suggested in paragraph 220 (d) that the
Northern Mandated Territory might, with the joint consent of the
Arabs and Jews, become some form of independent territory ; or
even, with the like consent, become part of an existing Jewish or
Arab State. So distant a hope should not be an argument to deprive
the Jewish State of areas which the Royal Commission considered
should form- part of that state.

17. As regards the town of Haifa. The figures of population
and land are set out in paragraph 202. It may perhaps be added
that, according to Jewish estimates, many of the Arab buildings
erected in and after 1933 were intended to be and were in fact

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260

leased to Jews. It is estimated that in the autumn of 1937 as many
as 14,000 Jews were living in Arab-owned houses, while only a few
hundred Arabs were living in Jewish-owned houses.

It is suggested, paragraph 203, that the proper course is to
retain- Haifa in Mandated Territory so that it can be developed
for the benefit of both Arabs and Jews. It is said that the town
cannot fairly be made part of the Jewish State because, among other
things, a number of Arabs come to Haifa from other parts of Palestine
to seek employment. But if Arabs of the Arab State are to be
allowed freely to compete for employment there, as indicated in
paragraph 295 (i), the result of the competition of unlimited supplies
of cheap labour would have an unfortunate effect on the labourers
of that town.

Another reason given in paragraph 202 why Haifa should not
form part of the Jewish State is that it is the only deep-water port
in Palestine. The Royal Commission stated that, as Haifa was
the only existing deep-water port on the coast, they considered
that, in the interests of Arab trade and industry, the Arab State
should have access to it for commercial purposes. They recom-
mended that the Jewish treaty should provide for the free transit
of goods in bond between the Arab State and Haifa. This
recommendation should be carried into effect.

The town was expressly included in the Jewish State by the
Royal Commission’s plan, and, taking that plan into account, it does
not appear to me that any reason of which the Royal Commission
were unaware has been shown for excluding it from that state.

From a military point of view it is necessary that Acre should” be
in the same hands as Haifa, or in friendly hands. If Haifa is to be
in Jewish hands that condition would, it seems to me, be satisfied
by Acre being under the Mandatory Power. The question of Galilee
has already been dealt with in paragraph 15.

It is proposed by the Royal Commission that Haifa should be
kept for a period under Mandatory administration. But it is sub-
mitted that any such temporary mandate would give rise to doubt
and trouble ; and that when the rest of the Jewish State is ready to
be brought into existence, Haifa and its environs should form part
of it. ‘

All the necessary naval and military facilities in Haifa and
throughout the Jewish State will be willingly afforded by the Jews
to the Mandatory Power by treaty.

18. As regards the Negeb. This forms the Southern Mandated
Territory under plan C, and in that plan it is divided into two areas :
the Unoccupied area and the Occupied area.

(i) As regards the Unoccupied area. I agree with what is pro-
posed, but I can only regard the development of this area as doubtful.
Even if water could be found there, which so far as our information

261

goes can only be regarded as a remote possibility, the great cost of
using it for irrigation purposes would seem to deny a successful out-
come. I agree that the Jews should be given the opportunity of
attempting this development : they have done many remarkable
things in Palestine. But in any case, the question of this desert
should not be counted in judging the equity and practicability of any
plan of partition.

(ii) As regards the Occupied area. I consider that this area
should form part of the Arab State. The proposals contained in
paragraph 257 seem to me to present administrative difficulties.
Again, a Mandate established ” with a view both to the protection
of the interests of the existing inhabitants and to the promotion of
Jewish settlement therein,” would be regarded with the deepest
suspicion by the Arabs. And I doubt whether the Jews would be
prepared to undertake ” the greater part of the experiments in
development ” so that the local inhabitants should have the first
claim to benefit by any improvements in cultivation which may be
found possible as a result of these experiments and which will enable
the local inhabitants to adopt a reasonable standard of life. Progress
in this area must be slow ; and the unrestricted reproductive
capacity of the Bedouin Arabs would keep pace with the benefits
conferred on them by Jewish industry. It is submitted that if this
area became part of the Arab State, Jewish immigration for develop-
ment purposes, by permission of the state, would be more likely to be
successful than under a Mandate with a political future which, in
spite of the assurances which it is proposed to give, will, I fear,
appear to the Arabs to be uncertain.

19. The financial and budgetary prospects are dealt with in
chapter XVIII and especial reference to plan B is made in para-
graph 386. ‘ It is submitted, however, that there is no sufficient reason
why the Arabs of Palestine should be considered as entitled as of right
to that high cost of social services which they have enjoyed as a result
of Jewish immigration and which has resulted in such rapidly
increasing Arab population. It seems to me that the Arab State
might reasonably be satisfied with the standards of Trans- Jordan
and the neighbouring Arab States.

20. In dealing with the general question of partition, a great
deal of emphasis has been placed upon the Arab resistance. It is
necessary, in my opinion, not to allow judgment to be determined
solely by a consideration of what the Arabs may do, without also
considering what the Jews may do. The evidence given us shows that
during the troubles the Jews have behaved themselves extraordinarily
well ; that they have received a great deal of provocation from the
Arabs and that, as a whole, they have not countered that provoca-
tion ; and that their discipline in obedience to their leaders argues
well for the success of the Jewish State in any contention with the

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262

Arab State. It is clear that the restraint shown by the Jews is due
to no fear of the Arabs. I was impressed with the manly bearing
of the youthful Jews, though some shewed traces of an arrogance
” which seemed to suggest that they felt themselves to be members
of a superior race destined before long to be masters of the country.”
The Jews number at present 400,000, one-third of the entire popula-
tion of Palestine. They are the modern and progressive part of the
population ; and, as a very experienced witness warned us, if they
feel that the pledges which have been given definitely to them are
to be torn up, they would resent any provocation from the Arabs
and might take the law into their own hands, and that the result
might be a kind of civil war which would give rise to a position many
times worse than the present position.

21. Finally, in coming to a conclusion on plan B, paragraph 11
and map 9a should once more be considered. I regret that plan B
can only offer to the Jewish State an area so small (considerably
smaller than the county of Norfolk) and so inconvenient, but the
facts as to the Arab population which I have set out above appear
to me to be inescapable. As regards the Arabs, they should reflect
on the immense areas of land over which Arabs have obtained
sovereignty as the result of the Allied success in the Great War, to
which the Jews contributed in no small measure.

22. Subject to the above, I am and have been in accord with the
Chairman and my colleagues on this Commission. I should like to be
allowed to say how greatly I have appreciated their patience and
consideration.

ALISON RUSSELL

19th October, 1938

263

NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY MR. RED)

The scheme for confining the Jewish State to the part of the
Maritime Plain indicated in plan C seems to be the least objectionable
that can be devised under our terms of reference. We were directed
to include as few Arabs and enterprises owned by Arabs in the
Jewish State as possible and vice versa. Plan C, however, may
be at variance with our terms of reference, inasmuch as 821,700-
dunums of land owned by Arabs is included in the Jewish State.
This is nearly 70 per cent, of the total area of that state, 1,257,800
dunums. Incidentally, it is nearly double the area of land, 436,100
dunums, owned by Jews in this proposed Jewish State. Whether
the inclusion of 54,400 Arabs in the Jewish State with its total
population of 280,400, of whom 226,000 are Jewish, is in accordance
with the terms of reference referred to above is not easy to decide,
as a definite formula was not laid down therein. In fact, it is not
possible to set apart an area for a Jewish State which is Jewish,
both as regards population and enterprises. I was forced by our
terms of reference to search for a Jewish area where the population
at least was predominently Jewish ; and the only possible place to
find such an area large enough to form the territory even of a
miniature state, was that part of the Maritime Plain set aside as
the proposed area of the Jewish State under plan C.

2. That plan of partition, however, is in my opinion imprac-
ticable, as is the scheme set out in plans A and B. The criticisms
applicable to plan C apply also as a rule to them, but with greater
force. We have devised and tested several plans of partition on
communal lines and I cannot envisage any scheme which would
not be even more defective and lead to stranger results than that
set out in plan C, whatever formulae were laid down in our terms
of reference.

3. Our task was to devise the best possible scheme of partition
and then to state if, in our opinion, that scheme was practicable. In
giving reasons for my conclusions on this subject I have deemed it to
be my duty to state the relevant facts and opinions, my own included,
necessary to enable the implications of the proposal to partition
Palestine according to plan C to be realized.

Absence orConsent

4. In the Statement of Policy of July, 1937, His Majesty’s
Government expressed a hope that it would be possible to give effect
to a scheme of partition which might secure ” an effective measure
of consent on the part of the communities concerned.” This refers
to the consent of both Arabs and Jews. In my opinion no plan of
partition of the Government of Palestine into three administrations
would be practicable without the consent of both Arabs and Jews.

264

From the evidence, oral and written, placed before us by Jews, it is
clear that many Jewish associations and individuals are opposed
to partition of any kind. Even the views of those Jews willing to
discuss partition, as expressed at Zionist assemblies, to us and else-
where, indicate that Jews would not accept such schemes as those
set out in plans B or C, which would reduce the area assigned by the
Royal Commission for a Jewish State. If so, this would seem to
make both impracticable. The Jews concerned are highly developed
politically and otherwise, and it is not clear how partition could be
justly imposed upon them. ,

5. From the statements placed before us, oral and written, and
judging by the violent opposition shown by the Arabs to partition
since the policy of partition was announced, it is clear that the Ara*b
community, who form about two-thirds of the population of Pales-
tine, would not accept either of the schemes B or C proposed. This
also makes both impracticable in my opinion and also any scheme
of partition. Here again the people concerned are not primitive folk.
A distinguished Jew, Lord Samuel, speaking with a knowledge of
Palestine such as only the holding of high office for several years in
that country can give, said in the House of Lords in July, 1937, ” The
Arabs are intensely aware of their history — that they acquired great
territory, built up a remarkable culture and gave to the world one
of its greatest civilizations.”

6. Proof of Arab opposition to, and of the probability that the
Arabs would violently resist the enforcement of, any scheme of
partition and that their resistance would continue even if the scheme
were implemented, is afforded by the fact that no witness suggested
that partition would be peaceably accepted by the Arabs. Below
are given selections from views expressed to us in Palestine by persons
whose opinions it would be rash to disregard, owing to the witnesses’
impartiality and long experience or special knowledge of Palestine
and of its communal problems.

7. One witness stated to us early this summer, ” When partition
goes through you will have to have a barbed wire right round it
…. with pill boxes every half kilometre …. Hostility in
our lifetime there will be.” This witness also said that the Arabs
would not submit to Jewish rule.

8. Another witness said, ” There would be a violent reaction to
anything which gives any part of Palestine to the Jews.” He did
not think that any of the plans of partition discussed by us with
him would promote peace.* He gave as his own opinion and that
of others whom he consulted, people like himself in intimate daily
touch with political realities in Palestine, that the Arabs could not
be conciliated as long as there was any question of setting up a Jewish

* Only certain officials were shown proposed plans of partition.

265

State and that if a plan similar to plan C were implemented, anything
up to open rebellion would occur. He thought that if Galilee were
excluded from the Jewish State that would not prevent even its
inhabitants from rebelling against partition. He envisaged strife
between the Jewish and Arab States.

9. Another witness, speaking as early as last June before the
Arab rebellion had fully developed, said, ” From the very moment
a report in favour of partition, with His Majesty’s Government’s
acceptance of that report, comes out, you will get in this country
accelerated rebellion which will gradually rise to an absolute cres-
cendo when you put your boundary commission on the spot to
demarcate. If you include Galilee in the Jewish State I think it
is certain to add more fuel to the flames.” He said that all classes
of Arabs oppose proposed Jewish rule and that they would oppose
partition by ” force of arms,” and that, even if both Arabs and Jews
got people to come forward to take up the task of governing, ” it
would not work properly.”

10. Another witness said that even if only a small Jewish State
were set up on the Maritime Plain, the Arabs ” would just bide their
time, that is all.”

11. Another witness said, ” There is really no hope in my view
of the Arab ever accepting partition . . . any form of partition.”
Another said, ” I think that the Arabs will oppose any scheme of
partition.” Another, speaking with prescience last June, said that
the Arabs would not accept the fait accompli if partition were imple-
mented and : ” I believe the opposition will become more serious,”
and that the Jewish ” State would be a disaster for the Jews rather
than for the Arabs.”

12. Another witness, when asked if the Arabs would not acquiesce
after a period of forcible repression, said, ” It is just like pressing
down a rubber ball ; when you take the pressure off, the rubber
ball resumes its natural shape.” Also — ” It would be reasonable to
say that any attempt to put any one of these plans (of partition)
into execution against the wish of one or other or both parties would
result in disorders of not less extent than at present and probably
greater.” Also — ■” Failing agreement between the parties, no plan
of partition can materialize unless the Power implementing the plan
is prepared to take the most sweeping and vigorous measures to-
enforce it, amounting to large scale and lengthy operations, in fact
possibly to an occupation for a number of years.” Again — ” Unless
there is a spirit of consent on both sides you cannot effect partition.”

13. Some of these witnesses said that the C plan of partition
would produce less resistance than others ; only one suggested that
after compulsion, but without force, ” in the long run ” the Arabs
might acquiesce in it.

266

None of the witnesses in the above category suggested that
the Arabs would consent to partition or accept quietly the fait
accompli, if partition were implemented. These statements give a
balanced view of the written evidence referred to. They all tend to
indicate that partition would not produce peace, but that was the
tenor of the evidence, while there was absence of evidence to the
contrary.

14. Coming now to Jewish views, Lord Samuel said with
prescience in July, 1937, in the House of Lords, ” The Arab national
movement … is not to be disposed of easily and lightly, simply
by using the strong hand and applying methods of coercion.”

In September, 1938, a group of about twenty leading anti-
partitionist Jews holding responsible public and private positions in
Palestine, sent us a memorandum in which they stated, referring to
the hope that the policy of partition would restore peace — ” This
sanguine assumption has already proved to be baseless.” Again —
” Arab resistance to Jewish colonization will have a far wider scope
for effective action following partition and will gravely threaten the
tiny, new Jewish State from the very commencement.” “The
British garrison will be compelled to participate in the defence of
the newly created frontiers.” ” The Jewish State will have to
maintain an army which is estimated at a minimum of 30,000 men.”
The Jews generally recognize frankly that they must have armed
forces and they envisage Arab hostility if a Jewish State is set up.
A large association of anti-partitionist Jews from many countries
sent us a memorandum stating, ” The establishment of the
sovereign States, a Jewish and an Arab one, is an utterly imprac-
ticable proposal, and would mean the perpetuation of murder and
warfare on the holy soil, with the most tragic consequences for Jew
and Arab in Palestine and elsewhere.”

15. The predictions of the witnesses quoted, who spoke in May
and June, 1938, have been generally vindicated by events. Their
predictions might prove to be wrong in the future ; but it is much
more likely that they would prove to be right. I have quoted them at
some length because their views coincide with mine and because
I desire to show that my views are not merely those of a single
individual equipped with the experience of a brief three months stay-
in Palestine. My views are similar to those held by persons best
qualified by real knowledge to give sound advice on the subject.
In my opinion the C plan of partition would not bring peace before
or after its implementation. I cannot envisage any other plan of
partition which would not be more defective than plan C in this
respect. .

16. Apart from opinions, it is a fact that the announcement
of a policy of partition, whose main object would be to secure peace,
turned the disorders which followed the rejection of the proposal

267

to set up a Palestine legislative council, into a national Arab rebellion
in Palestine which was assisted by Arabs resident in certain countries
outside Palestine. It would seem to be contrary to commonsense
therefore to imagine that the acceptance or implementation of the
C plan of partition would restore peace, that the ” wound ” of
partition, as the Royal Commission called it, would be healed by
driving home the weapon that caused the wound. Our report states,
” If a plan of partition is approved which brings under the political
domination of the Jews large numbers of Arabs in an area where
the Jews are not already in a substantial majority, the introduction
of such a plan will be resisted by the Arabs …. by open
rebellion.” I agree, but I think that the Arabs would also resist by
force partition according to plan C.

Absence of Equity

17. But, it may be urged, the Mandatory Power should not
yield to, but should crush, internal rebellion and Arab resistance
from outside Palestine as well, drive partition through and restore
peace by force. If the scheme of partition set out in plan C were
obviously just, there would be some grounds for the adoption of
such a course. If not, and if the attempt is made to implement
that plan, resistance is likely to be in proportion to the sense of
national wrong felt by the rebels and the protracted sequel to be
generally disastrous to Arab, Briton and Jew.

18. His Majesty’s Government, moreover, has announced that
it will not implement a scheme of partition until it is assured that
such scheme is equitable and practicable. One responsible witness
said that it was not a reasonable proposition to cut out the Maritime
Plain and set up a Jewish State there regardless of the fact that the
majority of the people in Palestine are Arabs, and that it. was not
fair to set up a small non-Arab State against the will of the population
of the whole of Palestine. Another said that to force Jewish rule
on Arabs in the Jewish State ” is immoral.”

19. From a respected Jewish source a memorandum came to us
stating that sovereignty in a Jewish State ” could not, unhappily,
be said to be derived from the consent of the governed.” It then
quoted President Wilson’s words, ” Peoples and provinces are not
to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
mere chattels or pawns in a great game.”

20. It is clear that no Arab, Jewish or other body in Palestine
asked for partition. The Royal Commission did not submit their
policy or plan of paitition for the views of people in Palestine whose
criticisms would have been invaluable. The Commissioners them-
selves put forward the policy admitting that their scheme was
tentative and not worked out in detail. We have now worked out

268

in detail plan C, which appears to me to be the best possible geo-
graphical scheme of partition, and it seems likely that the people of
Palestine, who never asked for partition, and have had ample time
to think about the policy of partition, would reject this scheme.

21. Under the scheme a small part of Palestine would be set
aside for the Jewish State ; but it is the richest Arab and Jewish
part, the area most favoured by nature, by reason of its fertile soil,
good rainfall and abundant underground water resources. Land
planted with citrus in bearing is most valuable being worth several
hundred pounds per acre. In recent years the Arabs have increased
their citrus-planted land six-fold and they own about half the
citrus-planted land in Palestine. Almost forty per cent, of the
total citrus land owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish
State. Partition would deprive Palestine for ever of a large part of
its best territory, with its wealth, revenues and population, Arab and
Jewish. Abraham Lincoln denied the rights of States desiring partition
to secede from a Federation ; but here the proposed Jewish State
would be abstracted from a unitary State, probably against the
wishes of the whole people of Palestine. If their votes were taken
on plan C, possibly the majority against the proposal, reckoning
Arab and Jewish votes, would approach to 100 per cent.

22. The establishment of the Mandate and the validation
therein of the national home or foyer is a fait accompli. It honoured
a promise made in the stress of war. But the proposal to partition
the country is quite another matter, a revolution that should not
be carried out by trustees, without the consent of the people of
Palestine, who are not primitive folk devoid of political consciousness,
incapable of making a decision on this subject.

23. The Arab residents in this tiny Jewish State, which would
be about as large as an English county, a little over 300,000 acres
in extent, would, if the state were set up, be forced to change their
nationality, or to leave their homes and occupations there, unless
they became citizens of the State. There would be about
54,400 Arabs within the State and nearly a million in other parts of
Palestine united in their detestation of Jewish rule. It would not
appear just to these people whose ancestors have lived in Palestine
for thirteen centuries, that 54,400 of their number should be placed
by their trustees under the rule in the Maritime Plain of Jews,
nearly all of whom immigrated from overseas into that Plain during
the last eighteen years. Others besides Palestinian Arabs, Christian
Arabs included, and Jews might object to the proposed scheme of
partition. Even if Great Britain were at peace with other nations,
but still more at a time when she might be involved in war, the
hostility of the people of Palestine created by partition and of
sympathizers with them from outside Palestine might cause
difficulties serious or otherwise.

269

24. The removal of part of Palestine from the rest cannot be
justly carried out against the wishes of, and without consulting,
the whole population of Palestine, merely because in that part there
is a preponderance of Jews. The partition envisaged is not morally
strengthened by the fact that Arabs own 821,600 dunums of land
as against 436,200 dunums owned by Jews in the proposed Jewish
State.

25. It was necessary to give a defensive boundary on the hills
for the railway and for the proposed Jewish State. For this and
other reasons the eastern frontier was pushed inland away from the
coast where the Jews have settled, with the result that villages
entirely owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish State.
Out of the many Arab villages included in this area, I have selected
fourteen in one of which there are about thirty-one Jews. In it
and the other thirteen there are about 6,000 Arabs. These villages,
Arab according to the population or the property test, are to be
included in the Jewish State.

26. As a further example of the strange results that would
follow the adoption of plan C, the case of Tulkarm may be mentioned.
It is a centre of Arab nationalism and, mainly for this reason, was
excluded from the proposed Jewish State, though its exclusion would
entail a diversion of the railway line costing the British taxpayer
£100,000. But most of the land belonging to the townsmen of
Tulkarm would be in the Jewish State and the town is the market-
place for many Arab villages to be included in that state. When
international boundaries separate the Arab people of these places
from their village lands and from their political and social centres,
the Arabs will not consider the procedure to be just. They would
ask why their friends and fields should suddenly be placed in a
foreign land.

27. On the eastern boundary of the proposed Jewish State this
unavoidable separation of Arabs from their lands by the proposed
frontier north of Tulkarm would frequently be caused. The Arabs
who would thus be separated from their land will not see any justice
in our demarcation of boundaries. These people would have the
problem of living in one state with their little bits of land close by
in another state. They would probably be compelled by force of
circumstances to sell their land in the Jewish State.

28. The Arabs in the Jewish State will almost certainly not be
an assenting contented minority, and one can imagine the political,
social and economic results of partition for them. On the other hand,
one can foresee the disastrous strife in store for the Jews, whether
they finally subdue their Arab subjects and neighbours or not.
Here, as in other parts of Palestine, the British are likely to be drawn
into the conflict permanently or sporadically, under their treaty
obligations with the two States. Hitherto the British have been

270

what a witness called the ” whipping boy ” in politics between
Arab and Jew. After partition, and indeed before it could be
implemented, they would probably be unfortunate soldiers fighting
in the communal war for one side or the other. The Arabs are very
politically minded and the flaws in a policy which seems to them to
be crudely unjust, would be exposed by educated Arabs who know
how to think politically, to the League of Nations and to the
Parliament and Government which will have to justify a policy of
partition.

29. Reliable witnesses assured us that the Arabs to be placed
in the Jewish State would fight and that they would be assisted by
Arabs from outside that state. In my opinion this view can be
safely accepted. If partition is to be implemented it will be
necessary to provide for this contingency on the borders of the
Jewish State as well as for similar contingencies elsewhere in Palestine .
from the time the policy is officially adopted till it is implemented
by crushing resistance. Even if the military and police forces could
crush Arab opposition, the trustees of Palestine, the League and
British Government have to consider the cost in reputation to them-
selves and in lives and wealth to all concerned. In my opinion
plan C is here again impracticable because the British people would
not tolerate the injustice and waste of life and property entailed
in driving through it or any more defective plan of partition.

30. Proceeding to other aspects of the subject, one notes that
the Royal Commission gave great prominence to the aspirations of
the Arabs to independence. These aspirations do exist and have
been voiced by Arab political leaders. But in my opinion, based
on that of persons with greater knowledge than mine, the chief
incentive to Arab unrest is the fear of the economic and political
domination of the Jews. They detest the idea of Jewish rule and
therefore detest partition. Their economic fears require explanation.

31. The Jews are steadily purchasing, with funds donated gratis
by world Jewry, the land of Arabs, even at the present time when an
Arab risks assassination if he sells his land to Jews. We are authori-
tatively informed that in future such land will generally be paid for
from Jewish national funds. Arabs know from experience that land
so purchased becomes Jewish for all time, that it cannot be leased
to any non- Jewish tenants, and that a clause in the leases forbids the
employment of non- Jewish labour on such land. Moreover, in non-
agricultural industries owned By Jews, employers who might desire
to employ cheap Arab labour, are persuaded, often very effectively,
not to do so. And if the rates of wages for each community were
effectively made the same by legislative enactment, the Arab worker
might lose his main claim to obtain work in the majority of such
Jewish concerns, save in Arab areas where it would be prudent to
have a mixed labour force.

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32. Probably nothing has produced more communal ill-will in
Palestine than this Jewish system of economic penetration. It

. affects all classes, but especially the mass of Arab workers. The
Jews tell us that there would be no economic discrimination against
Arabs, in the proposed Jewish State, but, even with the best inten-
tions, they would be faced with the claims of the unfortunate,
persecuted Jews of Europe seeking refuge, land and work in Palestine.
The Jews candidly stated to us, ” We should be untrue to our trust
if we employed Arabs, because our primary purpose is to employ
Jews.” The laws of the state might be equitable, but it would be
too much to expect a Jewish government to force Jews to employ
Arabs at the same wages as those paid to Jews.

33. The Arab land owner who sells his land to the Jews generally
secures a very high price. The Jews do not buy land for the ex-
tension of the National Home on commercial principles and need not
do so. With loss of Arab ownership the right to work on the land
even of Arab tenant or owner cultivator may disappear. The Arab
or other tenant in the Jewish State could retain his right to work on
a lot viable if he appealed to the provisions of the Protection of
Cultivators Ordinance, assuming that this Ordinance were retained.
But if he forgoes his right for a cash consideration or other cause,
he quits the land also. The Arabs are at present, even under British
rule, being slowly ” squeezed out ” of the land as the local phrase
expresses it. Some witnesses predict that the Arabs in the Jewish
State would sell their land and that Arab workers there would become
a proletariat and try to drift into the Mandated Territory in search
of a living.

34. The livelihood of thousands of rural Arab workers living
in the hills outside the Jewish State would also be jeopardized by
the creation of that state. A leading Zionist Jew with exceptional
knowledge, speaking of the orange groves in the Maritime or Coastal
Plain in a large part of which it is proposed to set up the Jewish State,
said to us —

In the orange districts during the high season of harvests
you will find tens of thousands of Arabs going in and earning
a great deal ; in fact it constitutes a very substantial part of
their wealth.

We have also been authoritatively informed by Jews that once the
Jewish State is set up no Arabs will be allowed to enter it from outside
to work for wages. And it is not only in respect of the great citrus
industry, but in other occupations also, that the Maritime Plain
enables Arabs from the hills to eke out at present an existence by
earning wages in that Plain.

35. There is grim competition in Palestine not only for land
but for work ; and the setting up of a Jewish State in the Maritime
Plain would be a serious blow to the large Arab proletariat in the

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hills, for whom no system of unemployment benefit exists now,
or would be possible after partition in the insolvent Arab State or
Mandated Territories unless the British taxpayer met the cost.
A scheme which threatens thousands of Arabs with destitution by
removing from their native land one of its chief centres of employment
is imprudent and would be difficult to justify.

36. Poverty is the root cause of much of the discontent in
Palestine. An experienced witness said to us, ” The most serious
problem in Palestine is land hunger.” In the Statement of Policy
of His Majesty’s Government in 1930 it was alleged that 29-4 per
cent, of Arab families in the villages were landless. The accuracy
of the figures was challenged and no reliable figures exist on the point.
But it is certain that there is in town and country a large class of
landless Arabs. There probably was even before the Jews began
purchasing land on a large scale after the war. Moreover, the number .
of Arabs with holdings too small to support those dependent on them
is large. With a rapidly rising population the economic problem of
the future inhabitants of Palestine is a serious matter. The majority
of us have decided that Haifa will be needed to supply work to some
of the Arabs living outside that town. But the setting up of a Jewish
State would be a serious blow to Arabs from the hills who now earn
wages also in the area proposed for the Jewish State. In August,
1938, in the eighteen Arab towns for which rough, approximate
statistics were kept, about 65 per cent, of Arab workers were
unemployed. There were no figures available for the rural villages.
The figure quoted referred to abnormal times, but it reveals a state
of affairs which is most serious. There was Jewish unemployment
at the same time, the figure for May, 1938, being 11,000 wholly and
9,000 partially unemployed. If a Jewish State were set up, the
Arab proletariat might well be driven by want to seek food and wages
in the Mandated Territory and thus become a burden on the British
taxpayer. Some witnesses thought this would happen ; others did
not. Jewish enterprise in Palestine has increased the wealth of the
country enormously. The Arabs have benefited thereby ; but the
two races are now in competition for land and labour, the needs of
both being great in the extreme. Partition in my opinion would not
solve this difficult fundamental economic problem of Palestine ;
it would possibly make the problem insoluble, except by continuous
subsidies from the British taxpayer.

37. Continuing the examination of plan C, it will be observed
that the majority of us propose that Haifa should be a Mandated
territory. In my opinion no Mandatory could undertake responsi-
bility for the security of Palestine, partitioned or otherwise, if this
town, its environs and port were in the possession of a foreign State.
If the Haifa town area be excluded from the rest of the Northern
Territory, it transpires that in this area, north of the proposed

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Jewish and Arab States, there are 180,000 Arabs and only 29,000
Jews : 2,715,000 dunums of land owned by Arabs as against only
675,000 dunums owned by Jews. If the Galilee hill area be omitted,
there would be left 83,000 Arabs and only 26,000 Jews, while the
land owned by Arabs would be 1,375,000 dunums as against 639,000
owned by Jews. Yet, it is proposed to make the whole of this
northern area, not part of the Arab State, but Mandated Territory.
It is stated in chapter XI that the whole northern area could not be
assigned to the Arab State without serious injustice to the Jews
and a violation of the charge to include the fewest possible Jews
and Jewish enterprises in the Arab State. I agree. But it is proposed
to set up a Jewish State where there are 54,400 Arabs and 821,700
dunums of land owned by Arabs, as against 226,000 Jews and only
436,100 dunums of land owned by Jews. Surely what is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander.

38. Even if the unique principle of disintegrating a country
without the compelling necessity of force majeure, by selecting
bits of it where the numbers of one community or its property
exceed greatly those of another community of fellow citizens,
without consulting the whole people, is to be adopted as a guide to
dismemberment, it should be consistently followed. We are not
dealing here with primitive people but with Arabs who can think
politically and would almost certainly resist discriminating and
indefensible treatment, even in the detested panellation of their
native land.

39. Moreover, the Arabs will see, in the scheme of immigration
proposed in this northern territory, the intention of establishing
there in the future a Jewish State when the Jews by extending towns
where they would be allowed to reside and by other settlement in the
area become a majority. The clause stating that this cannot occur
until most of the minority race agree to it, will not inspire any
confidence in people whose native land would have been disin-
tegrated by then, without consulting the people of Palestine, under
a disruptive scheme of partition based largely on the counting
of heads communally and the value and extent of property of each
community in selected places.

40. Somewhat similar criticisms apply to the southern area,
which is also to be Mandated Territory, though it is overwhelmingly
Arab. It must not be thought that I am opposed to further Jewish
immigration. What I urge is that, if the C plan of partition were
adopted, it would be a great obstacle to the equitable settlement
of this immigration problem. Immigration is one thing ; immigra-
tion which may culminate in periodical additions to the Jewish State
is quite another thing.

‘ 41. Passing now to an examination of the three administrations
to be set up under plan C, the plain fact emerges that, granted peace,
a solvent independent Jewish State could be set up at once. That

274

would be an irrevocable act unless, owing to conquest of that state,
or the consent of its Government, it ceased to exist. Mandated
Territories rendered insolvent permanently by the abstraction of the
area of the Jewish State from the whole, would be set up, financed
by the British taxpayer. Lastly, on the unlikely assumption that
the Arabs would co-operate in setting up their state, there would be
an insolvent Arab State also living on the British taxpayer.

42. Our terms of reference requested us to devise Arab and
Jewish States in which there would be ” a reasonable prospect of the
eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting
Arab and Jewish States.” But this Arab State would not be self-
supporting even if peace were established in Palestine ; it would
probably become more and more insolvent as time went on owing to
increase in population, natural poverty, and to the destitution caused
in it by partition. This administration would not be a state as
long as its existence depended on annual British subsidies.

43. It would be politically difficult to set up a Jewish state and
to postpone the setting up of an Arab State till it could be self-
supporting, that is, indefinitely. So, to get over this difficulty a
revolutionary departure from the ordinary, essential principles of
granting British subsidies to an insolvent country is recommended.
It is proposed to set up a quasi-independent, insolvent Arab State
without control of its administration by the subsidizer.

44. The proposed Arab State would contain less than half’ the
Arab population of Palestine. There would be in it some 9,000
unfortunate Jews under the rule of Arabs resenting partition.
The Jewish State would contain little more than half the Jews in
Palestine. Jewish and Arab minorities would be protected by the
written undertakings suggested in chapter XVI. It need not be
assumed that these clauses would prove to be more effective than
similar clauses have proved to be elsewhere. There are no sanctions
for breach of them, nor could external sanctions be easily devised
to curb the actions of sovereign Arab or Jewish States. Our terms
of reference have indeed led to strange results. Any attempt to
partition Palestine on communal lines is bound to lead to strange
results.

45. Our terms of reference did not prohibit us from considering
whether a scheme of partition were equitable or not. The equity of
a scheme is a vital, relevant factor in testing its practicability. In
fact, in chapter X our report applies the equity test to plans A and B.
I, in turn, apply it to plan C. I am not trying to show that partition
is in principle inequitable or bad. The partition of Scandinavia
into Norway and Sweden was equitable as far as I can recollect,
and it was carried out peacefully with the consent of the two peoples
concerned.

275

46. Before passing to some concrete aspects of the problem
I would quote here the words of Burke —

It is with the greatest difficulty that I am able to separate policy
from justice. Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society;
and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under
the suspicion, of being no policy at all.

In my opinion the C scheme of partition, and others more defective
still, would be an eminent departure from justice, and therefore
impracticable.

Absence of Security

47. The problem of defence that would be created if plan C
were implemented would be very difficult. A distinguished Jew,
Lord Reading, speaking in the House of Lords in July, 1937, said —

Of all the dangerous places in which to set up an unsupported,
inexperienced State, I wonder whether at the present moment you could
find a more perilous spot than the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The defence against a large Power or Powers of the new Jewish
State, even if, as is unlikely, it were at peace within, and on its
frontiers with the Arabs after partition had been implemented,
would need the protection of naval, air and land forces. These
could only be supplied in the main by Great Britain whose commit-
ments overseas are already considerable.

48. Foreign policy and defence are interconnected and, while
the sovereign Jewish State could create international conflict by its
foreign policy, Great Britain would have to accept the military
consequences. Great Britain has taken this risk elsewhere, but
before taking it in the case of the proposed Jewish State, it would
be necessary to ask why the risk should be taken and it would be
difficult to give a satisfactory answer. If the Jewish State surren-
dered the control of its foreign policy constitutionally and in fact
to the British Foreign Office, that state would become what the
proposed Arab State would be, a state only nominally independent.
Similar difficulties would be created in respect of the proposed
Arab State, except that it would be a bankrupt depending for its
very existence on the British Mandatory and therefore not likely
to have an independent foreign policy.

49. Coming to the purely executive side of the defence problem,
I quote some remarks made to us by witnesses whose views and
knowledge cannot be brushed aside, views which I accept. The
opinion reiterated was that the only defensive boundary for Palestine
is the present one. Additional boundaries within Palestine would
entail for Great Britain far more burdens than she can bear, in my
opinion. The additional boundaries under plan C would exceed
300 miles. It seems to me that —

(a) Partition is impracticable, because it is not possible to
set up a truly defensive boundary.

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(b) No scheme of partition can be implemented militarily if
the division of races is such that Great Britain would have to
go and help both sides.

(c) Unless people are prepared to accept boundaries as a
basis on which both parties try to live together, they are only
boundaries topographically.

A group of Palestinian Jews holding very responsible positions
wrote to us —

The complications resulting from the creation of at least three
different kinds of administrative territory with numerous corridors and
enclaves must immediately exercise a fatal effect on public security.

Our task was to propose the creation of two states possessing
adequate security. As this is not feasible, in my opinion, partition
is also impracticable on this ground.

50. In my opinion, Arab and Jew, in spite of the communal
rancour roused by the proposed policy of partition, can co-operate
in Palestine and live at peace with each other, but the first essential
to the restoration of peace is the abandonment of all schemes for
carving up the country by artificial boundaries, of plans for its
dismemberment and the logical sequel thereto, removal of Arabs
from their homes and occupations to make room for Jews. These
schemes seem to me to be unjust, unwise and impracticable.

Dismemberment

51. Coming now to civil administration, it will be seen from the
map illustrating plan C that that scheme would establish for the
governance of the little country of Palestine an administrative
labyrinth. The British Mandatory Government would control an
enclave stretching from the Jerusalem environs to the sea. But
it would also rule two additional blocks of territory in the north
and the south from which it would be separated by the proposed
Arab and Jewish States. The Jewish State is broken into two blocks
by the Jerusalem enclave. The Arab State is also in two blocks,
one of which, its chief town and port, Jaffa, is an enclave within the
Jerusalem enclave. But these seven blocks of land are not the only
sub-divisions under our plan. The Northern Mandated Territory
is to be sub-divided administratively into three portions with regard
to the vital problem of purchase of land by Jews, namely into the
Haifa area, the Galilee hills and the Galilee plains. The Southern
Mandated Territory is to be sub-divided into two areas, the occupied
and the unoccupied, again with reference to the same vital problem.
Furthermore, the Noithern or Southern Territories or parts thereof
may under the C scheme develop in future into additions to the
Jewish or Arab States or into States neither Jewish nor Arab. This
would involve the creation of further enclaves of Mandated Territory
at places like Haifa and Nazareth. Truly, the disintegrating policy
of partition would lead to strange results.

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52. It is hardly necessary to explain in detail the administrative
complications which the C scheme of partition would cause even if
there were friendly relations between the peoples of the three
administrations. There would be great difficulties created for people
separated by state boundaries from their lands, those needing pass-
ports, border passes, or identity cards for journeys, especially in the
case of poor and illiterate people. A person travelling from Haifa
to the southern boundary of Palestine on the main coast line, in a
railway journey of 133 miles, would pass through six blocks of
territory, no two contiguous blocks of which would be ruled by the
same Government.

53. The difficulty of preventing and detecting crime would be
great, where escape across a state boundary near at hand to the
criminal would be so easy, and an efficient system of inter-state
extradition could not function unless there were inter-state accord.

54. If different customs duties, quotas, or bounties existed for
different parts of Palestine, the customs administrative problem
would be truly formidable if smuggling were to be prevented with
tolerable efficiency. But it is proposed to overcome this difficulty
by a customs union. I do not think that this is feasible.

55. A system of communications by rail, road, and wire exists
which, like other branches of administration, was devised for all
Palestine. To allocate equitably the thoroughfares, rails, marshalling
yards, workshops, telephone and telegraph wires, and the capital and
debts connected therewith, the staffs who would not, perhaps,
desire to continue their service in foreign states and the pension
rights of those staffs, between three administrations would be
a most difficult task. If the division were carried out it would render
administration most difficult and expensive. Incidentally, the
Palestine railways, now running at a loss, would, save in the Jewish
State, be insolvent after partition and would have to close down
unless the British taxpayer met the deficit.

56. The administrative upheaval in all directions would be great ;
before initiating it the objective must be worth while and it does not
seem to be so. However, the civil administration could, if peace
prevailed, function, regardless of expense and exasperating incon-
veniences. But why should this administrative labyrinth be created ?
The answer is, the immediate object would be to set up a Jewish
State, for the proposed Arab State would be a state only in name.
In my opinion it is not a practicable proposal to break up the
administration of Palestine into three units in the manner proposed
in the C plan of partition for such an objective. The main object
of partition was to secure political peace by setting up two sovereign
states and Mandated Territory ; its result, if the C plan were adopted,

278

would almost certainly be the opposite of this. Partition, if so,
would not only be an enormous obstacle to the efficient government
of the small bits of territory concerned, but also, in my opinion, the
chief obstacle to the restoration of peace. The problems of Palestine
are too complex and intangible to be settled by carving out blocks
of territory and population in the manner proposed.

Absence of Solvency

57. Budget estimates for Palestine in the future can be of little
value unless it be assumed that peace is restored. Rebellions have
no respect for financial estimates, destroy revenue-producing
activities, impede the tax collector and cause new and unexpected
objects of expenditure. There are in chapter XVIII financial
estimates for partitioned Palestine based on the assumption that
peace were restored. In my opinion peace will probably not be
restored until the policy of partition is abandoned. But, on the
assumption that peace were restored and, in my opinion, it can be
permanently secured, I put forward a possible average budget
estimate for unpartitioned Palestine. It was made in consultation
with competent advisers for average times, not for periods of boom
caused by large imports of Jewish capital or otherwise, and allows
for the economic havoc wrought up to August, 1938, by the rebellion.
It assumes the absence of a catastrophic slump in industry^ My
figures are net, the gross figures include such items as gross’ Post
Office receipts, etc.

Average net revenue. Average net expenditure,

£P. £P.

3,750,000 Recurrent .. .. 3,200,000

Special .. .. 100,000

Extraordinary . . 250,000

To meet deficits on

Railways, etc. . . 200,000

Total .. .. 3,750,000

These figures are obtained without allowing for enhanced taxation
and without reducing any current service except that of police.*
At present the cost of police exceeds £1,000,000 a year, a sum about
twice the normal cost of this service before the recent disturbances
began. Even in the troublous year 1936 -7 the actual expenditure
on police and prisons was only /P.744,619. In my estimate I have
allowed a sum of £P.800,000 under this head ; but further reductions
would be possible if peace were permanently secured, while revenue,

* The figures given in chapter XVIII were based on the Government
estimates for 1938-39, and anticipate a deficit for all Palestine of ^P.365,000.
But these estimates included provision of £P. 1,022,068 for police and prisons.

279

especially customs revenue, might considerably exceed my estimate
in such circumstances. My estimate of average revenue is conserva-
tive for a peaceful Palestine. It thus transpires that if Palestine
were not partitioned, and if peace were restored, the country could
probably meet the full cost of its civil administration. Its military
defence in normal times would probably cost about £300,000 per
annum. It would not be excessively optimistic to hope that the
country could meet that expense, too, if the Mandatory did not
agree to meet it, by gradual reduction in expenditure on police and
by increase in revenue if peace were permanently secured.

58. My colleagues in their estimates for partitioned Palestine
do not allow for reduction in the police vote, but state that special
expenses caused by partition would absorb any savings likely to
occur in this item. Before adopting the C plan of partition it would
be well to contrast the balanced budget set out above, omitting
military expenditure with the budgets of the three administrations
envisaged after partition which also omit not only British military
expenditure but also the military expenditure of the Arab and
Jewish States. The Jewish State, if peace prevailed, would have in
respect of civil administration a surplus and the other two adminis-
trations would be insolvent, their combined annual deficit on civil
administration alone being about £P. 1,000,000 a year. If Trans-
Jordan were added to the Arab State the deficit would be greater
still. Comparison of the unfortunate financial position of the
Palestine Government to-day during rebellion with that of the
three Governments to be set up under plan C, functioning in peace,
on the assumption that rebellion had ceased, does not seem to me
to serve any useful purpose. The proper comparison is between
the finances of a peaceful Palestine undivided and a peaceful Palestine
partitioned into three administrations. I have given the salient
figures in each case. The figures given in our report for a partitioned
Palestine are probably as reliable as any others that can be envisaged
and they deal a staggering blow to the policy of partition. A huge
annual deficit in the case of two administrations would be created
by partition and it would probably be permanent, for the taxable
capacity of the proposed Arab State and Mandated Territories is
poor and inelastic. The deficit might well increase in the future.
Should this price be paid for partition in the hope that peace,
justice and good government would be secured thereby in Palestine ?

59. A customs union is proposed in our report as an economic
necessity for the Jewish State and the need of free trade within
Palestine is stressed. But if partition does not take place, existing
free trade and fiscal union within all Palestine will continue. Before
destroying this unity one must see some probable advantage and
I can only see economic, fiscal and other disasters if partition under
plan C is adopted. If the Jews or Arabs are to accept by treaty
a customs union as a condition precedent to partition, it is unlikely

280

that any Arab body would agree to this union, if by rejecting it,
partition could be avoided . The Jews tell us that they would desire
to have complete fiscal freedom in a Jewish State and they too would
probably reject the idea of a customs union. Even if it were formed
at the outset it would scarcely be permanent as the Jewish State’s
economic position would be quite different from that of the other
two Governments.

60. But a further blow to the independence of the two states
is proposed by the suggestion to set up a customs board selected
by the three administrations whose decisions all three Governments
would normally accept. It is difficult to see how any Government
could surrender its responsibilities to a board composed of representa-
tives of three Governments in a matter vitally affecting its economic
welfare. Such an arrangement is not likely to be permanent. But
combined with this is a proposal that the actual collection of customs
revenue should not be carried out by each of the three Governments,
but by the Mandatory. He is also to have the final voice in respect
of Customs policy as long as Great Britain grants subsidies. And
the customs revenue is to be pooled amongst the three Governments,
not according to the region paying the duties, but on the principle
of sharing according to needs, the Jewish State thus giving grants
indirectly to the other two Governments. Finally, as all these
devices would not make the budget of the Arab State balance, it
is proposed that an additional sharing-out of the shares taken -from
the Jewish State should be made between the Mandatory Power
and the Arab State, to the latter’s advantage. These devices for
reducing the deficit of the proposed Arab State at the expense of
the Jewish State do not seem to me to be practicable. The Jews,
in my opinion, would not consent to such a scheme, even if they were
able to meet the cost of it after providing for their own armed
forces. The overburdened British taxpayer is also not likely
to consent to subsidize two Governments doomed to insolvency
without good reason. The immediate object gained would be the
setting up of a puny Jewish State. It is not easy to see how this
token state could be of any conceivable use to the Jews, while it is
easy to realize that its existence might be a permanent source of
fiscal and political discord in Palestine and in places interested in
Palestine. In my opinion the establishment of such a state would
prove disastrous for the Jews.

61. The British taxpayer would have to face the combined
deficit in the civil administration of the Arab State and Mandated
Territories. But he would also have to face the military expenditure
involved in defending all three areas. In my opinion, protracted
rebellion would be the sequel to partition. If so, the cost of defence
would be enormous. One well-informed witness states to us on this
point, ” There might be no limit to the cost.” In my opinion, on
financial grounds alone any form of partition of Palestine is
impracticable.

281

Conclusion

62. It may be said that one cannot make an omelette without
breaking eggs, but it would not be easy to discover an omelette in
any possible scheme of partition. Finally, in my opinion, if plan C
were adopted, it would not and could not be implemented.

63. In stating that partition is impracticable I am in accord
with nearly 100 per cent, of non-Arab and non- Jewish persons in
Palestine, in direct contact with the problem, who by experience
and impartiality are best qualified to judge. Probably most Arabs
in Palestine and certainly many Jews in Palestine are of the same
opinion. I am not a lonely recusant flying in the face of the facts
or of the evidence.

64. I regret that I felt bound to disagree with the opinions of
my colleagues and to write this lengthy memorandum ; but the
matter is of great importance and I had to place my dissentient
views fairly fully on record. My conclusions are purely negative,
but our terms of reference compelled us to devise a scheme of
partition and then to state if it were impracticable. In my argument
I have adhered strictly to the mission I undertook, made use of the
freedom to judge which was a condition of acceptance of that
mission, and have not put forward any solution as an alternative to
partition.

T. REID

19th October, 1938

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APPENDIX 1

POLICY IN PALESTINE

Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner

for Palestine *

Downing Street,

23rd December, 1937.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom have had under consideration the Statement of Policy in
Palestine issued in July last (Cmd. 5513), and the conclusions to be drawn
from the resolutions on the subject which have been passed first by the House
of Commons and subsequently by the Permanent Mandates Commission and
the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. A memorandum contain-
ing relevant extracts from the Statement of Policy, and the resolutions in
question, and containing also extracts from Ministerial statements, is enclosed
for convenience of reference.

2. I feel that it is necessary to emphasize certain implications of the
acceptance in principle by His Majesty’s Government of the recommendations
contained in Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission,! and to dispel
if possible, the uncertainty which appears to exist in some quarters with
regard to the course of action which His Majesty’s Government have in view.

3. In the Statement of Policy His Majesty’s Government have expressed
their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Royal
Commission and their opinion that a scheme of tripartite division is the best
and most hopeful solution of the problem. In view of the public attention
that has been devoted to criticism of certain features of the tentative plan of
partition which is outlined in Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission,
I’ wish to make it clear that His Majesty’s Government are in no sense
committed to approval of that plan, and in particular that they have not
accepted the Commission’s proposal for the compulsory transfer in the last
resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area. »

4. In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the discussions at Geneva
justify the undertaking of the further investigations required for the drawing
up of a more precise scheme expressed in greater detail. The final decision
cannot be taken in merely general terms, and the further enquiry will
undoubtedly provide the necessary materials on which, when the best possible
scheme has been formulated, to judge of its equity and practicability.

5. As you are aware, it has been announced that a further special body
will be appointed to visit Palestine, and to submit to His Majesty’s Govern-
ment, after consultation with the local communities, proposals for a detailed
scheme of partition ; and that it will be the task of this body to advise in due

* Published separately as Cmd. 5634. \ Cmd. 5479.

283

course as to the provisional boundaries of the proposed Arab and Jewish
areas and of the new British Mandated area, and also to undertake the financial
and other enquiries for which the Royal Commission recommended that a
Financial Commission should be appointed. The functions of this new body
will be to act as a technical Commission, that is to say, its functions will be
confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the practical
possibilities of a scheme of partition.

6. The terms oi reference of the technical Commission will be as follows : —

” Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III of
the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest
modifications of that plan, including variation of the areas recommended
for retention under British Mandate,

And taking into account any representations of the communities in
Palestine and Trans- Jordan —

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish
areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily
under British Mandate which will —

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment,
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States ;

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa ; and

(c) enable His Majesty’s Government to carry out the Mandatory
responsibilities the assumption of which is recommended in the
Report of the Royal Commission, including the obligations imposed
by Article 28 of the Mandate as regards the Holy Places ;

(ii) to examine and report on the economic and financial questions
involved in partition upon which decisions will require to be taken,
including —

(a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between the various
areas of the public assets and public debt of Palestine and other
‘ financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration
of Palestine during the period of the Mandate ‘ referred to in
Article 28 thereof ;

(6) means to ensure that the financial obligations referred to
above will be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28 of the
Mandate ;

(c) the administration of the railways, ports, postal, telegraph
and telephone services ;

(d) currency arrangements ;

(f) customs administrations and tariffs ;

(/) the budgetary prospects of the various Administrations to be
established ;

(g) the preservation of the rights of civil servants in accordance
with the provisions of Article 28 of the Mandate ;

(h) the treatment of industrial and other concessions ;

(i) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and population,
and the prospects of providing by works of land development room
for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring to move
from one area to another ;

(j) the provision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious
or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated to Arab and Jews
respectively, including the protection of religious rights and
properties.”

284

7. If, as a result of the investigations of the technical Commission, which
will undoubtedly occupy many months, a scheme of partition is regarded as
equitable and practicable by His Majesty’s Government, it will be referred to
the Council of the League for consideration. If the scheme is approved by
the League Council, a further period will be required for the establishment
of new systems of government under mandate in the areas concerned and, if
the necessary consent is forthcoming, for the negotiation of treaties with a view
to the eventual establishment of independent States. It may also be necessary,
in the light of the Commission’s report, for His Majesty’s Government to give
further consideration to the suggestion of the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission that the Arab and Jewish areas should be administered temporarily
under a system of ” cantonisation ” or under separate mandates. It is
obvious, therefore, that, for some time to come, any action taken will be
only of an exploratory nature.

8. I will communicate with you further in due course on the subject of
the personnel of the Commission and its procedure.

I have, etc.,

W. ORMSBY GORE

High Commissioner,

General Sir Arthur Wauchope,

G.C.M.G., K.C.B., CLE., D.S.O.,

etc., etc., etc. •

Summary of recent Statements and Resolutions

1. Statement of Policy.

In the Statement of Policy of July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513) it was stated that
His Majesty’s Government had been driven to the conclusion ” that a. scheme
of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents
the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock ” ‘

” His Majesty’s Government, therefore, propose to take such steps as are
necessary and appropriate …. to obtain freedom to give effect to a scheme
of partition, to which they earnestly hope that it may be possible to secure an
effective measure of consent on the part of the communities concerned.”

2. Parliament.

The House of Commons, on the 21st July, 1937, passed a resolution to the
following effect : —

” That the proposals contained in Command Paper No. 5513 relating
to Palestine should be brought before the League of Nations with a view
to enabling His Majesty’s Government, after adequate enquiry, to present
to Parliament a definite scheme taking into full account all the recom-
mendations of the Command Paper.”

285

3. Statements by Mr. Ormsby Gore before Permanent Mandates Commission.

” What I ask is that you should advise the Council that, in the light of our
experience and our knowledge of Palestine, a solution on the lines of partition
should be explored as the best and most hopeful solution of what the mandatory
Power is itself convinced is, in fact, a deadlock. I do not ask you to approve
a scheme of partition, or to settle these questions of defence, minorities, &c.
All I ask you is to recommend that the door should not be closed to a solution
by partition. I ask you to open the door and not to close it. I do not ask the
Mandates Commission to commit itself finally, but to allow the mandatory
Power to explore the solution which it thinks best in the circumstances, and to
produce for the League in due course a more definite scheme for your later
consideration.” (Minutes of Thirty-Second Session, pp. 37-38.)

* * * *

” It was his belief that, in view of the actual wording of the Royal
Commission’s report, and in view of the mandatory Power’s declaration that
a deadlock had arisen and that its hopes of seeing Palestine evolve into a
self-governing State, where Jews and Arabs would have reconciled their
differences, had not been fulfilled, and in view of the fact that neighbouring
Arab States had intervened, and in view of all the efforts sincerely made to
work the mandate as drafted, he was satisfied that no British Government
could administer Palestine on the basis of the existing mandate without
considerable alterations.” (Minutes, p. 169.)

# * * *

” The idea that it would be open to the United Kingdom or any other
Power to carry on the existing mandate was an idea in which he hoped the
Mandates Commission would not take refuge. He said frankly, not speaking
for himself, but speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, that
the prospects of carrying on indefinitely on the terms of the existing mandate
seemed to His Majesty’s Government to be a commitment involving repression,
involving continual friction and hostility between each of the two races, on
the one hand, and the Administration on the other, as well as between the
two races themselves, in a manner which could not inure to the advantage
of any one of the three parties concerned — or, for that matter, to the credit
of the mandate system or of the League itself.

. ” Mr. Ormsby Gore was satisfied that a new solution — a political solution,
as he had described it — of the problem of Palestine must be explored in the
interests of the future peace of Palestine, and, further, in the wider interest
of the future relations between the Jews and the world of Islam, for the benefit
of the suffering Jews in Europe, as well as for the benefit of the peace of the
world. It was in the light of these broad political considerations that he came
before the Mandates Commission, not as an administrator, but quite frankly
as a politician, to say that, in his opinion, and in the opinion of His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom, it was essential that a solution of what
they regarded quite definitely as a deadlock should be explored.” (Minutes,
pp. 184-185.)

” [Mr. Ormsby Gore] had certainly had no intention of conveying the
impression that the Balfour Declaration was not still a binding obligation on
both the League and the United Kingdom. Obviously, like the mandate, it
was still a binding obligation, and would remain so until replaced by an inde-
pendent Jewish State. It was only if the suggested plan of partition were
accepted, and eventuated in the creation of a Jewish State, that the Balfour
Declaration would reach its fruition and cease to be binding. Similarly, the
mandate was binding until it was replaced by another regime in Palestine.”
(Minutes, p. 182.)

286

” The Mandates Commission would see that the solution recommended
by the Arab Higher Committee implied : first, the retention by the Arabs
of the right to complete independence in their own land, which they described
as the whole of Palestine ; second, the cessation (whatever that meant) of
the experiment of the Jewish National Home ; third, the cessation of the
British mandate and its replacement by a treaty similar to those existing
between the United Kingdom and Iraq, the United Kingdom and Egypt,
and France and Syria, constituting Palestine a sovereign State ; and, fourth,
the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews
pending the conclusion of the treaty. That solution, Mr. Ormsby Gore wished
to say, quite frankly, was unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government if
it were for the whole of Palestine.” (Minutes, p. 191.)

* * # *

” I take it that the basic principle of any partition scheme would be to
leave as few Jews as possible in the Arab State ; indeed, even under the
proposals of the Royal Commission, that seems to be the main basis upon
which it has acted, and would, I believe, be the only possible basis on which a
frontier could be drawn. But, however you draw that frontier, it is inevitable
that there will be a large Arab minority in the Jewish State, and it is therefore
politically wise, and indeed necessary, that special provisions should be made
for the legitimate safeguarding of the interests of that minority. And again,
on the other side, though an appreciable number of the Christians will be in
the proposed British mandatory enclave, there will be, in the proposed Arab
State, however you draw that frontier, a considerable number of Christians.”
(Minutes, p. 37.)

* * * *

” Therefore, I grant that provisions for safeguarding minorities will have
to be made over and above the ordinary provisions which are made in the
ordinary minorities treaties operating under League auspices in many countries
in Europe. … I see no reason why, in the case of Palestine, we should be
strictly limited to the kind of procedure which operates in those European
States.” (Minutes, p. 37.)

4. Permanent Mandates Commission.

The Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council of the
League on the work of its Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session contains the
following conclusions : —

” The Commission therefore considers that it is worth continuing the
examination of the advantages and drawbacks of a new territorial solution.
It appears quite natural and legitimate that the mandatory Power, rightly
anxious to give satisfaction to the conflicting aspirations of Arabs and Jews
in Palestine, and having failed to do so by the institution of a common adminis-
tration for the whole territory, should be empowered to contemplate in some
form or other the establishment of a regime in which these aspirations would
each be satisfied in a part of the territory.

” This satisfaction cannot, of course, be complete. For the Arabs, any
partition must necessarily involve the abandonment of a fraction of what they
consider to be their hereditary patrimony. For the Jews, it could involve,
together with a restriction of the scope of their national home, already limited,
as they allege, by the exclusion of Trans-Jordan in 1922, a fresh reduction in
its capacity of absorbing population.

287

” Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs
of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach particular
value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion.
And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be sufficiently extensive,
fertile and well situated from the point of view of communications by sea and
land to be capable of intensive economic development, and consequently of
dense and rapid settlement. …

” The Commission would be failing in its duty if it did not draw the Council’s
attention to the delicate problem of the transfer of populations from one
territory to the other which might be necessary if there was a partition. In
order to guarantee that the advantages of such a transfer should outweigh
the disadvantages, particular care would have to be given to ensure that it was
carried out with the greatest fairness.

” As regards the proposal to withdraw the Holy Places from the
domination of Arabs and Jews and place them under a special rrgime, the
Commission thinks that such a step could not but be of advantage to general
peace, provided that this regime was based on Article 28 of the present
mandate. …

” While declaring itself favourable in principle to an examination of a
solution involving the partition of Palestine, the Commission is, nevertheless,
opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent
States. …

” The Commission therefore considers that a prolongation of the period of
political apprenticeship constituted by the mandate would be absolutely
essential both to the new Arab State and to the new Jewish State. This
apprenticeship might be carried on in one of two forms.”

” Provisional cantonization ” and ” Two Mandates ” are then discussed.

5. Extracts from the Speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the
98th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, on the 14th September,
1937.

” I would remind the Council that the Balfour Declaration itself had a dual
character. On the one hand, it provided for the Jewish national home, on the
other it laid down the condition that nothing should be done which might
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish communities
in Palestine or the rights or political status enjoyed by Jews elsewhere.

” It is clear that under these provisions a twofold task was imposed upon
the mandatory Power. It was under an obligation to further the establish-
ment of the Jewish national home, and at the same time it was bound to do
its best to guide the country as a whole along the path towards full nationhood.
Indeed, the development of self-governing institutions is one of the objects
specifically prescribed in Article 2 of the mandate.

” At the time when the mandate was drawn up by our predecessors it was
clearly not contemplated that these two obligations would prove mutually
incompatible. . . . No one, least of all the mandatory Power itself, or the
Council of the League, who approved the form of the mandate, anticipated
that the future would be entirely free from difficulties. But it was hoped
that the two races in Palestine would so adjust their national aspirations as
to render possible the establishment of a single self-governing commonwealth
under a unitary Government. This hope has, unfortunately, not been fulfilled.
The reasons for its non-fulfilment are admirably set forth in Chapter 20 of
the report of the Royal Commission. . . . Stated briefly, their conclusion is
that the attempt has failed, not from any fault on the part of the Adminis-
tration, or from any hesitation in applying the mandate, but because the
conflict between Arab and Jewish political aspirations, which was inherent
in the situation from the first, has tended to be confirmed by certain provisions

(C31078)

288

of the mandate itself. It has, moreover, been intensified, not only by the
estranging forces of conditions inside Palestine, but perhaps even more by
external factors beyond the control of the British Administration in Palestine.

” These external factors fall into two main sections. Firstly, there has
been a growth of anti-semitism, and the development of new economic and
social conditions, in certain European countries, which have resulted in
increased desire on the part of the Jews, and increased pressure on His
Majesty’s Government to find room in Palestine for largely increased numbers
of Jewish refugees. Secondly, there has been the growth of Arab nationalism
throughout the Arabic-speaking countries and their increasing concern in the
future political destiny of Palestine.

” I am anxious to avoid over-statement, but I do wish to say, with all
the emphasis in my power, that these new factors, which no one could have
foreseen when the mandate was drawn up and approved by the Council, have
transformed the whole situation and have created a new set of conditions
under which the policy which was contemplated some two decades ago, and
which we have done our utmost to carry out ever since, has become definitely
unworkable. . . .

” That is the situation in which His Majesty’s Government come to
the Council to-day. Palestine is a mandated territory administered by Great
Britain on behalf of the League. The Palestine problem is not merely one
that concerns Arabs and Jews, or one for which His Majesty’s Government
alone is required to find a solution. It is a problem that concerns the League
as a whole. The mandatory Power can take no steps towards the modification
of the mandatory regime without the authority of the League. His Majesty’s
Government clearly cannot proceed to work out the details of any scheme
of partition, such as has been suggested by the Royal Commission, unless
they are assured that they have the general approval of the Council in embark-
ing on this task. It is for that general approval that I ask to-day. •

” My colleagues will have seen the statement of policy issued by His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom at the time of the publication
of the Royal Commission’s report. In that statement the opinion was
recorded ‘ that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the
commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.’

To that opinion we adhere All I ask at this stage is that His Majesty’s

Government shall be given authority to proceed forthwith to work out the
details of such a scheme, if possible in co-operation with representatives of
both Jews and Arabs, it being understood that no scheme will be put. into
effect without further reference to, and approval by, the Council.

‘ ‘ The procedure that His Maj esty ‘ s Government have in mind, if the Council
give their general approval to the policy which I have outlined, is to appoint
a further special body to visit Palestine, to negotiate with Arabs and Jews
and to submit to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom proposals
for a detailed scheme of partition. It would be the task of this body to advise,
in due course, as to the provisional boundaries of the proposed Arab and
Jewish States and of the new British mandated area, and also to undertake
the financial and other enquiries for which the Royal Commission recom-
mended that a financial commission should be appointed.

” At a later stage, a final and detailed boundary demarcation commission
would need to be appointed

” In the view of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
partition is the only ultimate solution. It alone admits of the fulfilment
both of Article 22 of the Covenant, which contemplates independence as the
goal of all territories in the category of ‘ A ‘ mandates, and of the obligation
to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people.

” What His Majesty’s Government contemplate is not a dual but a tripartite
division of the country, for they take it from the terms of Article 28 of the
existing mandate that it is the intention and wish of the League that the

289

Holy Places, including the Christian Holy Places, should remain permanently
under League supervision and control. The vast majority of the Christian
Holy Places are in the three cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth.
The two latter are almost entirely Christian towns. In the old city of Jeru-
salem and its immediate environs are not only many historic religious sites,
but the religious settlements of many faiths. We think it will be in accordance
with the wishes of the vast majority of States Members of the League that,
when contemplating the ultimate establishment of Jewish and Arab States in
.the Holy Land sacred to all three religions, these religious sites and institutions
should be placed permanently in the care of a Power acting on behalf of and
responsible to the League as a whole for what must always be a sacred
trust. . .

6. Council of the League.

The Council of the League, on the 16th September, 1937, adopted the
following resolution : —

” In view of the United Kingdom Government’s statement of July, 1937-
concerning the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Palestine ;

” In view of the preliminary opinion given to the Council by the Mandates
Commission ;

” In view of the statement made by the Representative of the United
Kingdom at the Council meeting of September 14th, 1937, and the discussion
on the status of Palestine which took place at the same meeting ;

“Having regard to the intention expressed by the United Kingdom
Government of pursuing the study of the problem of the status of Palestine
while concentrating on a solution involving partition of the territory ;

” Recalling the assurances given in that connection by the Representative
of the United Kingdom on the subject of immigration ;
” The Council :

” Agrees to the United Kingdom Government’s carrying out the aforesaid
study and taking such steps as it may entail ;

” And, while pointing out that the Mandate of July 24th, 1922, remains
in force until such time as it may be otherwise decided, defers consideration
of the substance of the question until the Council is in a position to deal with
it as a whole and in the meantime entirely reserves its opinion and its decision.”

7. Assembly of the League.

The resolution adopted by the Assembly on the 30th September, 1937,
reads as follows : —
” The Assembly,

” Having noted the activity of the mandatory Powers, the Permanent
Mandates Commission and the Council concerning the application of the
principles laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant and in the texts of the
mandates :

” (a) Renews the expression of confidence in them voted by previous
sessions of the Assembly, and pays a tribute to the results they
have achieved thanks to a close and frank co-operation which it is
essential to maintain ;

” (b) Expresses its conviction that the problem of Palestine, which is
at present before the Council, will be equitably settled, account being taken
to the fullest possible extent of all the legitimate interests at stake.”

290

APPENDIX 2

FLANS B AND C

List showing the village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between
the Jerusalem Enclave on the one hand and the Arab and Jewish States on
the other —

Village sites in the
Jerusalem Enclave.

Salama.

Al Kheiriya.

Saqiya.

Kair ‘Ana.

Al Yahudiya.

Wilhelma.

At Tira.
Beit Nabala.
Shuqba.

Shabtin.
Deir Qaddis.
Shilta.
Saffa.

Beit Ur at Tahta.
Ein Arik.
Ramallah.
Surda.

Beitun.
Deir Dibwan.
Mukhmas.
Jaba.
Hizma.
Anata.
Isawaiya.
Al Elizariya.
Abu Dis.
Sur Bahir.
Beit Sahur.
Beit Fajjar.

Nahhalin.
Wadi Fukin.
Allar.

Beit Nattif.

Zakariya.

Burei j .

Mughallis.

Idhnibba.

Jilya.

Shama.

Village sites in the Arab or Jewish
State as the case may be (that is,
outside the Enclave).

Tel Litwinsky.

Rantiya.
Al Muzeiri’a.
Quia.

Rantis.
Abud.

Deir Abu Mash’al.

Jammala.

Deir Ammar.

Kharbatta.

Bil’in.

Kafr Niima.
Deir Ibzi.
Ein Qinya.
Mazra’a al Qibliya.
Abu Qashsh.
Dura al Qar.
Ein Yabrud.
Rammun.

Al Khan al Ahmar.

Arab Ibn ‘Ubeid (Deir Mar Saba).

Ash Shuyukh.
Si’ir.

Beit Immar.
Al Jaba.
Surif.

Kh. Umm Burj.
Ajjur.

Tall as San.

At Tina.

Al Kheima.

Al Mukheizin.

Qatra.

Al Mughar.

291

Village sites in the
Jerusalem Enclave.

Aqir.
Ni’ana.
Bir Salim.
Abu Al Fadl.
Sarafand al Amar.
As Safiriya.
Beit Dajan.
Yazur.

Bayit Vegan.

Village sites in the Arab or Jewish
State as the case may be (that is >
outside the Enclave.

Zarnuqa.

Rehovot.

Beer Ya’aqov.

Rishon le Zion.
Nahalat Yehuda.

APPENDIX 3

PLAN B

(a) List of village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the Jewish
State and Galilee (Mandated Territory) —

Village sites in the Jewish State.

Qadas.

Mallaha.

Al ‘Ulmaniya.

Marus.

Ammuqa.

Qabba’a.

Fir’im.

Ja’una.

Rosh Pinna.

Al Qudeiriya.

Ash Shuna.
Yaquq.

Hittin.

Nimrin.

Tur’an.

Ein Mahil.
Dabburiya.
Iksal
Yafa.

Kefar ha Horesh.
Illut.

Beit Lahm.
Ramat Hasafon.
Kufritta.
Qiryak Bialik.

Village sites in Galilee
(Mandated Territory).

Al Malikiya.

Deishun.

Alma.
Dallata.

Safad.

Akbara.

Farradiya.

Al Mansura.

Mughar.

Ailabun.

Bu’eina.

Uzeir.

Kafr Kanna.
Mash-had.
Ar Reina.

Nazareth.

Saffuriya.
Shafr ‘Amr.

Ar Ruweis.
Ad Damun.
Al Birwa.
Al Judeida.
Al Makr.
Al Manshiya.
Acre.

(C31078)

292

(b) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the
Arab and Jewish States —

(i) in the section which lies north of the Jerusalem Enclave —

l/ill/jcp, sitas tin. th.p. 1 ‘ pi9)%$h 5stct,tp,
Village sites ifi the Avab St&te.
Al riawati.
Al Ghazzawiya.
Bcisan.
i.an asn oiiaun.
xil /\blii ctiJ._y ct.
Faqqu’a.
Jalbun.
Deir Abu Da’if .
“Roif Onarl
-DclL V^UdU..
Arabbuna.
J_/Cll VjrildiZdld,
Arrana.
Sandala.
J alama.
Zir’in.
Muqeibila.
Amila.
Zububa.
±vn. J-«iaa.
An Naghnaghiya.
Ein al Mansi.
Arab rsanina (Kit. al Mansi).
Al Lajjun.
Jrxl lVlu.oii.CJJ.lIct.
iYi Uoiil Uo .
Ai Hairm.
Umrci al Fah.m.
Al Buteimat.
Ar’ara.
Qannir.
TTa-fr Oan*
iYeUX v^dXl.
Ori vat Ada.
Karkur.
A

Wadi Ara.
Bacja al Gharbiya,.
j att.
ZsClLd. *
A 4-4-il
At til.
fl’i mm
A-JOJ. Cti VJTJJ. U3 Li 11 ,
vjli LI WClxS-Ct.
luixarrQ.
irtan.
Far’un.
onuia.
At Taiyiba.
At Ras.
TCafr Qiir
xvciir o ui .
r alama.
Kafr Jammal.
Jaiyus.
Azzun.
Habla
Kafr Tulth.
Kafr Bara.
Sannirya.
Kafr Qasim.
Mas-ha.
Zawiya.
Majdal Yaba.
Rafat.
Deir Ballut.
Al Muzeiri’a.
Quia.
Rantis.

(ii) in the section which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave—
Village sites in the Jewish State. Village sites in the Arab State.

Zarnuqa. Al Mughar.

Al Qubeiba. Yibna.

293

APPENDIX 4

PLAN C

(a) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the
Northern Mandated Territory on the one hand and the Arab and Jewish
States on the other — •

Village sites in the Northern
Mandated Territory.

Al Bawati.

Tall ash Shauk.
Faqqu’a.

Axabbuna. ”

Sandala.

Zir’in.

Affula.

Kh. Lidd.

An Naghnaghiya.

Arab Baniha (Kh. al Mansi).

Ghaba al Fauqa.

Ji’ara (Bennir).

Ar Rihaniya.

Umm az Zinat.

Ijzim.

Ein Ghazal.
Kafr Lam.

Village sites in the Arab or Jewish State
as the case may be {that is outside the

Northern Mandated Territory).

Al Ghazzawiya.

Beisan.

Al Ashrafiya.

Jalbun.

Deir Abu Da’if.

Beit Quad.

Deir Ghazzala.

Arrana.

Jalama.

Muqeibila.

Zububa.

Ein al Mansi.
Al Lajjun.
Al Kafrin.
Daliyat ar Rauha.

Bat Shelomo.
Shefeiya.
Al Fureidis.
Tantura.

(b) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the
Arab and Jewish States —

(i) in the section which lies north of the Jerusalem Enclave —

Village sites in the Arab State.
Al Kafrin.

Village sites in the Jewish State.

Khubbeiza.
Umm ash Shauf.
Qannir.
Giv’at ‘Ada.
Karkur.

Qaqun.

Irtah.
Far’un.
At Taiyiba.

Falama.
Jaiyus.

Al Buteimat.

Kafr Qari.

Wadi Ara.

Baqa al Gharbiya.

Jatt.

Zeita.

Attil.

Deir al Ghusun.

Shuweika.

Tulkarm.

Shufa.
Ar Ras.
Kafr Sur.
Kafr Jammal.

Azzun.

(C31078)

L*2

294

Village sites in the Jewish State.
Habla.
Kafr Bara.
Kafr Qasim.

Majdal’Yaba.

Village .sites in the Arab State.
Kafr Tulth.
Sannirya.
Mas-ha.
Zawiya.
Rafat.
Deir Ballut.

Al Muzeiri’a.

Quia. Rantis.

(ii) in the section which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave —
Village sites in the Jewish State. Village sites in the Arab State.

Zamuqa. Al Mughar.

Al Qubeiba. Yibna.

APPENDIX 5
(Chapter III, paragraph 51)

THE METHODS BY WHICH THE LAND AMD POPULATION FIGUEES
USED IN THE REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPILED

1. Population

(i) The Arab rural population. — The approximate percentage increase in the
Arab rural population of each of the • seventeen sub-districts between the
date of the Census in 1931 and the middle of 1937 was first calculated from
the vital statistics. The percentage figure for the sub-district as so calculated
was then applied to the Arab rural population of each village in that sub-
district as determined at the Census of the year 1931, and the resultant figure
was adopted as the population of the village at the middle of the year 1937.
This method takes no account of inter- village migration, with the result that
the population of some villages may be over-estimated and that of others
under-estimated.

(ii) Jewish rural population.- — The figures adopted for the Jewish rural
population are those given in the survey of the population of the Jewish
settlements carried out by the Jewish Agency in September, 1936.

(iii) The Arab and Jewish urban population. — The figures adopted for the
Arab and Jewish population of certain large towns are those given in
estimates of such population in the middle of 1937, made by the Office of
Statistics of the Palestine Government.

2. Land

The figures relating to land, with the exception of citrus land, have been
extracted from the tax distribution lists prepared under the Rural Property
Tax Ordinance and other tax records. They show the position as it was on j
the 1st April, 1935, when the rural property tax first became payable. A
special survey of citrus land was made in the autumn of 1937 ; the figures of
citrus land are those given by this survey.

Unleased State Domain has been classified as Arab where it is situated
in Arab villages and as Jewish where it is situated in Jewish settlements.
Metrouke land, that is common land over which the public as a whole
exercises rights, has been classified according as the public which enjoys
its use is Arab or Jewish.

295

APPENDIX 6 ‘
(Chapter VI, paragraph 96)

THE BOUNDARY OF THE JEWISH STATE UNDER PLAN A IN THE
VICINITY OF THE POWER STATION OF THE PALESTINE
ELECTRIC CORPORATION ON THE RIVER JORDAN AT JISR AL
MAJAMI

The power station, of the Palestine Electric Corporation at Jisr al Majami
on the River Jordan is situated on the eastern side of the river and is in
Trans-Jordan territory.

The area of the land held by the corporation on the Trans- Jordan side
of the river is 6,000 dunums.

It has been suggested to us that, in order to ensure the safety of the
power station, it would be necessary to establish a belt of agricultural
settlements on the east of the station and that for this purpose an area
(50,000 dunums) of Trans- Jordan territory, lying west of a line drawn from
the bridge at Ash Sheikh Hussein across the River Jordan near Beisan to
El Hamma on the River Yarmuk, should be included in the Jewish State.

We agree that the boundary should be modified so as to include the power
station in the Jewish State, but consider that the area to be transferred
from Trans-Jordan to the proposed Jewish State should not be larger than is
absolutely necessary. In agreement with the military authorities the con-
clusion we have reached is that the boundary of the area of 6,000 dunums
which the corporation now hold on the east side of the River Jordan should
become the boundary between Trans- Jordan and the proposed Jewish State.
From the point of view of defence it is not considered essential to detach a
larger area from Trans- Jordan.

APPENDIX 7
(Chapter X, paragraph 190)

THE AGRICULTURAL ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF GALILEE

1. Galilee, as it has been denned in paragraph 184 of chapter X of our
Report, includes two plains, the coastal plain between Acre and the northern
boundary of Palestine, and the Battauf plain north of Nazareth. The rest
of the area is hill country.

1. The Acre Plain

2. This area is fertile and the coastal strip has good underground water
supplies. The Director of Agriculture is of opinion that, if capital is available
and the important question of markets is satisfactorily solved, there are
considerable possibilities of development by intensive cultivation. Jewish
authorities, in furnishing us with an estimate of agricultural absorptive
capacity, assumed that the whole of the cultivable land of this area
could be irrigated and that the farm unit could be as small as 25 dunums.
But, as they themselves admit, their estimate of the amount of land that can
be irrigated is based upon a theoretical computation which may not prove to
be accurate. Moreover, their estimate of a farm unit of 25 dunums is based
upon the experimental ” Organic Mixed Farm ” at the Rehovot Agricultural
Research Institute. This ” Organic Mixed Farm ” is, however, still in the
experimental stage and we believe that very few, if any, such farms have
been established. Further, the success of the small ” Organic Mixed Farm ”
as a means of establishing a large number of persons on the land is dependent
upon a solution of the problem of markets. The Director of Agriculture
takes a more conservative figure for the farm unit and, subject again to

296

the proviso that the question of markets has been, solved, proposes a unit of
30 dunums in one half of the area — the strip along the coast— and 70 dunums
in the other half. In estimating the possibility of further settlement in Galilee
we propose to adopt the Director’s unit figures.

2. The Battauf Plain

3. This area is also fertile but is subject to flooding during seasons of
heavy rainfall. The Director of Agriculture considers that with suitable
drainage works, which would be costly, it would be possible to increase the
productivity of this plain ; for this area he suggests a farm unit of 70 dunums.

3. The Hill Country

4. The Director of Agriculture takes the view that, provided the
problem of markets is solved, and provided capital is available for terracing,
levelling and “other reclamation works, this area could be planted extensively
with fruit trees, and that if, in addition, underground water were discovered,
certain areas could be utilized for the cultivation of vegetables and fodder
crops. He is of opinion, however, that the whole area cannot be brought under
cultivation. Afforestation is of great importance in the hill areas in order to
prevent soil erosion, and he takes the view that an area of 220,000 dunums
should be excluded as forest reserves. Moreover, the hills are in parts wholly
rocky and uncultivable ; such areas are estimated at about 185,000 dunums.

5. For a fruit plantation in this hill country^the same Jewish authorities
estimate that a lot viable is 40 dunums. But they admitted before us that
they had had no experience of a fruit farm of this size -being operated success-
fully. The Director of Agriculture takes a more conservative estimate of
60 dunums, and we propose to adopt this figure.

6. We are now in a position to form an estimate of the agricultural
absorptive capacity of Galilee on what we regard as an optimistic basis—

(i) The Acre Plain.

Area . . . . . . . . . . = 158,400 dunums.

Deduct —

Uncultivable area . . . . … . . 15,700

71,350 dunums at 30 dunums per farm unit
71,350 dunums at 70 dunums per farm unit

(ii) The Battauf Plain.

Area = 41,339 dunums at 70 dunums per farm
unit.

(iii)

The Hill Country.
Total area
Deduct —

Forest reserves
Uncultivable area

142,700
2,378 farm units.
1,019

590

= 1 105,162 dunums.

Dunums.
220,000
185,000

405,000

700,162

700, 162 dunums at 60 dunums per farm unit = 1 1,669 farm units.
We assume that a family consists of 4-75 persons.*

* The census of 1931 showed that the average household in Palestine
consisted of 4 • 5 persons (Vol. I, page 32) : for the sub-districts of Acre, Safad
and Nazareth the average figure was somewhat higher, and we have, therefore,
adopted 4-75 for our present purposes.

297

The agricultural absorptive capacity of Galilee then becomes : —
(2,378 + 1,019 + 590 + 11,669) X 4-75 = 74,366 persons.

The present total population of Galilee is 91, 104 persons. If it be assumed
that 65 per cent.* of tnis population is supported primarily by agriculture,
the present agricultural population is 59,218 persons. On the assumption,
therefore, that the land is fully developed under the most favourable conditions,
the additional agricultural population which Galilee can support is (74,366 —
59,218) = 15,148 persons. The natural increase in the Arab population of
Palestine as a whole may be taken at 2-5 per cent, a year. Assuming that
this rate holds good for Galilee, the yearly increase, due to natural causes,
of the agricultural population in this area is therefore
59,218 n „

— jqq- X 2’5 = 1,480 persons a year.

The additional agricultural population which Galilee can support, if the
land is fully developed under the most favourable conditions, will be therefore
absorbed by the natural increase of the existing population in about ten years.

APPENDIX 8
(Chapter XIII, paragraph 251 (5) ).

THE BOUNDARY OF THE HAIFA INDUSTRIAL ZONE

We suggest that the following boundary would be suitable —

A line starting from the sea shore south of the town of Acre where
the Na’amin river flows into the sea, along that river until it meets the
boundary of the lands of the village of Emeq Zevulun, along the eastern
boundary of the lands of that village till it meets the boundary of the
lands of. the village of Kufritta, along the northern and eastern boundaries
of that village till it meets the boundary of the lands of the village
of Ramat Hasafon, along the eastern boundary of the lands of that
village till it meets the boundary of the lands of the village of Kefar
Hassidim, along the eastern and southern boundaries of that village till
it meets the boundary of the village of ‘Isfiya, along a line drawn from
the junction of the boundaries of Kefar Hassidim and Tsfiya to the
south-west corner of the lands of the village of Yajur, along the western
boundary of the lands of the villages of Yajur and Nesher, along the
western boundary of the lands of the village of Balad esh Sheikh till it
meets the southern boundary of the lands of the village of Ahuzat
Sir Herbert Samuel, along the southern boundary of the lands of that
village, and then along a line drawn to the sea south of the settlement of
Neuhardhof.

We do not, of course, rule out the possibility that the line we have proposed
may from the outset require some modification.

* The figure of 65 per cent, has been calculated from Table XVI of Vol. II
of the census of 1931. It represents the percentage which the total number
of earners and their dependents under class A, sub-class 1, Order 1, Pasture
and Agriculture (excluding Forestry and Agricultural machines service) in
the three sub-districts of Acre, Saf ad, and Nazareth bore to the total population
of those sub-districts at the census of 1931.

298

APPENDIX 9
(Chapter XVI)

DECLARATION OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ MADE
ON THE OCCASION OF THE TERMINATION OF THE
MANDATORY REGIME IN ‘IRAQ.

CHAPTER I
Article 1.

Protection ol Minorities.

The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as
fundamental laws of ‘Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action, shall
conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or
official action now or in the future prevail over them.

Article 2.

1. Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all
inhabitants of ‘Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race
or religion.

2. All inhabitants of ‘Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not
inconsistent with public order or public morals.

Article 3.

Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territory of ‘Iraq on
August 6th, 1924, shall be deemed to have acquired on that date ‘Iraqi
nationality to the exclusion of Ottoman nationality in accordance with
Article 30 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and under the conditions laid down m
the ‘Iraqi Nationality Law of October 9th, 1924.

Article 4.

1. All ‘Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy
the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or
religion.

2. The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to
racial, religious and linguistic minorities in ‘Iraq.

3. Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any
‘Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights,
as for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or
the exercise of professions or industries.

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any ‘Iraqi national
of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press
or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the ‘Iraqi Government of Arabic
as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements
to be made by the ‘Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of the present Declara-
tion, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate
facilities will be given to all ‘Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is “not the
Official language, for the use of their language, either orally or in writing,
before the courts.

299

Article 5.

‘Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religions or linguistic minorities will
enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other ‘Iraqi
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage
and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable,
religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments,
with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely
therein.

Article 6.

The ‘Iraqi Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem
minorities, in so far as concerns their family law and personal status,
measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the
customs and usage of the communities to which those minorities belong.

The ‘Iraqi Government will communicate to the Council of the League
of Nations information regarding the manner in which these measures have
been executed.

Article 7.

1. The ‘Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities
and authorisation to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious
establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of minority religious
communities existing in ‘Iraq.

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing councils,
in important administrative districts, competent to administer pious founda-
tions and charitable bequests. These councils shall be competent to deal
with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof
in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among
the community. These communities shall also undertake the supervision of
the property of orphans, in accordance with law. The councils referred to
above shall be under the supervision of the Government.

3. The ‘Iraqi Government will not refuse, for the formation of new
religious or charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which may
be guaranteed to existing institutions of that nature.

Article 8.

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which
are resident a considerable proportion of ‘Iraqi nationals whose mother
tongue is not the official language, the ‘Iraqi Government will make provision
for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction
shall be given tp the children of such nationals through the medium of their
own language ; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the
‘Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the
said schools.

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of
‘Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these
minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application
of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State,
Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

Article 9.

1. ‘Iraq undertakes that in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and
Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish
in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

. In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk,
where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official
language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.

300

2. ‘Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas the officials shall, subject to
justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish
as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will
be, as in the rest of ‘Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather
than race, ‘Iraq undertakes that the officials shall as hitherto be selected, so
far as possible, from among ‘Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

Article 10.

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration/ so far as
they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities are
declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed
under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be
made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of
Nations.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council shall have the
right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of
infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take
such measures and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective
in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of
these articles between ‘Iraq and any Member of the League represented on
the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute
shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court
of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be
final and shall have the same force and effect- as an award under Article 13
of the Covenant.

CHAPTER II.
Article 11.

Most-favoured-nation Clause.

1. Subject to reciprocity, ‘Iraq undertakes to grant to Members of the
League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the
date of its admission to membership of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any Member of the League of
Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or
are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of
such a nature as to disturb to the detriment of ‘Iraq the balance of trade
between ‘Iraq and the Member of the League of Nations in question, by
seriously affecting the chief exports of ‘Iraq, the latter in view of its special
situation reserves to itself the right to request the Member of the League of
Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of
restoring the balance.

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months
from its request ‘Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, vis-a-vis of
the Member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the
first sub-paragraph above.

2. The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply
to any advantages which are, or may in the future be, accorded by ‘Iraq to
any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting
from a customs union concluded by ‘Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply
to any special advantages in customs matters which ‘Iraq may grant to goods
the produce or manufacture of Turkey, or of any country whose territory
was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

301

Article 12.

Judicial Organisation.

A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, ‘Iraqis and foreigners
alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise
of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

The judicial system at present in force, and based on Articles 2, 3 and 4
of the Agreement between the Mandatory Power and ‘Iraq, signed on
March 4th, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of 10 years from the date
of the admission of ‘Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by Article 2 of the
said Agreement shall be made by the ‘Iraqi Government. Their holders
shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality ; they must
be fully qualified.

Article 13.

International Conventions.

‘Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and
conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether
by its own action or by that of the Mandatory Power acting on its behalf.
Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements
and conventions shall be respected by ‘Iraq. throughout the period for which
they were concluded.

Article 14.

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligation.

‘Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations
of September 15th, 1925 :—

(1) Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the
termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or
juridical persons, shall be respected.

(2) Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever
nature assumed on ‘Iraq’s behalf by the Mandatory Power during the
period of the Mandate.

‘Article 15.

Freedom of Conscience.

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of
public order and morality, ‘Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee through-
out its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of
the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all
denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

Article 16.
Final Clause.

The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international
concern. Any Member of the League of Nations may call the attention of the
Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified
except by agreement between ‘Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations
acting by a majority vote.

Any difference of opinion which may arise between ‘Iraq and any Member
of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the
interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall, by an application
by such Member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice.

302

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of ‘Iraq, subject to
ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the
resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of May 19th, 1932.

DONE at Baghdad on this thirtieth day of May, 1932,

in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of
the League of Nations.

(Signed) Noury Sa’id.

Prime Minister of ‘Iraq.

APPENDIX 10
(Chapter XVI, paragraph 327)

CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS COURTS

The Eastern (Orthodox) Community-

A. Appeal

B. First Instance

Latin (Catholic) Community —

A. Appeal

B. First Instance . .

3. Gregorian Armenian Community-

A. Appeal

B. First Instance

4. Armenian (Catholic) Community-

A. Appeal

B. First Instance

Jerusalem.

1. Jerusalem for —

Jerusalem District.
Ramie sub-district.
Gaza sub-district.

2. Haifa (for the town).

3. Acre (for sub-district as well

as the villages of the
Haifa sub-district) .

4. Nazareth for —

Nazareth sub-district.
Tiberias sub-district.

Jerusalem.

Jerusalem for —

Jerusalem and Southern
Districts, and Nablus
and Tulkarm sub-
districts.

Nazareth for —

Haifa, Acre, and Jenin
sub-districts, and all
Galilee sub-districts.

Jerusalem.

Jerusalem, for Palestine.

Beirut (Lebanon).
Jerusalem, for Palestine.

303

5. Syrian (Catholic) Community —

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Beirut (Lebanon) .

B. First Instance . . . . Jerusalem, for Palestine.

6. Chaldean (Uniate) Community —

This community has no ecclesiastical representation in Palestine.
Cases of personal status are referred to the Courts of the Greek Catholic
(Melkite) Community.

7. Greek Catholic (Melkite) Community —

A. Appeal .. .. .. .. Jerusalem.

B. First Instance . . . . . . 1. Jerusalem, for the Jerusalem

and Southern Districts.

2. Haifa.

3. Acre.

4. Nazareth.
-5. Tiberias.

8. Maronite Community —

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Bkirky (Lebanon) .

B. First Instance . . . . . . Jerusalem for Palestine.

9. Syrian Orthodox Community —

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Horns (Syria) .

B. First Instance . . . . . . Jerusalem, for Palestine.

10. Coptic Community —

Cases are heard by the Courts of the Eastern (Orthodox) Community.

11. Abyssinian Community —

This Community was administered hitherto by the Coptic Patriarch
(Cairo) through the Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem. The number of its adherents
being very limited, they have had no known cases of personal status hitherto.

APPENDIX 11

BUDGETARY FORECASTS : RECONCILIATION WITH CURRENT

ESTIMATES

I. Palestine

1. The forecasts given in chapter XVIII are based on the published
Estimates of Palestine for the year 1938/39. In this appendix we give a
brief explanation of the main causes of difference between the estimated
figures and the figures of ” distributable ” revenue and expenditure used
in the forecasts. By ” distributable ” figures we mean the figures under each
head of revenue and expenditure for all Palestine after such adjustment as
may be necessary to arrive at the appropriate amount in each case which
falls to be distributed between the post-partition areas.

304

Revenue

2. The following table gives the estimated revenue for 1938/39 according
to the published estimates under each of the main heads ; the ” distributable ”
figure for each head ; and the difference between the two.

Tax Revenue — •

(i) Customs Duties

(ii) Excise Duties

(iii) House and Land Tax, Tithes,

Animal Tax, Urban and
Rural Property Tax

(iv) Licences and Stamp Duties

(v) Fees for Registration of

Companies and Partner-
ships, and Registration of
Land

Total Tax Revenue
Non-tax Revenue —

(vi) Other fees

(vii) Posts and Telegraphs

(viii) Port and Marine

(ix) Rent on Government Pro-

perty, Interest and
Currency Profits, etc.

(x) Miscellaneous receipts and

reimbursements, fines and
forfeitures

(xi) Grants-in-aid and other

grants from the United
Kingdom

(xii) Non-recurrent items (land

sales, adjustment of
items overpaid, etc.)

(1)

Estimated
Revenue,
1938-39.

£P-

1,900,010
340,000

399,000
163,700

(2)

Distribut-
able
Revenue.

£P-
1,815,000
340,000

385,000
158,000

(3) (4)
Difference
between
(1) and (2).
+

— 85,010

.14,000
5,700

135,500 170,000 34,500

2,938,210 2,868,000

309,400
516,350
125,350

308,000
120,000

212,100 163,000

220,125 190,000

176,710 —

1,400
516,350
5,350

49,100

30,125

176,710

21,900 31,000 9,100

43,600 883,745

Total non-tax Revenue . . . . 1,581,935 812,000

Total Revenue 4,520,145 3,680,000 — —

Net difference between (1) and (2) . . 840,145

3. This difference between the current estimates and the distributable
figure is accounted for as follows —

(i) The main cause is the fact that certain items are shown in the
former in gross but in the latter as net. Thus the figures in the estimates
are swollen by the gross receipts from posts, telegraphs and telephones
(off-set on the expenditure side by the gross cost of the Posts and
Telegraphs Department). Again the figure for Customs duties in the
current estimates is the gross receipt, off -set on the expenditure side by
the amount estimated to be repayable in drawbacks and refunds. This
cause accounts for a difference of ^P. 604, 850, made up of —

£P-

(a) Posts and Telegraphs . . . . . . . . . . 516,350

(6) Drawbacks and Refunds of Customs duty . . . . 88,500

604,850

305

(ii) The next important difference is the omission of all grants and
grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds, accounting for ^P. 176,7 10,
made up of —

(a) Grant-in-aid of Trans- Jordan Frontier Force . . . . 148,000
(6) Grant-in-aid of Hydrographic Survey . . . . 27,000

(c) Grants from Colonial Development Fund . . . . 1,710

176,710

(iii) There remains a difference of ^P. 58, 585 spread Over a number of
heads, as shown in the table in the preceding paragraph, and caused by
the necessity of making allowance for the effect of various existing ten-
dencies, some indicating a prospective fall in revenue, such as the appre-
ciable fall in rents in the four large towns, by which the receipts from
urban property tax will be affected, and some pointing in the opposite
direction, such as the fact that over the next few years the annual
assessment to rural property tax will be augmented by the inclusion
of newly planted citrus land, as the period of exemption from payment of
tax at the higher rate expires.

The sum of these three items is equal to the difference between the
two sets of figures, ^P. 840, 145.

4. For the purpose of allocating the distributable revenue between the
several areas, all available sources of information, consistent with the need
for secrecy, were drawn upon. The yield of direct taxation, and a number
of other miscellaneous items, can be allocated in accordance with the known
origin of the receipt ; but the allocation of the proceeds of indirect taxation
requires to be specially explained. For this purpose, the population was
divided into a number of categories, based upon locality, race, social habits,
and earning power, and an average daily wage was applied to each category.
The necessary information was derived partly from the Village Statistics,
partly from data obtained in the Census of 1931, and partly from estimates
furnished by the Jewish Agency. The total of the products of the number
of households in each category multiplied by the corresponding basic wage
was assumed to give the purchasing power of the population in each category.
Each of the main items in the list of import and excise duties was then analysed
upon certain assumptions as regards the preferences and purchasing power of
consumers according to the various categories, and the estimated yield of
duties distributed in accordance with the results of the analysis between the
several areas. In the absence of any ground for assuming a special racial or
social preference, the yield was distributed in accordance with the ratio of
general purchasing power indicated by the distribution of the several categories.
It is interesting to note that according to these tables the purchasing power
of the Arab State works out at about 23 per cent, of the purchasing power
of all Palestine, whereas the estimate of the total amount of revenue, tax-
revenue, and customs revenue, respectively, allocable to that state is only
13-8 per cent., 13-2 per cent., and 11-73 per cent., respectively, of the total
distributable amounts in each case.

5. The value of the figures prepared by the Treasurer of Palestine, as a
guide in estimating the probable revenues of the proposed new states, depends
on the assumptions —

(a) that the existing system and rates of taxation will continue ;
(6) that the distribution of population will remain unaltered ;

(c) that economic conditions in the proposed new states will be
unaffected by partition ; and

(d) that the ability of the Jewish and Arab States to collect revenues
will be the same as that of the existing Administration.

In other words, this analysis of revenue assumes that partition amounts to
no more than the drawing of a series of lines on the map of Palestine.

306

6. It must also be borne in mind —

(a) that any shifting of the Jewish population from the Arab State
or the Mandated Territories to the Jewish State will increase the tax-
paying capacity of the Jewish State and reduce that of the Arab State
and the Mandated Territories ; and

(6) that the figures of estimated non-tax revenue receipts of the
proposed states and the Mandated Territories largely depend on the
provision to be made for expenditure for services in respect of which a
large part of these receipts is specifically collected.

7.

Expenditure.

(1)
(2)
Distribut-
Estimates ableexpen-
1938/39.
diture.
£P-
£P-
A. Departmental Services ~\
B. Direct Departmental Super- >
3,437,577
3,150,000
visory Services J
C. Pensions
72,775
72,775
D. Public Debt and Loan Charges
283,660
283,660
E. Defence and Trans- Jordan
208,954
Frontier Force
F. Railways (net)
67,000
86,000
G. Central Administration
130,032
134,000
H. Public Works Extraordinary . .
755,651
350,000
I. Posts and Telegraphs
490,111
+ 13,140
(surplus)

(3)

Difference between
(1) and. (2).

+

19,000
3,968

£P-
287,577

208,954

405,651
503,251

Total

Net amount by which distri-
butable expenditure falls
short of the current year’s
estimates is therefore

5,445,760 4,063,295 22,968 1,405,433

1,382,465

8. Details of Heads A and B are given below —
Head of Expenditure.
(1) District Administration
(.2) Judicial Department

(3) Customs, Excise, Trade and

Ports

(4) Department of Health

(5) Department of Education . .

(6) Department of Agriculture

and Fisheries

(7) Department of Forests

(8) Department of Antiquities . .

(9) Department of Lands and

Surveys

(10) Department of Police and

Prisons

(11) Department of Migration . .

(12) Department of Public Works

(13) Public Works Recurrent

(14) Printing and Stationery

(15) Civil Aviation

(16) Miscellaneous

187,550
121,376
187,550 —
121,376 —
276,762
245,646
326,406
188,262 —
240,000 —
310,000 —
88,500

. 5,646
16,406
194,700
25,668
24,217
184,000 —
25,668 —
24,217 —
10,700
140,669
140,669 —
1,022,068
41,599
112,334)
344,800 J
31,966
18,071
323,745
1,022,068 . —
41,599 —

¥ 449,554 —

31,966 —
18,071 —
165,000 —
7,580
158,745
3,437,577
3,150,000
287-,577 .

307

9. The difference between distributable expenditure and the amounts
provided under each head in the current year’ estimates may be explained
shortly thus- —

(i) As explained under Revenue, the cost of the Posts and
Telegraphs Department is shown in the Palestine Estimates
in gross, but in the distributable figures the cost of the service
is netted, on the assumption that revenue and expenditure will
exactly balance, after meeting the Post Office share of the public
debt charges (^P. 13, 140). In fact the estimates provide for a
small surplus of £P.26,239 in the current year, after meeting the
estimated expenditure on capital account in full, but without
providing for the Post Office share of public debt charges, which
in the Palestine Estimates is provided as part of the cost of
Public Debt and Loan Charges in general (Head II of Palestine
Estimates) . In the figures of distributable expenditure the full
cost of public debt and loan charges is shown under Head D,
including the Post Office share (^P. 13, 140), and accordingly
it is necessary to show a surplus of ^P. 13, 140 under Head I
(Posts and Telegraphs) in order to balance this amount. The
netting of the Post Office figures therefore accounts for £V.

(^P.490,111 + 13,140)= 503,251

out of the difference between ‘the distributable expenditure and

the estimates for the year.

(ii) The Estimates provide only a token sum of ^P.5,0Q0
for Defence (for the reason given in chapter XVIII), but
£P. 203, 954 for the gross cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier
Force, although the net liability of the Palestine Govern-
ment is limited to one-quarter of the recurrent cost of the
Force, and the whole of the capital cost in Palestine, the rest
being financed by a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom.
As explained in chapter XVIII, nothing is included in the figures

of distributable expenditure on account of Defence, including £P.

the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force ; and the grant-in-aid has

also been excluded. This accounts for . . . . . . . . 208,954

(iii) Under Head A is included in the current Estimates
£P.88,500 for the payment of customs drawbacks and refunds of
duty, an item which, as explained in paragraph 3(i) above, is
netted in the distributable figures. Under Head A (6) is
also included £P.50 for expenditure from a Colonial Develop-
ment Fund grant which is omitted from the distributable figures £V.
on both sides of the account .. .. .. .. .. 88,550

(iv) There remain differences under two heads of expenditure £P.

Head H— Public Works Extraordinary 405,651

Heads A and B — Departmental Services (net) . . . . . . 176,059

which represent non-recurrent or abnormal services for which

it is not thought necessary to make special provision in the
figures of distributable expenditure.

Of the total provision £P.755,651 for Public Works Extra-
ordinary in the 1938/39 Estimates, ^P. 194,962 is on account of
revotes and ^P.228,776 for the continuation of works in progress.
Of the balance of ^P. 331, 913, at least half is for Police and
Prisons, and may be classed as emergency measures. Before
1935 the average expenditure on Public Works Extraordinary
was only about ^P. 150,000 a year. A large reduction below the
present rate of expenditure may be expected under normal
conditions. —

Total difference 1,369,325

308

10. The following notes explain the basis of apportionment between the
several areas of the distributable expenditure under each head — ■

(i) Heads A and B, Departmental Services
The apportionment is based on returns submitted by each of the Depart-
ments concerned.

(ii) Heads C and D, Pensions and Public Debt
These are regarded as financial obligations common to the whole of
Palestine ; and for the reasons explained in chapter XX, no attempt has
been made to apportion them, in the case of pensions, in relation to service
in or for the several areas, or, in the case of loan charges, in relation to the
assets created out of the proceeds of the loan. It is proposed that they should
be paid as an undistributed liability out of a common central fund. The
effect of this will be to distribute the cost between the several areas in the
same proportion as the distribution of the net surplus revenue of the’ central
fund. According to formula A proposed in chapter XXI, this will be in equal
shares between the three areas ; and for the purpose of the budgetary fore-
casts made in chapter XVIII this basis has been followed for expenditure
under both these heads. The share of the Mandated Territories has, for
convenience, been divided equally between the Jerusalem Enclave and the
Northern Mandated Territories.

Under Head D is shown the full amount of public debt and loan charges,
including both the share of the Posts and Telegraphs Department (^P. 13, 140)
and the Railways share (^P. 124, 760, being interest and management charges
on ^2,480,105 stock of the 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, but no part of the
sinking fund) .

(iii) Head E, Defence
For the reasons given in chapter XVIII, no account has been taken of
the future cost of defence in the budgetary forecasts of the proposed areas.

(iv) Railways

The estimated loss on working (excluding the cost of debt) has been
revised and is now found to be as follows —

Surplus +
Capital
Total.
or
Expen-
Surplus.
Deficit.
Deficit —
– diture.
£P-
£P-
£P-
£P-
Arab State (Lydda-Rafah section
and portion of Hejaz Railway)
-25,000
15,000
40,000
Jerusalem Enclave (Jaffa-Jerusa-
lem section)
-46,000
10,000
„ 56,000
Northern Enclave (Hejaz Railway)
-40,000
40,000
Total Mandated Territories
-86,000
96,000
Jewish State (Haifa-Lydda
section)
+80,000
30,000
50,000

50,000 136,000

Net Total Deficit …. 86,000

For the reasons given in chapter XVII, it is thought that the public service
will be best served if the Mandatory Government takes over direct respon-
sibility for the Lydda-Rafah section of the line in the Arab State : accordingly
in the apportionment of charges ^P. 35, 000 has been added on this account
to the deficit falling on the Mandated Territories, leaving the Arab State with
a -deficit of £P. 5,000 in respect of the portion of the Hejaz Railway in
Trans-Jordan.

309

The net result is —

Arab State 5,000 deficit

Jewish State . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 surplus

Mandated Territories 131,000 deficit

(v) Head G, Central Administration
This has been distributed in proportion to the total expenditure in each area.

(vi) Head H, Public Works Extraordinary
The allocation is a rough estimate of probable requirements.

(vii) Head I, Posts and Telegraphs
It is estimated that the service in the Arab State will involve a deficit
of £P.20,000, without allowing for debt charges. The total Post Office share
of debt charges is estimated to be distributable thus — ■

Arab State 2,190

Jewish State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,550

Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,150

Northern Mandated Territory 2,250

Total 13,140

The service is deemed to be self-balancing over the whole country, after
meeting the debt charges in full : so that the transfer of the debt charge to
Head D leaves a surplus of ^P. 13, 140 to be apportioned between the several
areas, which has been taken into account in estimating the outcome for
each area.

11. It is recognized that the figures of distributable expenditure are to
some extent unreal, because (i) by the time the new Administrations have been
set up, the amount of distributable expenditure will probably be found to
have been under-estimated on account of normal increments and pension
charges, etc. ; (ii) no provision has been made in the forecasts for the
additional expenditure directly attributable to partition ; (iii) no provision
has been made for defence ; and (iv) above all no provision has been made
for the risks of economic and other disturbances initially attendant on the
introduction of partition. Nor can it be said with any confidence that the
adjustments in the economic system which will inevitably be caused by
partition will be without a permanent effect on the budgetary prospects of
the several areas, and particularly of the Arab State.

12. To sum up, assuming that peace will be restored and the necessary
economic adjustments are safely carried out, the forecasts allow a considerable
margin for improvement. But if disorders should continue, or if partition
proves to have a serious and far-reaching effect on the economic structure
of all or any of the new areas, it is probable that the budgetary position of
the areas affected will be considerably worse than the forecasts suggest.

II. Trans-Jordan

13. The Trans- Jordan Estimates for 1938-39 are —
Revenue — £P.

i. Local Revenue (including Posts and Telegraphs) . . . . 348,292

ii. Grants and Grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds . . 148,025

iii. Total Revenue

496,317

310

Expenditure — £P.

iv. Ordinary Expenditure (including Posts and Telegraphs and

^P. 12,400 for pensions and gratuities) .. .. .. 374,641

v. Extraordinary Expenditure, other than that met out of

specific grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,970

vi. Expenditure met out of specific grants (Trans- Jordan

Frontier Force ; Trans-Jordan share of Ottoman Public
Debt ; Hydrographic Survey ; and expenditure from
Colonial Development Fund grants) . . . . . . 93,025

vii. Total Expenditure 509,636

14. For the purpose of estimating the effect on the budgetary position
of the Arab State, if Trans- Jordan and the Arab area west of Jordan should
unite to form a single Arab State, it is proposed to exclude, on the revenue
side, the whole of item (ii), on the assumption that assistance will no longer
be provided direct by the United Kingdom to an independent State, and, on
the expenditure side, the whole oi item (vi) on the assumption that —

(a) the question of responsibility for the Trans- Jordan Frontier
Force will be considered as part of the general question of defence of
the new states, for which no provision is being made in the present
budgetary forecasts ;

(6) the Trans- Jordan share of the Ottoman Public Debt will be taken
over direct by His Majesty’s Government, for the reasons given in
chapter XVIII ; and

(c) the Arab State will not, for the present at least, be able to make
special provision from within its own resources for financing services
such as the Hydrographic Survey, for which grants have hitherto been
provided by His Majesty’s Government.

(d) It is also proposed to take out the cost of pensions from item (iv)
(^P. 12,400), and to charge this to the central fund as proposed in
chapter XX (Public Debt).

15. The net effect will be to add to the budget of the Arab State —

On the revenue side . . . . . . . . . . . . 348,292

On the expenditure side (£P. 509,636-93,025-12,400)= . 404,211

(C 31078) 10,000 10/38

THE COMMISSION’S TOURS

MAP No, 2.

Scale t: 1,000,000

Kilometre^ S 10 20 30

■ ■ ■ 1 u . I

40
_i

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Tyre

Has an NaQnra mfm^^f

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Survey of Paitttf/te, JAfia J93B,

Ordnance Snrvty, I938l

MAP OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION’S PARTITION PLAN
(REPRODUCED FROM THEIR REPORT)

MAP No. 3

IWILE& 20 IO

Scale

20

Railways
Hosds

— +

■y-

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Printed at O.S, 1938.

THE BOUNDARIES OF JAFFA
JEWISH LAND HOLDINGS map No. s.
Aitttir Mf Mrtm,, J»7. i : 750,000 OrctndFi h Starve JftH,

rqAMS-joftoAH snow i na cultivated

AND DESEfcT ZONE

KSiftT NHL
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AOA&A \

Printed at Q.S. 193&.

MAP ILLUSTRATING JEWISH PROPOSALS EXAMINED IN CHAPTERS IX. and XIL

MAP No, 7

SOUTHERN PALESTINE
TuniurQ, .

Biny-fufilm

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tfntm ,

Jinm

KABLUE

ARAB STATE JAFF.

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TERRITORY
-IS 11

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KUcnulrES 10 5 (I

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THE A PLAN OF PARTITION

MAP No. 8,

SOUTHERN PALESTINE

LEBANON

P^£J’ Qutritr-a

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THE B PLAN OF PARTITION

MAP No. 9.
Avivtj/ of PvitiTinf. Jaffa i$$? r

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JO JO

, THE B PLAN : SHEWING JEWISH LAND

MAP No. 9a
f*PVU *J fojwtintr Jajfa 1*37.

KUCHrttlrtft ID 5

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THE C PLAN OF PARTITION

MAP No. 10.
KXkm^Tta. ID 5

I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ a ■ ■ r I

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